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The purpose of this thesis is to examine the reforms in the British Army and 
NATO's Northern Army Group (NORTHAG) during the 1980s. The highlight of 
the reforms was to change the force disposition of the British-led NOR THAG 
and adopt a new operational concept for the army group so as to allow it to 
undertake more offensive and manoeuvre-oriented defence. Also, the recognition 
that the envisaged concept required close coordination with the Air Force 
ultimately led to the formal adoption of the Landi Air Battle concept. 
The reforms were prompted by improvements in the Warsaw Pact (WP) 
nuclear and conventional capabilities--in particular, its perceived ability to launch 
a surprise attack. The British Army thought that NATO's deterrence was losing 
credibility in this situation, and that NATO's forward defence strategy involved 
unacceptable vulnerabilities and constraints. As a result, the British insisted that 
forward defence be reinterpreted. 
In Britain, the way the changes were introduced by reformers, such as 
Nigel Bagnall, prevented the formation of any tangible opposition within the 
military. The reforms also enjoyed strong government support at the time. 
Although the issue became a major focus of debate and dispute with the 
Germans, who saw the British reforms as a move that might compromise the 
defence of Germany, this obstacle was overcome and the reforms were duly 
implemented. 
In this thesis, I discuss all these issues in detail in order to provide the 
first comprehensive study of the subject. This allows for detailed discussions and 
analyses of the content, motivation and context of the reforms from their 
conception in the early 1980s to the end of the Gulf War (when the validity of 
the reforms was successfully tested for the first, and probably, last time). This 
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thesis reveals significant new information, from interviews and other sources, 
and thereby facilitates a clearer understanding of the developments in the British 
Army and NATO's conventional strategy during the 1980s. 
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1.1. SCOPE AND PURPOSES OF THE RESEARCH 
Britain's effort to strengthen deterrence, as well as the defence of Central 
Europe, was particularly significant in the 1980s. The stance of Margaret 
Thatcher's new Conservative government on a strong defence through the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) facilitated the initiation of many reforms 
at various levels of the British defence establishment and military. At the 
strategic level, the new government quickly moved to adopt the Trident 
programme in order to enhance the British contribution to NATO's nuclear 
deterrence. At the conventional level, a major review of British conventional 
forces was instituted, the aim of which was to streamline the three services of the 
British military to accommodate the new government's emphasis on the 
continental commitment. This resulted in the 1981 Defence Review, The Way 
Forward, under which the capacity of the Royal Navy (RN) was severely cut 
since it was viewed as of lower strategic priority, whilst the British Army and the 
Royal Air Force (RAF) escaped with only a minor reduction in strength as their 
role in the defence of the Central Front was viewed as crucial in implementing 
the government's renewed focus. 1 This reflected the desire to playa greater role 
in Europe by confirming that the security of Britain critically depended on the 
NATO Alliance, and that this goal would be best served by a stronger British 
military presence on the Central Front as it would strengthen both Alliance 
cohesion and Britain's position within NATO.2 
1 David K. Boren, Britain's 1981 Defence Review, (Doctoral Thesis, King's 
College London, 1993), p. 3. 
2 See Michael Dockrill, British Defence Since 1945, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1988), pp.114-5~ Michael Chichester and John Wilkinson, The Uncertain Ally, 
(Hampshire: Gower, 1982), p. 63~ John Baylis, British Defence Policy, (New 
York: S1. Martin's, 1989), pp.23-4; and Boren, op. cit., p.8. 
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While this series of changes was being announced as a result of the 
renewed emphasis on governmental security priorities, there was a less 
publicised development in the British Army. It was committed to frequent radical 
reforms in an attempt to enhance its conventional capability, and ultimately, to 
delay the use of nuclear weapons in defence by winning the first battle against 
possible Warsaw Pact (WP) aggression with conventional means alone. 3 
However, this development was neither influenced by the government's 
new aspiration, nor was it a mere 'face-lift' on behalf of the British Army to re-
structure its forces in order to accommodate the shift in the government's 
strategic priority as in the past. Unlike the past, when such a ritual was the norm 
following each defence review, and which usually resulted in cuts in defence 
spending, the main aims of the reforms were fundamentally different from 
previous changes. 4 
They were focused on altering not only the physical composition of the 
Army but also its mentality in general--the way in which the British Army 
planned and prepared to fight a major war in Europe. In other words, the 
reforms were designed to transform the Army from a defensive and passive-
minded institution to an active one which would actually be capable of 
undertaking defence without a heavy reliance on the use of nuclear weapons. 
This reflected a newly-reinforced desire in the Army to defend Central Europe 
by conventional forces alone and put aside nuclear weapons to their originally 
envisaged role--deterrence. 5 Thus, the paramount requirements for the reforms 
3 Interviews, Field Marshal Sir Nigel Bagnall on 5 May 1993 and General Sir 
Martin F amdale on 14 April 1993. 
4 Interview, Bagnall on 5 May 1993. 
5 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993 and F amdale on 14 April 1993. 
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were to strengthen the Army's conventional capacity with the help of better 
planning, education, and new technology to maximise its war-fighting potential. 
The highlights of the reforms were: a) the modification of the force 
dispositions in NATO's British-led Northern Army Group (NORTHAG)~ and b) 
the adoption of a new army group defence plan and operational concept. The 
most important aspect was the acceptance of a joint land/air mobile warfare 
concept, which exploited manoeuvre principles at the operational level in close 
coordination with the air force in support of land operations.6 This required the 
formulation of a jointly-agreed concept of operation understood throughout 
NORTHAG and 2 Allied Tactical Air Force (ATAF) in order to enable the army 
group to fight a single operational battle. The resulting concept was called 
'Landi Air Battle'~ its counter-offensive concept was also known as 'counter 
stroke.' 
The reforms were most strongly advocated by Field Marshal Sir Nigel 
Bagnall, who was Commander Northern Army Group (COMNORTHAG) and 
later Chief of the General Staff (CGS). He felt his task was to eradicate the 
passive nature of NORTHAG's defence through the reforms~ this was to be 
achieved within the existing resources; consequently, do more with less became 
his motto. 
F or Bagnall, the only logical way to achieve his task and repel the enemy 
first operational echelon attack was to enable NORTHAG to conduct an 
offensive mobile defence against the WP. In turn, this called for the creation of a 
large army group reserve to be held in the rear to launch a major operational 
6 See Nigel Bagnall, "Airmobile Operations in Northern Army Group," NATO's 
Sixteen Nations (NSN), (October 1988), p.75.; and "Concept of LandiAir 
Operations in the Central Region I," Journal of the Royal U ruted Service 
Institution (RUSIJ), (September 1984), pp.59-62. See bibliography for 
abbreviations. 
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mobile counter-offensive aimed at defeating the WP first offensive. 7 Besides 
containing a WP attack in the early stages without the use of nuclear weapons, 
this approach also aimed at recovering lost NORTHAG territory and deterring 
further attacks, either by the threat or the execution of the army group reserve 
counter offensive. 8 
Despite the fundamental and continuing importance of these reforms, 
they have hitherto been little known outside the Army. As a result, although 
these developments deserve a comprehensive review, they have not yet been 
subjected to any in-depth study. This is perhaps partly because ot the existence 
of more controversial issues like the Trident deterrent, which aroused greater 
public interest. One must also remember the secret and highly-insulated nature of 
the developments, the details of which were obviously shielded from the public 
and media. It is only possible to write a detailed study on the subject now 
because the enemy, the WP, has disintegrated. 
Such literature, as is already available on the reforms, is often limited and 
inaccurate. Many of the published sources (both primary and secondary) on the 
subject offer little more than a simple introduction to the changes.9 There is also 
quite a sense of confusion in the writing, and particularly in that of outside 
7 See Bagnall, 1984, p. 60. Also interview, Bagnall on 5 May 1993. 
8 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993 and F arndale on 14 April 1993. 
9 For example, the writings by academic and civilian observers which discuss the 
subject in some details, or make a reference to the changes in the British Army 
concept of operation, include: Chris Bellamy, The Future of Land Warfare, 
(London: Croom Helm, 1987); Richard Simpkin, Race to the Swift, (London: 
Brassey's 1985); Wyn Rees, "Britain and NATO," in Peter Byrd, ed., British 
Defence Policy: Thatcher and Beyond, (London: Philip Allan, 1991); M. Niklas-
Carter, "NATO's Central Front," in J.P. Harris and F.N. Toase, ed., Armoured 
Warfare, (London: Batsford, 1990)~ and Hugh Faringdon, Strategic Geography, 
(London: Routledge, 1989). 
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observers. Even pieces written by the people who were involved in the reforms 
are often deliberately ambiguous. This is particularly so with the details of the 
scope of the operation and its implementation, such as the composition and 
specific tasks of the operational reserves. Therefore, it is necessary to shed new 
light on already available information on the reforms in order to facilitate the 
correction of misunderstandings and provide more information which would help 
to substantiate some of the claims. 
Further objectives of this thesis are to provide the historical background 
of the changes and to examine the extent to which they stemmed from certain 
leading individuals (not just Bagnall, but also his successors as 
COMNORTHAG, General Sir Martin Farndale, General Sir Brian Kenny and 
Field Marshal Sir Peter Inge), as well as what prompted the reforms. Also, the 
question arises about whether the implementation of the reforms, which caused 
many potentially destabilising disputes in the Alliance, was a risk worth taking. 
In this sense, particular attention will be paid to the West German perspective 
and the causes of their initial opposition, as well as to an overall discussion of 
the context of the debates and oppositions. 
In addition, I shall try to identify the context and content of the reforms. 
This will involve the description of specific changes in the operational concept, 
weapon systems, organisation and other related fields, such as education, 
logistics, etc .. The main questions here are what the specific topics and aims of 
the reforms at the various stages of military operations were, and above all, 
whether the implementation of the reforms within NORTHAG's existing 
resources was feasible. 
These processes will lead to the answers to the most important questions 
of this thesis: a) how successful were the reforms?~ and b) what are their 
consequences for the British Army in the post-Cold War world? Also, they will 
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allow the examination of a few crucial issues, hitherto excluded from open 
discussion: a) would the Germans have been content with restoring the original 
status quo, or did they secretly hope to achieve the reunification of Germany 
once the war got underway?; b) did not the offensive nature of the NORTHAG 
counter offensive concept in fact serve such a German aspiration rather well?; 
and c) as a result, did it not provide an impetus for fostering a different outlook 
in the Alliance, and especially in Germany, at variance with the fundamental 
ethos of forward defence? 
In order to undertake a comprehensive historical survey to answer all the 
above questions and fulfil the aims of the research, this thesis primarily covers 
the ten years between 1981 and the fall of the WP and the end of the Gulf War in 
1991. This time frame is an ideal way of supplying a broader perspective on the 
reforms because it was in 1981 that the reforms were initially introduced to, and 
began to be implemented in, the British Army with Bagnall becoming the British 
corps commander. Although the reforms were essentially completed in 1989, 
after the endorsement of the army group Standing Operational Procedure (SOP) 
in 1988, the fall of the WP in 1991 signalled that the Army was moving into an 
entirely different environment as the threat evaporated. 10 It is appropriate to end 
with a review of the British performance during the Gulf War, because with the 
major threat gone in Europe, it provided what was probably the first and last 
opportunity to test the validity of Bagnall's reforms. 
10 See Martin Farndale, "The Operational Level of Command," RUSIJ, 
(Autumn 1988), p.24. (Farndale, 1988--A) 
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1.2. SOURCES 
Primary sources are very limited due to the restricted access to documentary 
sources. There are practically no official accounts and records of the British 
government and Parliament dealing directly with the reforms as they are 
concerned either with finances, or with government policy in the Alliance. 11 The 
only official sources which actually deal with the subject directly are those 
records kept in the Army, but most of them are not available for reasons of 
security. 12 
The only open writings which deal with the reforms are monographs 
which were published via the Army Staff College and a few collections of essays 
by senior officers in the British Army. 13 Although they are technically secondary 
publications, they should be categorised as primary sources for this research, 
because in fact they deal with the reforms in the British Army directly. 
Moreover, they were written by officers who underwent the Higher Command 
and Staff Course (HCSC), which was established as a result of the reforms. 
11 For example, issues concerning the British Army are found in House of 
Commons (Hansard), Debate on Army, (London: HMSO, Various Years). 
There are also special reports from the Defence Committee on specific issues. 
See United Kingdom in Primary Sources section in bibliography for details. 
Otherwise, Ministry of Defence, Statement on the Defence Estimates (SD), 
(London: HMSO, Various Years) are the major sources of information. 
12 There is actually an exception. For example, Army, Design For Military 
Operations: The British Military Doctrine (Bl\1D) , Army Code (AC) 71451, 
which is the official Army doctrinal pamphlet, is not restricted material. 
13 Thomas Boyd-Carpenter, ed., Conventional Deterrence into the 1990s, 
(London: Macmillan, 1989), J.J.G. Mackenzie, and Brian Holden Reid, ed., The 
British Army and the Operational Level of War, and Central Region vs. Out-of-
Area-Future Commitments, (London: Tri-Service Press, 1990)~ Brian Holden 
Reid and Michael Dewar, ed., Military Strategy in a Changing Europe~ and Brian 
Holden Reid, ed., The Science of War, (London: Routledge, 1993). 
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The timing of the writing of this thesis has enabled me to take advantage 
of a lot of new information from two specific primary sources, which would 
otherwise have been unattainable if the WP still existed. Firstly, a handful of the 
official documents of the British Army concerning the subject have been released 
exclusively for the purpose of this research. I did not deliberately seek classified 
information, although a few people graciously went to the trouble of allowing 
me access to a few restricted documents upon my request. 14 Unfortunately, 
these are limited both in number and content. For example, only ten of the 
previously restricted documents became available to me, and some of them were 
clearly edited prior to their release. Above all, the amount of primary information 
in documentary form is too little to be used as a major source. Nevertheless, it 
proved invaluable as it contained the raw information through which I was able 
to verify or dispute some claims made both during the interviews and in other 
secondary written sources. 
Secondly, it was possible to conduct a number of interviews with those 
people who were directly involved in formulating and implementing the reforms. 
In fact, these interviews are the single most important information source of this 
thesis. The first group of interviewees consists of those who exercised exclusive 
authority over the implementation of the reforms. They include the prime 
architect, Bagnall, and the three COMNORTHAGs who served after him. The 
second group includes the in-service officers of both the British Army and the 
RAP, from senior officers down to the rank of Major, who have been 
implementing the reforms in the front-line. Their testimonies and opinions have 
been invaluable in assessing the impact of the reforms throughout the ranks and 
14 See Private and Unpublished Papers and Documents section in bibliography 
for examples. 
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services. The third group consists of the officers of other NORTHAG armies 
(Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium). Interviewees include two former 
CINCENTs (Commander-in-ChiefCentral Europe) and Chiefs of Staff (COS) of 
the Bundeswehr and other ranks down to Colonel. The last group is made up of 
former senior officers of the British Army, who remained keen observers of the 
changes, and civil servants, who have in-depth knowledge of the subject by 
having been involved in the implementation of the reforms at the governmental 
level. 15 
As the reforms were a recent development, the memones of those 
interviewees were fresh, and they were usually able to provide specific details. 
Sometimes, there was more than one interview with a particular person. I have 
been fortunate in many ways in securing so much detailed information through 
them, because, with the demise of the WP, many of them felt comfortable 
enough to give detailed testimony on the reforms without hesitation. I have tried 
to verify the information gathered in interviews by cross-referencing with other 
testimonies or with written sources, if they were available. As mentioned, the 
primary documentary sources were particularly useful for this purpose as I have 
tried to provide dual sources for each statement. However, due to the overall 
scarcity of the information, most of which is still shielded from the public, some 
of the assertions simply cannot be verified. The major drawback then is that 
sometimes there is no way to check some claims, or to research contradictory 
statements made during interviews. Also, it forces some information to be 
narrated without a critical review process. Consequently, the constructIon of a 
framework for analyses must sometimes depend on the claims made during 
interviews, sometimes utilising the critiques used by those people as the basis to 
15 See bibliography for details. 
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construct my own arguments. Hence, the primary focus of the thesis is on a 
historical review of the reforms, with limited scope for critical analysis. 
As discussed earlier, the lack of publicly available information has meant 
a limited range of literature concerning the subject in secondary sources. 16 
There are a few articles available in military journals, such as the Journal of the 
Royal United Service Institution, written by those who were involved in the 
formulation of the concept. They are mostly focused on the implementation of 
the concept and reforms. 17 There is also a handful of articles which discuss the 
broader aspects of the theoretical and operational facets of the new concept. 18 
However, with the exception of Colin McInnes' well-informed introductory 
pieces on the subject, few other non-military sources are available,19 and even 
they fail to provide enough details for readers to understand the reforms. 
Although there is ample material concerned with the general 
developments in the British Army, including broad discussions on recent 
16 For example, many issues of British Army Review (BAR), which is one of the 
most widely-read in-house publications in the British Army, are in fact 
'technically' restricted as they carry a "Restricted" classification. 
17 For example, Bagnall's articles cited in Note 4 discuss the aims of his reforms, 
while Patrick Hines's article, "Concepts of Landi Air Operations in the Central 
Region II," RUSIJ, Vol.129, No.3, (September 1985), pp.63-66, outlines the 
role of the RAF in Bagnall's initiative. 
18 See two articles by Martin Farndale, "Counter Stroke: Future Requirements," 
RUSIJ, Vol. 130, No.4, (December 1985), pp.6-9; and 1988--A. Also see 
Halberdier, "Counterstroke-An Option for the Defence," B~ No. 73. (April 
1983), pp.30-32. This was the first discussion in a British military journal on the 
subject. 
19 The writings of Colin McInnes on the subject are: "Conventional Forces," in 
Stuart Croft, ed., British Security Policy, (London: Harper Collins, 1991); 
NATO's Changing Strategic Agenda, (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990)~ and 
"BAOR in the 1980s: Changes in Doctrine and Organization," Defense Analysis 
(DA). Vol.4, No.4, (1988), pp.377-394. 
25 
developments and some in-depth analysis of the issues (from the tacttcal and 
operational philosophy of the Army to new weapon systems), it is not directly 
concerned with the reforms--although it incidentally touches upon some aspects. 
The material is mostly written by people who are more or less directly affiliated 
with the British Army and the other armed forces. Consequently, it is found most 
often in in-house journals of the British (and sometimes American) military or in 
special interest and government-sponsored publications. 20 
Far more secondary sources are available on the theoretical discussions 
relevant to the new concept, but they vary a great deal in both temporal and 
spatial scope.21 Historical background on the subject is also abundant, ranging 
from works which provide a detailed chronology and analyses of various wars in 
the twentieth-century to the memoirs of many who were involved in those 
conflicts. 22 
20 See the beginning of Article section in bibliography for the list of titles. 
21 For example, the following monographs deal exclusively with concepts and 
theories of modern warfare, especially theories of manoeuvre warfare and the 
operational level of war. Christopher Bellamy'S two books: The Evolution of 
Modern Land Warfare, (London: Routledge, 1990), and The Future of Land 
Warfare; John English, On Infantry, (New York: Praeger, 1981)~ Robert 
Leonhart, The Art of Maneuver, (Novato: Presidio, 1991)~ William Lind. 
Manoeuvre Warfare Handbook, (Boulder: Westview, 1985)~ Edward Luttwak, 
Strategy, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987)~ John Mearsheimer, 
Conventional Deterrence, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1983)~ Richard 
Simpkin, Race to the Swift; F.W. Von Mellenthin and R.H.S. Stolfi, NATO 
under Attack, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1984). The following books deal 
with the Soviet theories of war: Richard Simpkin, Red Armour, (London: 
Brassey's, 1984)~ P.H. Vigor, Soviet Blitzkrieg Theory, (London: Macmillan, 
1983); and Steven Zaloga, Red Thrust, (Novato: Presidio, 1989). Finally. 
although it was based on a fictional scenario of a war between NATO and wp, 
John Hackett's The Third World War, (London: Sphere Books Ltd., 1978), 
provides excellent insight on how the war might have developed in reality . 
22 For example, the basis for historical analysis relevant to this research can be 
found in the following titles: Correlli Barnett, Shelford Bidwell, Brian Bond, 
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Nevertheless, there is only a handful of writings available in secondary 
sources concerning the history and development of British operational and 
doctrinal ideas in the past. Even more lacking are discussions on the 
development of the British and NORTHAG concept of operations. There are 
few such articles, and those provide only basic ideas on the subject. 23 
As a result, because of the overall lack of information and substance the , 
use of secondary material was limited to providing a historical and general 
background to the reforms. In short, it does not offer sufficient information for 
the undertaking of impartial evaluations of the many issues which tlus thesis 
discusses other than providing some theoretical and historical reference with 
which to conduct an analysis of some aspects of the reforms, such as an 
evaluation of the validity of NORTHAG's operational concept and weapon 
systems. 
John Harding and John Terraine, Old Battles and New Defences-Can We Learn 
from Military History?; Michael Carver, The Apostles of Mobility, (London: 
Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1978); three books by Anthony Cordesman and 
Abraham Wagner: The Lessons of Modern War, Vols. I (1990--A)., II (1990--
B) and III (1990--C), (all from Boulder: Westview Press, 1990); B.H. Liddell 
Hart, Deterrent or Defense, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960)~ Kenneth 
Macksey's two books: Tank versus Tank, (New York: Crescent Books, 1991)~ 
and Tank Warfare, (New York: Stein and Day, 1971). Consult Bibliography for 
more sources. 
23 For example, the following articles provide insights into the earlier British 
concept of defence in Central Europe. W.L. Dawson, "Land/Air Warfare," 
RUSIJ, (May 1949), pp.209-219~ R. S. Evans, "The Need for Offensive 
Operations on Land," RUSIJ, (September 1976), pp.28-33~ Frank Kitson, "The 
New British Armoured Division," RUSIJ, (March 1977), pp.17-19; L.O. Lyne, 
"The Fighting Potentialities of a British Armoured Division," Armor, (July-
August 1954), pp.46-47; Edgar O'Ballance, "The Development of British 
Armoured Doctrine," Armor, (January-February 1965), pp.14-17~ and Richard 
Ogorkiewitz, "British Tank Policies," Armor, (January-February 1955), pp.24-
28. 
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1.3. RESEARCH PLAN 
CHAPTER TWO exanunes the foundation of the reforms. Three areas are 
discussed to determine each one's influence in formulating the reforms in the 
British Army: 1) the British and other NORTHAG corps' operational concept 
and deployment in Central Europe~ 2) contending ideas and debates on 
conventional improvements in the west, as well as two new operational 
concepts, the US Army AirLand Battle Doctrine and SACEUR's (Supreme 
Allied Commander Europe) FOFA (Follow-On Forces Attack) sub-concept~ and 
3) the origins of Bagnall's ideas. This is to provide an overview and examine 
both the circumstantial and intellectual roots of the reforms. 
CHAPTER THREE looks back on the major political, strategic, and 
operational developments in Europe and in Bntain up to the early 1980s in order 
to discuss the events which influenced the reforms in the British Army Above 
all, this chapter reviews the British perception of the major external and internal 
developments at the time, issues which had particularly strong bearings on the 
formulation of the reforms. Notably, the British perception of NATO's nuclear 
deterrence, the WP threat and forward defence are discussed. In addition, the 
impact of the 1981 defence review on the Army's reforms is examined. In short, 
this chapter discusses the reasons why the reforms became imperative, whether 
the logic behind the initiation of the reforms was correct, and with what 
resources the Army planned to implement the reforms. 
CHAPTER FOUR exanunes Bagnall's reforms ill detail. It 
comprehensively discusses the aims, contents, and major issues of the reforms 
from their formulation to initial implementation. This includes a review of 
NORTHAG's operational level thinking and the Land/Air Battle Doctrine. Also, 
the counter offensive/counter stroke concept is analysed to discuss the 
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fundamentals of the ideas. This includes an examination of the overall aspects of 
the doctrine, as well as its underlying principles and logic. 
CHAPTER FIVE outlines the debates and process of disseminating the 
new doctrine in Britain and the Alliance. The contents of the debate and the 
opposition in the Alliance, especially by West Germany, are examined in 
particular. There is also an in-depth look at Bagnall's personality and role, and an 
analysis of whether the reforms would have been possible without him. Hence, 
this chapter highlights not only the political and strategic foundation of the 
debates within the Alliance, but also the personal disputes among NATO 
commanders, and their influence on the reforms. 
CHAPTER SIX focuses on the expansion of the reforms by F arndale In 
order to address a few critical issues, such as a possible cross-border counter 
offensive. More specifically, there is an in-depth discussion of this subject in 
relation to the secret German aspiration to reunite Germany, which examines 
whether the reforms in fact served German political and strategic aims as much 
as they did British ones. This chapter concludes with a review of how the debate 
was settled and what became of the reforms, as well as how the revised concept 
became assimilated into the NORTHAG armies, and what their stance was after 
they became fully integrated to operate under a single army group concept. 
CHAPTER SEVEN discusses the details of the material changes which 
occurred as a result of the reforms. It is concerned with all aspects of the issue, 
from the procurement and deployment of new weapon systems and equipment 
and the establishment of a new major formation (the airmobile force), to 
education, training and finances. Specifically, the question of whether the 
reforms could be implemented within the existing resources (or if not, where 
new resources were to come from and what other measures became necessary to 
fulfil the requirements) is addressed. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT examines the validity of the reforms. It uses the 
British performance during the Gulf War, as well as examples from the past, as 
evidence to support the credibility and success of the reforms. The Gulf War was 
the first and probably the last major testing ground for the validity of Bagnall's 
reforms in the British Army in a real war, since the chances of fighting a major 
conventional war in Europe became remote (at least for the time being) as the 
threat from the Soviet Union and WP evaporated. Such an analysis can provide a 
useful insight into how the reforms have changed British attitudes towards 
warfare, as well as how they will operate in future contingencies. The chapter 
also discusses the future of the British Army in the face of force cuts under 
Options for Change. 
CHAPTER NINE concludes by looking at various aspects of the reforms 
and by answering what I consider to be the most crucial and relevant questions 
regarding the reforms. These include questions on whether the reforms were 
justified and feasible, and whether NORTHAG's operation, including the counter 
offensive, could have been plausibly carried out. Ultimately, I will attempt to 
answer whether the reforms were successful or not. 
CHAPTER 2 
THE FOUNDATION OF THE REFORMS 
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2.1. INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a general overview and offer analyses of 
both the circumstantial and intellectual foundations of the reforms. I shall begin 
with an examination of the developments in the British and other NORTHAG 
armies' operational concept and their deployment on the Central Front up until 
the early 1980s (2.2. and 2.3.). This is to identify and examine the weaknesses of 
their previous posture, as well as to pinpoint the reasons which necessitated the 
reforms. 
Firstly, I argue that in the case of the 1 (BR) Corps, the changes it 
introduced since 1945 were mostly cosmetic and designed to accommodate a fall 
in defence spending as the British economy declined. Furthermore, deep-seated 
traditions, such as the regimental system, proved to be an additional barrier 
which hindered the formulation of a plausible concept of operations above the 
tactical level, because regimental officers were reluctant to develop a broader 
perspective of the battlefield. 
Secondly, the NORTHAG armies were deployed to carry out, in essence, 
positional defence individually in shallow depth. This remained so despite a 
number of modifications introduced by each corps over the years because of the 
lack of resources. Also, since each corps had developed its own concept of 
operation based on the notion that this was an individual prerogative, coherent 
joint defence planning was absent. All these negative factors fostered wide-
spread pessimism and ignorance in NORTHAG. Under the circumstances, the 
army group's ability to offer a credible defence against the WP was in grave 
doubt. The attempt to correct this critical deficiency was the initial impetus for 
Bagnall's reforms. 
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The next topic (in 2.4., and 2.5.) consists of a series of brief discussions 
of contending ideas and debates over conventional improvement, which took 
place in the west during the late 1970s to the early 1980s, as well as of the two 
new major operational concepts--the US Army AirLand Battle Doctrine and 
SACEUR's FOF A sub-concept--that examine various ideas and options which 
were offered and formulated as a result of the renewed western effort to 
strengthen deterrence and conventional defence in Europe. This is to facilitate 
analyses of their possible influence in shaping the reforms in the British Army. 
In 2.7., I examine the impact of Bagnall's own ideas on the formulation 
of the reforms to determine their intellectual roots. I argue that his idea was 
developed, from the outset, entirely by himself in an effort to offer a plausible 
joint concept of operation for NORTHAG based on his personal research into 
German counter offensive operations on the Eastern Front during World War 
Two. Therefore, despite the fact that his concept had a lot in common with other 
proposals and operational thinking at the time, their influence on Bagnall's ideas 
was non-existent. Nor was Bagnall's effort an attempt to profit from growing 
trends at the time. In fact, his concept was developed prior to the formation of 
any other ideas despite the fact that its official endorsement came only in 1984. 
Before beginning the discussions, I provide a comprehensive 
chronological review to help readers understand the often confused processes 
and developments of the reforms, from their conception to the completion of 
their initial implementation in the late 1980s. 
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2.2. A CHRONOLOGICAL OVERVIEW OF NIGEL BAGNALL'S 
REFORMS 
It took roughly eighteen years (1971-1989) from the time when the need to plan 
at the operational level was first conceived by Bagnall until the completion of the 
initial implementation of the reforms went through. Bagnall first began 
promulgating the need to fight a whole battle when he became a Brigadier 
commanding the Royal Armoured Corps in 1971. From then on, he started 
developing his ideas about formulating a more robust concept of operation in the 
British Army. He continued this throughout the 1970s, during which time he was 
promoted to Commander 4 (BR) Armoured Division in 1975 and later to 
Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff (Policy) in 1978.1 As a divisional 
commander, he was able to dispute the British operational concept of the time 
through conducting a series of exercises aimed at showing the vulnerability of 
the corps' defence. It was then that his idea was received with more attention 
throughout the corps.2 
Nevertheless, he had to wait until becoming Commander of 1 (BR) 
Corps in 1981 to put his ideas to the test. The first step he took was to establish 
an informal discussion group called the Tactical Doctrine Committee (TDC) in 1 
(BR) Corps in 1981. The TDC was an unorthodox gathering within the Army 
which initially had twelve members in various ranks from different services of the 
Army and military establishments, including an official from the Ministry of 
Defence (MoD). The purpose in the early days was to discuss plans and ideas 
concerning the improvement of the 1 (BR) Corps' capability, but the scope of the 
1 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May and 6 November 1993. 
2 Interview, General Sir Brian Kenny on 16 September 1993. 
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topics and discussion was greatly extended as the TDC expanded and became an 
established feature within the office of the CGS and the MoD. 3 Meanwhtle, such 
an unconventional move by Bagnall was criticised by some people in the Army 
who saw it as breaking the chain of command.4 Nonetheless, the TDC played 
one of the most crucial roles throughout the reforms~ it was especially 
instrumental in building up the necessary consensus within the British and 
NORTHAG military establishments.5 As a result of Bagnall's initiative and TDC 
meetings, the divisions within the corps were able to undertake a series of 
studies to explore the manoeuvre and mobile defence option in the defence. By 
the end of 1982, each produced a tactical battle concept concerning the 
feasibility and conduct of counter stroke operations in the divisional and corps 
areas. 6 
By the time Bagnall became Commander British Army of the Rhine 
(COMBAOR) and COMNORTHAG in 1983, the reforms in the British Army 
were in full swing, as well as being introduced to NORTHAG. He first tested his 
concept of operation during the Command Post Exercise-83 (CPX), code-named 
'Winter Sale.' During the exercise, he managed to shock many participants and 
observers, including the Germans, by willingly abandoning West German 
territory from the 1GB (Inner German Border) down to near Hanover before 
3 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May and 6 November 1993 and Field Marshal Sir 
Peter Inge on 22 June 1993. 
4 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May and 6 November 1993, Inge and Kenny. 
5 See chapter 5.3. for more. 
6 See 1 (BR) Corps Battle Notes, Sect. 3 0-The Counter Stroke. Tactical Studies 
by the 11 th and 20th armoured Brigades of the 4th Armoured DiviSIon, (22 
November 1982), TDRC 6266.; Corps Battle Note-Counter Stroke. A Battle 
Note prepared by Charles Guthrie and Amended by the GOC (General Officer 
Commanding), (November 1982), TDRC 6265. 
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launching a major counter offensive with the army group reserve over the 1GB 
against the gap discovered between the WP operational echelons. 7 The result of 
CPX-83 was reported to the MoDs of many different countries, and elicited 
severe criticism and controversy.8 Above all, he broke two cardinal rules: not 
only did he ignore the forward defence imperative by intentionally allowing 
enemy penetration, but he also launched a counter offensive across the 1GB in 
the direction of Magdeburg. Such an operation had been regarded as taboo, and 
even thinking in such terms was discouraged. Nevertheless, it became a 
watershed after which NORTHAG armies were able to think and plan their 
operations in a different dimension. 
Thereafter, he soon succeeded in reaching an agreement with the RAF 
and 2ATAF in 1984 on the fundamentals of the joint LandfAir Battle. 
Furthermore, he reported that an initial agreement was reached with forces in 
NORTHAG on the relaxation of the rules of forward defence, which was 
accompanied by permission for the re-deployment of national forces to create 
the army group reserve. 9 
In 1985, Bagnall was promoted to CGS, a position which he held until 
1988, whereupon he retired. Meanwhile, Famdale, who was Commander 1 (BR) 
Corps under Bagnall, replaced him as COMNORTHAG, and enthusiastically 
7 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May and 6 November 1993 and Colonel Michael 
Dewar on 20 May 1993. 
8 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May and 6 November 1993, Dewar and General Hans 
Henning Von Sandrart on 8 April 1993. 
9 See Bagnall, 1984, passim. 
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continued the reforms. In fact, F arndale was instrumental in further expanding 
Bagnall's reforms in NORTHAG. 10 
That same year, Farndale officially outlined the essence of counter stroke 
and acknowledged that the British Army would embrace the new concept from 
then on. 11 In 1986, official endorsement of the new NORTHAG concept of 
operation came for the first time in the Statement on the Defence Estimates, 
which reported details as follows: 
2. The revised concept places greater emphasis on the selection and 
defence of vital areas; on cooperation between ground and air forces; on 
tactical flexibility and mobility; and on the employment of reserves. 
Indeed, a key element of the plan is a considerable strengthening of the 
armoured reserve forces available to NORTHAG. It is important to 
recognise that the concept does not mark any change in NATO's 
essentially defensive posture; nor does it imply any abandonment of the 
principle of forward defence, which remains a fundamental tenet of 
NATO strategy. But it does recognise that force improvements permit 
the adoption of a more mobile tactical concept. Static defence can lead 
only to a war of attrition, while the new concept would allow the 
defenders to seize the initiative from the aggressor, giving the Alliance a 
much better chance of defeating the enemy, rather than merely delaying 
hi 12 m. 
1987 was a busy year as Farndale was finalising the details of generating 
the army group reserve with other national forces and preparing for 
REFORGER 87 (Return of Forces to Germany) and the FTX (Field Training 
Exercise) phase of the exercise, code-named 'Certain Strike.' 13 During the 
exercise, the deployment of the external reserve, 3 (US) Corps, in the 
10 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May and 6 November 1993, Farndale on 14 April 
and 21 June 1993, Inge and Kenny. 
11 See Farndale, 1985. 
12 SD 1986, p.33. 
13 Interviews, Famdale on 14 April and 21 June 1993 and Von Sandrart. 
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NORTHAG sector was successfully tested. Also, NORTHAG's Land/AIr Battle 
and counter offensive/counter stroke concept were, for the first time, 
successfully tested in a FTX format. 14 
Meanwhile, a new Operational Guideline (GDP) was issued that same 
year by the new CINCENT, General Hans Henning Von Sandrart, who was also 
the COS of the Bundeswehr.1 5 Concurrently, the first class of the HCSC was 
given at the Army Staff College in Camberley. This three-month course was 
inspired and founded by Bagnall as a part of his reforms, its purpose being to 
educate officers about the theory and conduct of war at the operational level. 16 
Famdale was then replaced by Brian Kenny as COMNORTHAG in late 
1987. Soon after, in 1988, the new army group operational level SOP was 
formally adopted. It laid out the principles of mutual support, operations in 
depth and effective reserves, and advocated greater peacetime cooperation 
among national corps, which enabled 'the men of one nation to train under the 
command of another,' as the joint operations of the Allies was a crucial part of 
the new operational level thinking. 1 7 At the same time, it was agreed that 
NORTHAG's defence would become more elastic as the possibility of initially 
yielding more ground was approved by the Alliance. 18 
14 See Martin Famdale, "Exercise Reforger 87," Army Quarterly and Defence 
Journal (AQ&DJ), Vol.118, No.1, (January 1988), pp.8-20. (Farndale, 1988--B) 
See more in chapter 6.2. 
15 The German MoD, Operational Guideline (or General Defence Plan--GDP). 
(August 1987). See more in chapter 6.3.3. Also interview, Von Sandrart. 
16 For references on HCSC, see HCSC, Detailed Programme for Course 
Number 5, 1992.; and HCSC, Operational Art. Course Material for Course 
Number 6,1992, TDRC 10361. See further discussion in chapter 7.5.1. 
17 Farndale, 1988--A, p.24. Also see McInnes, 1991, p.33, for more details. 
18 SD 1988, p.16. 
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The endorsement of the first ever British operational doctrine, Design for 
Military Operations: The BMD, in 1989 signalled the completion of the initial 
objectives of Bagnall's reform, as it outlined the highlights of the Army's 
understanding of the operational level of war and the new operational 
concept. 19 
By the time Peter Inge became COMNORTHAG that same year, most of 
the ground work for the fulfilment of the initial aims of the reforms had been 
laid. He was to be in charge of streamlining the implementation of other 
requirements, such as introducing the NORTHAG Airmobile Division, which 
was a by-product of the reforms.20 He was the ideal person to put a final touch 
on the reforms because he had followed the developments closely and inspired 
many ideas himself from the time when he was Bagnall's COS as Commander 1 
(BR) Corps. He eventually became CGS in 1992 and CDS (Chief of the Defence 
Staff), with promotion to Field Marshal, in 1994. Since then he has been carrying 
out what Bagnall started more than twenty years ago, further modifying the 
reforms to suit the new roles of the British Army in the post-Cold War era. 
Although the British Army, fortunately, did not have to fight the WP, it 
nevertheless had a chance to test the validity of the reforms during the Gulf War. 
Despite the fact that it sent only one division--1 (BR) Armoured Division--under 
the command of Major General Sir Rupert Smith, and undertook a 
comparatively smaller role than that of the US forces, its demonstration of 
19 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May and 6 November 1993 and Colonel Robin 
Draper on 10 March 1993. Also see F.R. Dannatt, Towards an Operational 
Doctrine for the British Army in the Post Cold War Era, (TDRC 10224, 1992), 
pp.1-2. 
20 See Peter Inge, "Development in the Land Battle," RUSIJ, (Winter 1989), 
p.11, on his views on airmobile force. Also see chapter 7.4. for further 
discussion. 
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flexibility and superior war-fighting capability surprised many. 21 It was an event 
which largely vindicated the value and success of the reforms. 
In fact, most of the major field commanders in the Gulf, including Smith, 
were a new breed of officers, educated at the HCSC and indoctrinated with 
operational level thinking. They also successfully exploited many weapon and 
logistics systems which were introduced throughout the reforms.22 It was the 
opinion of Smith that, the British Army, the incompetence of the Iraqi's 
notwithstanding, could not have achieved such a spectacular success or gained 
respect from the other forces in the Gulf, especially from the US Army, if not for 
its effectiveness and ease of ability to plan and execute a joint operation, without 
the reforms and the new education provided by the HCSC.23 
21 See Ministry of Defence. Operation Granby: An Account of the Gulf Crisis 
1990-91 and British Army's Contribution to the Liberation of Kuwait, Army 
Code 71512, 1991, for the British account of Operation Granby. Interviews, 
Field Marshal Lord Michael Carver on 20 April 1993 and Major General Sir 
Rupert Smith on 12 May 1993. 
22 Interview, Bagnall on 5 May and 6 November 20 1993 and Smith. Rupert 
Smith was not technically a student, though he sat in on HCSC2. Eventually, he 
became the course director for HCSC3. 
23 Interview, Smith. 
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2.3. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BRITISH ARMY OF THE RHINE AND 
1 (DR) CORPS SINCE THE END OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR 
2.3.1. THE SITUATION UP TO THE END OF THE 1960S 
Since the end of World War Two, a main determinant of Britain's defence policy 
had been the state of the country's economy. Within the constraints of a 
shrinking financial pool, successive governments were forced to maintain, 
according to Carver, 'a perpetual balancing act' between commitments and 
resources.24 Continuous economic difficulties gradually eroded Britain's world-
wide role, and its position as a state with global interests was compromised each 
time a review of British defence commitments was carried out. Although Britain 
continuously attempted to keep some of its influence outside Europe throughout 
the 1950s, it was inevitably retreating from the glories of empire. Eventually, the 
commitment to the commonwealth was replaced by an interest in Europe as the 
country wished to pursue a leading role both in the European Economic 
Community (EEC) and NATO.25 
The Alliance's commitment to the defence of Germany was first officially 
endorsed in the 1954 Paris Agreement. Under the accord, Britain pledged to 
maintain four army divisions and a tactical air force on the continent until 1998~ 
24 Michael Carver, Tightrope Walking, (London: Hutchinson, 1992), p.vii. Also 
see Keith Hartley, The Economics of Defence Policy, (London: Brassey's, 1991), 
pp.I-2, for the major determinants for defence budget allocation. 
25 See David Greenwood, "The United Kingdom," in Douglas J. Murry and 
Paul R. Viotti, ed., The Defense Policies ofNations--A Comparative Study, 2nd 
ed. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), p.264~ and Peter 
Byrd, "Introduction," in Peter Byrd, ed., British Foreign Policy under Thatcher, 
(Oxford: Philip Allan, 1988), pp.3-4. 
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this marked the official foundation of British Army of the Rhine (BAOR). In 
fact, BAOR was originally formed from the residual British occupation force of 
Germany after the Second World War.26 
The transformation was initially completed by the ensuing foundation of 
NORTHAG in 1952, and its headquarters (HQs) were subsequently established 
in Monchengladbach. 27 From the outset, careful consideration was given to 
assigning NORTHAG corps sectors to the four national armies. Among them, 
the stronger ones (i.e. the British and German corps) would defend the major 
attack route in the middle while the weaker ones (the Netherlands and Belgian 
corps) would defend less important routes in the north and south ends of the 
army group area.28 
In 1954, BAOR's air and ground HQs moved to Rheindahlen in West 
Germany, where they have been co-located ever since.29 Meanwhile, the 
number of troops in the BAOR quickly declined from 77,000 in 1957 to 55,000 
in 1959; this level of strength was maintained until 1992. Although the total 
number of troops contracted, it was nonetheless the single largest British 
overseas deployment, especially after demobilisation and the end of conscription, 
and came to represent 30 per cent of the total Army strength.30 Furthermore, 
26 Faringdon, op. cit., p 279. 
27 Jane's NATO Handbook 1989-90, (Surrey: Jane's Publishing Co.. 1989), 
p.122. 
28 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993 and Farndale on 21 June 1993. See 
details of the NATO deployment on the Central Front in Faringdon, op. cit., 
chapter 10. 
29 Harry Tuzo, "Northern Army Group and its British Component," RUSIJ, 
(June 1975), p.9. 
30 Faringdon, op. cit., P 279. 
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this was to be substantially strengthened by an up to 120,000-strong 
reinforcement in an emergency. 3 1 At the same time, RAF Germany (G), which 
had fifteen squadrons as part of 2 ATAF, maintained around 10,300 personnel 
from 1959.32 In fact, despite the relatively quick rundown of the overall strength 
of BAOR, there was a persistent effort to introduce a new generation of 
equipment to either supplement or replace many of the Second World War 
vintage weapons, most of which were becoming obsolete. 3 3 
By 1961, the number of divisions in BAOR was reduced from four (three 
of which were armoured) to three divisions.34 The abolition of conscription was 
followed by a major force reduction in 1963, which left the Army with 180,000 
men. Also, the reforms introduced by Dennis Healey, then Secretary for 
Defence, in 1964 caused a further erosion of Army strength, which left it with 
only six divisions. As a result, the Army came under severe pressure as it was 
still expected to carry on with the traditional responsibility of imperial policing as 
well as maintaining the same level of commitment in Germany. An expectation 
that the pressure would be somewhat relieved only arose after the Healey 
statement in 1966 that Britain would soon relinquish the commitment east of 
Suez. 
31 See SD 1985, p.23, para. 4, for details on the reinforcements sent during 
Exercise LIONHEART in 1984. 
32 See Robert Close, Europe Without Defense? (New York: Pergamon, 1979), 
p.60; Bruce George, "United Kingdom," in Jane's NATO Handbook 1989-90. 
p. 53; and The Military Balance 1982-83, (London: International Institute of 
Strategic Studies, 1982), p.32. 
33 See Richard Orgokiewitz, Armour, (London: Stevens, 1960), p.62; and 
Anthony Verrier, An Army for the Sixties, (London: Seeker & Warburg, 1966), 
p.146. 
34 See H.C.B. Rogers, Tanks in Battle, (London: Seeley & Co., 1965), pp.218-
9. 
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The ensuing 1968 Defence Review thus reflected Britain's recognition of 
Europe as its strategic centre. 3 5 Therein, Britain displayed a strong enthusiasm 
towards aligning its policy with the US. This was based on Healey's belief that as 
long as the US remained in Europe, a war with the WP was inconceivable. Thus, 
Europe should increase the level of its conventional commitment sufficiently 
enough to convince the US that it would not be prematurely dragged into a 
nuclear war with the Soviet Union due to NATO's lack of conventional 
capability.36 Nonetheless, Britain still lacked consistency in the direction of its 
defence policy and remained without any longer-term strategic thinking. 
2.3.2. THE 1 BRITISH CORPS AREA OF RESPONSmILITY 
The NORTHAG area of responsibility covered roughly the northern two-thirds 
of the FRG which included the Northern German Plain, also known as 'the 
Hanover Plain.' Consequently, this was where the British corps sector was 
located. With a frontage of about 60 kilometres from the region of the Mittelland 
Canal to the northern Harz, this region lay 'along the most direct axis of advance 
between Berlin, Magdeburg, Hanover, the Rhine, and the Ruhr.'37 
All of the former NORTHAG commanders whom I have interviewed 
pointed out that they expected the WP was planning to achieve its major 
35 See Baylis, 1989, p.33.~ Stephen Kirby, "Britain, NATO and European 
Security: The Irreducible Commitment," in John Baylis, ed., British Defence 
Policy in a Changing World, (London: Croom Helm, 1977), p.l09. Also 
interview, Air Chief Marshal Sir Brendan Jackson on 11 May 1993. 
36 See Carver, 1992, pp.70-77, for Healey's legacy. Also interview, Carver. 
37 Faringdon, op. cit., p.366. 
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concentration in this area. 3 8 It had the best tank -going terrain, and lay on the 
route to the Channel and the western French coast. This assumption was more 
credible since the WP was seeking a quick conclusion to a possible conflict 
before the NATO nuclear decision; any WP attack would be as quick as possible 
and would take the shortest path to its objective.39 In fact, an Autobahn (A2) 
between Hanover and Berlin was the shortest route for an attack from the east. 
2.3.3. THE BRITISH OPERATIONAL CONCEPT BEFORE THE 
REFORMS 
BAOR had yet to formulate a plausible operational concept during the 1950s 
and early 1960s. Armoured forces had become the predominant arm, and faith in 
their value remained strong.40 In reality, however, a series of reorganisations in 
1956 and 1957, the result of which confined armour's role mainly to infantry 
support and exploitation, reflected confusion as to what its exact role should 
be.41 As a result, BAOR's operational concept remained diffuse, and its 
dispositions were suitable neither for a cohesive positional defence, nor a mobile 
one. 
The advent of TNWs (Tactical Nuclear Weapons) proved to be a mixed 
blessing for BAOR's armoured force, since it became heavily dependent on their 
38 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993, Farndale on 14 April 1993 and Von 
Sandrart. 
39 Interview, Farndale on 14 April 1993. He verified this in a discussion with a 
Soviet General in 1990. See 3.4. for more on the WP operational plan. 
40 See Rogers, op. cit., pp.215-6. 
41 See Lyne, op. cit., p.47; Orgokiewitz, 1955, p.28; D.C. Mullen, "New 
Divisional Organization Trials," BAR, (March 1956), p.7. 
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use rather than developing a robust conventional capability. As Verrier stressed, 
the order of the day concerning TNWs became, in fact, 'ask and ye shall be 
given.'42 Yet TNW s secured the dominance of armour which was considered the 
only arm able to undertake defensive operations in a nuclear environment. 43 
Due to the premium given to nuclear weapons, BAOR had based its 
force planning on a deliberate insufficiency of forces throughout the 1960s. This 
thinking primarily stemmed from the fact that the BAOR would force a 'pause,' 
but nothing more. This weakness was thought to be a factor which reInforced 
deterrence under massive retaliation,44 as it was assumed that deliberate 
weakness would convince the US to increase its nuclear guarantee. Thus, the 
logic of the 'pause' philosophy assumed that immediate conventional defence 
would be offered merely in order to provide 'a chance for second thoughts 
before it gets rougher' so as to prevent the WP from pursuing a course of action 
which would be disastrous.45 Even the adoption of Flexible Response in 1967 
did not change the underlying rationale of the British Army for some time. 
Upon entering the 1970s, however, there was a sign that BAOR was 
moving towards the adoption of a more imaginative defensive posture as its 
priority shifted from a purely defensive posture to a mobile linear defence, which 
emphasised more offensive operations.46 The new concept of operations 
reflected an initial gesture to comply with Flexible Response by learning to 
prolong the conventional phase within existing resources, although the notion of 
42 Verrier, op. cit., p.149. 
43 See Rogers, op. cit., p.215; and Macksey, 1971, p.247, and p.250. 
44 . 55 Hackett, op. CIt., p. . 
45 . 12 Tuzo, op. CIt., p. . 
46 Interview, Carver. 
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deliberate insufficiency was still important. Within this framework, 1 (BR) Corps 
would be deployed in two echelons, with two divisions being close to the 1GB in 
accordance with forward defence, and expected to hold a line closer to the 
border in a tactical mobile battle until forced by attrition to withdraw through the 
second echelon, which would then assume the forward echelon's role. The 
weakened divisions would then re-group to provide an additional echelon behind 
the second one. 47 General Tuzo commented that, given reasonable deployment 
time, the defending forces would be able to fight an aggressive and imaginative 
battle under the new concept. 48 
While it was very mobile at the tactical level, however, this was an 
essentially static defence which remained vulnerable to attrition from superior 
enemy forces.49 Above all, because of the open and flat terrain of its corps 
sector, which did not favour linear static defence, and because of limited 
resources, the corps would have quickly fallen back to consolidating defensive 
positions at the rear. 
Under the restructuring plan of 1975, divisions in BAOR were made 
smaller to create an additional division. Each consisted of two less permanent 
'field forces,' which deployed five 'battle groups' based on either an armoured 
regiment or an infantry battalion, thus producing a flexible force more adept at 
both responding to various situations and mobile defence. This provided the 
corps with increased infantry strength and gave the dismounted infantry a greater 
capability to hold ground, and with the provision of Milan ATGWs (Anti-Tank 
Guided Weapons), it became possible for them to be deployed further forward in 
47 See Mcinnes, 1990, pp.134-5. 
48 . 11 Tuzo, op. Clt., p. . 
49 See Mcinnes, 1991, p.30. 
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the initial defence line. 50 In return, this allowed for the concentration of 
armoured force and, as a result, the corps allocated it a counter penetration 
role. 51 Nonetheless, the reduction of the number of unit (or battlegroup) HQs in 
relation to the number of sub-units (or combat teams) proved to be an obstacle. 
It became difficult to obtain the required command coverage unless the 
battlegroup was broken up into a series of independent and largely ineffective 
combat teams, and they were essentially too weak to undertake an offensive 
campaign. 52 In the end, the changes failed to secure the flexibility the corps had 
hoped to attain because, in addition to the elimination of the brigade command, 
the creation of the fourth division forced it to depend further on reinforcements. 
In short, the 197 4 review, which initiated the 1975 restructuring, failed 
to deliver what had initially been envisaged, and the new structure made only 
negligible improvements in the offensive efficacy of the BAOR. Hence, it created 
more problems in the short term because such a move, building an additional 
division without an actual increase in the overall strength of BAOR, looked as if 
it was only an attempt to produce a quick-fix so as to show that Britain was 
standing by its increased continental pledge. In fact, due to the lack of flexibility 
and increased dependence on reinforcement, everyone in BAOR expected very 
early use of nuclear weapons. 53 As General Hackett argued, the drastic changes 
made the weaker force even weaker and 'within three years of the 1974 Defence 
50 See William Scotter, "The British Army Today," RUSIJ, (June 1976), p.17: 
McInnes, 1988, p.378~ and Bellamy, 1987, p.146. 
51 See Kitson, 1977, p.18~ and Hackett, op. cit., pp.146-7. 
52 Kitson, 1977, pp.18-19. 
53 Interview, Carver. 
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Review BAOR was at its lowest level of operational efficiency ever.,54 The only 
positive aspect of the review was the fact that it made possible the initiation of a 
series of new weapons procurement programmes by the Army and RAF, the 
benefits of which were only to be felt much later in the early 1980s when the 
reforms were initiated. 5 5 
Efforts to correct the deficiency created by the 1974 revIew started 
almost immediately. Their highlight was the formulation of a new defensive 
concept called 'killing zones' or 'armoured killing areas (AKA),' which attempted 
to improve upon the previous echeloned defence while consolidating the changes 
introduced. AKAs were a series of mobile pockets which could be placed along 
the axes of an enemy advance. Their positions were not rigidly determined, but 
likely avenues of the enemy advance would be identified, and the terrain would 
be surveyed during peacetime, providing the defenders with intimate knowledge 
of it. 56 The selected defence terrain would be prepared immediately after the 
outbreak of hostilities, or when the enemy's imminent attack was anticipated. 
Once the enemy was sucked into an AKA, the local defender would then inflict 
high rates of attrition in a relatively positional battle with a combination of 
armour and ATGW-armed mechanised infantry, with artillery and air support 
available throughout. The defenders would mainly fight against the enemy first 
echelon and then withdraw before the second echelon arrived. 57 In short, it was 
a mobile defence concept which took advantage of local mobility and firepower 
for defence while exploiting terrain as a force multiplier. Also, counter attack 
54 Hackett, op. cit., p.329. 
55 Interviews, Bagnall 5 May 1993 and Jackson. 
56 McInnes, 1990, pp.134-5. 
5 7 Interview, F amdale on 14 April 1993. 
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inside an assigned area within a corps sector was critical for successful defence. 
This concept was very similar in many respects to the West German defence 
counter attack concept which was underlined in the 1973 Hdv 100/100.58 
Although the AKA concept was considered to be both more aggressive 
and a general improvement, it fell short of addressing the fundamental problems 
ofBAOR's defence. In fact, the idea was more of positional than mobile defence. 
It was criticised as only a doctrinal rationalisation which was based on the 
extension of the infantry tactics of the Army and which was vulnerable against a 
numerically superior enemy with considerable fighting power. 59 Moreover, the 
British corps' ability to create strong AKAs along each anticipated enemy route 
of advance would be inevitably curtailed by insufficient personnel strength and 
equipment, which would, in turn, render virtually impossible the maintenance of 
a cohesive defence throughout AKAs and would result in the defenders either 
being forced to abandon those positions quickly, or eventually being overrun by 
superior enemy forces through attrition. Also, the limited number of reserves 
available in each sector would be too small to retake the initiative through 
counter attack, and so they would quickly succumb to the continuous WP 
follow-on forces onslaught. 60 
The most damaging aspect of the concept's positional nature was that it 
could be operationally dislocated by the enemy at will, because it essentially 
involved waiting for him to enter the designated area before an attack could be 
launched. In fact, the defender would be helpless if the enemy decided to bypass 
58 See chapter 2.4.2. for the Bundeswehr concept of operation. 
59 See Peter Stratmann, "NATO Doctrine and National Operational Priorities," 
in Robert O'Neill, ed., Doctrine, The Alliance and Arms Control, (London: 
Macmillan, 1986), p.197. 
60 See Hackett, op. cit., p.159, for an example. 
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him (almost certain because the success of the OMG--Operational Manoeuvre 
Group--depended on the maintenance of tempo), leaving him to be dealt with by 
the follow-on echelons. Meanwhile, the WP's strong forward air and artillery 
assets would generate enough firepower to pin down the defenders in positional 
defence. 61 In short, even if a few zones managed to hold their positions, they 
would eventually be beaten piecemeal by follow-on echelons while the first 
echelon or the OMG would be running well beyond those defence zones towards 
the rear area. 
The introduction of the 'aggressive delay forces' battle concept in the late 
1970s was an attempt to redress the many drawbacks of the killing zone 
concept, particularly the vulnerability to the WP multi-echeloned and OMG 
attack. 62 It envisaged the disruption and delaying of the enemy's advance while 
determining the direction and scale of the WP main attack by the aggressive 
covering force battle, which was reinforced with more armour. Then, according 
to the 1981 Statement on the Defence Estimates, 'the aggressive delay forces 
would be withdrawn through the main defensive position after they had 
disrupted the enemy's advance. The forces in the main defensive position would 
then absorb any attack and create time .... for other formations to counter-attack 
in order to regain lost ground. ,63 Its main focus was to allow the defenders to 
determine the enemy's major efforts prior to the manning of the killing zones. 
Thus, the areas which were supposedly on the path of the enemy major thrusts 
would be given sufficient resources to withstand the enemy onslaught. The other 
61 See McInnes, 1990, p.13S. See 3.4.2. for more on OMG. 
62 SD 1981, para. 320. 
63 SD 1981, para. 320. 
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areas would be thinned out to achieve economy of force so as to provide a 
strong reserve for counter attack, or to reinforce the identified threatened area. 
This was a logical evolution from previous thinking, and attempted to 
compensate for its weakness. It did provide a much greater opportunity for 
mobile defence with the stronger reserve, and it became the conceptual 
framework within which the earlier version of Bagnall's operational concept was 
developed. In fact, it was the first time Bagnall played a major part in influencing 
the operation of the British corps by demonstrating the validity of this form of 
defence when he was commanding 4 Armoured Division in Germany. 64 
In conclusion, during much of the 1970s, Britain considered its military 
contribution to the Alliance to be adequate, not for the purpose of defending 
Germany, but to satisfy the US in order to keep American forces at a level which 
would be sufficient to deter WP aggression.65 Above all, it reaffirmed that the 
main agenda for the defence of Europe remained firmly focused on nuclear 
deterrence provided by the US. Thus, conventional defence had only a 
supporting role in Europe. The series of cosmetic changes made in BAOR over 
the years was a good indicator that Britain certainly adhered to such a 
perception. 
2.3.4. THE IMPACT OF TRADITION AND THE REGIMENTAL 
SYSTEM 
The regimental system was developed by the Army in the nineteenth-century for 
the purpose of policing the empire. To guard imperial possessions, British forces 
64 Interview, Kenny. 
65 Interview, Carver. 
52 
were often deployed in overseas garrisons in the colonies conducting relatively 
minor campaigns.66 Henceforth, the emphasis was placed primarily on the 
cohesion and effectiveness of regiments, and the system provided cohesion and 
loyalty among its members in the infantry units, especially under the environment 
in which soldiers sometimes had to fight long and isolated wars in remote 
outposts of the empire.67 
However, many--including Bagnall--criticised the system for the 
parochial and passive tendency it nurtured among its officers. Perhaps the 
following remark by Bagnall may best describe the origin of the passive tendency 
and low-level tactical thinking of most British officers: 'The Army had been lazy 
about studying the conduct of major operations. Officers did their job as 
regimental soldiers.... And at NORTHAG, some of my predecessors thought 
their job was just to keep everyone happy.'68 Its impact was profound. 
Although officers exercised strong leadership within a regiment, as well as 
demonstrating a lot of moral and personal courage during many wars, the system 
nevertheless discouraged them from becoming good strategists by preventing the 
development of a broader perspective of the battlefield, and by limiting the 
aptitude for fighting a war on a scale beyond the tactical level. Also it inhibited 
officers from developing constructive and creative criticism. 69 
As Bagnall observed, the most profound effect of such a paSSlve 
tendency among British officers, therefore, was the lack of zeal and the aptitude 
66 See Brian Holden Reid, "Is There a British Military 'Philosophy'?" in 
Mackenzie and Holden Reid, 1990, p.4. 
67 See Luttwak,1987, p.98. 
68 Interview, Bagnall on 6 November 1993. 
69 R.A.D. Applegate, "Why Armies Lose in Battle: An Organic Approach to 
Military Analysis," RUSIJ, (December 1987), p.53. 
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to undertake high-tempo mobile operations at the operational level. Applegate 
said that: 
the needs of a conformist hierarchy for a stable environment was 
reflected in the British Army's linear and positional style of warfare .... 
British officers had been.... essentially administrators and tended to 
command from the rear, 'running' the battle from a series of maps .... 
and. . .. the [regimental] discipline, training and leadership meant that the 
British military organism lacked any real aptitude for mobile operations, 
but whilst their linear integrity remained intact they could offer very 
stubborn resistance. 70 
As a result, the British had been 'historically bad at combining little engagements 
into bigger ones.'71 In short, the particular British characteristics which had been 
developed over the years reflected a good fighting spirit at unit level while it 
seemed to have been understood that a collection of unit combats made up the 
higher-level fighting. Thus, no sense of urgency existed among officers in the 
Army to develop a concept with which to mampulate higher level operations. 
Although it had an operational aim of driving the Germans out of Egypt, 
for instance, the battle of EI Alamein was achieved by a strict methodical 
approach in the attritional tradition, not by manoeuvre.72 It was not an 
application of the operational method, at least in the sense which Montgomery's 
German opponents preferred or the 1980s' British Army envisioned. 
Nonetheless, his success there became the basis for the so-called 'Montgomery 
approach,' which according to Holden Reid, was elevated as the British model 
for 'some 20 years after 1945.°3 
70 Applegate, op. cit., pp.53-4. 
71 Faringdon, op. cit., p.365. 
72 Brian Holden Reid, "The Operational Level of War and Historical 
Experience," in Mackenzie and Holden Reid, 1989, p.9. 
73 Holden Reid, op. cit. in Mackenzie and Holden Reid, 1990, p.10. 
54 
Consequently, any glimpse of operational level thoughts in the British 
Army diminished after the war when Britain re-focused on the duties of empire. 
Kennedy eloquently summed up the effects of this development: 
After 1945, the United Kingdom's military energies were once again 
focused on her empire. Although her land and air forces were to spend 
the next 25 years conducting a fighting withdrawal rather than campaigns 
of conquest, the European continent resumed its historical role in British 
military thinking as an unpleasant place out of which comes no good ... 
The savage pressure on defence resources produced, instead of strategic 
clarity, out of which an understanding of the operational level of war 
might have developed, an introspective attitude which examined the 
infantry platoon in detail and failed to apply similar scrutiny to the higher 
level conduct of war. In this respect it is significant that the British 
experience of command of large forces in a manoeuvre war was limited 
in scale.74 
Indeed, having had a small professional force with which to fight brush wars in 
peacetime, the Army inevitably embraced the proven ideas which favoured 
'down-to-earth practical soldiering' over unproven theory and doctrine. 75 Hence, 
it had an abundance of tactical doctrines and was taught to adhere to the 
principles of war. Thus, the Army was not compelled to endorse an operational 
doctrine, since, as Holden Reid observed, 'doctrine at any level above the tactical 
has always been an anathema.'76 
Changes began as Britain finally recognised that its contribution to the 
Alliance had become the key to its national defence. Bagnall said in an interview 
that in the early days the Alliance only existed on paper. Also, up until the 
74 A.I.G. Kennedy, "The Operational Art of War," in Mackenzie and Holden 
Reid, 1989, p.140. 
75 Dominick Graham, "England," in Richard A. Gabriel, ed., Fighting Armies: 
NATO and Warsaw Pact-A Combat Assessment, (London: Greenwood Press, 
1983), p.76 
76 Holden Reid, op. cit., in Mackenzie and Holden Reid, 1989, p.l0. 
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1970s, the British Army considered Germany as 'a good place for training' 
without many implications for its national defence, and certainly not as a place to 
fight. 77 
Ironically, one of the outcomes of such developments, and of a series of 
cuts in strength since, was a positive impact on the Army's ability to take up a 
more demanding role later as, with ever-shrinking resources, it tried to adapt to 
the increasing demands of the defence of Europe. In fact, these cuts paved the 
way for a more professional and efficient army to be established as it had to seek 
a way to do more with less. 
77 Interview, Bagnall on May 5 1993. The same point was raised by Carver 
during an interview. 
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2.4. THE DEPLOYMENT OF OTHER NORTHERN ARMY GROUP 
CORPS 
2.4.1. 1 NETHERLANDS CORPS 
The Netherlands corps was located on the top of the 'layer-cake' where it would 
defend an area between the northern border with AFNORTH (Allied Forces 
Northern Europe) and the German corps sector. It was thought to be well-
equipped and to have a good chance of defending its area of responsibility, 
mainly due to favourable terrain for defence.78 The Netherlands was responsible 
for a build-up by M-day to three divisions in the forward area, as well as two 
reserve ones. At the start of the 1980s, however, it was able to provide the M-
day equivalent of less than two full three-brigade divisions, while maintaining 
only one armoured brigade in Germany to cover for the deployment of the whole 
corps in the case of war, due to continuous cuts in defence spending and the 
consequent lack of resources. 79 
The Netherlands Army shared doctrinal and operational concepts with 
West Germany. The bulk of its equipment was of German origin, and it co-
operated closely with the Bundeswehr in training. It pursued a concept which 
combined positional and area defence with a form of FOF A to interdict the 
enemy from the rear. Under this concept, it envisaged a simultaneous defence 
combining first, a close-in defence in forward defence positions, and second, a 
78 See Faringdon., op. cit., p.360~ and Anthony Cordesman, NATO's Central 
Region Forces, (London: The Royal United Service Institute, 1988), p.121, for 
more details on the geographical conditions. 
79 See Jane's NATO Handbook 1989-90, p.122~ and Cordesman, 1988, p.8S, 
p.llS, and p.120, for an assessment of the Netherlands' mobilisation capability. 
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depth defence with combined positional and mobile defence-in-depth. During the 
latter operational phase, the reserves would be employed for an offensive mobile 
defence which included 'offensive actions such as surprise fire, counterthrusts 
and counterattacks. ,80 During an interview, Colonel Soetemeer of the Dutch 
Army stressed that the corps planned a fluid armoured mobile defence in the 
early 1980s, and, unless the WP deliberately chose to concentrate in the Dutch 
area, it would have been able to cope with the WP attack there. 81 
Nevertheless, many doubted its capability to carry out mobile warfare, 
while acknowledging that it had greater ability to conduct static attritional 
defence.82 Also, the lack of in-theatre forces to cover the corps' deployment 
would prove to be damaging despite its ability to conduct a cohesive positional 
defence in the early hours of the conflict. As will be discussed in chapter 4, its 
deployment would probably have to be covered by the Germans. This would not 
only tie up the valuable German reserve, but also the lack of a jointly agreed 
concept of operation and SOP in the army group would undoubtedly prevent the 
timely committal of the Dutch corps in strength. Moreover, the traffic problem, 
which would inevitably be caused by such a tie-up, would substantially degrade 
the army group's efficacy during the initial operation, while providing the WP air 
force with a series of lucrative targets. 
80 J.R. Roos, "Armour in Central Region," NSN, (Special 1, 1985), p.67. 
81 Interview, Colonel G.C.W. ~oetemeer on 23 April 1992. Also interviews, 
Bagnall on 5 May 1993 and Farndale on 14 April 1993. 
82 See Cordesman, 1988, p.121. Also interviews, Bagnall 5 May 1993 and 
Draper. 
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2.4.2. 1 GERMAN CORPS 
The 1 German Corps sector shared the heart of the Hanover Plain with the 
British corps on the south. The German corps was designed to exploit a 
geographical segment of its sector which was open and flat. Consequently, 
Germany deployed the strongest mobile corps among NORTHAG and all other 
German corps in NATO, which consisted of four regular divisions (three Panzer 
and one Panzergrenadier) with a substantial number of artillery, airmobile and 
ancillary forces under the direct corps control and four Home Defence Brigades 
and four Home Defence Regiments from the German Territorial Command-
N orth (which was two division strength equivalent). The main task of the Home 
Defence forces would be to guard the corps' rear areas to ensure the operational 
freedom of the German and other NORTHAG corps, and in some cases they 
might be used to reinforce the main defensive areas. 83 
The Bundeswehr's operational thinking was influenced by the 
Reichswehr's experience in Russia, since many of its founding senior officer 
corps were W orld War Two veterans. The experience was passed on to the 
post-war Bundeswehr; however, this focused on tactical lessons, 'particularly 
those of mobile defence at which the Wehrmacht excelled, rather than on 
analysing Russia's successful operational conduct of the campaign. ,84 Also, the 
circumstances of the German constitution 'limited its military horizons to the 
Central Region and Schleswig-Holstein' and only in 1987 did the Bundeswehr 
83 See K. G. Benz, "Fire and Manoeuvre-The German Armoured Corps and 
Combined Arms Battle," International Defence Review (IDR) , (April 1984), 
p.475; Cordesman, 1988, p.90. Also interview, Von Sandrart. 
84 Kennedy, op. cit., in Mackenzie and Holden Reid, ed., 1989, p.141. Also see 
William Rennagel, "West Germany," in Gabriel, op. cit., p.122. 
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draft its own operational level doctrine independent of the Alliance. as a result of 
the reforms.85 All this led many to believe that the Bundeswehr was losing 
touch with its traditions by breeding defensive-minded soldiers due to a narrow 
interpretation of past experience and an indifferent attitude towards tradition. 86 
The earlier Bundeswehr concept of operations was prescribed in Army 
Regulation Hdv 100/100 Command and Control in Battle, w-hich was drafted to 
provide a uniform guideline of conducting 'a combined operation by a major 
combined-arms unit (brigade and above). ,8 7 The concept and language used in 
Hdv 100/100 were generally compatible with ATP-35 (A).88 It recognised that 
the basic manoeU~Te unit would be the brigade, whilst the division would be 
mainly responsible for the defence of an assigned sector without intervention 
from the corps. The corps' involvement would be the last resort. Thus, the 
operational level in the Bundeswehr would signify the handling of divisions and 
corps. 89 
85 Dannatt, op. cit., p.13. Also see Jan Oerding, NATO's New Strategy and Its 
Implementation on the Operational Level (HCSC 6, TDRC 10472. 1993), 
pp.14-5. See chapter 6.3.3. for more on the 1987 GDP and its relations to the 
reforms. 
86 See Simp~ 1985, p.18. Interviews. Bagnall 5 May 1993 and Dewar. 
87 Ministry of Defence, Hdv 100/100 (Army Regulation 100/100 Command and 
Control in Battle), 1973. p.l. 
88 See Bellamy, 1987, p.139; and Roy Meller, "Federal Germanys Defense 
Potential-Part L" IDR, (February 1974). p.170. Interviews, Fischer 7 April 
1993 and \:"on Sandrart. 
89 Interview, Von Sandrart. Also see Philip Karber and John Milam, "The 
Federal Republic of Germany, " in Jeffrey Simon., ed., NATO-Warsaw Pact Force 
Mobilization, (Washington., D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1988), 
p.259. 
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There are some similarities between the earlier Bundeswehr and the 
British AKA concept with more emphasis on the combined armour, infantry and 
artillery operation. Based on interviews with General Von Sandrart and Lt. 
Colonel Fischer, the defenders' tasks can be summarised thus: 1) to identify and 
occupy important terrain; and 2) to wear the enemy down by lateral movement 
and immediate local counter attack. 90 The defenders were expected to conduct 
a primarily defensive delaying battle both from prepared positions and by 
encounter battle. 
However, in line with forward defence, the overriding emphasis was 
placed on the immediate local counter attack to catch the enemy on the move 
with surprise in order to regain the initiative. Thus, they would seek to make an 
early commitment of tactical reserves in the local counter stroke whenever 
possible.91 Consequently, the concept suffered from the same shortcomings as 
did the British one. In short, its stress on the tactical battle at lower levels would 
be a disadvantage against the WP. Furthermore, even if divisions and corps 
enjoyed freedom of action and some elasticity of defence within the assigned 
sector, their operations would essentially remain within the tactical scope. It 
seemed to be the antithesis of the tradition of the operational level of war and 
defence-in-depth which characterised the typical German operations during the 
Second World War. 
Despite these shortcomings and as Cordesman wrote that the 
Bundeswehr was 'far from perfect,' it maintained better readiness and 
sustainability than other corps, and was the best equipped army in 
90 Interviews, Fischer and Von Sandrart. 
91 Interviews, Fischer and Von Sandrart. 
61 
NORTHAG.92 Although its sustainability was not entirely satisfactory, it had 
persistently maintained adequate war reserves and ammunition stocks for 30 
days of intensive conventional combat, the amount of which were believed to be 
sufficient for the operation it envisaged.93 Moreover, its reliable and effective 
mobilisation system, and the re-equipment of its territorial and regular forces 
during the 1970s and 1980s, had enhanced its fighting capability significantly. 94 
In conclusion, as many commented, the Bundeswehr would have been 
able to defend its own corps sector effectively at the early stages of the war, but 
the lack of a coherent and plausible operational idea and the weakness of, 
especially the Dutch and Belgian Corps, would have forced it to quickly abandon 
its forward defence positions and engage in a battle of withdrawal to avoid 
isolation and piecemeal defeat. 95 Under the circumstances, 1 German Corps' 
resources and fighting-power would have been wasted. 
2.4.3. 1 BELGIAN CORPS 
The Belgian corps sector was located south of the British corps and north of the 
border with CENTAG (Central Army Group). The sector frontage was about 40 
kilometres long, and the Harz to its south provided much of the protection to its 
92 Cordesman, op. cit., p.112. 
93 See Rennagel, op. cit., p.121. Also see Cordesman, op. cit., p.98 and 101. 
Also see 7.6.4., for other corps sustainability. 
94 Karber and Milam, op. cit., in Simon, op. cit., p.261. 
95 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993, Chalupa, Farndale on 21 June 1993 and 
Von Sandrart. 
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front and right flanks.96 1 Belgian Corps consisted of two divisions (each with 
three brigades and a Reconnaissance Brigade Group which had three 
reconnaissance, two tank, one logistics and one artillery battalions) in the early 
1980s. Nevertheless, only two out of six brigades (one mechanised infantry and 
one armoured) were actually deployed in the Belgian corps area along with the 
Reconnaissance Brigade Group.97 Also, among the NORTHAG armies, the 
Belgian Army had the poorest reputation. It was called a 'hollow army,' which 
suffered from a lack of funds and sustainability despite its high professional 
standards and good record in NATO exercises and competitions.98 
Yet the defensive advantage afforded by the Harz mountains in the south 
provided the army group with some assurance that the Belgians would probably 
be able to cope with the defence of the sector at the early stage.99 It was also 
hoped that the Belgian sector would be spared if the WP launched a standing 
start attack because the WP was not expected to go out of its way 'to give 
themselves a bad time just for the sake of springing a local surprise in the Harz, 
when this tangled country may be so easily bypassed through flatter and easier 
ground on either side. ,I 00 
In an interview, Lt. Colonel Briot of the Belgian Army said it also 
developed an AKA concept around 1974-5. However, due to the lack of 
resources and reserves, it is difficult to imagine that more than a straight static 
defence could have been managed, despite the fact that they were eager to 
96 Faringdon, op. cit., p.37l. 
97 Interview, Lt. Colonel Briot on 25 March 1993. 
98 Jane's NATO Handbook. 1989-90, p.123. Also see Cordesman,1988, p.179. 
99 Interviews, Briot and Famdale on 14 April 1993. 
100 Faringdon, op. cit., p.373. 
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contribute as much as possible within their resource limitations. 101 Also, similar 
to the problems with the Dutch corps, its lack of in-theatre forces could hamper 
the already over-stretched British corps operations by forcing it to provide cover 
for their deployment. Hence, regardless of German criticism over the British 
propensity for an early fall-back, 102 it would be difficult for the British corps to 
cover the Belgian deployment while maintaining a strong coherent defence close 
to the 1GB with the limited assets available to it at the time. 
2.4.4. CONCLUSION 
The conventional posture and operational concept of the NORTHAG corps in 
the late 1970s was very passive and aimed at conducting separate corps battles 
which were untenable, and thus could not offer a cohesive defence against the 
WP's superior might. Furthermore, the lack of readiness, especially in the Dutch 
and Belgian corps, would have seriously threatened the army group's initial 
defensive operations, making NATO's nuclear early-use inevitable. In fact, there 
was no chance that they could offer a prolonged and coherent conventional 
resistance against a surprise WP deep attack, and this would result in a rapid 
collapse of the army group defence as the posture eased the WP's chance to 
achieve deep penetrations along the army group sector. As will be discussed in 
chapters 3 and 4, this and other political and strategic considerations during the 
late-1970s gave the impetus to the British Army to explore new ways of 
bolstering its conventional defence capability, which were ultimately to be 
realised through Bagnall's reforms in the early 1980s. 
101 Interview, Bagnall on 5 May 1993 and Farndale on 21 June 1993. 
102 Interview, General Leopold Chalupa on 12 May 1993 and Fischer. 
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2.5. CONTENDING IDEAS FOR CONVENTIONAL Il\lPROYEI\IENT 
BEFORE THE REFORMS 
2.5.1. THE MILITARY REFORM MOVEMENT AND THE DEBATE 
BETWEEN MOBILE AND ATTRITIONAL DEFENCE 
The military reform movement, which was advocated by such people as Steven 
Canby and Edward Luttwak in the US, was one of the most influential forces 
behind the burgeoning interest in conventional improvements throughout the 
mid-1970s and 1980s. It had a very strong impact on the perception of the US 
and the Allies towards new conventional options in Europe, such as the 
operational level mobile defence. 1 03 The reformers' main focus was on the 
reduction of NATO's dependence on early nuclear use. They stressed that 
bolstering the direct defence option by the restructuring of NATO forces and the 
creation of operational reserves was both desirable and feasible within the 
existing budget and resources. 104 Furthermore, they opposed an overwhelming 
reliance on high-technology solutions, as shown in the European Security Study 
(ESECS) reports and FOFA. 
In sum, they suggested that several improvements were needed if 
NATO's ability to counter the WP conventional attack was to be reinforced. 
Firstly, it was recognised that the future military doctrine of the Alliance should 
be based on the principles of the operational level of war in order to enable them 
103 See two articles by Steven Canby, "Military Reform and the Art of War," 
Survival, (May/June 1983), pp.120-127; and "NATO: Reassessing the 
Conventional Wisdoms," Survival, (July/August 1977), pp.164-168. 
104 Robert A. Gessert, "The AirLand Battle and NATO's New Doctrinal 
Debate," RUSIJ, (June 1984), pp.56-8. 
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to fight a war on a larger (theatre-wide) scale with efficiency and without 
duplication of effort. Secondly, the desirability of conducting an operational level 
mobile defence in Europe was suggested because it was perceived as a better 
option to secure victory against the numerically superior wp.l OS Thirdly, it was 
felt that NATO would require better C3I (Command, Control, Communication 
and Intelligence) capability--as well as better training, interoperability and 
sustainability--to conduct the style of warfare mentioned. Finally, closer 
coordination with the air force was seen as essential if NATO's capacity to 
conduct a joint air and land operation was to be improved. In short, their support 
was based on the assumption that NATO enjoyed some advantages over the Wp 
which could be exploited to reinforce its defence. 106 
However, the military reformers' views on the conventional option, and 
particularly on mobile defence, sparked a major debate. The opposition was led, 
for example, by John Mearsheimer, who championed the cause of a defensive 
concept which combined forward defence and relatively static defence. This kind 
of defence would utilise both local mobility and the increased accuracy and 
firepower of newly-available weapon systems such as Precision Guided 
Munitions (PGMs).1 07 In the first place, he argued that the mobile defence 
lOS See Edward N. Luttwak, "The Operational Level of War," International 
Security (IS), (Winter 1980/1981), pp.61-79; and Canby, 1977, pp.164-68. 
106 See Gessert, op. cit., p.S8; Von Mellenthin and Stolfi, op. cit., p.123; 
Simpkin, 1985, pp.S2-3; and Zaloga, op. cit., p.6S, for details of NATO's 
advantages. 
107 See John Mearsheimer, 1983, chapters 6 and 7; "Precision-Guided 
Munitions and Conventional Deterrence," Survival, (Marchi April 1979), pp.68-
76· and "Maneuver, Mobile Defense, and the NATO Central Front," IS, (Winter 
, 
1981/1982), passim. See Richard K. Betts, "Conventional Strategy," IS, (Spring 
1983), pp.140-162, for criticism on the reformers' views. Also see Bellamy, 
1987, pp.297-8, for support for Mearsheimer's views. 
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concept was too risky and allowed virtually no margin for error~ nor did it favour 
the outnumbered defender and, even if the initial counter attack succeeded it 
, 
would eventually succumb to follow-on echelons. Therefore, such a situation 
would make mobile defence vulnerable to WP counter attack and envelopment. 
Finally, NATO's lack of interoperability and cooperation would make the 
operation a very difficult one to perform. 108 
Mearsheimer's criticism at the time seemed to be justified. Indeed, if 
NATO intentionally allowed WP penetration deep into its territory for mobile 
defence, which such a form of warfare would inevitably involve, it would require 
extreme agility and powerful operational reserves to deal with the breakthrough. 
Moreover, if the counter attack failed, the WP would be free to push deeper into 
NATO territory. The problem would be aggravated if there was more than one 
penetration due to the lack of operational reserves in NATO. Lastly, the lack of 
interoperability among its armies would scarcely aid the planning of any 
coordinated counter move by NATO. 
Nevertheless, there were a few discrepancies in this argument as well. 
Naturally, good defence was indeed a stronger form of warfare, but without the 
capability for a major counter offensive to restore the original status quo, it 
would be very difficult to deter the attacker in the first place. 1 09 Secondly, 
advances in technology notably brought about an exponential increase in the 
lethality of weapons--they also introduced better and more capable C3I systems 
which could be used to enhance the coordination and synchronisation of a major 
counter offensive by the defenders. Furthermore, the increase in mobility and 
108 Mearsheimer, 1983, chapters 6,7 and 8, passim. 
109 See Mearsheimer, 1983, pp.56-9, for the susceptibility of having no counter 
offensive capability against, e.g. in his analogy, 'Limited Aim Strategy.' 
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protection, as well as in the firepower and range of weapon systems, would 
allow the counter forces to be more responsive and lethal in their attack. 110 In 
short, the advances in technology favoured defence, yet they could also be 
utilised as a force multiplier to achieve economy of force and elasticity of 
defence at the operational level, which was the main focus of the military 
reformers. Particularly, Mearsheimer's view on the use of PGMs was quite 
skewed as he concentrated on the defensive potential of the weapons, whereas 
they could be equally exploited for offensive operations. 1 11 Although forward 
static defence utilising a good defensive terrain seemed to offer an economic 
solution, as it was a tactically sound deployment, it involved an equal 
distribution of forces along the entire front, making it very difficult to achieve 
economy of force at the operational level. Also, many units in forward positions 
would be operationally dislocated because of the linear nature of the defensive 
positions close to the front, which was quite vulnerable to a surprise attack. 
This debate seemed to represent the clash of the two opposing 
mentalities, since the two schools argued from distinctively different positions 
based on two opposing, yet very strongly logical, points of view. Perhaps this 
was one of the reasons for their cautious reception by the public and military. 
Despite their distinctive contribution in shedding new light on the necessity of 
exploring the operational thinking, as Richard Betts wrote, 'Both the intellectual 
power and policy weakness of reformist critiques lie in their simplicity and the 
110 See Holden Reid, op. cit., in Mackenzie and Holden Reid, 1989, p.6, for 
the view that technology strengthened both defensive and defensive-offensive 
options. 
III See Betts, 1983, P .161. Also see the same article for excellent critiques of 
the overall shortcomings of the reformist ideas, as well as other proposals. 
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clarity of their theoretical premises. ,112 This criticism could equally be applied 
to the attritional defence advocates. In the end, reformist ideas provided a useful 
framework within which NATO was able to develop a new conventional 
thinking in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Yet one of the most important lessons 
of the debate was that the evolution of both operational thinking and technology 
could not be considered in isolation, but should be exploited to supplement the 
new-found interest in enhancing NATO's conventional options. 113 
2.5.2. EMERGING TECHNOLOGY AND THE EUROPEAN SECURITY 
STUDY (ESECS) 
One of the more disturbing trends in NATO at the time was its grOWIng 
dependence on technological solutions in order to support its conventional 
improvement, as well as to off-set the WP's numerical superiority.114 As the 
debate continued, a new line of thought emerged, which stressed the possibility 
of replacing nuclear with conventional deterrence. F or example, it was 
sometimes thought that PGM technology would offer an alternative way of 
attacking objectives which previously required strikes by nuclear weapons due to 
the inaccuracy of many conventional delivery systems at the time. Even if this 
were not the case, some, like Mearsheimer, firmly trusted PGMs to be 
instrumental in the significant reinforcement of NATO's defences. 115 
112 Betts, 1983, p.162. 
113 See Flanagan, 1988, p.82. 
114 Timothy Garden, The Technology Trap, (London: Brassey's, 1989), p.3. 
115 See James A. Tegnelia, "Emerging Technology for Conventional 
Deterrence," ID&, (May 1985), p.652; and Frank Barnaby, Future War, 
(London: Multimedia, 1984), p.10. 
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Among many developments, the ESECS report entitled Strengthening 
Conventional Deterrence in Europe--Proposal for the 1980s, which was 
published in 1983, became the most influential--and controversial--work 
concerning the use of ET (Emerging Technology) in strengthening the defence 
of Europe. Briefly, this report concluded that an increase in NATO defence 
expenditure of about 4 per cent per annum would enable NATO to acquire the 
necessary high-technology equipment to deter a WP conventional attack. 116 
Although the overall emphasis of the report was on the selection of the 
technological option, it also attempted to identify the advantages and 
weaknesses of the WP, and its suggestions were centred around exploiting those 
points. The report pointed out the necessity for improvements in the following 
areas: 1) improvement in NATO's C3I, surveillance and target acquisition 
capability; 2) blunting the initial WP attack; 3) eroding WP air power (by 
counter-air); 4) attrition of the WP follow-on forces (FOFA); and 5) disruption 
of the WP C3I. Furthermore, all the missions including counter-air and 
interdiction, were expected to be accomplished with non-nuclear forces. 117 
In sum, the ET debate and ESECS report represented the strong desire 
of the West to compensate for the weakness of NATO's numerical strength and 
avoid the early use of nuclear weapons by introducing means of substituting for 
and supplementing them. In fact, its analysis was similar to those that led to the 
early work on the AirLand Battle Doctrine and to FOF A.118 Also, it indicated 
116 See the Report of the European Security Study Group (ESECS), 
Strengthening Conventional Deterrence in Europe, (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1983), for details. Also see Johannes Steinhoff, "Dream or Reality: 
Hardware for FOFA," NSN, (May 1985), pp.24-28. 
117 Steinhoff, op. cit., p.26; and Gessert, op. cit., p.56. 
118 Gessert, op. cit., p.56. 
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that ET could have benefits in bolstering NATO's conventional defence, so long 
as the notion of substitution and an overwhelming stress on the technological 
solution were avoided. 119 
2.5.3. NON-OFFENSIVE DEFENCE 
The original non-offensive defence idea was proposed in Germany in the 1950s, 
but more tangible support began appearing in the 1970s and remained strong 
within the civilian sector throughout the 1980s. 120 In essence, the non-offensive 
defence (NOD) concept meant 'structuring and organising military forces in such 
a way that they are suitable only for defence and as useless as possible for 
attack.'121 Its advocates believed that NATO defence without the offensive 
capability would be a positive factor in stabilising its deterrence structure. 122 
The controversy over ERW (Enhanced Radiation Weapon) and INF 
(Intermediate-range Nuclear Force) deployment further fuelled the cause of 
NOD, and led to the 'Without the Bomb' debate in Britain in the early 1980s. 
Above all, the supporters of NOD rejected any move, either nuclear or 
119 Karl-Heinz Kamp, "NATO's Defense--FOFA but Still Nuclear," IDE, (July 
1986), p.902, for criticism. 
120 For the discussion on NOD see: McInnes, 1990; Barnaby, 1984 and 1986. 
For the British thinking, John Baylis, Alternative Approaches to British Defence 
Policy, (London: Macmillan, 1983); Alternative Defence Commission. Without 
the Bomb, (London: Paladin, 1985); Ken Booth and John Baylis, Britain, NATO 
and Nuclear Weapons, (London: Macmillan, 1989). 
121 Niklas-Carter, op. cit., in Harris and Toase, ed., op. cit., p. 225. 
122 See Barnaby, 1986, p.161 and p.165; and 1984, p.152; and Bellamy, 1987, 
p.130. 
71 
conventional, that could be seen as offensive, including the AirLand Battle 
Doctrine and FOF A, or the maintenance of a large mobile armoured force. 123 
Yet NOD was criticised as posing a series of political and operational 
problems for NATO, both in crisis and war. 124 If NATO's declared strategy was 
based on the combination of nuclear no-first-use and defensive defence which , 
NOD advocates supported, it would be easier for the WP to choose a military 
option as they would feel less vulnerable. Also it could only lead to a war of 
attrition which NATO could not expect to win. A.J.G. Pollard clarified the point: 
'[It] is the philosophy of defensive defence that is most dangerous. [It] denies the 
conventional offensive force elements and thus questions the validity of 
deterrence.'125 This could compromise the whole essence of NATO's posture 
based on maintaining deterrence. 
2.5.4. CONVENTIONAL RETALIATION 
The conventional retaliation idea was proposed by such people as Samuel 
Huntington in his article, "Conventional Deterrence and Conventional 
Retaliation in Europe," and Elmer Dinter and Paddy Griffith in their book, Not 
over by Christmas. Their fundamental argument was that it would be a more 
credible deterrent since their proposal incorporated deterrence based on both 
123 Niklas-Carter, op. cit., in Harris and Toase, ed., op. cit., p. 225. 
124 See Keith Dunn, In Defense of NATO, (Boulder: Westview, 1990), p.82~ 
Bellamy, 1987, pp.130-1; and Michael Dewar, The Art of Deception in Warfare, 
(London: A David and Charels, 1989), p.209, for criticism. 
125 A.J.G. Pollard, "Future Defence of the Central Region," in Holden Reid and 
Dewar, ed., op. cit. p.125. 
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denial and punishment. 126 This would involve, according to Dinter and Griffith, 
taking 'tokens' by undertaking counter offensive action early in the war with 
which to secure some territorial gains in the WP territory. It was argued that 
such an action would 'reduce the risks of both a prolonged war and nuclear one' 
while strengthening NATO's 'hand at the negotiating table' in bringing a quick 
cessation of the conflict and securing 'a lasting peace' thereafter. 127 
F or example, Simpkin observed that the idea of incapacitating the 
enemy's will to carry on the fight by neutralising his rear with 'a prompt Allied 
offensive into Eastern Europe' could unhinge the WP offensive was plausible. 128 
Nonetheless, this concept was very difficult to accept, particularly because it was 
too aggressive for a defensive alliance like NATO to adopt, as well as because 
the cost of implementing the strategy was a lot higher than postulated. 129 
Despite such political and operational difficulties, as will be discussed, 
once NATO achieved a substantial improvement in its capability and regained 
confidence, a line of thought which favoured such an option became established 
in the minds of many--slowly but surely. This was the case with the formal 
endorsement of the NORTHAG concept of operation by both the Germans and 
British, the integral tenet of which was an army group counter offensive against 
the main enemy force, regardless of its location--either within or over the 1GB. 
126 See Samuel P. Huntington, "Conventional Deterrence and Conventional 
Retaliation in Europe," IS, (Winter 1983/4), pp.32-56; and Elmer Dinter and 
Paddy Griffith, Not over by Christmas, (Sussex: Anthony Bird Publications, 
1983), p.23, and passim. 
127 Dinter and Griffith, op. cit., p.23. 
128 Simpkin, 1987, p.307. 
129 See Keith A. Dunn and William O. Staudenmaier, "The Retaliatory 
Offensive and Operational realities in NATO," Survival, (May/June 1985), 
pp.1 08-118, for criticism. 
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2.6. NEW CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONAL THINKING 
2.6.1. THE US ARMY FM 100-5 AIRLAND BATTLE DOCTRINE 
The AirLand Battle Doctrine, which was first endorsed in 1982, was to 
compensate for the limitations in the Active Defense Doctrine of 1976. 13 ° 
Although Active Defense called for a return to the spirit of the offensive, seizure 
of the operational initiative and rejection of the all-firepower, all-attrition style of 
battle, in reality it focused on firepower-oriented defence, which involved lateral 
movement of the forces in all-arms operations, to achieve concentration while 
taking advantage of new weapon systems as combat multipliers to increase 
lethality.131 Consequently, it was criticised for the lack of operational level 
design by being 'inactive and unaggressive, relying once again on attrition, 
firepower and a "managerial" fix to a military problem,' which demonstrated that 
the US had yet to comprehend the principles of the operational level of war and 
was uncomfortable with the concept. 13 2 Under the circumstances, the relevance 
of manoeuvre was limited to the movement of reserves from one point to the 
130 See Robert Romjue, From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The 
Development of Army Doctrine 1973-1982, (Monroe: U.S. Army TRADOC, 
1984), passim; McInnes, 1990, chapter 5; and Paddy Griffith, Forward into 
Battle, (Novato: Presidio, 1990), chapter 6. 
131 See Griffith, 1990, pp.164-5; Bellamy, 1987, p. 132. Also see Paul H. 
Herbert, Deciding What has to be Done: General William E. Depuy and the 
1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations, (Washington, D.C.: Combat Studies 
Institute, 1988), for the background of the Active Defense Doctrine. 
132 Griffith, 1990, p.165. Also see Leonhard, op. cit., p.6.; William G. Hanne, 
"AirLand Battle: Doctrine Not Dogma," ID&, (August 1983), p.l035; and J.G. 
Williams, "The British and American Approaches to Operational Art--Where 
They Might Lead," in Mackenzie and Holden Reid, 1990, p. 18. 
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other, and, because of the lack of a coherent campaign plan, it would result in a 
piecemeal committal of the reserves. 133 
Unlike Active Defense, AirLand Battle stressed a more manoeuvre-
oriented offensive approach at the operational level, which addressed the 
demands of the European theatre as well as others, in order to adapt 'to the 
specific strategic and operational requirements of each theatre.' 134 It was an 
evolution of the earlier thoughts of the US Army on 'the integrated battlefield' 
and 'the extended battlefield.' The integrated battlefield meant combined nuclear, 
chemical and conventional operations, whereas the extended battlefield involved 
a deep attack into WP territory with the above combination in both air and land 
dimensions.1 35 Ultimately, the AirLand Battle Doctrine became the over-
arching concept under which the above two sub-concepts became integrated 
with combined conventional air and ground operations to increase both 
firepower and mobility in three-dimensional warfare. 13 6 
The new doctrine envisaged three types of battle: first, deep battle 
against the enemy follow-on forces; second, close-in battle; and third, battle in 
one's own rear against Soviet special forces (e.g. OMGs).137 It placed a 
particularly strong emphasis on deep battle. It was understood that the battle 
would be fought by both the air force with interdiction, and the army with stand-
133 . 12 See Dannatt, op. CIt., p. . 
134 The US Army, FM 100-5 Operations, (Washington, D.C., 1986), Preface. 
Also see McInnes, 1990, p.125; and Dannatt, op. cit., pp.12-3. 
135 See more on the extended and integrated battlefields in: Romjue, op. cit., 
p.43; and Gessert, op. cit., p.54. 
136 Romjue, op. cit., p. 44. 
137 See Bellamy, 1987, pp.133-4. 
75 
off firepower, armour, and attack helicopter assets against the enemy's follow-on 
echelons. 13 8 It would be conducted simultaneously with close-in battle, and 
both of them would be aimed at winning the first battle.139 The purpose would 
be to keep the enemy forces arriving for the close-in battle at a manageable level 
and to defeat them piecemeal by isolating them from the follow-on ones. 140 The 
advantage would be that a numerically inferior force could defeat a substantially 
larger foe with a combination of manoeuvre, firepower, and superior technique 
in a multi-dimensional battle. 141 Also, the doctrine postulated that technology 
favoured offensive action since it enhanced the firepower and mobility of the 
weapon systems used. In fact, it was thought that the advent of new 
conventional technology nearly detached the nuclear and chemical dimensions 
from the earlier extended battle concept, and thus it became possible to conduct 
an extended conventional war. 142 
The deep battle element in AirLand Battle had a fundamental influence in 
the ensuing development of FOF A, which stressed its hardware and technology 
aspects. Specifically, the emphasis on deep battle was seen as a willingness to 
take the war beyond the 1GB. If the extension of the battlefield by ground forces 
was forbidden, it was considered acceptable to use air power and long-range 
138 See Griffith, 1990, p.165; and Gessert, op. cit., p.54. 
139 See FM 100-5, p.2. 
140 See Niklas-Carter, op. cit., in Harris and Toase, op. cit., pp.215-6; and 
Griffith, 1990, p.165. 
141 See Gessert, op. cit., p.54; and lB.A. Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower, 
(Oxford: The Military Press, 1989), p.299. 
142 Gessert, op. cit., p.54. 
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firepower to attack across the 1GB. 143 Above all, it caused a major controversy 
in NATO over the intentions of the US, especially over possible offensive land 
operations across the border. 144 As a result, the emphasis on the deep attack 
aspects of the doctrine was significantly reduced in the 1986 revision, but 
without changes in the overall doctrinal aspects. 145 Furthermore, the possibility 
of a major counter offensive and anything supporting such an idea were officially 
dismissed. 146 
2.6.2. FOLLOW-ON FORCES ATTACK (FOFA) SUB-CONCEPT 
Similar to the AirLand Battle Doctrine, FOF A, which was officially adopted by 
NATO in 1984, postulated that the conduct of deep battle would create a major 
advantage in defence against the WP, which would significantly strengthen 
NATO's deterrence.147 Furthermore, it offered an alternative in which 
technology could replace some of the roles that were previously assigned to 
nuclear weapons. Thus, FOF A technology, which seemed to alleviate the need 
for early use of nuclear weapons, was seen as increasing the flexibility of 
143 See Bailey, op. cit., p.299. Also see the GDP, p.9. 
144 See Hansard, Debate on Army, 22 October 1984. Comment by Davies and 
Boyes, for the British criticism. 
145 See Bellamy, 1987, p.133. 
146 See Henry S. Tuttle, "Is AirLand Battle Compatible with NATO Doctrine?" 
Military Review (MR.), (December 1985), pp.8-9. 
147 See Bernard W. Rogers, "Follow-On Force Attack (FOFA): Myths and 
Realities," NATO Review (NR), (December 1984), p.6; and "Sword and Shield: 
ACE Attack of Warsaw Pact Follow-on Forces," NSN, (February-March 1983), 
p.26. 
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NATO's responses at the strategic and higher operational levels. 148 Firstly, it 
was felt that the interdiction of the isolated follow-on forces, (whose elements 
were yet to join the battle), in WP territory offered a cost-effective solution 
compared to having to fight them in contact battle. 149 It was thought that 
attacking choke points, such as major road junctions and railway systems, or 
interdicting with the enemy body while on the move, would be a very effective 
means of slowing down the advance of the WP forces. Secondly, as a part of 
FOFA, Offensive Counter-Air (OCA) operations would attack the enemy air 
force on their airfields. This was viewed as a more economic option than fighting 
the enemy aircraft one-to-one in the air. In short, it stressed the realisation of a 
combined multi-depth interdiction operation by air and land forces with which to 
take the initiative and start attrition from the early stages. 150 
However, it created a major political controversy since the perceived 
offensive nature ofFOF A, and also its reliance on conventional strike capability, 
caused concern among Europeans, particularly Germans. This concern was over 
the possibility that strong dependence on the conventional solution of FOF A 
might replace nuclear deterrence, and that NATO's intention might be viewed as 
shifting toward fostering a preemptive capability. 151 
148 See McInnes, 1991, p.40; and Kamp, op. cit., p.90l. Also see Bailey, op. 
cit., p.318, for the substitution of the inferiority of the NATO force with FOF A 
andET. 
149 See John G. Hines and Philip A. Petersen, "Is NATO Thinking Too Small?" 
ID&, (May 1986), p.572. 
150 See McInnes, 1990, p.150. 
151 See Kamp, op. cit., p.902.; and Richard Mills, "Follow-on Force Attack: 
The Need for a Critical Reassessment," RUSI and Brassey's Defence Yearbook 
1990, (London, 1990), p.136. This question, as well as other debates, was 
addressed by General Rogers' 1984 article. 
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Furthermore, the success of FOF A depended heavily on the effectiveness 
of emerging surveillance, targeting, and weapon technology. Indeed, when 
FOF A was first conceived, it was based on technologies which were still on the 
drawing board. 152 Thus, FOFA would have seriously drained AAFCE's (Allied 
Air Force Central Europe) strength to conduct the all-important air superiority 
and counter breakthrough operations, which were two of the most important 
missions outlined especially by the Germans. 153 Above all, it was felt that the 
deployment of the new technology was precarious and the complexity of high 
technology weapons and equipment was susceptible to both counter measures 
and unreliability. 154 
Also, parallel to the criticisms of the ESECS report, it was felt that 
FOF A was not as cost-effective an option as was suggested by General Bernard 
Rogers, its most powerful proponent, and then SACEUR. Although the idea of 
FOF A was very appealing, the cost involved (Rogers claimed that an estimated 4 
per cent increase per annum would suffice) was in fact prohibitive considering 
NATO had an array of other important missions to carry out. Basically, to fully 
implement the concept to the level that Rogers envisaged would have 
jeopardised other high priority missions (e.g., initial defence) by absorbing scarce 
resources. 
152 See Flanagan, 1988, pp. 66-8, for details on such weapon systems as J-
STARS (Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System), JTIDS (Joint Tactical 
Information Distribution System) and MLRS-ATACMS (Multiple Launch 
Rocket System-Army Tactical Missile System). 
153 The U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, New Technology for 
NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack. (OTA-ISC-309), (Washington, 
D.C.; US GPO, 1987), p.113. 
154 See Mills, op. cit., p.128; and McInnes, 1990, pp.154-9. 
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In addition to this, Rogers' over-enthusiastic support was seen as 
threatening, as well as liable to deplete already scarce assets. General Von 
Sandrart said in an interview that Rogers was 'running into a blind alley' without 
properly considering the implications for NATO's overall defence plan. Thus, he 
had to convince Rogers that, as the COS of the Bundeswehr, unless the FOF A 
requirements were streamlined to fit the existing NATO defence priority, it 
would not get the necessary political approval from the Alliance. Von Sandrart 
added that he suggested the building of a 'Conceptual Military Framework 
(CMF)' to review FOF A. 155 As a result, his proposed CMF became an official 
review body within NATO in December 1985 following the endorsement of the 
initial report on Conventional Defence Improvements (CDI) in May. CDI was a 
move to conduct a long-term defence planning of NATO's defence priorities 
which enabled the carrying-out of the CMF review on the original FOF A 
requirements as a part of its initiative. 156 Thereafter, the emphasis on FOF A 
was somewhat toned down under the CMF review. 
155 Interview, Von Sandrart. 
156 SD 1986, para. 315-7. Also see Dunn, op. cit., p.85; and James Moray 
Stewart, "Conventional Defence Improvements--Where is the Alliance Going?" 
~ (July 1985), p.6. 
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2.7. THE ORIGINS OF BAGNALL'S IDEAS 
2.7.1. THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATION OF BAGNALL'S IDEAS 
Despite the fact that many plausible ideas appeared at the time of Bagnall's 
formulation of a new operational concept, he based his thinking exclusively on 
studies of the German experience in the Second World War. He paid particular 
attention to its mobile defence/counter stroke operations on the Eastern front 
through extensive research of the lessons of the war from books. 157 Some of 
these books include Panzer Battles by Von Mellenthin, On Tactics by Herman 
Balck and Von Mellenthin, and The Rommel Papers edited by Liddell Hart. 158 
Moreover, talks with such people as Generals Balck and Von Mellenthin proved 
to be important as well. In fact, Balck and Von Manstein's counter stroke 
operations were the model which Bagnall used for the development of his mobile 
defence concept. 159 
The logic behind Bagnall's approach was quite simple; by examining the 
historical references to the Russian defeats in battle by the Germans during 
World War Two, he hoped to discover how the outnumbered Germans had 
repeatedly been able to beat the Russians (mainly through mobile defence), so 
157 Interview, Bagnall on 5 May 1993. 
158 The list was provided courtesy of Field Marshal Bagnall. Other titles 
include: Ordnung in Chaos and Panzer Operationen by General Herman Balck; 
Verlorene Siege by Mellenthin; Der Gegenschlag by General Von Senger und 
Etterlin; Korpsabteilung by Lt. General Wolfgang Leuge; Mittlere Ost Front and 
Panzer Operationen by General Cerd Nicpold; Deutschen Panzerwaffe by 
Wachzer Nehriging; Der Geschichte Der Panzer Lehr Division by Brigadier 
General Helmut Ritgem; Panzer Operationen by General Herman Hoth; etc. 
159 Interview, Bagnall on 5 May 1993. See chapter 8 for more on analyses of 
the validity of the concept. 
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that he might apply the principles behind the former's success to the situation at 
his own time. This approach was largely justified in that he himself had to defend 
against the Russians, whose operational thinking remained similar to that which 
they had applied in the past--deep attack and OMG. 
Specifically, Bagnall was attracted by the fact that a small but highly-
motivated force conducting offensive action with surprise was able to defeat a 
big army, as the German forces often did during 1943 when they were retreating 
from Russia. 160 Thus, the German operations offered a small force a viable 
alternative to successfully counter a considerably larger one. Also, the Germans 
succeeded in securing surprise by offensive action, and their effort to dislocate 
the defenders in depth was accomplished quickly through the maintenance of the 
initiative and momentum of forces by deliberately attacking the defender's 
weakness while avoiding his strength. Furthermore, the Germans were equipped, 
both physically and psychologically, to conduct such a high-tempo operation. 
They had command flexibility, which was governed by directive control 
(Auftragstaktik), while maintaining clarity of direction and purpose of attack 
(Schwerpunkt ).161 Meanwhile, their forces consisted of armoured and 
mechanised infantry forces with dedicated CAS (Close Air Support) by the 
Luftwaffe, all of which were committed to maximising the speed of their 
operation. This was a classic joint land/air operation at the operational level. 162 
160 Interview, Bagnall on 6 November 1993. See Macksey, 1991, chapters 5 
and 6 for the details of the German operations in the Eastern Front. 
161 See Edward Luttwak, Strategy and Politics, (New Brunswick: Transaction 
Books, 1980), p.299, for a comparison between the German and British 
command styles during the Second World War. Also see Lind, op. cit.. p.18, for 
Schwerpunkt. See 7.2.2. for more on Auftragstaktik. 
162 See Luttwak, 1980, p.300. 
82 
Bagnall did not utilise the British literature and experience (such as the 
Arras counter stroke in 1940) in formulating his concept, unlike some British 
officers and academics who seemed keener to use the British experience in Arras 
as the main example of a successful counter stroke. 163 After all, the Arras 
counter stroke, during which a handful of British armoured and infantry forces 
were able to stop Rommel's 7th Panzer division, was a model example of how a 
hasty counter stroke by a small disorganised force could bring about spectacular 
results, if surprise was achieved. 164 Although the operation was a glorious 
failure, it did succeed in slowing the enemy down, and showed that even a failed 
counter stroke could have a major benefit at the operational level. 165 While 
understanding such an advantage and wishing a tactical battle to be fought in 
such a manner, Bagnall nevertheless managed to mitigate the arbitrariness and 
peculiarity of his choice of the German World War Two practice as his guideline 
by stressing that the Arras experience was too small and isolated to be used as 
the general background for his concept, whereas the German successes offered a 
wider and more concise set of concepts to be utilised. 166 
The same applies to Bagnall's ignorance of the Israeli operations during 
the 1967 and 1973 wars, although the kind of operation he envisaged would be 
closer to the combination of the Israeli operations in the Sinai and Golan Heights 
163 See Halbadier, op. cit., passim; and Brian Bond, "Arras, 21 May 1940: A 
Case Study in the Counter-Stroke," in Barnett, Bidwell, Bond, Harding and 
Terraine, op. cit., passim. 
164 Halbadier, op. cit., pp.31-2; and Bond, op. cit., in Barnett, Bidwell, Bond, 
Harding and Terraine, op. cit., pp.82-3. 
165 See McInnes, 1988, p.385; and Bond, op. cit., in Barnett, Bidwell, Bond, 
Harding and Terraine, op. cit., passim. 
166 Interviews, Bagnall on 6 November 1993 and 4 May 1994. 
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during the Yom Kippur War as will be discussed in chapter 8. It can be argued 
that perhaps he paid more attention to the German experience partly because he 
was able to read and speak German, which enabled him to consult the German 
material from early on in his career. 167 Another major factor was his recognition 
of the fact that what the Israelis did was not dissimilar from what the Germans 
had done earlier, and he verified this during his visit to Israel when he was a 
Defence Fellow in Oxford during 1972-3. 168 He was thus persuaded to stick 
with the original German concept, of which he felt he had more knowledge. 
2.7.2. RELATIONSHIP WITH THE EARLIER PROPOSALS 
Since Bagnall's concept was developed based on his own assessment of 1) the 
various political, strategic, and operational situations during the 1970s and the 
early 1980s (see next chapter for details); and 2) the conditions the British and 
other corps in NORTHAG had to face, the evolution of his idea was quite an 
isolated and independent process. A number of interviews I have conducted with 
him revealed that the foundation of his ideas was indeed the work of an 
individual, the origin of which lay with the all-important goal of finding an 
alternative style of warfare to the attritional posture under which NORTHAG 
would not be able to offer an effective defence against the WP. He concluded 
that such a deficiency would result in a rapid collapse of the army group's 
defence, and it would be forced to use nuclear weapons at quite an early stage of 
167 Interview, Bagnall on 6 November 1993. 
168 Interview, Bagnall on 6 November 1993. Also see Carver, op. cit., chapter 
4 for the intellectual root of and the German influence on the Israeli operations. 
, 
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the conflict (in fact he postulated that their use would be necessary from day 
one).1 69 
In relation to contending notions of conventional improvement at the 
time, his earlier ideas, more than those of any other reformer, shared a similar 
logical foundation with the military reformers--finding a way to increase the 
prowess of the NATO forces with a doctrinal rationalisation and improvement in 
command performance, which would then enable its forces to exploit more 
manoeuvre-oriented warfare at the operational level. 
However, there were several fundamental differences between the two. 
Most of all, as I shall argue in chapters 4 and 5, Bagnall's ideas were certainly 
neither about undertaking a defence-in-depth for the sake of mobile defence, nor 
about taking unnecessary chances by embracing an all-mobile battle. In fact, 
Bagnall's concept could be summarised as a combination of positional defence in 
strong areas and mobile defence while taking advantage of firepower, initially to 
deny the WP quick penetration, and then to rapidly exploit the successes by 
counter attack, or counter stroke, throughout the front during the early hours of 
the conflict to create an opportunity for an operational counter offensive to 
defeat the enemy's main force. In this sense, Bagnall's concept did not suffer 
from the same ambiguity and simplicity as the reformers' concept did (as 
criticised by Betts), but had a clear purpose, and the plans and means with which 
to achieve this goal. 
Nonetheless, as will be discussed in chapters 4, 6 and 7, technology was 
to playa major role in the implementation and expansion of his concept because 
it was seen by him as a major force-multiplier, whereby a better use of the 
resources, as well as significant improvements on existing firepower without an 
169 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May and 6 November 1993 and 4 May 1994. 
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increase in the number of assets or overhead, could be achieved. Meanwhile, 
because of the dubious strategic logic which did not consider the vital 
requirements for deterrence, NOD was quickly and persistently resisted by 
Bagnall and the military as a whole. 170 At the same time, although he accepted 
that the conventional retaliation concept was too ambitious and could have a 
number of political and strategic ramifications, Bagnall did see its operational 
logic and validity. In fact, as will be discussed in chapter 6, Bagnall's concept 
unwittingly evolved into something similar to the conventional retaliation 
concept once NORTHAG achieved substantial growth in its capacity and 
confidence by way of the reforms. 
In sum, other than sharing some intellectual and logical roots, Bagnall's 
concept of operation was neither influenced by, nor did it ever rely on, the 
debates and contending ideas at the time. Moreover, it had no relation to the US 
AirLand Battle Doctrine and the FOF A sub-concept (I shall discuss this further 
in chapter 4). At least this was the case when the new concept was developed 
and being implemented in the Army during the early stage of reforms and until 
Bagnall retired. 171 
However, despite Bagnall's earlier lack of interest, it was inevitable that 
the new concept eventually paid more attention to other Allies' doctrines, 
especially the American thinking and practice, because of the necessity to 
operate effectively under the joint environment in an Alliance-wide operation. 
Also there were some lessons to be learned since the US Army was the only 
force which was capable of conducting an operational level operation 
170 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993, Farndale on 21 June, Kenny and Inge. 
171 Interviews, Bagnall on 4 May 1994, Farndale on 19 May 1994 and Inge. 
86 
independently. 1 72 As will be discussed in chapter 8, such an effort paid off 
during the Gulf War, when the British Army was able to effectively conduct joint 
operations with the US Army, and this was why the Army's new doctrine, Army 
Doctrinal Publication (ADP)--Operations, attempts to use similar language and 
the operational terminology as the US AirLand Battle Doctrine. 
172 See Holden Reid, op. cit., in Mackenzie and Holden Reid, 1989, p.8. 
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2.S. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of the discussions of various subjects in this chapter has been to 
show the historical background which gave rise to Bagnall's reforms. There were 
many political and strategic factors which determined the size and capacity of the 
British Army and BAOR; however, the main policy consideration remained 
domestic economic conditions. Over the thirty-plus years from the end of the 
Second World War to the end of the 1970s, the Army had to accept the gradual 
dilapidation of its strength. The changes in structure and operational thinking 
during this period were a constant balancing act between the shrinking resources 
and the requirement of maintaining a certain degree of efficiency in the force. 
There were conscious efforts to offer the best plausible solution under the 
circumstances, but they had a limited effect, and BAOR's operational thinking 
remained fundamentally tactical because of the overall shortage of resources and 
the enduring reliance on positional defence. Nor did the British Army's tradition, 
which embraced the regimental system and the traditional set-piece approach to 
a war, offer any help to solve this problem. As a result, the British corps concept 
until the end of the 1970s was based on a battle of attrition which involved 
successive withdrawals to the next planned defence line while offering some 
ambushes and tactical counter attacks. 
Other corps in NORTHAG were suffering from similar economic and 
operational constraints. Most of all, the trouble with such passive operational 
thinking was its lack of credibility. For instance, as Field Marshal Inge pointed 
out in an interview, the British operational concept, as well as others, was so 
static and unrealistic that even the numerous exercises in Germany failed to test 
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its conceptual integrity)73 As a result, few people, especially in the 1970s, 
believed that NORTHAG would hold the position conventionally for long)74 
Hence, NORTHAG's fighting-power and prospect for successful defence of the 
army group suffered a great deal due to both the diminishing financial resources 
and the negligence demonstrated by some members, especially by the Belgians 
and Dutch. 
Therefore, the principal determinant, and the most influential impetus, 
underlying Bagnall's reforms was to find an alternative to this problem once and 
for all, and to allow for a better utilisation of limited resources, while promoting 
a more active and positive spirit that could offer a realistic chance of defending 
the NORTHAG sector. To Bagnall, and many others who supported his efforts, 
the adoption of the operational level concept, which could be taken up by all 
members of the army group, was the only plausible solution towards achieving 
this goal, as well as the best remedy to correct the previous deficiency--both 
mental and physical--ofthe army group. 
This was one of the major reasons underlying the isolated nature of the 
development of Bagnall's concept; it was formulated exclusively for use in 
NORTHAG, whereas other major contending ideas at the time looked at the 
overall aspects of NATO's conventional defence. In this sense, Bagnall's 
sometimes skewed and dismissive views on incorporating historical experience 
other than that of the Germans could be justified because of his conviction that 
this particular experience offered the best lessons to his corps and army group. 
173 Interview, Inge. 
174 Interviews, Bagnall 5 May 1993 and Farndale on 14 April 1993. Also see 
Hackett, op. cit., p.3 28. 
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POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENTS 
BEFORE THE REFORMS 
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3.1. INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this chapter is to identify and examine the major political and strategic 
developments during the 1970s and early 1980s which had a profound bearing in the 
formulation of the reforms. Understanding the British Army's perception of these 
issues, all of which were identified by Bagnall and the supporters of his reforms as 
seriously compromising for NATO's deterrence, is critical in tracing the logic of the 
formulation and the course of the implementation of the reforms. 
The main arguments and rationale which were offered by Bagnall and others 
were as follows: firstly, they were becoming progressively more discontented with 
the existing implementation of NATO's Flexible Response. It was felt that the 
strategy was becoming increasingly less feasible as the Soviet Union had achieved 
substantial improvements in both tactical and strategic nuclear capability in the 1970s. 
Due to the inadequacy of NATO's conventional defence, nuclear weapons had to be 
used quite early in a conflict, but this in turn could trigger a devastating nuclear 
response. Secondly, they believed that the Soviets and WP acquired de facto 
conventional superiority over NATO as a result of a persistent build-up during the 
1960s and 1970s. One of the major strategic implications was that the WP would be 
able to launch a conventional-only standing start (or short warning) attack. Thirdly, 
Bagnall recognised that NORTHAG's posture in the 1970s was a liability as the West 
German 'over-literal interpretation' offorward defence ignored the mal-deployment of 
forces near the 1GB. 1 It was thought that, without modifying the German perception 
of the strategy, NORTHAG's defence would rapidly succumb to the WP onslaught. 
Thus this chapter examines these various perceptions in more detail. 
1 Bagnall, 1984, p.60. 
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It also assesses the impact of the 1981 defence review, which was the first 
major reassessment of Britain's defence policy by the new Conservative government. 
This is examined in order to evaluate the role of the government in supporting the 
initiation and promotion of the reforms, and thus to determine the political gains 
which the new right-wing government established by openly supporting the reforms, 
as well as the benefits which the Army enjoyed through such actions. 
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3.2. THE BRITISH ARMY LEADERSHIPS'S PERCEPTION OF NATO'S 
NUCLEAR DETERRENCE 
3.2.1. NATO'S NUCLEAR DETERRENCE 
• Flexible Response 
NATO's hope of reinforcing deterrence with the adoption of MC (Military 
Committee) 14/3 Flexible Response disappeared soon after it was formally endorsed 
in 1967 by NATO. It was a hope of the US that flexible response would eventually 
convince Europe to foster an adequate capability to conduct conventional war, 
although they acknowledged that the adoption of a strategy based on a major non-
nuclear option was not possible.2 
However, Europe saw the US argument, and especially the possibility of a 
WP limited attack, to be implausible and decided that there was no need to prepare 
for such a contingency. Even in the case of conventional war, it was thought, Europe 
would not escape ravages which would be little better than the destruction caused by 
a nuclear war. As a result, Europe put its faith firmly in nuclear deterrence, and 
opposed any move which it regarded as weakening deterrence.3 Furthermore, along 
with the persisting notion that deterrence was best served by the nuclear threat and 
the serious disparity in the conventional balance with the WP, both the economic and 
2 See Jane Stromseth, The Origins of Flexible Response, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1989), p.60, and p.177; and Stephen Flanagan, NATO's Conventional 
Defenses, (London: Macmillan, 1988), p.18. 
3 See Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1989), pp.294-5; and Stromseth, op. cit., p. 176 and p.181. 
93 
Istitutional hesitation of Europe against an Increase in the defence budget to 
nplement the goal proved to be additional barriers. 4 
As a result, the controversy caused a major rift in the Alliance as de Gaulle's 
irance withdrew from NATO's military structure, arguing from a position of extreme 
leterrence.5 Germany, too, was disappointed by such hesitation. It placed its trust 
irmly in the Alliance to adhere to the principles of forward defence, as it was felt that 
he strategy fulfilled the ultimate security aim of the Federal Republic of Germany 
FRG) and justified its membership of NATO. Therefore, any move which was seen 
~s a weakening of such a security framework and nuclear deterrence, thus exposing 
ts territory to a possible war, was bound to face major opposition and discontent in 
}ermany. Thereafter, the FRG played an increasingly assertive role in NATO, 
~specially after the French withdrawal, to compensate for the supposed weakness 
:reated by the new strategy and to secure its own security imperatives.6 In short, the 
eactions of Europe to Flexible Response were negative as they began questioning 
he US commitment and nuclear guarantee. 
Strong FRG insistence on forward defence without a substantial conventional 
mprovement in the end left NATO agreeing on Flexible Response, while failing to 
evise the fundamental flaw in Massive Retaliation. Ultimately, it was only ready for a 
nodest improvement of its conventional strength.7 The controversy yielded no 
. See Stromseth, op. cit., pp.189-192. 
I See Hew Strachan, European Armies and the Conduct of War, (London: George 
~llen and Unwin, 1980), p.195. 
I See Phil Williams, "Nuclear Weapons in Europe in the 1990s," in Holden Reid and 
)ewar, op. cit., pp.47-52, for background. 
See Flanagan, 1988, p.18. See chapter 3.4.1. for more on the conventional balance. 
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substantial improvement while creating a major political split in the Alliance in the 
early days. Meanwhile, regardless of the earlier problems, it did succeed in at least 
laying down a framework on which NATO's conventional improvement, which came 
later, would be based . 
• Nuclear No-Early-Use 
The impetus for strengthening the conventional pillar of NATO's Flexible Response 
came in the early 1970s. The new decade began as the US accepted nuclear parity 
with the Soviet Union as the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I) was 
signed in May 1972. The acknowledgement of nuclear parity made it difficult for the 
US to maintain a strategy based on the threat of nuclear weapons against the Soviet 
Union. Europe also realised that it could not enjoy the same degree of protection 
under the US nuclear umbrella and, under the circumstances, the improvement of 
conventional forces would actually strengthen deterrence. 8 
The European perception was further galvanised by growing public discontent 
with NATO's deterrence posture, and in particular against its handling of the ERW 
and INF controversies. Naturally enough, the European public became opposed to 
the very idea that nuclear weapons could be used in Europe, since it was they who 
would have to bear the consequences. Furthermore, the nature of those short and 
intermediate range weapons, which were both easier to use and confinable to nuclear 
8 See William Park, Defending the West, (Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books, 1986), 
p.140; and Freedman, 1989, p.384. 
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exchange within Europe, reinforced the European public's abhorrence of the fact that 
the US would be able to fight a limited nuclear war.9 
These developments in the 1970s, along with the US pressure on Europe to 
comply with the LTDP (Long Term Defence Programme) goals, acted as a strong 
influence fostering the rise of a nuclear no-early-use consensus throughout Europe in 
the late-1970s and early-1980s. 10 The major debate on nuclear no-first-use was 
initiated when the so-called 'gang of four' of former US officials, Robert McNamara, 
McGeorge Bundy, George Kennan and Gerard Smith, contributed an article to 
Foreign Affairs in 1982.11 They emphasised that 'rather than depending on the option 
of responding to a WP conventional attack with nuclear weapons if necessary--as 
provided under Flexible Response--NATO should make an explicit commitment to 
deter and defend against a non-nuclear attack with non-nuclear forces alone.'12 They 
claimed that this would enhance the political cohesiveness of NATO and facilitate a 
serious effort to improve its conventional defence. 
The major argument of opponents of the no-first-use option both in Europe 
and the US was that it would, most of all, weaken deterrence, as well as endanger the 
political cohesion of the Alliance because it would be seen in Europe, and especially 
by Germany, as a weakening of US commitment. Moreover, there were many 
9 See Freedman, 1989, pp.385-6; and Lawrence Freedman, "Europe between the 
Superpowers," in Gerald Segal, Edwina Moreton, Lawrence Freedman, and John 
Baylis, Nuclear War and Nuclear Peace, (London: Macmillan, 1983), p.98. 
10 Stromseth, op. cit., pp.195-197. 
11 McGeorge Bundy, George Kennan, Robert McNamara and Gerard Smith, 
"Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance," Foreign Affairs (FA), (Spring 1982), 
pp.753-768. 
12 Stromseth, op. cit., pp.200-202. 
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political and econonuc difficulties In achieving the necessary improvements in 
NATO's conventional forces, and it was felt that such a declaration would 
automatically strengthen the Soviets' operational hand. 13 
By the early 1980s, no-first-use was already receiving widespread support 
throughout Europe, and although NATO did not admit that it would officially adopt 
such an option, there was a tacit acknowledgement that it would consider 'no-early-
use. ,14 As a result, the notion of a more effective conventional defence began 
receiving growing support, while it was stressed that the purely conventional 
deterrence option should not be considered. 15 
3.2.2. THE BRITISH ARMY LEADERSHIP'S NUCLEAR NO-EARLY-USE 
THINKING 
In the late 1970's, many senior British Army officers came to hold the view that 
raising the nuclear threshold by prolonging conventional resistance would reinforce 
13 See Karl Kaiser, George Leber, Alois Mertes and Franz-Josef Schulze, "Nuclear 
Weapons and the Preservation of Peace," FA, (Summer 1982), pp.1157-1170; R.A. 
Mason, "Military Strategy," in Edwina Moreton and Gerald Segal, ed., Soviet 
Strategy Toward Western Europe, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), pp.194-
195; and Stromseth, op. cit., pp.203-5. See Neville Brown and Anthony Farrar-
Hockley, Nuclear First Use, (London: Buchan and Enright, 1985), pp.l02-3, for the 
British opposition against 'no-first-use.' Also see two articles, one by Michael Carver, 
"Towards a No-First-Use Policy," and the other by Jonathan Alford, "A Sceptical 
View of "No-First-Use," in "Nuclear Weapons in the Defence of Europe: Two 
Viewpoints," Conflict Quarterly (CQ), (Winter 1984), pp.5-16, for an example of a 
British debate on the issue. 
14 Stromseth, op. cit., pp.206-207. 
15 See Michael 1. Bell, "Flexible Response--Is It Still Relevant?" NR (April 1988), 
p. 14 and p .17. 
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the deterrent value of nuclear weapons by making the threat of their use more 
credible in the era of nuclear parity. 16 Most of all, they felt that Flexible Response at 
the time meant little more than nuclear early use due to NATO's inability to put up a 
convincing conventional defence against the WP. 1 7 
One of the most serious consequences of the lack of strong conventional 
capability was that, as Bagnall said in an interview, the possible paralysis of the 
political leadership could result in its failing to draft specific options and responses 
according to the developing situation, because it might not have sufficient time as 
NATO's defence collapsed rapidly.1 8 Indeed, the military was apprehensive of the 
possibility of failing to reach a consensus on the use of nuclear weapons in time when 
this was genuinely required. Famdale added: 'When we had Massive Retaliation [and 
in the early days of Flexible Response], we relied on politicians to fire nuclear 
weapons as soon as the Russians set a foot on the 1GB. What if politicians didn't do 
that? . . . If politicians couldn't make the decision in the first minute, we were in 
trouble.' 19 The aim of the military, he said, was to be assured of its own capability, 
and ready to counter any unforeseen eventuality to assist the political leadership in 
maintaining control of the crisis. 
It was thus hoped that no-early-use would mitigate the risk of the Alliance 
failing to authorise nuclear release at a critical stage, and so avoid a crack in its 
cohesion. Simultaneously, NATO's successful defence would bolster the confidence 
16 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993, Carver and Famdale on 21 June 1993. Also 
see Michael Carver, A Policy for Peace, (London: Faber and Faber, 1982), pp.l0-12. 
17 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993 and F amdale on 21 June 1993. 
18 Interview, Bagnall on 5 May 1993. 
19 Interview, Famdale on 21 June 1993. 
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of the defenders to go on fighting, demonstrating in the eyes of the enemy its stem 
resolution and capability to resist and, if it became necessary, to go to the top of the 
nuclear ladder to defend its interests. Famdale emphasised that: 
We had to take all these [political] factors into consideration as well as the 
military .... There were those who weren't very keen on fighting at all. There 
were some people who even said if [war] had come, it would be better to 
surrender.... So it was to mould together a collection of different national 
armies into one plan, and they all had slightly different national priorities, and 
different national capabilities and so on.20 
Indeed, if the WP succeeded in pulling off a spectacular penetration of NATO's 
defence in depth using conventional means alone, some countries in the Alliance 
could have chosen to surrender rather than suffer horrific damages to their population 
from a nuclear exchange. NATO had to be able to show both to the enemy and the 
allies that it was capable of maintaining solidarity even under extreme pressure. 
Under the circumstances, Bagnall and Famdale's assumption that a higher 
threshold in nuclear deterrence would offer many strategic and operational 
advantages was correct. One of the most visible benefits would be that the threat of 
nuclear use would have been credible because it would be logical rather than forced. 
It was felt that the early-use option could have led to retaliation from the WP and, 
eventually, to an early full strategic exchange. Moreover, both Bagnall and Famdale 
emphasised in interviews that, in many ways, the threat of nuclear use was a bluff 
based on the uncertainty in Soviet minds about the risk of escalation and the fact that 
no-early-use provided better options in strengthening NATO's hand.21 Above all, 
20 Interview, Famdale on 14 April 1993. See Beatrice Heuser, "Warsaw Pact 
Military Doctrine in the 1970s and 1980s: Findings in the East German Archives," 
Comparative Strategy (CS), (Vol. 12, 1993), p.441, for the Soviet intention to 
exploit such a weakness to neutralise some members' determination to fight a war. 
21 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993 and Famdale on 21 June 1993. 
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Bagnall's intention was focused on the strengthening of Flexible Response to the level 
which had been initially envisaged in 1967. 
3.2.3. THE BRITISH ARMY LEADERSHIP'S VIEWS ON TACTICAL 
NUCLEAR WEAPONS: INF VS. SNF (SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR 
FORCES) 
Bagnall's vision of the higher nuclear threshold, however, did not imply an indefinite 
delay in the use of nuclear weapons, like that of no-first-use advocates. In other 
words, he thought that nuclear 'no-first-use' was an incredible option, whereas 'no-
early-use' could be beneficial for both deterrence and defence. In fact, Bagnall 
explicitly stated that, 'you can never reduce first use because it is lowering deterrent 
value .... but the use should be the last resort rather than the first. ,22 
In his view, nuclear no-early-use had three critical consequences, which cast 
doubt on the utility of short-range TNWs, or SNFs. Firstly, delaying their use until 
the conventional battle was already lost would have meant that target acquisition and 
information about the location of NATO troops would have made their selective 
application virtually impossible; one would have had to fire them at unconfirmed 
targets in depth with no certainty of achieving effective results.23 
Secondly, unless the release of SNFs was authorised at an early stage, their 
use would have to be made in NORTHAG's territory. Quite apart from the civilian 
damage, this would have made the defender's own defensive operation impossible, 
22 Interview, Bagnall on 5 May 1993. Also see, Nigel Bagnall, "The Future of 
Landi Air Warfare," in Boyd -Carpenter, op. cit., p. 153. 
23 Interview, Bagnall on 6 November 1993. 
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because they would have caused extensive damage to the NATO forces which would 
be intermingled with the WP forces. Particularly, considering the speed of an OMG 
advance racing towards the army group's rear areas, the use of SNFs at the later 
stage would have been impossible. 24 
Thirdly, even if their use was eventually authorised, it would be doubtful 
whether the SNF attack would be sufficient to persuade the WP to stop its assault 
while it was making significant progress in breaching NATO defences in depth; their 
use at that stage would trigger a Soviet response--in Famdale's words, 'a reply in kind 
but on a much increased scale'--by the WP to accelerate NATO's capitulation.25 In 
response, NATO's nuclear retaliation would have to be even larger in scale to be 
credible because any lesser or equal reply would only reaffirm its fear. As Simpkin 
postulated, this would quickly result in, at least, an immediate theatre nuclear 
exchange as NATO and the WP would compete to establish control against each 
other.26 It would, therefore, have started a rapid escalation of the conflict to a full-
scale nuclear war. 
In short, their delayed use would have effectively dismissed the utility of 
SNF s, while the inevitable initial hesitation of politicians to cross the nuclear 
threshold would make early use almost impossible anyway. What these conditions 
pointed to was that, in order to use SNFs, NORTHAG would have to utilise them at 
the early stage of the conflict in a timely manner. 
24 See more on 3.4.2. on the OMG. 
25 Famdale, 1988--A, p.23. 
26· ki 985 ... SImp n, 1 , p.XX1ll. 
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However, this was the very thing which Bagnall wanted to avoid by providing 
stronger conventional defence, which was to prevent this situation from developing in 
the first place by aiming at reaching a level of conventional improvement at which 
reliance on SNFs for initial defence could be avoided.27 Under his vision, therefore, 
the utility of TNWs in NORTHAG's defence, and particularly the operational utility 
of SNFs, was considered to be Just about nil. ,28 
Essentially, the logic of Bagnall's thinking was founded on the fact that 
nuclear use at the early stage of a war to compensate for NORTHAG's weak 
conventional defence would make it impossible for him to maintain control of the 
battle, as well as inevitably causing a rapid escalation of the conflict. Also, the role of 
SNF s, which were designed for battlefield use, was a fallacy because, regardless of 
size, they were still nuclear weapons which could change the nature of the conflict 
altogether. Thus, if what NATO wanted was the maintenance of deterrence, the 
threat of nuclear use had to be credible, and this required NATO to be prepared, once 
it was ready to cross the nuclear threshold, to go all the way up the nuclear ladder in 
quick succession so that the WP would not get away with an easy victory. In any 
case, the use of SNFs would not be sufficiently credible as a sign of NATO's 
determination. 
The rationale behind his reforms was that NATO would have to take a 
'thoroughly offensive response to an act of aggression,' on the basis of a strong 
conventional defence to convince the WP that it could only win by resorting to its 
own nuclear use--something which both sides knew could not result in any kind of 
27 A similar view can be found on Von Mellenthin and Stolfi, op. cit., p.121. 
28 Nigel Bagnall, "The Central Front: A Strategic Overview," in Holden Reid and 
Dewar, op. cit., p.241. 
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victory.29 As a result, Bagnall wanted to discard what he called the deployment of 
the 'militarily valueless' short-range TNWs altogether, and replace them with long-
range weapons (possibly the Lance replacement) to complement the use of the 
INF.30 
Bagnall's operational and strategic considerations were echoed in the 
prevailing debates on the utility of SNF in the Alliance, which were triggered by the 
INF deployment decision in 1979. It was noted, especially by the FRG and Britain, 
that the operational vulnerability of the SNF s, and the fallacy of the way of thinking 
which viewed them as pure battlefield weapons, the primary task of which was to 
stop enemy breakthroughs.31 In fact, they concluded that the early use of SNF s 
would create an array of problems, including the command and control difficulty. 
Also, the fact that their survivability would be in doubt due to their proximate 
deployment to the front (given the WP doctrinal emphasis on deep attack), and thus 
the inevitability of their use inside or near the 1GB, became a serious concern. 32 
29 Bagnall, op. cit., in Boyd-Carpenter, op.cit., p.1S3. 
30 Bagnall, op. cit., in Holden Reid and Dewar, op. cit., p. 241. The British capability 
to deliver nuclear weapons did not really suffer even after the signing of the INF 
treaty in 1987 because it has traditionally depended more on aircraft delivering them 
to the intermediate-range. Interview, Farndale on 21 June 1993. Also see Tom 
Halverson, The Last Great Nuclear Debate: NATO and Short-range Nuclear 
Weapons in the 1980s, (Doctoral Thesis: King's College London, 1992), p.297. 
31 Halverson, op. cit., p.67, p.70 and pp.388-9. 
32 Halverson, op. cit., pp.67-74. See Freedman, 1989, p.399 and pp.417-20; 
Lawrence Freedman, "Britain's Nuclear Commitment to Germany," pp.191-7; Hugh 
Beach, "Flexible Response and Nuclear weapons: A British View," pp.131-3; Franz-
Joseph Schulze, "Conventional and Nuclear Forces and their Interaction in the 
Defence of Europe," pp. 116-121, all in Kaiser and Roper, op. cit.; David Schwartz, 
NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas, (Washington, D.C.; The Brookings Institution, 1983), 
chapter 7, on the subject of the INF and SNF debates. 
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This judgement closely paralleled what Bagnall had outlined, and led to the 
question of whether it was credible to use nuclear weapons against a WP 
conventional attack. This mirrored the increasing desire of the Alliance, and 
particularly the FRG, to counter a WP conventional attack with conventional means 
alone, despite the knowledge that the process of the Bundeswehr adopting this view 
was slow in coming. In fact, the FRG's heavy reliance on nuclear deterrence remained 
as strong as ever when Bagnall introduced his reforms. 3 3 
Nevertheless, this indicated that the Germans began recognising the attraction 
of a strong conventional defence, which was the only viable alternative to the early 
use of SNFs; and namely that the use of nuclear weapons should be to send a political 
message and for the purpose of defence alone.34 By the mid-1980s, the SNFs were 
pushed to the back of the British Army's mind and the sort of rationalisation which 
Bagnall developed became widely accepted by the Alliance, including the FRG.35 It 
was a recognition by the FRG that a strong conventional capability was a measure 
aimed not only at strengthening defence, but also at reinforcing deterrence--the core 
on which Bagnall's reforms were based.36 
Eventually, the role of SNF in NATO was significantly reduced--in fact, to a 
level close to Bagnall's and Farndale's ideas on the use of TNWs in NORTHAG's 
defence. Where SNFs (especially long-range systems) were still thought to play an 
important part was in a major strategic or theatre nuclear retaliation, especially when 
33 Interview, General Leopold Chalupa on 12 May 1993. 
34 Halverson, op. cit., p.75, p.224 and p.389. 
35 Halverson, op. cit., p.298 and p.388. 
36 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993, Farndale on 21 June 1993 and Von Sandrart. 
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used concurrently with INFs in a major retaliatory or warnmg strike. Farndale 
labelled them as 'vital to stop the conventional breakthrough. ,3 7 Specifically, Bagnall 
and F amdale thought SNF s would be vital in preventing the WP from winning the 
war as it would still be pushing towards the west amidst the strategic and INF 
exchanges.38 
This in fact verified that the use of nuclear weapons for many in the British 
Army's eyes had become a last resort. Yet, according to Bagnall and Famdale, 
although the changes in the views in the leadership of the Army coincided with the 
no-early-use and SNF debate at the time, the logic behind its perception was not 
developed to satisfy the growing public and political desires at the time. 3 9 In fact, its 
primary logic was formulated to offer solutions to many operational problems 
stemming from nuclear early use, especially of SNFs. Nonetheless, as Halverson 
wrote in his thesis, the governments of the UK and West Germany became firmly 
supportive of INF as the weapon of the first line use for warning purposes as their 
dissatisfaction with the US nuclear thinking led them question its policy more 
openly.40 The changes in the Army's views were in line with the changes in the 
perception of political establishments. 
Consequently, Bagnall's reforms had to secure sufficient conventional 
capability to be able to undertake missions which were previously assigned to, or 
depended upon, nuclear weapons. As I shall show in chapters 4, 5 and 6, this was the 
37 Farndale, 1988--A, pp.23-4. Also interview, Famdale on 21 June 1993. Also see 
Halverson, op. cit., pp.388-9. 
38 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993 and Famdale on 21 June 1993. 
39 Interviews, Bagnall on 6 November 1993 and Famdale on 21 June 1993. 
40 Halverson, op. cit., p.3 90. 
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reason why the reforms emphasised the creation of a large operational reserve to be 
employed in an operational counter offensive. This was because only with a counter 
offensive could NORTHAG hope to stop the WP and recover territory without using 
nuclear weapons, and, in this sense, the reserve was the substitute for SNFs. 
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3.3. THE STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF FORWARD DEFENCE 
3.3.1. WEST GERMANY AND FORWARD DEFENCE 
The formal adoption of forward defence during a meeting of the North Atlantic 
Council in New York in 1950, as well as the decision to rearm the FRG in 1955, 
were mainly intended to increase the conventional capability of NATO so as to off-
set the much larger Soviet presence in Europe.41 Nevertheless, contrary to the earlier 
hope, and with the advent of nuclear weapons and the overall reluctance of the Allies 
to improve conventionally, forward defence became a corollary of nuclear early-
use.42 Also, the Allies' pledge on forward defence was literally interpreted by the 
West Germans as a defence of the FRG as far forward and to the east as possible by 
all NATO forces. This meant there would be no voluntary ceding of its territory, even 
for the purpose of mobilisation and counter-offensive; a notion which left NATO 
with few choices in defence by making Flexible Response less flexible, but satisfied 
the German belief that forward defence was more of a guarantor for nuclear 
deterrence than a strategy for defence.43 
41 See SD 1988, p.15, para. 1 and 2, for dates. Also see Park, op. cit., p.15. For the 
details of the intellectual root and overall aspects of the development of forward 
defence, see sources outlined in footnotes 42 to 53. 
42 See Gary L. Guertner, Deterrence and Defence in a Post-Nuclear World. 
(London: Macmillan, 1990), p.14. Also see Leopold Chalupa, The Defence of 
Central Europe--Implication of Change? (A Lecture given at RUSI on 13 November 
1984); and A.J. GarfKielmansegg, "A German View of West em Defence," RUSU, 
(March 1974), P .14, for the emphasis on first use of nuclear weapons. 
43 See Freedman, 1989, p.289 and 325; T. Cross, "Forward Defence--A Time for 
Change?" RUSIJ, (June 1985), p.19; and Park, op. cit., p.130. Interview, Chalupa. 
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Of course the FRG, among all the allied nations, had most to lose, since any 
war would be fought on its soil; NATO had to take this factor into account and 
reassure it, through the reinforcement of forward defence, that it would be defended 
and that no territorial sacrifices would be made.44 Given the strength of German 
feeling, as emphasised in The FRG White Papers, the FRG was naturally more 
convinced of the benefits of nuclear deterrence than its allies, not least because, as 
General Chalupa who was COS of the Bundeswehr and CINCENT explained, such 
an eventuality would have imperilled all nations equally, thus engendering a we-are-
all-in-this-together mentality.45 There was neither a chance that Germany could 
question its safety under NATO, nor seek independent measures to reinforce its own 
security or even reconsider its membership of the Alliance. If German sensibilities of 
this sort had not been properly addressed, some signs of strain would have appeared 
in the Alliance. Moreover, as already mentioned, the more extreme feeling in 
Germany could favour surrender under attack on the grounds that it would be better 
to meet the demands of the WP than face destruction under the allied obligations. 
So, it had to be clear to the Germans that NATO's first objective was not to 
fight a war but, should this come to pass, to ensure that the Alliance would commit 
itself to full-scale nuclear response rather than to a long conventional war.46 Nor 
should such thinking be seen in merely idealistic terms since Germany provided a 
44 See Rennagel, op. cit., in Gabriel, op. cit., p.126; and Hans Henning Von 
Sandrart, "Defence Concepts and the Application of New Military Thinking," RUSIJ, 
(Summer 1989), p.24. Also interviews, Chalupa and Famdale on 21 June 1993. 
45 Interview, Chalupa. Also see the FRG MoD, The Defence White Paper 1985, 
para. 60 and 73; Schulze, op. cit., in Kaiser and Roper, op. cit., p.116; and Kaiser, et. 
al., 1982, p.1161. 
46 Interviews, Famdale 21 June 1993 and Chalupa. 
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substantial conventional contribution to NATO.47 Of course, this was primarily due 
to its desire to protect itself regardless of the approach NATO eventually opted for, 
but it also provided the country with a powerful voice within the Alliance. Therefore, 
whenever the Alliance's attention shifted towards strong conventional defence, the 
German reaction was one of abhorrence. This was particularly the case with Bagnall's 
reforms in the early 1980s. Thus, to pacify German objections, the British officers 
always had to reaffirm their commitment to nuclear deterrence and forward defence 
in public, despite having different ideas.48 
3.3.2. THE BRITISH PERCEPTIONS OF THE SHORTCOMINGS OF 
FORWARD DEFENCE 
West Germany advanced several operational justifications for forward defence. One 
was that the FRG lacked strategic depth and that the most favorable terrain for 
defence was near the 1GB, so that, if the WP were allowed to penetrate forward 
defence, it would quickly move through open terrain behind the border to threaten 
areas and cities of major strategic importance.49 Secondly, it was argued that, to 
provide sufficient time to fly in reinforcements from the US and UK and to allow 
NATO time to build up its defences, the WP advance had to be contested as far 
forward as possible. Thirdly, if nuclear weapons were employed, NATO wanted to 
47 See Cordesman, op. cit., chapter 3, for details on the FRG contribution to NATO. 
48 Chris Bluth, "British-German Defence Relations, 1950-80: A Survey," in Kaiser 
and Roper, op. cit., p.33. 
49 See details in Chalupa's speech in 1984; Rennagel, op. cit., in Gabriel, op. cit., 
p.123; and Farindon, op. cit., pp.329-332. 
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avoid their use inside the FRG to safeguard its own forces and prevent damage to the 
population. 50 Finally, the successful defence of forward areas was said to be able to 
stop the enemy building up the momentum of an attack, thereby demoralising its 
forces while strengthening NATO's fighting spirit. 51 
However, developments in the WP, the OMG, and the prominence given to 
deep attack, were sufficient to discredit all such arguments. After penetrating NATO 
forward defence, enemy deep attack formations could intercept NATO's 
reinforcements in their assembly areas, as well as attack forward deployed forces 
from behind. So, although NATO's ground-based defence would be effective when 
the WP envisaged an attack on a broad front, the WP could choose to concentrate in 
areas where it could achieve major breakthroughs easily because NATO's positional 
defence at the time limited its ability to counter-concentrate, and thus, its forces 
could simply be outflanked or ignored by the attackers. In short, under the 
circumstances, nuclear use had to be committed very early near the 1GB to prevent 
enemy concentration and penetration, but such an obvious lack of ambiguity in 
NATO's posture and conventional capability would convince the WP to calculate the 
risk more readily. Any nuclear use after the WP achieved major breakthroughs to 
NATO's strategic depth would only amount to mutual suicide. 52 
British commanders, therefore, never really accepted forward defence as it 
was understood by the Germans, although they did persevere in reaffirming Britain's 
50 See Frank Kitson, Warfare as a Whole, (London: Faber and Faber, 1987), p.24. 
51 See Schulze, op. cit., in Kaiser and Roper, op. cit., p. 116; and Kitson, 1987, 
p.24-5. 
52 See, for example, Hansard, Debate on Army, 22 October 1984. Comment by D. 
Davies, for the view that the strong British adherence to forward defence would only 
bring more dangers to Britain itself Also see Guertner, op., cit., p.ll. 
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pledge, at least in public. Despite the official position, they continuously thought and 
planned their defence 'in terms of tactical retreat to regain some depth of territory for 
defence. ,53 Furthermore, they were of the opinion that once a war broke out, the 
operational imperatives would overtake the political ones, and, as Hackett assumed, 
defence would inevitably develop in depth. 54 This was the operational consideration 
on which Bagnall eventually based the development of his ideas. 
It did not mean that the British, and specifically Bagnall, intentionally 
attempted to discredit the political imperative and strategic logic of forward defence. 
Bagnall was trying to modify the deficiency of the strategy, in which the Germans 
themselves had become trapped. As Chalupa stressed, under forward defence, the 
penetration of NATO's defence meant the start of a nuclear war. 55 It was true that 
such an unambiguous stance could be beneficial for maintaining deterrence, as the 
Germans took nuclear deterrence more seriously than any others in the Alliance 
precisely because of its powerful effect. The British acknowledged this benefit, and as 
Farndale stressed in an interview, they accepted and respected German views. 56 
Nevertheless, the overriding dependence on nuclear weapons for the defence 
of the FRG, as the Germans concentrated on fighting a short conventional war near 
the 1GB, would only expedite their use. Regardless of their deterrent value, once 
deterrence failed, it was in the Germans' own interest to delay their use. Therefore, 
53 Bluth, op. cit., in Kaiser and Roper, op. cit., p.33. 
54 Hackett, op. cit., p.54. Also see TJ. Granville-Chapman, "The Importance of 
Surprise: A Reappraisal," in Mackenzie and Holden Reid, 1989, p.59; and T. Wright, 
"Surviving Soviet Encirclement Operations," ibid., p.207, for allowing some defence-
in-depth in the case of a war. 
55 Interview, Chalupa. 
56 Interview, Farndale 21 June 1993. 
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what Bagnall wanted to achieve was to highlight the benefits of conventional defence 
within the political guidelines of forward defence, and this was best implemented by 
fostering a capability to counter and destroy the WP attack as quickly and as near to 
the 1GB as possible. 57 This, in fact, was what the Germans wanted, and thus his 
concept eventually became a major instrument with which to bolster forward defence, 
so that his idea of're-interpretation' did not entail abandonment of the strategy at all. 
In short, the German paradox over forward defence was a typical example of 
the German dilemma. These debates reconfirmed that Germany always had to balance 
between the political and strategic (and operational) realities, and a search for a 
compromise was always the biggest source of paradox in their thinking. There was no 
doubt that political imperatives were the most important considerations in 
determining their policy, but this often led them, and the Alliance, to a strategic and 
operational deadlock, resulting in their agreeing upon strategically and operationally 
invalid decisions. 
57 Interview, Bagnall on 5 May 1993. 
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3.4. THE BRITISH ARMY LEADERSHIP'S PERCEPTION OF THE 
SOVIET-WARSAW PACT THREAT 
3.4.1. THE PROSPECTS OF A SURPRISE ATTACK 
Despite the fact that nuclear use, especially TNW s, was closely integrated in Soviet 
military thinking in the 1960s, 5 8 there was a shift towards stressing on the 
conventional attack as it entered the 1970s. The renewed emphasis on the 
conventional option by the Soviets was strongly advocated by Marshal Orgakov from 
the 1970s. He thought that the availability of more capable weapon systems, in 
conjunction with all-arms conventional formations, would enable a more dynamic and 
mobile form of warfare to secure early retention of the initiative. Eventually, this 
thinking played an instrumental role in the Soviets embracing a deep, fast-moving all-
arms attack doctrine, which was to become engraved in their deep-attack concept. 59 
This was accompanied by a growing belief that the WP's 'sufficiency of force', 
both nuclear and conventional, would allow it to launch a successful offensive, 
including a conventional attack, provided it could maintain surprise and quickly 
pulverise NATO's defence.60 This would deprive NATO of adequate time for 
mobilisation and preparation for a coordinated defence, and delay or even deter the 
decision to use nuclear weapons due to the WP's speed of action and the numerical 
58 See Strachan, op. cit., p.199~ and Harriet F. Scott and William F. Scott, Soviet 
Military Doctrine, (London: Westview Press, 1988), p.39. 
59 See McInnes, 1990, p.l04. 
60 Heuser, op. cit., p.449. 
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superiority of its battlefield and theatre nuclear capability.61 Thus, its rapid success 
might have convinced the US not to proceed with the strategic exchange over the 
already defeated Europe. Furthermore, it could avoid potential operational problems 
in starting a war with massive nuclear use, such as radiation and fall-out, which could 
inhibit its own forces' movement at the outset of hostilities. 62 Hence, dependence on 
nuclear weapons was reduced; the WP would refrain from nuclear use unless NATO 
used them first, or was about to do so. 63 
Consequently, the importance of surprise was highlighted. Its value lay in the 
fact that, above all, it would render NATO's reinforcement plan largely unworkable 
by preemption, and satisfy the need of simultaneously surprising its WP allies, thus 
depriving them of the time necessary to reconsider their position in a war with 
NATO. Operationally, it would be a valuable force multiplier and could compensate 
for the logistics penalties as such an attack was bound to involve a smaller number of 
forces. 64 On the other hand, the WP realised that, once significant mobilisation had 
been achieved on both sides, the chances of carrying out a swift and successful 
campaign would be diminished. 65 
61 See Scott and Scott, 1988, p.85 and p.257. Also see Freedman, 1989, pp.420-
423, for the Soviet no-first-use thinking. 
62 See Joseph D. Douglass Jr. and Amoretta Hoeber, Conventional War and 
Escalation: The Soviet View, (New York: Crane, Russak and Co., Ltd., 1981), p.l0 
and pp.21-3. 
63 See Heuser, op. cit., p.444. 
64 Dewar, op. cit., pp.205-6. 
65 Once mobilisation was fully implemented (e.g. M+ 120), the overall force ratio 
would be less than 2 to 1 in WP's favour, a situation in which it would not have a 
significant overall advantage over the technically superior NATO. See Andrew 
Hamilton, "Redressing the Conventional Balance," IS, (Summer 1985), pp.120. 
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Such a change in Soviet operational thinking, which was accompanied by the 
renewed stress on deep attack and the advent of the OMG, and the significant 
reinforcement of the GSFG (Group of Soviet Forces in Germany) since the late 
1970s, aroused deep concern among many people in the British Army and 
NORTHAG.66 This had a major influence on the perception of Bagnall and others 
that the growing capability of the Soviet Union and WP in the 1970s was an ever 
greater threat to NORTHAG's defence, and although the WP's numerical superiority 
was one of the major concerns, they felt that the possibility of a surprise attack from 
a standing start, or more specifically, 'short-warning following a stop-go situation,' to 
be the most serious menace.67 Such an assumption stemmed from the realisation that 
a possible Soviet-WP attack could be launched with conventional means alone, and in 
order to win a war under such circumstances, it would have to be a surprise attack. 
As Farndale emphasised, for the WP, defeating NATO before its nuclear use was an 
irresistible option if war had to come, and if it could find a way to secure surprise. 68 
In fact, this view was one of the most influential reasons for Bagnall's reforms and 
adoption of the new army group operational concept which exploited the benefits of 
manoeuvre and the offensive. 69 
66 The GSFG had been substantially reinforced since the late 1970s with the 
following increases in strength: 5 per cent tank, 100 per cent attack helicopter, 50 per 
cent in artillery and 35 per cent in mechanised infantry. (See Richard Aboulafia, "The 
Soviet Operational Response to FOF A," Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review (JSIR), 
(February 1989), pp.78-9.) 
67 Bagnall, op. cit., in Boyd-Carpenter, op. cit., p.152. 
68 Interview, Famdale on 19 May 1994. 
69 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993, Farndale on 21 June 1993 and Inge. 
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Under the standing start attack scenario, there would be approximately fifty 
Category 1 (full-strength) divisions available for immediate combat for the WP, 
among which some ten to twelve divisions, with immediate follow-on forces of some 
eight to thirteen, would attack the NORTHAG area.70 Although it was estimated 
that the overall ratio of the in-place forces between the two would be roughly equal 
with no mobilisation, 71 this ratio could increase if the WP achieved some 
mobilisation under a stop-go situation. This assumption would be more plausible 
since the leading elements would quickly be reinforced by the follow-on echelons 
within the WP first strategic echelon (including the forces of Soviet Western TVD: 
Theatre of Military Operations) as they would travel far less distance compared to 
NATO's reinforcements. 72 
Due to the lack of de facto superiority in force ratio, the WP could not have 
launched an attack on a broad front, but it could instead choose to achieve higher 
force density by selectively concentrating on a few narrow sectors to create 
breakthroughs since it was assumed that the WP could achieve local superiority of 
70 See Rennagel, op. cit., in Gabriel, op. cit., pp.124. See more detail in Henry 
Stanhope, "New Threat--or Old Fears?" in Derek Leebaert, ed., European Security: 
Prospects for the 1980s, (Massachusetts, Lexington Books, 1979), p.50. For 
example, the GSFG alone had 20 divisions (including an artillery division) with a 
substantial reserve stock for a few more divisions. See Otto P. Chaney, "The Soviet 
Threat to Europe: Prospects for the 1980s," in Robert Kennedy and John M. 
Weinstein, ed., The Defense of the West, (Boulder: Westview, 1984), pp.260-l. 
71 Hamilton, p.118. 
72 See Simpkin, 1985, p.8l. Also see David M. Glantz, Military Strategy of the 
Soviet Union, (London: Frank Cass, 1992), p.201, for the composition of the WP 
attack formations under the scenario. 
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between 5 and 7 to 1 at the selected axis of advance even under this scenario. 73 This 
approach was particularly plausible since NATO's force density would be low, with 
the bulk of its forces scattered throughout its territory, and when surprised, it would 
be more difficult to achieve a counter-concentration of forces at all. Under the 
circumstances, the WP might be able to penetrate NATO's defence in depth before 
NATO had properly prepared its defences, and this could cause a premature nuclear 
use by NATO to stop the WP onslaught. For Bagnall, this was the worst case 
scenario, and he firmly believed that the Army and NORTHAG had to have 
capabilities to counter this contingency and be ready to fight surprised in order to 
delay nuclear use, and to buy time to fly in the reinforcements and start 
mobilisation. 74 
Many sources newly available from the eastern bloc since the fall of the Berlin 
Wall have confirmed that Bagnall's assumption was a credible one as they show that 
the Soviet Union was indeed planning an offensive war against NATO. The highlight 
of its offensive plan was the conduct of 'operations along the front with and without 
nuclear weapons,' with heavy emphasis on conventional attack. 75 Most of all, 
evidence of its intention to launch a standing start attack was discovered. For 
example, the barracks in the GSFG and East German Army were always kept on a 
high alert status to facilitate instantaneous preparation for war which could start in 
less than a day. Their equipment was kept in peak condition at all times, their 
73 See George Richey, Britain's Strategic Role in NATO, (London: Macmillan, 
1986), p.70. 
74 Interview, Bagnall on 5 May 1993. 
75 Mark Karma, "Warsaw Pact Military Planning in Central Europe: Revelations 
from the East German Archives," Cold War International History Project Bulletin 
(CWllIPB), (Fall 1992), pp.14. Also see Heuser, op. cit., p.437. 
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ammunition dumps were maintained at a very high standard, and the amount of stock 
therein was enough to shock western visitors.16 Also, to avoid detection by NATO 
of its communication traffic, all the barracks were wired up to underground cables. 77 
Above all, Farndale stressed that, after visiting the barracks of GSFG after the fall of 
the Berlin Wall, he was able to confirm his suspicion that at least the enemy first 
operational echelon could have come very quickly without NATO's detection.78 
Nonetheless, it is questionable whether Bagnall's argument that the standing 
start attack was the worst case scenario was justified. Many commentators at the 
time argued that, despite its theoretical attractiveness, the standing start attack was 
not a feasible scenario. For example, the scenario which General Hackett offered in 
his book The Third World War, in which he assumed that a war would follow a 
general political deterioration, was often accepted as a more plausible one.79 Other 
possibilities included: a miscalculation; an artificially generated crisis; or a preemptive 
strike.80 There was also a chance that the WP would launch a simultaneous nuclear 
and conventional attack without the initial conventional phase. 
Most of all, many thought that the worst case scenario for NATO would have 
emerged in a short-term mobilisation scenario (between M+ 15 to M+30) in which 
76 Interviews, Farndale on 19 May 1994 and Brigadier Harry Brown on 23 March 
1993. 
77 Interviews, Farndale on 14 April 1993, Kenny and Brown. 
78 Interview, Farndale on 19 May 1994. 
79 See Hackett, op. cit., chapters 1 to 10. Interviews, Carver, Chalupa, Von 
Sandrart. 
80 See Philip Sabin, The Third World War Scare in Britain, (London: Macmillan, 
1986), pp.71-77, for more. 
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case the WP could be assured of at least 2 to 1 overall superiority to NATO.81 This 
ratio would be enhanced if NATO was suffering from indecision or a split, which 
would delay the decision for its own mobilisation. 82 In this case, the WP would have 
achieved both higher force ratio and density in Central Europe, and any delay in the 
decision to mobilise by NATO would further enhance WP's advantage. Truly the 
worst case scenario would have unfolded if, due to political splits and indecision, 
NATO failed to give sufficient time for its forces in the front to prepare defences 
while the WP was committed to a full-scale mobilisation. Furthermore, such a delay 
would prevent the timely arrival of the reinforcements when the WP's onslaught 
against NATO would be making significant progress. 
81 See Hamilton, op. cit., p.118, for in-depth discussion on the debate. There were 
numerous different interpretations of the force balance between the WP and NATO, 
which put it overall between 2.5 to I and 1.2 to 1, depending on the degree of 
mobilisation and on the method whereby analysts chose to calculate it. The method 
varied from the simple 'bean count' to Armoured Division Equivalent (ADE), 
Standard Division Equivalent (SDE) and Heavy Division Equivalent (HDE). One 
estimate was that the force ratio on M+60 days would be: 2 to I in ADE; 2.25 to I in 
HDE. (SDE in M+90 would be 2.31 to I). (See Hamilton, op. cit., pp.120. See more 
in Eliot A. Cohen, "Toward Better Net Assessment--Rethinking the European 
Conventional Balance," IS, (Summer 1988), pp.67-81; and Stephen D. Biddle, "The 
European Conventional Balance," Survival, (March/April 1988), pp.90-121.) In the 
case of Britain, an official estimate, the 1981 Statement on the Defence Estimates. 
spoke of a 2.5 to 1 WP advantage in tank strength, and 2.8. to I in artillery. (p.17.) 
Meanwhile, when Chalupa was the CINCENT in 1984, he provided a figure of about 
2 to I to 3 to I in land force and 2.5 to I advantage in force ratio in favour of the 
WP. (See his speech in 1984 at RUSI) Yet most analysts thought that the WP would 
no longer attain a favourable force ratio with NATO after full mobilisation (M+ 120), 
falling to only about 1.25 to I superiority--particularly in tank strength. (See Malcolm 
Chalmers and Lutz Unterseher, "Is There a Tank Gap?" IS, (Summer 1988), p.7; 
Stanhope, op. cit., in Leebaert, op. cit., pp.50-2, for the estimate. Also see Steven 
Zaloga, "The Tank Gap Data Flap," IS, (Spring 1989), pp.180-194, for an opposing 
opinion.) 
82 Hamilton, p.118 and p.121. 
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Bagnall also recognised the problem stemming from the short term 
mobilisation scenario. In fact, despite having said that the standing start scenario was 
the biggest concern, Bagnall emphasised, concurrently, that he did not expect an 
attack out of the blue without any prior deterioration of the political situation, and he 
indicated that he was anticipating the possibility of a short term mobilisation attack as 
well as the standing start one.83 In essence, regardless of a strong perception that the 
short mobilisation scenario would be the worst case, it was the standing start attack 
scenario's theoretical plausibility about which Bagnall and others in the British Army 
were concerned, as their conclusion was based on the understanding that the standing 
start attack was an ideal military option if the WP wanted to secure a victory in a 
conventional war.84 This contingency planning based on a theoretical possibility, 
which disregarded all other subjective variables but considered only those calculable 
factors which could be predetermined in peacetime, played a major part in the 
formulation and implementation of the reforms. In short, although a short term 
mobilisation scenario was more plausible in reality, it was felt that having a credible 
ability to counter a surprise attack was vital and desirable since it enhanced the 
capacity of in-place forces to prepare against both contingencies. 
Indeed, Bagnall's new concept was focused on giving the in-place force more 
capability to withstand the enemy onslaught without depending on mobilisation. This 
was critical to counter various scenarios including the short-mobilisation and the 
standing start attack. For instance, to counter the short term mobilisation scenario, 
Bagnall's new concept stressed reinforcing the overall NORTHAG conventional 
83 Interview, Bagnall on 5 May 1993. Also interview, Farndale on 14 April 1993. 
84 See, for example, P .H. Vigor, "Doubts and Difficulties Confronting a Would-be 
Soviet Attacker," RUSIJ, (June 1980), p.33, and Hackett's scenario in op.cit. 
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capability by improving the fighting-power of its in-place forces in order to: a) deter a 
war from breaking-out by presenting a strong defence capability in the theatre; b) 
provide sufficient time for the leadership of the Alliance to draft its options without 
pressure (which could be instrumental in preventing a political split among the 
Allies); c) buy time for reinforcements to arrive if war broke out; and d) avoid nuclear 
early use which could be both strategically and operationally suicidal. Most of all, the 
capability to delay the WP attack would be crucial in maintaining high morale and 
giving a major psychological boost to the Allies. 
As for the standing start scenario, NORTHAG a) would not be overwhelmed 
even if surprised, due to heightened readiness; b) could achieve counter concentration 
of forces with in-theatre reserves; c) could actually win the battle if its counter 
offensive against the enemy main body was successful; and d) could prevent a war 
from escalating and dissuade the WP from using nuclear weapons. Above all, 
planning the defence against the standing start attack would have ensured that 
NORTHAG would explore the best way to achieve almost immediate preparation of 
the army group defence, and introduce its full fighting-power without committing to 
instantaneous mobilisation. Also, countering a surprise attack by destroying the 
enemy initial attack was crucial for the morale and cohesion of the Alliance, and such 
a capability would even provide NATO with the ability to preempt if it became 
necessary. Furthermore, eschewing the need for immediate mobilisation, unless the 
WP did so, would have prevented a further deterioration of the relations between the 
two, leaving a further chance for negotiation. 
In short, the highlight of the new concept was to enhance readiness and allow 
more stringent preparation of the in-place forces, which was beneficial in countering 
both a surprise attack and an attack following a short mobilisation. It would offer not 
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only flexibility and choice (including an early cross 1GB operation) in the preparation 
for war, the capability for which did not exist in the past, but also psychological 
assurance and confidence to the politicians. Therefore, there were many political, 
strategic and operational benefits secured by such a posture and enhanced fighting 
ability, and this was what Bagnall wanted to achieve. 85 
Consequently, the most attractive aspect of Bagnall's counter offensive 
concept, which was the heart of the new operational concept, was its ability to 
counter the standing start scenario by avoiding the need to maintain a higher density 
of standing forces through making the best use of the force one had.86 As discussed 
in chapter 2, as the NORTHAG leadership postulated, since the WP would have to 
achieve concentration quickly in one, or possibly two, sectors, under the scenario, it 
was likely that the WP attack would be pushed through the Hanover Plain in a large 
single-echeloned onslaught in an effort to avoid difficult terrain in other sectors due 
to lack of resources.87 This would allow NORTHAG's counter concentration of 
forces to achieve a significant (if temporary) superiority in numbers in an offensive 
counter manoeuvre against the enemy. In this sense, the success of the operation by 
the operational reserve at the early stage of the conflict could achieve an early 
disruption of the WP operational plan by forcing it to counter this threat. The effect 
of this would be a significant slowing down of its advance since there would be no 
immediate follow-on forces available, thus preventing it from launching a meaningful 
85 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993 and Famdale on 14 April 1993. 
86 See McInnes, 1990, p.83, for support. 
87 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993 and Famdale on 21 June 1993. They 
postulated that the WP could achieve no more than one, or maximum two, 
penetration(s) under the surprise attack scenario. 
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retaliation or counter attack. Hence, Bagnall's logic that the success of this operation 
would by and large stabilise the original border and slow down the progress of war, 
and that the launching of such an attack would be possible due to the low force 
density of the battlefield, was persuasive. Most of all, this would be entirely feasible 
due to the low density of the battlefield, allowing easy movement of a large counter 
offensive force. In other words, Bagnall's concept was a measure whereby counter 
surprise could be achieved, which was indeed a considerable factor in deterring a WP 
surprise attack as it provided the necessary means to check this gamble. 88 
Moreover, the main attraction of the reforms was that their implementation 
was relatively cost-free since there were few visible trade-offs in resources, and this 
was reflected in the motto of the reforms, which was to do more with less. Rather 
than providing expensive new standing forces, the changes were concentrated on 
providing enhanced C3I systems, establishing the principles of the joint and combined 
battle throughout the army group and AT AF, and accepting the new operational 
concept, which facilitated more imaginative use of available forces. 89 
In this sense, regardless of the fact that Bagnall's thinking on the WP threat, 
which gave rise to the reforms, did not wholly conform to the mainstream view at the 
time, his desire to focus on the standing start attack as a means to address various 
contingencies was quite plausible. Essentially, what Bagnall wanted was to secure a 
capability to maintain deterrence through the demonstration that such an ability 
existed. He saw the cold war as a psychological game, and this required a player to 
have a good hand, which was vital in calling the opponent's bluff Therefore, 
88 See chapter 4, 6 and 8. 
89 See chapter 4. 
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Bagnall's effort to prepare his forces under the standing start scenario was not only a 
wise choice, but also a crucial one because it enhanced NORTHAG's confidence and 
gave a major psychological boost. This could have not been done under forward 
defence where NORTHAG's passive defence would have prevented successful 
employment of reserves and resources to counter the WP surprise moves. 
Above all, this approach provided a tool with which to evaluate NORTHAG's 
capability, enabling the leadership to take a sober look at what their options were in 
this desperate situation. Rather than assessing one's capability under optimum 
conditions, this allowed for a more critical and balanced review of one's existing 
capability, and put a premium on one's ability to fight with what one had rather than 
what one might be able to get. This was a product of the prudence of Bagnall and 
others in the Army and their hope to counter whatever contingencies might develop; 
to a certain degree, as Sabin pointed out, it agreed with the necessity and habits of 
NATO, i.e. to plan for the worst in order to calculate the deterrent requirement.90 
As NORTHAG's surveillance capability improved and some changes in the 
Soviet and WP military, which indicated a shift from the offensive to the defensive, 
became evident after Gorbachev came to power in 1985, the perception of threat was 
toned down and NORTHAG began to think in terms of the stop-go situation 
following a mobilisation.91 Nevertheless, NORTHAG was preparing to fight the 
enemy's standing start attack throughout the 1980s, starting with the 48-hour 
warning preparation in 1983.92 
90 Sabin, 1986, p.1 00. 
91 Bagnall, op. cit., in Boyd-Carpenter, op. cit., pp.151-2. 
92 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993 and Dewar. Also see Dewar, op. cit., p.207; 
and Cross, op. cit., p.20, for the time allowance to counter a standing start attack. 
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In this sense, Farndale's expansion of the reforms (see chapter 6) was a logical 
development of Bagnall's ideas to counter different contingencies, but his attempt to 
do so by risking a large counter offensive force in a manoeuvre battle was both 
dangerous and infeasible. This was because the higher force density and ratio in the 
theatre would probably have prevented the movement of such a force, and most of 
all, because the need to take such a risky option had substantially subsided. In short, 
Bagnall's ideas were plausible and warranted, but only in specific circumstances of the 
early 1980s when the risk of a WP surprise attack was at its highest and NATO's 
resources and ability to counter this threat were not available. 
3.4.2. SOVIET-WARSAW PACT OPERATIONAL THINKING 
The British Army and NORTHAG's major operational concern was the OMG and the 
WP armies' alleged ability to conduct a series of encounter battles. Surprise was 
essential to WP's success, and it was felt that the OMG was crucial in supporting the 
idea that the WP might attack from a standing start. 93 
The OMG was designed to maximise the effect of surprise, speed, and shock, 
all of which could substitute for mass, to accomplish the rapid collapse of NATO's 
defences. It was a highly mobile, self-contained combined arms formation which 
would quickly link up with airborne and air assault forces already deployed deep 
inside NATO territory.94 Such a capability was demonstrated in the Zapad-81 
93 Frederick Hogarth, "Dynamic Density: A Deterrence for the OMG," RUSIJ, 
Vol. 132, No.2, (June 1987), p.30. Interview, Bagnall on 5 May 1993. 
94 See Starry, "Forward," in Simpkin, 1985, p.ix; and C.L. Donnelly, "The 
Development of the Soviet Concept of Echeloning, " NR, (December 1984), p.17. 
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exercise.95 The OMG's role was to achieve the following operational aims: 1) 
destroy or neutralise as many NATO air and nuclear assets as possible; 2) keep 
attacking forces dispersed; 3) make a number of penetrations so as to confuse the 
enemy as to the direction of the main thrust; and 4) get their own forces close enough 
to NATO forces and centres of population to discourage nuclear use.96 Thus, once 
in NATO territory, the OMG would try to avoid any unnecessary engagements in 
order to reach its objective as soon as possible.97 
Another rationale for the OMG was to compensate for the inflexibility of rigid 
echeloning in WP forces and allow the operational commander to exploit a sudden 
chance, which could not be done by the regular formation. In some ways, the OMG 
was a reserve formation for exploitation, but it was 'a free reserve,' which reflected a 
different way of thinking in the Soviet military, i.e. an effort to redress the problem of 
the inflexibility of echeloned formations with a clear-cut mission. 98 
The success of the OMG operation thus depended on how fast it could move 
once it was in NATO territory. They had to be able to fight a series of fast and 
violent encounter battles (or meeting engagements) while avoiding unnecessary 
95 Steve Doerfel, "Meeting the Strategic Challenge," ID&, (March 1984), p.253. 
96 Chris Bellamy, "Trends in Land Warfare: The Operational Art of the European 
Theatre," RUSI and Brassey's Defence Yearbook 1985. London, (1985), p.23l. Also 
see C .L. Donnelly. "The Soviet Operational Manoeuvre Group--A New Challenge 
for NATO," ID&, (September 1982), pp.1777-1186; and John G. Hine and Philip A. 
Petersen, "The Warsaw Pact Strategic Offensive--The OMG in Context," ID&, 
(October 1983), pp.1391-1395, for more on NATO's perception of the OMG in the 
early 1980s. 
97 Henry S. Shields, "Why the OMG?" MR, (November 1985), p.5. 
98 Interview, Von Sandrart. 
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ones.99 The main advantages of encounter battle were as follows: 1) the WP could 
fight NATO forces in the open rather than be forced to attack against prepared 
defence, and hence could fight on 1 to 1 terms; 2) it could achieve tactical surprise 
and overwhelm the defender if he was caught on the move; 3) it could accelerate the 
OMG's speed, thus increasing the chance of its survival and penetration; and 4) it 
would 'hold the enemy's centre of mass forward' so as to slow him down before 
encircling and destroying him in coordination with regular echeloned forces. I 00 The 
Soviets were believed to have placed a premium on the training for encounter battle, 
which constantly practised deployment from line-of-march, and it was felt among the 
Alliance that such an ability was a grave threat indeed. 101 
Nevertheless, there were numerous inherent deficiencies in the WP capability 
to implement such a form of attack in real-time. One of them was the lack of flexibility 
in the lower level of command, as well as its propensity to depend on extensive 
planning based on adequate reconnaissance and intelligence. Therefore, it would take 
longer for the WP to plan the attack in the first place, and when its initial plan failed, it 
would take considerable time to re-plan its attack. I 02 
99 See A.I. Radzievsky, Dictionary of Basic Military Terms, (Moscow: Voenizdat, 
1972), USAF Trans. Washington, D.C.: US GPO, 1976), para. 373, for the Soviet 
definition of encounter battle. 
100 Simpkin, 1984, p.183. Also see Paddy Griffith, "A Concept of Armoured 
Warfare on the Central Front," SJMS, (March 1990), pp.61-5; English, op. cit., 
p.196, for more on encounter battle. 
101 See Niklas-Carter, op. cit., in Harris and Toase, op. cit., p.220; and Vigor, 1983, 
p.204. 
102 Peter Millar, "The Central Region Layer Cake," in Mackenzie and Holden Reid, 
1989, pp.22-3, and Leonhard, op. cit., pp.54-5. 
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Moreover, the WP capacity to fight encounter battle with the OMG, as well as 
the ability to handle the formation itself, was treated rather too cautiously by the 
West. Even if the OMG was more flexible than other formations, its insertion would 
depend on the ability of those first echelon formations to let it pass through their own 
lines. 103 Also, command rigidity and the general lack of high standard training 
remained major barriers. 104 Farndale confirmed this by saying in an interview that 
OMGs were not as good as NATO was led to believe, nor did evidence from the WP 
exercises suggest that they would be any better in real battle, especially in encounter 
battle. 105 
Since the most serious menace the OMG posed was the amount of tempo and 
momentum it could generate for the first operational echelon through the successful 
initial penetration, if NATO were able to force the WP to revise its plan consistently 
by continuous offensive actions, the WP would have a very difficult time making 
progress in the attack. Therefore, it became the operational imperative to identify the 
location of the OMG as soon as possible and destroy it before it could make a 
breakthrough through which the first operational echelon could concentrate to create 
an operational penetration. Also, the OMG's location would probably indicate the 
areas of the enemy main effort. This would enable NORTHAG to concentrate its 
local ( corps) reserves to counter the enemy's initial breakthrough by preventing it 
103 John S. Hyden, "Soviet Deep Operation," ID&, (June 1987), p.724. See Simpkin, 
1985, p.44, for criticism of the OMG. Also see Millar, op. cit., in Mackenzie and 
Holden Reid, 1989, pp.22-3, for the difficulties involved in coordinating the insertion 
ofanOMG. 
104 See Von Mellenthin and Stolfi, op. cit., p.123; and Cordesman, 1990--C, pp.206-
8. 
105 Interview, Farndale on 21 June 1993. 
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from making an operational penetration. If NATO failed in the timely committal of 
reserves, this would bring a number of serious problems, resulting in reserves 1) 
colliding head-on with an OMG and being overrun because of the lack of time to 
prepare defence, or 2) being altogether dislocated and failing to intercept the OMG 
due to the delay in their committal. Failure stemming from such blunders, and from 
the reserves' not managing to counter the enemy's initial breakthrough, would prevent 
NORTHAG from committing its reserves against the enemy's first operational 
echelon. 1 06 
Although its capacity to destroy the OMG and the WP first echelon as part of 
a counter offensive became the highest priority, there were contradictory views on 
how serious the OMG threat was to NORTHAG.l 07 Famdale commented that: 
[The] OMG didn't force the concept. And counter stroke was not just against 
the OMG, but a wide variety of attacking forces .... We had a good chance of 
destroying OMGs if we got them correctly. OMGs were best trained to fight 
head on meeting engagements .... thus we needed to avoid that situation .... If it 
didn't upset the Germans, I would let them loose and even let them run to the 
coast of France. Then, I would chop it off ... We would have dealt with them 
later as long as we were holding the front. 108 
Thus, Famdale considered the two operations separately: the local reserves were to 
deal with the OMG while NORTHAG's operational reserve was to be concentrated 
against the first operational echelon. 
106 Millar, op. cit., in Mackenzie and Holden Reid, 1989, pp.22-3. 
107 One other reason for this discrepancy again originated from the perception 
between the worst-case and optimum scenarios, and hence the different views on the 
role of the local and operational reserves in countering the OMG. See 6.2. for more 
detail on how Bagnall and Famdale's views differed. 
108 Interview, Famdale on 21 June 1993. 
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However, this opinion differed from Bagnall's. It was true, as Farndale said, 
that Bagnall did not design the new army group operational concept specifically 
against the OMG, but that the purpose was to counter the OMG by the combined 
local and operational reserve operation as a part of the counter move against the first 
operational echelon. Bagnall stressed that letting the OMG loose would bring 'fatal 
consequences' as it would wreak havoc in the army group's rear by destroying HQ 
and threatening the logistics chain. 1 09 Thus, Bagnall placed more emphasis than did 
Farndale on the destruction of the OMG as a main part of the reserve operation. 
Despite some difference in views, it was clear to both of them that the aim of 
the new operational concept, which stressed a number of counter offensive options, 
was to exploit the WP weaknesses so as to enhance its own defence. Bagnall stressed 
that he was confident the WP would not be able to carry out an effective attack if its 
plans were disrupted because of its lack of flexibility, even if this was being improved. 
Thus, he said, it should have been possible to destroy the OMG during the early days 
ofa conflict. 1 10 This, nonetheless, would only be likely ifNORTHAG abandoned the 
strict interpretation of forward defence to enhance its readiness and created an in-
theatre operational reserve. The ensuing debates in both Europe and Britain were on 
the feasibility and necessity of acquiring such capabilities. 
109 Interview, Bagnall on 6 November 1993. There will be a further discussion on 
the difference in each COMNORTHAG's opinion on the counter offensive priority in 
chapters 6 and 7. 
110 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993 and F arndale on 14 April 1993. 
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3.5. THE IMPACT OF THE 1981 DEFENCE REVIEW ON THE REFORMS 
3.5.1. BRITAIN'S DEFENCE POLICY BEFORE THE REFORMS 
The so-called four pillars of Britain's defence: 1) the provision of UK nuclear forces 
for NATO's deterrence; 2) the defence of the UK; 3) the defence of the European 
mainland; and 4) the maritime forces, were spelt out clearly for the first time in the 
1974 defence review. This was a watershed in Britain's strategic thinking as it 
signalled the shift in its security interest to the defence of NATO. Also, the review 
facilitated the conventional rearmament of Britain; it legitimised what the military had 
to purchase in order to implement the goals identified in the four-pillar strategy. I 11 
The continental commitment was upheld by the new Conservative government, 
whose strategic and political priorities became the honouring of the domestic pledge 
for strong defence and the Alliance pledge to fulfil the L TDP commitment. 112 
The L TDP was one of the most comprehensive conventional defence 
improvement packages which NATO countries adopted in order to improve the 
Alliance's existing defence posture. With the enthusiastic support of the Carter 
administration, the LTDP was formally endorsed by the NATO Heads of State in 
1978. The central component of the plan was the Allies' pledge to implement a 3 per 
cent annual real growth in defence spending to support a series of conventional 
defence improvements. It was envisaged that the L TDP would encourage 
III Interviews, Carver and Jackson. 
112 See Greenwood, op. cit., in Murry and Vlotti, op. cit., p.279. 
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improvements in NATO's posture (including readiness and reinforcement capability) 
through the more efficient use of resources. 113 
Ultimately, the programme did largely yield positive results, despite some 
adverse effects which shook NATO cohesion through internecine recriminations over 
issues such as defence co-operation and meeting the budget pledge. 114 It favoured 
further initiatives in conventional improvements in the 1980s, and provided a useful 
mechanism under which longer-term defence planning could be implemented. 115 
Furthermore, the LTDP was an important event which initially consolidated the Allies' 
growing desire to reinforce Flexible Response. For the British Army, the government's 
intention to comply fully with the plan was to become a major factor which enabled 
the initiation of the reforms. 116 
The Thatcher government's views on strong defence were based on the 
development of Soviet military power, which it considered to have become more 'a 
potential threat to the West.' 11 7 Therefore, reinstating the strong leadership of the 
US was considered critical for the security of the west. In fact, this view coincided 
with the Reagan administration's efforts to restore its strategic position in the world 
so that the two governments were to share an intimate relationship based on the 
similar personalities of the leaders and their perception of the international 
113 See Flanagan, 1988, pp.22-3. 
114 See Flanagan, 1988, pp.22-3; and "Emerging Tensions over NATO's 
Conventional Forces," ID&, (January 1987), p.33. 
115 See Flanagan, 1988, pp.24-5; and 1987, p.33. 
116 Also see Baylis, 1989, pp.127-8; and SD 1981, para. 112, for more on the 
background of the LTDP. 
117 SD 1981, para. 105. 
132 
system. 118 This intimacy was confirmed with the Thatcher government's move to 
adapt to the US concepts of conventional improvement, which it viewed as critical in 
reinforcing its position in NAT0.1 19 This was also quickly followed by the Trident 
decision and the accommodation of US Cruise missiles in Britain. 120 
Yet, economic constraints remained a hurdle to the new government In 
implementing both conventional and nuclear forces improvements. 121 By the early 
1980s, Britain was facing a major economic crisis brought on by recession. 
Consequently, the MoD's financial pool was rapidly diminishing, and it had no ability 
to continuously pay for both the L TDP commitment and the rise in other costs in the 
military. 122 By 1985, in addition to the overall cutbacks of the 1981 review, this had 
resulted in the abandonment of the LTDP's 3 per cent goal. 123 
3.5.2. THE 1981 DEFENCE REVIEW--THE WAY FORWARD 
The most controversial issue in the 1981 defence review, The Way Forward, was the 
choice between Britain's continental and maritime contribution to NATO. Because 
118 See Bluth, "The Use of Force, " in Croft, op. cit., p.61; and David Allen, "British 
Foreign Policy and West European Co-operation," in Byrd, 1988, p .11. 
119 See Rees, op. cit., in Byrd, 1991, pp.98-9. 
120 See more on Trident in the speech by Michael Heseltine at King's College 
London in Autumn 1983. 
121 See David French, The British Way in Warfare 1688-2000, (London: Unwin 
Hyman, 1990), p.236; and Chichester and Wilkinson, op. cit., pp.67-8. 
122 See Baylis, 1989, pp.23-4; and Chichester and Wilkinson, op. cit., p.67. 
123 See 7.6. for the impact of the abandonment of the LTDP and other resource 
constraint on the continuing implementation of the reforms in the mid-1980s. 
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the role of the RN was considered less crucial than that of the Army and RAF, which 
were essential in reinforcing the government's strategic priorities, it was inevitable 
that John Nott would choose the RN to bear the brunt of the cuts. 124 As a result, the 
Navy's surface fleet was severely reduced and its role shrunk to nuclear deterrence 
and anti-submarine warfare, while the Army and RAF escaped with only minor cuts--
the former losing 7,000 personnel. 125 
There were obvious advantages, and some inevitability, behind the decision to 
spare the Army and RAF from the cuts. A reduction of the Army, and particularly in 
that of the BAOR, could be seen by NATO as deviating from Britain's pledge and 
would have drawn criticism from the other Allies. It could also provoke the US to 
curtail its commitment to Europe, as well as result in the weakening of the British 
leadership within the Alliance. This would be a very serious blow to the government, 
undermining its stance on strong defence and deterrence. 126 
F or the Army and BAOR, the review paved the way for a rationalisation of its 
structure and helped obtain a guarantee of continuous governmental support of the 
earlier weapons procurement programme outlined after the 1974 review and the 
L TDP, as well as securing funds for additional weapons purchase. Meanwhile, the 
RAF initially benefited from the review as the previous improvement programmes 
(i.e. acquisition of new aircraft and missiles) were allowed to continue. 127 Above all, 
124 . II See Boren, op. CIt., pp. . 
125 See Dockrill, op. cit., p.IIS. 
126 See Baylis, 1989, pp.23-4; and Carver, 1992. p.133. Also interview, Carver. 
127 Interview, Jackson. Also see Boren, op. cit., p.348. 
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the 1981 review permitted the Army to carry out a critically needed re-examination of 
the capability ofBAOR, and to begin the subsequent reforms under Bagnall. 
The reorganisation of 1 (BR) Corps, which was outlined in the 1981 review, 
was completed by 1984.128 Under the new plan, the corps retained three armoured 
divisions and one infantry division, comprising seven armoured, one airmobile, two 
regular infantry and two T A (Territorial Army) infantry brigades and substantial 
corps troops, including a reconnaissance brigade equivalent and strong artillery 
assets. 129 The British Army returned to the idea of the peacetime maintenance of 
three divisions of 12,500 men in three brigades each, with the fourth stationed in 
Britain and ready to re-deploy to Europe at the first sign of danger to reinforce the 
corps' rear areas. 13 0 The new structure was seen as a measure offering flexibility in 
order to fight an immediate tactical battle, particularly in a short warning attack, and 
to provide substantial corps reserves, the capabilities for which the previous four-
division structure was unable to provide. With each division having eight to twelve 
battle groups formed into a number of flexible task forces, or into large defensive and 
major counter offensive forces, this represented a significant increase in both fighting 
power and flexibility in defence. 131 
The list of new weapons introduced after the 1981 review was impressive. 132 
Overall, the most significant aspect of the new weapon procurement programme was 
128 SO 1984, para. 416. 
129 SO 1985, para. 418. 
130 Bellamy, 1987, p.146. 
131 See Terry Gander, The Modern British Army, 2nd ed., p.19. Also see ibid., p.18 
and p.22, for details on the BAOR divisional structure. 
132 See SO 1983, para.323; SO 1984, para.424, for some details. 
135 
the emphasis on the exploitation of emerging high technologies, which allowed for 
the exploitation of the other ET weapons advantages outlined before. 133 This was 
thought to compensate for the small decrease in manpower, while actually expanding 
the Army's fighting power. 134 
However, there remained two maIn obstacles. Firstly, despite strong 
Parliamentary support for the government on the increase of the ammunition stocks 
and provisions for forward ammunition storage to enhance the sustainability of 
forces, the implementation of this promise was slow in coming. Also, a pledge was 
made to allocate more funds for training and exercises; but in reality, the government 
pursued cuts in the Individual Training Organisation (ITO). 135 This was an adverse 
action by the government, especially when lack of training and sustainability was 
being severely criticised by Parliament. One of the 1981 Parliamentary Defence 
Committee reports acknowledged that the training of forces in BAOR was restricted 
to conserve spares and fuel in such a way that it was 'affecting the training of the 
forces in BAOR and operational effectiveness must be diminished if problems of this 
kind continue.' 13 6 Furthermore, it was criticised in a Commons debate as causing 
'general low morale' in the Rhine Army.137 In another report, meanwhile, it was 
133 Also SD 1983, para. 412. 
134 . 298 Boren, op. CIt., p. . 
135 See Boren, op. cit., p.3 51. Also see First Report from the Defence Committee 
Session 1979-80: Ammunition Storage Sites for British Forces Germany, para. 31; 
and Hansard, Debate on Army, 9 July 1981. Comment by Minister of the Armed 
Forces, John Stanley. 
136 First Report from the Defence Committee Session 1981-2: Allied Forces in 
Germany, para. 19. 
137 Hansard, Debate on Army, 22 October 1984, Comment by Cyril Townsend. 
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pointed out that the lack of sustainability in the BAOR might force the commander 
'to recommend the premature introduction of tactical nuclear weapons into the 
battle.' 138 These problems had largely been corrected by 1984 with the increased 
allocation of funds, although the abandonment of the L TDP and other resource 
problems were to cause some restrictions in implementing the reforms as they were 
initially envisaged (I shall discuss this further in chapter 7). Meanwhile, the cuts in 
ITO were successfully resisted by the Army's bureaucracy and by strong opposition 
from the General Staff, which argued that such a move would demoralise the troops 
and cripple their operational effectiveness. 139 
Secondly, the government wanted to expand the role of the TA to a direct 
defensive one on the Central Front. Accordingly, the strength of the T A was 
increased from 76,000 to 86,000 to reinforce the BAOR in an emergency.140 
However, the government's view of the T A's increased role was opposed by the 
Army on the grounds that Regulars were more cost-effective and the TAwas not 
well trained to undertake a role other than reinforcing the Regulars in the BAOR.141 
The first major test of the 1981 reorganisation and the credibility of the new 
reinforcement plan was carried out during the 1984 exercise LIONHEART. The 
deployment scheme for the TAwas tested earlier through exercise CRUSADER 80 
in September 1980, which largely reaffirmed its reinforcement plan. However, 
LIONHEART was designed to test the combined reinforcement plan of both TA and 
138 First Report from the Defence Committee Session 1979-80, para. 31. 
139 Hansard, Debate on Army, 22 October 1984. Comment by Townsend. Also see 
Boren, op. cit., p.351. 
140 See Carver, 1992, p.133 and p.136. 
141 See Boren, op. cit., p.351. 
137 
Regulars from Britain to Germany, which involved the largest single transfer of 
British troops to the continent since World War Two. 142 
The second phase of LIONHEART in Germany, exerCIse SPEARPOINT, 
involved 120,000 British troops in a major FTX and successfully demonstrated the 
credibility of the new corps structure with most of its reinforcing units in place. 
Finally, the 1985 Statement on the Defence Estimates acknowledged that the 1981 
reorganisation of 1 (BR) Corps was a major accomplishment which resulted in the 
creation of 'a better-balanced force' with more effective reserves. 143 
3.5.3. THE 1981 DEFENCE REVIEW AND THE REFORMS 
By the mid-1980s, the British Army enjoyed greater capability and fighting power 
than many in Britain and the Alliance had estimated. To recap: 1) Instead of four 
weak divisions, 1 (BR) Corps ended up having three full-strength divisions. Thus, 2) 
BAOR was able to plan its defences with fully-trained, well-furnished and high-
morale forces already in the theatre. Furthermore, since it no longer had to rely on 
reinforcements to plan its initial defence, although it did depend on them in order to 
maximise its strength, it became less reliant on 2 (BR) Division, which consisted 
mostly of T A troops. This resulted in a major enhancement in its readiness, which 
was a significant boost in the forces' ability to counter a surprise attack--especially a 
standing start attack. Above all, 3) it provided Bagnall with several important 
leverages with which to implement his reforms. 
142 SD 1985, p.23, para. 4. Also see McInnes, 1988, p.379. 
143 SD 1985, p.23, para. 6. 
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In reality, however, the resources needed for the reforms were initially to 
come from assets already available to the Army through the rationalisation of the 
structure and equipment in the early days of conceptualisation along with, as 
mentioned, provisions made after the 1974 review and the LTDP.144 Without 
knowing this intention, therefore, some (especially in the Bundeswehr) thought that 
the reforms were a government-induced development, the implementation of which 
was only made possible because of the new organisation and equipment introduced in 
the 1981 defence review.1 45 However, such an opinion was too dismissive and 
hasty. Although some areas of the reforms at the later stage of their implementation 
became dependent on the purchase of weapon systems and equipment secured by the 
new government's pledge, Bagnall initially planned the reforms based on what the 
British Army already possessed in the early 1970s, and thus he would have gone 
ahead with his reforms regardless of the 1981 review or any other developments. 146 
As will be discussed in chapter 6.2., his strong personality and immense confidence 
had a greater impact on the realisation of the reforms than any other factor, especially 
in the early days. 
One of the psychological causes of such a dismissive view of the reforms was, 
again, growing German assertiveness and influence in formulating and implementing 
the course of the Alliance's strategy, while BAOR had been sluggish and passive in 
undertaking a leading role in NORTHAG. This was due to the earlier tendency of the 
British Army to treat the defence of Germany in a 'business as usual' manner, and the 
144 Interview, Bagnall on 5 May 1993. 
145 This view was offered by officers of other NORTHAG armies. Interviews, 
Chalupa, Fischer, Colonel V. Kunzendorf on 22 June 1992 and Stoetermeer. 
146 Interview, Bagnall on 6 November 1993. 
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overwhelming reliance on the use of nuclear weapons in defence. 147 So, although 
Britain was the most important European partner, providing both the nuclear 
deterrent and substantial conventional power through NORTHAG's leadership, its 
opinion had had a less than enthusiastic reception in the past. 
For example, as Bagnall pointed out in an interview, the position of 
COMNORTHAG before him was considered as more of an administrative one, 
through which authority was delegated via the international staff at NORTHAG 
without actually presiding over and controlling the affairs of the army group and its 
four different national corps. This was also partly due to the sensitivity of other 
nations, who did not want any external direction determining the course of their own 
policy. 148 Thus, it seemed only natural for the Germans and others in the Alliance to 
have doubts as to the originality and feasibility of the concept, as well as its ability to 
stand independently of the 1981 review. Moreover, they were only accepted with 
much suspicion and contempt by some Germans, who actually saw them as a 
dangerous move which could jeopardise their operation by draining its reserves for 
the operation in the British sector and by endangering Allied cohesion. 149 
So, what role did the 1981 defence review actually play in Bagnall's reforms? 
Firstly, it reaffirmed the government's pledge on the weapons procurement decisions 
in 1974 and 1978, which were critical assets ensuring the success of the operational 
concept. Principally, the value of new weapons lay in the fact that they would allow 
the corps to undertake a larger-scale operation than initially planned with more 
147 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993. Also, interview, Carver. 
148 Interview, Bagnall on 5 May 1993. 
149 Interview, Chalupa. See chapter 5.4. for more on debates. 
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efficiency and prowess. Also, the reVlew eventually made prOVlSlons for more 
financial and material resources for training, which were vital for the successful 
execution of the new concept. As Farndale stressed, though the 1981 review did not 
provide everything the Army wanted, it did stop the decline of its capability for the 
time being by introducing new weapons and resources to reinforce other vital 
requirements, such as training and ammunition, in order to increase sustainability.150 
Secondly, the emphasis on the exploitation of ET, especially in C3I systems, 
and the much-enhanced performance of the new weapon systems, significantly 
strengthened the Army's efforts and extended the range of the reforms in terms of 
operational scope. In particular, they had a crucial role in transforming the 1 (BR) 
Corps' ability to fight a mobile battle and to execute complex operations such as 
counter stroke. 151 Moreover, since the aim was to achieve cuts in cost while gaining 
higher operational capacity, it was imperative to exploit the benefits of technology 
which in fact allowed for better integration of the forces with their supporting 
elements. This was a way of making the best use of what the Army had in its hands. 
Thirdly, the restructuring, which provided three in-theatre Regular armoured 
divisions, permitted the conduct of high intensity training and the maintenance of unit 
cohesion. 152 If 1 (BR) Corps had to rely on the T A to build up its strength to the full 
in the event of war, which was the case with the previous four-division structure, its 
ability to conduct a difficult operation (i.e. counter stroke) would have been seriously 
reduced. Thus, although the reorganisation left fewer divisions in Germany, they 
150 Interview, Farndale on 21 June 1993. 
151 See McInnes, 1988, p.387, for details of the benefits of new weapons. 
152 Interview, Bagnall on 5 May 1993. 
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were all battle-ready formations with higher provisions of combat units per division, 
which increased the 'teeth-to-tail' ratio resulting in a substantial growth in corps' 
fighting-power. Overall, the changes prepared the British corps to counter the WP 
surprise attack more effectively than before; this was a positive move which 
reinforced NORTHAG's conventional defence to such a degree that it no longer had 
to resort to early nuclear-use. 
Therefore, despite the government's appearance as the main catalyst for the 
changes in the British Army and NORTHAG (due to the 1981 review), its role in 
influencing the reforms was, according to McInnes, surprisingly limited. He admitted 
that the assertive use of force fit the image of the new government, and the attention 
given to a better conventional defence in the reforms coincided with its renewed 
emphasis on strong defence. Thus, the government was more instrumental 'in creating 
a permissive atmosphere' within which Bagnall's reforms could occur, rather than 
actually promoting the changes. 153 Above all, it regarded the reforms as a strictly 
military-operational affair aimed at accommodating changes in organisation and 
technology. Thus, it was felt to be improper to dictate the initiation or course of the 
reforms in which civilians were considered to have no part to play. 154 , 
It is not even clear that the advent of a Conservative government was vital in 
facilitating the reforms. Labour had endorsed the L TDP as the stepping-stone for its 
own build-up programme and might have been just as supportive if it had remained in 
power. 155 Therefore, although the right-wing element of the new government could 
153 See McInnes, 1991, p.45. 
154 Interviews, Jonathan Day on 22 March 1993 and Paul Flaherty on 11 May 1993. 
155 Interviews, Bagnall on 4 May 1994 and F arndale on 19 May 1994. 
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have appeared to have strongly supported measures to strengthen Britain's and 
NATO's defence, particularly because the Labour Party keenly explored an option of 
NOD and non-nuclear defence in the early 1980s, its direct influence over the reforms 
was smaller than one might expect. 
Above all, the government had no plausible grounds, either political or 
strategic, to reject the reforms, especially as they could only strengthen its policy 
goal. 156 As long as it was made to look good, while being spared the Army's 
pressure to provide more financial support, it had nothing to lose by supporting the 
reforms both in public and within the Alliance. In fact, the financial factor was so 
important in securing the government's full support that, if Bagnall failed to convince 
the government that the reforms could be implemented within the existing resources 
and those already authorised by the LTDP and the 1981 review, there was a strong 
chance that Thatcher could have objected to Bagnall's attempt. 157 In short, the 
government benefited politically without actually having to go out of its way to aid 
the military. In fact, the government did not play any positive role other than creating 
a 'permissive' environment; it neither starved the military of necessary resources nor 
vetoed the changes. 
156 Interview, Bagnall on 6 November 1993. See chapter 5.3.3. for more on the 
government's role in implementing the reforms. 
157 See Bagnall's letter to The Times on 3 August 1994, for the frustration he 
experienced by challenging Thatcher's views on Britain's nuclear capability. In fact, he 
had offered an opinion that the cost of the Trident system was too extravagant, and 
the financial resources allocated to the system could be better utilised for improving 
Britain's conventional capability. As a result, he wrote that he was 'written off as 
being unreliable thereafter.' 
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3.6. CONCLUSION 
The main findings in this chapter have been that the development of the British logic 
for the reforms was as much a product of all the changes that were taking place at the 
time as it was of its own unique views and rationalisations on what was required to 
bolster the defence of Central Europe. For example, although the British Army 
leadership'S nuclear no-early-use thinking coincided with the growing desire of the 
public and other nations, it was formulated based strictly on its own interpretation of 
the utility of such weapons, as it recognised a number of political, strategic and 
operational benefits of nuclear no-early-use. Conversely, not only did the Army 
leadership'S logic not always conform to the mainstream view, which was the case 
with its perception towards threat of a WP surprise attack, but also it sometimes ran 
quite contrary to the established views at the time--it was particularly so with its 
dismissive views towards the German notion of forward defence. 
Nonetheless, despite the fact that the Army leadership'S perception of the 
above developments did not make everyone happy, its logic was not only persuasive 
but also quite justified because of the situation at the time. Most of all, under forward 
defence, as it was understood by the Germans, if the WP succeeded in a surprise 
standing start attack, NATO's defence would quickly collapse as a large portion of its 
forces would be dislocated and beaten piecemeal by the numerically superior WP. As 
a result, the Alliance would be forced to resort to nuclear-early-use in the case of war 
due to the lack of its conventional capacity to stop the WP's initial onslaught. 
Otherwise, NATO would face the possibility of losing its territory and thus, 
inevitably, the cohesion of the Alliance. Yet, not only could nuclear-early-use bring a 
number of political and strategic ramifications, but it could also effectively nullify any 
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cohesive defensive efforts by the Alliance as it would quickly lead to the loss of 
control of the battlefield and, eventually, to an escalation to strategic nuclear 
exchange. Therefore, regardless of what the others in the Alliance thought, this series 
of logic provided the initial impetus for the Army leadership to pursue the reforms. 
Meanwhile, although it did not have any direct bearing on the formulation of 
the reforms, the 1981 defence review nevertheless had some positive results. The 
most significant contribution of the review was that it did not make further cuts in the 
Army's strength under the difficult economic conditions at the time. The undisrupted 
procurement of weapon systems and equipment to implement the reforms was 
essential if the reforms were to be effective. In this sense, the role of the Conservative 





The purpose of this chapter is to review the three core elements of the reforms: 
1) operational level planning; 2) LandfAir Battle; and 3) counter stroke. In doing 
so, I will examine the background and process of their formulation in order to 
provide an overall analysis of their strategic and operational logic and to 
determine the validity of their principles. 
I argue that the primary aim of Bagnall's efforts to introduce the 
operational level concept in the British Army and NORTHAG was to enable a 
rational use of the limited resources available in the army group. Therefore, the 
acceptance of the new concept of operation was not an attempt to adopt a 
radically different concept based on newly emerging manoeuvre theory at the 
time. It was rather an inevitable choice to enhance their ability to simultaneously 
achieve economy and concentration of forces so as to bolster the existing ideas 
for defence through better utilisation of mobility and firepower. For this reason, 
Bagnall paid more attention to reinforcing and extending the already existing 
capability through better C3I, interoperability, education, etc., to enhance 
NORTHAG's operations at the operational level, and why his ideas 
fundamentally differed from the AirLand Battle Doctrine and FOF A. 
Thus the adoption of the Landi Air Battle Doctrine should be seen in the 
same vein, i.e. that it was essentially aimed at achieving a rational distribution of 
valuable resources (air assets) at the operational level by streamlining the air 
force's obligations to suit the land force's requirements which, in turn, would 
enable the recognition of the joint nature of the command of the two forces. This 
would allow the air force to support only the vital missions, and thus avoid 
wastage and duplication of effort in supporting the ground war. 
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I also argue that the endorsement of the counter stroke concept, both at 
the tactical and operational levels, had the same logical foundation. This would 
permit a simultaneous achievement of economy of efforts and concentration of 
forces to strengthen the existing defences (although the counter offensive 
concept had a larger purpose) by using manoeuvre at the operational level. This 
was not a purely mobile concept because the positional element remained 
important to the achievement of the operational goal. 
148 
4.2. OPERATIONAL LEVEL THINKING IN NORTHAG 
4.2.1.THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE LACK OF OPERATIONAL 
LEVEL THINKING IN NORTHAG 
Before the reforms, the lack of a single operational level concept in NORTHAG 
took a major toll on the force disposition of the NORTHAG corps, as well as the 
army group's ability to conduct a theatre-wide joint battle. First of all, the 
Netherlands and Belgian corps were already criticised for their lack of readiness 
by many British and German commanders who considered them to be seriously 
flawed. 1 Also, not only did they have to bring forward the majority of forces 
from their homes, but also their peacetime barracks had little relation to wartime 
operational areas. This was also true for the British and German corps, though 
to a lesser extent. 2 
Secondly, the gamson areas did not coincide with the operational 
sectors, forcing the NORTHAG corps to travel a long distance while doing 
much 'criss-crossing' of paths over other corps areas.3 This would undoubtedly 
cause a serious traffic problem with their deployment to wartime positions, 
causing them to take longer than expected and paving the way for a WP surprise 
attack against a vulnerable NATO. 
Thirdly, the lack of interoperability in NORTHAG, as the former British 
and other national commanders whom I interviewed pointed out, hindered the 
1 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993, Farndale on 21 June 1993 and Von 
Sandrart. 
2 McInnes, 1988, p.382. See Cross, op. cit., p.20, for an assessment of the 
Belgian and Dutch readiness problem. 
3 See Faringdon, op. cit., p.339. 
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achievement of flexibility of command and rendered the conduct of a joint 
operation difficult. 4 Cooperation received little attention, and this compelled 
each corps to use indigenously developed weapons and communications 
systems, different to those utilised by their counterparts, due to the need to 
maintain a national industrial capacity. Particularly, the serious problem of the 
different communication networks, which made the coordination of the battle a 
laborious task for COMNORTHAG, remained unsolved until the British corps 
supplied its own signal assets to NORTHAG.5 
Fourthly, the lack of a commonly understood operational language and 
military terminology created confusion and encumbered effective joint operations 
in NORTHAG.6 NATO army groups overlooked this element due to the 
political consideration that the Alliance was a voluntary grouping of sovereign 
states, each with its own defence policies.7 To have ignored this would have 
been to risk a rift in the Allies' cohesion. 8 
Finally, the overriding dependence on nuclear weapons was also a 
negation of the requirement for NATO and army group-wide joint operations. 
Under the nuclear environment, 1) it would be safer if NATO did not 
concentrate its force for a large operational level manoeuvre because it would 
4 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993, Chalupa, Famdale 21 June 1993 and 
Jackson. 
5 Interview, Bagnall on 5 May 1993. 
6 See R.L. Sloane, "REFORGER Interoperability," Armor, (September-October 
1979), p.9, for an example of the confusion created during the 1979 exercise due 
to the lack of common tactical and operational terms. 
7 Nicklas-Carter, op. cit., in Harries and Toase, op. cit., p.207. 
8 See Hans Henning Von Sandrart, CINCENT's Operational Principles and 
Concept of Operations, A CINCENT's Lecture given to the HCSC at the Staff 
College, Camberley on 2 February 1989. 
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present a major target for a WP nuclear attack; and 2) the recovery of lost 
territory, or the maintenance of defensive positions, could be carried out by 
corps operations as they would have to reoccupy the temporary void created in 
the target areas after NATO's nuclear attack. As a result, Bagnall claimed that, 
under such conditions, developing a single army group SOP and a fully 
integrated GDP was almost impossible. 9 
The most serious ramification of this was that each corps was left to fight 
an essentially separate corps battle. Bagnall expressed his frustration by saying, 
'all corps have been told to conduct the battle within their own corps area and 
have been given a coordinating line behind which they are not to withdraw 
without authority. Currently this instruction is interpreted in different ways in the 
four corps, without an overall design for battle at the army group level.' 1 0 As a 
result, each corps was trying to 'defend passively and right up to the 1GB, 
regardless of whether this is feasible.' 11 
Also, because COMNORTHAG could only take over the command of 
the army group in war and then coordinate the operations of the corps 
commanders--as well as the tendency to consider COMNORTHAG as more of 
an administrator whose role was political rather than as the decision-making 
theatre commander--he had no power in real time to control a combined army 
group battle, and most of the fighting would be conducted independently by each 
national corps commander. Under the circumstances, the role of army group 
commander before Bagnall, in Chalupa's view, was confined to coordinating 
manoeuvre, barrier and fire plans, 'to halt and defeat the enemy within an area of 
9 Interview, Bagnall on 5 May 1993. 
10 Bagnall, 1984, p.62. 
11 Bagnall, 1984, p.60. 
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limited depth.'12 In other words, COMNORTHAG's role was primarily limited 
to producing a coordinated fire plan mainly with air assets because he did not 
have any other means of influencing the army group battle. 13 
Such a situation would cause a number of problems. Most of all, the 
overall priorities of the operational level (AFCENT --Allied Forces Central 
Europe--and army group) could not be identified. 14 Each corps would consider 
its own situation to be more grievous than that of the others, and would use 
most of the available corps resources for its own battle, as each corps 
commander would try to support his own battle regardless of the operational 
situation. Furthermore, there could be a conflict between corps over priority in 
the use of the operational level resources when they became available (i. e. the 
operational reserves and air assets). 
The consequence would be a waste of effort and resources since each 
corps would be fighting a series of individual tactical battles absorbing a lot of 
valuable assets while causing chaos at the theatre level as the operational 
commander would have to cope with each corps' demands to provide support 
for its operation. As Hines and Petersen said, "'Corps battle".... thoroughly 
pervades operational thinking' since the army group commander would depend 
upon subordinate corps for the combat resources to react to operational 
developments. 15 One consequence could entail: 
Commanders of Corps experiencing relatively shallow tactical 
penetrations.... might exaggerate the significance of the enemy's 
12 Chalupa'S speech at RUSI in 1984. 
13 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993 and Jackson. 
14 Bagnall, 1984, p.60. 
15 Hines and Petersen, 1986, p.565. 
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successes... . Corps commanders who are holding, or even advancing 
somewhat, in those sectors where the Pact Front. ... chose not to weight 
the attack. ... would be accurately reporting victory-winning the corps 
battle-while army group and CINCENT could be trying unsuccessfully to 
fend off operational and strategic encirclement. 16 
Under the circumstances, the operational dislocation of corps became a distinct 
possibility. Given the isolated nature of the corps battle and the different national 
doctrines, if the WP penetration occurred along inter-corps boundaries (a 'spill 
over' of the WP thrusts into neighbouring corps), it would have been extremely 
difficult for two different corps to counter it in an effective joint operation. 17 
Furthermore, the army group would not be able to concentrate its assets because 
it had to support two separate corps operations. Thus, if one corps stayed on 
fighting while others were withdrawing, this could have exposed its flanks to the 
enemy. This was a distinct possibility, since, as Bagnall said in an interview, he 
could not rely on the Belgians to have sufficient strength to fulfil their tasks--and 
nor were the Dutch any better, with the exception of the initial defensive 
battle. 18 This problem was aggravated by the German corps' determination to 
fight its own fierce corps defensive battle. 19 
4.2.2. HIGHLIGHTS OF BAGNALL'S OPERATIONAL CONCEPT 
The core of Bagnall's idea revolved around finding an alternative to the 
attritional and static styles of defence. Such approaches would fail against the 
16 Hines and Petersen, 1986, p.570. 
17 See Bagnall, 1984, p.62. 
18 Interview, Bagnall on 5 May 1993. Also interviews, Famdale 21 June 1993 
and Day. Also see Faringdon, op. cit., p.370. 
19 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993 and Famdale 21 June 1993. 
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WP, because: 1) it would have the initiative of attack by being on the offensive, 
whereas NORTHAG would be reacting to the enemy; and 2) NORTHAG would 
thus not be able to recover lost territory because it would lack the ability to 
concentrate scattered forces for a major counter attack while remaining on the 
defensive. Moreover, as mentioned previously, such a situation would have been 
further exacerbated if the WP succeeded in launching a standing start attack. 
In order to strengthen deterrence, Bagnall felt that NATO needed to 
foster a credible conventional capability which would be enough to secure a 
quick cessation of a conflict without yielding German territory in the case of 
war. Otherwise, NATO's deterrence was only a tenuous remedy, and he thus 
made sure everyone understood his view that actually having such a capacity 
would be the critical factor in preventing a possible war with the WP. This also 
required the army group to 1) contain the WP advance at the earliest hour 
without using nuclear weapons; and 2) deter further aggression by the WP by 
maintaining a major counter offensive capability.20 
Bagnall perceived two overriding and irreconcilable political and 
operational realities in the defence of Central Europe. Firstly, under no 
circumstances could he breach the forward defence imperative regardless of his 
own views on the subject. Secondly, the amount of resources available was 
finite, confined to what was already available to NORTHAG during the early 
hours. Therefore, he concluded that only accepting the principles of the 
operational level of war would offer an alternative with which to strengthen 
conventional defence within the above confines.21 The most attractive aspect of 
20 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May and 6 November 1993. 
21 See next section for more on the British understanding of the operational 
level. 
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conducting a war at the operational level was the rational management of 
existing resources, which could allow for the necessary degree of operational 
flexibility within the political guidelines. 22 
The requirements for Bagnall's operational level concept were designed 
to alleviate the problems listed at the beginning of this section, i.e.: 1) to allow 
the rearrangement ofNORTHAG's posture, under which the rationalisation and 
reallocation of resources would be determined according to the priorities; 2) to 
permit the creation of a large operational reserve by achieving economy of force 
at the operational level; 3) to provide a common language and concept of 
operation to enable a joint and cross-corps operation within NORTHAG; and, 4) 
to free 2AT AF from constantly having to support the army group operations so 
that it could pursue its own aim of air superiority. This was to be done by 
identifying the priorities and by accepting the joint planning and coordination 
between the two, under which the AT AF would provide extended and intensive 
support when needed.23 
Thus, the multi-faceted aims and directions of the reforms, as already 
mentioned earlier, can be summarised as follows: 1) the adoption of a jointly 
agreed concept of operation in the form of a single army group operational 
doctrine, which could be understood throughout the NORTHAG corps; 2) the 
acceptance of mobile defence and manoeuvre warfare in the NORTHAG 
doctrine; 3) the formulation of a more offensive-oriented defence concept in the 
form of counter offensive and counter stroke with the consequent nurturing of a 
more positive attitude and dynamic spirit among NORTHAG forces; 4) the 
22 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May and 6 November 1993. Also see Bagnall, 1984, 
paSSIm. 
23 See more in chapter 4.3. 
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creation of a large army group reserve for COMNORTHAG's operational battle~ 
and 5) the adoption of the joint land/air battle doctrine for the effective 
management and rational use of resources within the corps, the army group and 
the ATAF under one command. 
The core of Bagnall's plan, and a recurring theme in the British Army and 
NORTHAG operational concept, was the creation of a large mobile operational 
reserve within the existing resources for the army group counter offensive. The 
ultimate aim of the operational reserve and its timely committal was focused on, 
as Lt. General Mackenzie emphasised, preventing 'either a catastrophic 
penetration of the linear defence or a strategic turning manoeuvre around one of 
the flanks of the Central Region' which was crucial in order to avoid 'a loss of 
cohesion and total collapse of the defence of the Central Front. ,24 
Taking the initiative at an early stage by offensive was another such 
theme. Bagnall wrote in emphasis: 'let us be quite clear there is no alternative to 
us attempting to seize the initiative at an early stage. Unless we achieve this we 
will only be reacting to the Soviet moves and would inevitably be ground down 
in a battle of attrition which we could never hope to win. ,25 It would most of all 
allow the army group to force the enemy to react to its move and not vice versa. 
As a result, the army group would be able to cause confusion and friction to the 
enemy's plan to slow him down and allow time to prepare for the army group 
counter move. This would not only cause a delay in the enemy operation, but 
could also induce the army group to further expand its initiative--which could 
create extra blunders and confusion in the enemy and permit additional 
24 llG. Mackenzie, "The Counter-offensive," in Holden Reid and Dewar, op. 
cit., p.164. 
25 Bagnall, 1984, p.60. 
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disruption by the army group at the time and place of its choosing. This also 
meant that each corps would take on offensives based on tactical counter stroke 
whenever feasible to maximise the chance of taking back the initiative and foster 
the environment within which the army group operational counter offensive 
could be committed. 26 
Finally, NORTHAG was to move away from the static mentality in 
order to enhance its ability to undertake offensive mobile battle and counter 
offensive. This would both achieve concentration of forces at the critical point 
and permit a smaller NORTHAG force to offer effective defence against the 
numerically superior WP, a more viable option because of the lack of resources. 
The operational planning would enable the conduct of daring operations such as 
mobile defence and manoeuvre warfare, which could compensate for 
NORTHAG'S numerical inferiority. 27 
All in all, Bagnall hoped that the combination of these actions would 
unhinge the enemy at the theatre-wide level. 28 Particularly under the standing 
start scenario, the WP could not concentrate on more than one or two major 
breakthrough points, while attempting to disguise them by fake attacks in other 
areas. Thus, NORTHAG's delaying and disruption of the WP progress in general 
would force the WP to reveal its main efforts early because it would have to 
concentrate its attempts on achieving a quick breakthrough, and this, in turn, 
26 This was the main issue on which misunderstandings about the NORTHAG 
concept most frequently occurred, i. e. most observers could not distinguish 
between the corps and army group counter stroke and the aims of such an 
operation on two different levels. See details in chapter 4.4. 
27 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May and 6 November 1993, F amdale on 14 April 
and Von Sandrart. 
28 Interview, Bagnall on 5 May 1993. Also interview, Famdale on 21 June 
1993. 
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would make it difficult to prolong the deception. Thus, NORTHAG's operational 
planning would allow it to establish a coherent counter measure against the 
enemy's surprise penetration. Firstly, it would enable the corps to avoid 
positional dislocation and wastage of corps reserves by being deployed forward 
in separate corps battle. Secondly, the covering forces would fight an aggressive 
delaying battle to reveal the enemy main efforts. Thirdly, the operational reserve 
could be concentrated after the enemy's main efforts were identified. Fourthly, 
with covering force and main defensive battles, the army group could coordinate 
tactical counter attacks to further disrupt the enemy. Finally, the army could 
commit to a counter offensive to destroy the enemy main effort(s). 
While NORTHAG's major concern was the WP surprise standing start 
attack, it was also expected to vastly enhance its ability to counter other 
scenarios, including a post-mobilisation one.29 Under this specific contingency, 
the army group's ability to prevent the enemy from making any significant 
progress in the initial stage of the conflict, and to increase the odds of 
committing a counter offensive (with either in-theatre or external reserves), 
would markedly improve NATO's political stance against the WP, and the 
Alliance's threat of nuclear use would be more credible. Also, as Bagnall 
repeatedly--and ironically--emphasised during a number of interviews with me, 
every commander in NATO could win a war against the WP if full mobilisation 
could be achieved, and NORTHAG could defend itself without all this intricate 
29 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993 and Farndale on 21 June 1993. See 
chapter 6 for the expansion of the reforms, under which the NORTHAG concept 
was extended to counter other scenarios, including a post-mobilisation one, and 
more strikingly, a conventional retaliation. 
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and difficult planning if it could be assured of the arrival of the full contingent of 
3 (US) Corps in its area before the outbreak ofwar.30 
An additional benefit would be to permit COMNORTHAG to plan a 
cohesive defence without a dispute with other national commanders at a critical 
time, and to gain the initiative by influencing the battle at the operational level. 
He could also avoid confusion in language and concepts with subordinate 
commanders of different national corps, which would allow for a smoother 
distribution of resources throughout the army group. In short, it could achieve 
doctrinal interoperability in NORTHAG in terms of the concept and language 
used. In addition, it could provide a basis on which conceptual and operational 
interoperability could be achieved with other NATO and national concepts (i.e. 
FOF A and the AirLand Battle Doctrine), by adopting a compatible concept 
which was based on similar operational principles.31 
Finally, the army group was able to achieve a rational management of 
resources by avoiding the redundant deployment of weapon systems and 
equipment. As mentioned, the advances in C3 I technology significantly enhanced 
the army group's ability to coordinate operations with the corps and air force. If 
the C3 I systems in each corps could be integrated, it also meant that the corps 
were not required to maintain extensive intelligence-gathering assets, and that 
information could be distributed quickly and reliably by the army group, offering 
cost-effective, yet substantial, improvements to the army group's defensive 
capability. 
30 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May and 6 November 1993 and 4 May 1994. Also 
see 4.2.4. for detail on NORTHAG's reserves. 
31 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May and 6 November 1993 and F arndale on 14 
April and 21 June 1993. The compatibility of the British and US doctrines 
proved to be a very useful element ~hi~h enabled cooperation between the two 
armies during the Gulf War. See detatls m chapter 8.3. 
159 
4.2.3. THE BRITISH AND NORTHAG UNDERSTANDING OF THE 
OPERA TIONAL LEVEL 
So as to minimise the impact of the changes when the new operational concept 
was to be introduced to the British Army, it was accepted that the reforms 
should not be too different from the operational and tactical ideas, as well as the 
languages, already in use. Therefore, attention was focused on the formulation of 
a concept which utilised the fundamentals of war at the operational level, while 
focusing on achieving 'considerable flexibility from the actual organisation of the 
regimental system, while still trying to preserve its inspiration and motivation. ,32 
The Army's principles of war contained ten tenets which represented the 
British experience of war. The Army was expected to apply the ten principles as 
appropriate in the general conduct of war. 3 3 Therefore, it was planned that the 
adoption of the operational doctrine, and the revision of the fundamentals of war 
to supplement the new concept, would not constitute an attempt to create a 
series of new rules which the Army was expected to follow. The following 
explanation by Inge clearly shows Bagnall's operational philosophy: 
You will adhere to the fundamentals of war and the right size reserves at 
[operational] level under the operational commander who can influence the 
campaign. You can't plan the next move without reading the current 
situation, and planning in advance is not wise. You have to develop a skill 
to read the battlefield. 
Thus, when the principles of war were used to provide an operational concept, 
the main purpose was to provide an ideal linguistic and conceptual platform on 
32 Edwin Bramall, "British Land Forces: The Future," RUSIJ, Vol.127, No.2, 
(June 1982), p.22. 
33 See The BMD, Annex A, for details of the British Army Principles of War. 
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which the British and NORTHAG's operational level concept could be 
developed. 34 
As a result, 'operational level' became understood in the British Army, as 
defined in the BMD, as the level which 'is concerned with the direction of 
military resources to achieve the objectives of military strategy' as opposed to 
the 'tactical level,' which 'involves the direction of military resources to achieve 
operationalobjectives.,35 The definition continues: 
The vital link between the setting of military strategic objectives and the 
tactical employment of forces on the battlefield is the exercise of 
command at the operational level. The skilful execution of the 
operational level of command is described as 'Operational Art'. That art 
embraces both decisions taken at the operational level and the outcome 
of those decisions, often tactical activity but bearing on the strategic 
level. For actions at the operational level must be planned with a view to 
seeking a decisive result. 36 
Yet recognising the operational level and operational art did not signify, as Inge 
emphasised, setting up a set of rules for the conduct of operations. For instance, 
mobile defence was not the sole prescribed method of conduct of a war at the 
operational level. Rather, the idea was to provide a broader view and 
understanding of the nature of warfare, under which various options for defence 
could be formulated and executed. Such options included counter stroke and 
offensive or defensive operations by fostering, as the BMD emphasised, a 'better 
understanding of what is required of the Army and how it will operate.'37 Lastly, 
34 See more in chapter 4.4.2. for application of the principles. 
35 The BMD, pp.38-9. For a more detailed discussion and definition, see 
Bellamy, 1987, p.l05, chapter 4; Luttwak, 1987, p.69, pp.91-2 and p.260; 
Simpkin, 1985, pp.23-4; Leonhart, op. cit., pp.8-9; and Lind. op. cit., p.24. 
36 The BMD, p.39. 
37 See The BMD, p.vii. 
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one of the inevitable and recognisable benefits of the operational level was that it 
gave NORTHAG a better chance of conducting more mobile operations--
although this was not always the preferable choice. 
Above all, the major aim of the new operational doctrine was to allow 
the overall priorities of the army group to be identified, thus permitting the 
simultaneous achievement of concentration and economy of forces through 
rational resource management. 3 8 This meant that forward defensive positions 
had to be held with elasticity in mind as the army group did not have the 
resources to man them throughout the frontage. This was to allow NORTHAG 
to retain a ready army group reserve in order to react quickly to the WP 
penetrations at selected points. 3 9 It was also recognised that a series of tactical 
successes could be broadened by the principle of synergism at the operational 
level, which would be created by fighting a manoeuvre war in a fluid battlefield. 
Lind wrote: 
What is the operational art? Broadly, it is the art of winning campaigns .... 
[It] is the art of using tactical events--battles or refusals to give battle--to 
strike directly at the enemy's strategic center of gravity. For the 
commander, it is the art of deciding where and when to fight on the basis 
of the strategic plan.... Why is the operational art important if you are to 
do maneuver warfare? Because it is through excellence in the operational 
art more than through maneuver in tactical battles .... that a small force can 
defeat a larger one.40 
Therefore, accepting the principles of the operational level of war and 
operational art, which permitted elastic defence (in combination of positional and 
38 See Bagnall, 1984, p.60. Also see Simpkin, 1987, pp. 23-4; and Leonhard, 
op. cit., p.8. 
39 Bagnall, 1984, p.62. 
40 Lind. op. cit., p.24. See 4.4.2. for further discussion on the Centre of Gravity. 
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mobile defence with reserves) under the manoeuvre principles, was a logical 
alternative. 
Meanwhile, there was a need for clarification of the operational level in 
the NORTHAG armies, if the joint operational concept was to be adopted. As 
mentioned, Germany understood the operational level to mean the handling of 
divisions and corps, in which the corps would exercise exclusive power. The 
British started with the same understanding. Yet the thought evolved gradually, 
initially to the notion that the command between the corps and the army group 
was the linchpin between the tactical and operational levels. 
However, Bagnall soon realised that the corps defensive battle was still 
tactical, and that focusing on this level would result in an operational dislocation 
by the wp.41 Thus, the British came to stress that NORTHAG's operational 
level should be identified with the army group operation. The logic was, again, 
how to use the limited resources of NORTHAG effectively. For example, the 
reason why CENTAG did not have a joint army group concept like NORTHAG 
was that, because of the strong US and German corps deployed on the difficult 
terrain, they did not have to emphasise the use of operational reserves as much 
as NORTHAG as long as they could have effective corps-level operations.42 
After agreeing upon this fundamental question, COMNORTHAG's 
authority was eventually expanded to include many important tasks under the 
new operational concept. According to Farndale, they were: I) monitoring his 
corps Commanders whose task was to destroy the lead attacks without calling 
on army group reserves; 2) finding out what the enemy was doing and where his 
point of main effort was; 3) attacking the enemy at long range with concentrated 
41 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993 and Von Sandrart. 
42 See Karber and Palmer, op. cit., in Pfaltzgraff and Schulze, pp.17S-S0. 
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air power and artillery; 4) committing his own reserves of several armoured and 
airmobile divisions; 5) committing any extra external reserves allotted to him by 
the strategic commanders; 6) continuing his long range attack so as to prevent 
any follow-on enemy formation arriving fresh into battle; and, 7) being ready to 
move into the battlefield nuclear phase, once authorised. 43 
4.2.4. NORTHAG'S OPERATIONAL RESERVE 
As repeatedly expressed, the most important aim of the acceptance of the 
operational level by NORTHAG was to permit the creation of the army group 
reserves. The situation had been such that while each corps had its own reserves, 
COMNORTHAG had very little. As the operational commander, he did not have 
much to do without reserves, not to mention launching a counter offensive. 44 
There were two obstacles to remedying this situation. Firstly, the corps did not 
want to provide them for COMNORTHAG because they were national reserves. 
Secondly, there were no dependable resources either inside or outside 
NORTHAG from which COMNORTHAG could create the army group reserve. 
For example, the British TA divisions, which were to reinforce NORTHAG's 
rear areas, were too weak, while 3 (US) Corps was in fact CINCENT's 
operational reserve with some obligation to NORTHAG. Moreover, the political 
43 Farndale, 1988--A, p.26. 
44 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993, Farndale on 21 June 1993, loge and Von 
Sandrart. 
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sensitivity concerning their mobilisation during a crisis would have jeopardised 
their immediate availability. 45 
Most of all, although no one disagreed with the necessity of the 
operational reserve and on the potential operational and strategic benefits which 
could be gained from the success of its operation, there were simply not enough 
forces available within NORTHAG.46 Under the existing deployment plans, an 
alternative which was available to Bagnall was, as he stressed, the 
reinterpretation of forward defence to release some troops from it and earmark 
them as the exclusive army group reserve without responsibilities during the 
initial defensive (covering and main defensive) battles. The only problem was 
that it had to be done through the thinning-out of forward defence. Eventually, 
after heated debates, this resulted in the reallocation of some FEBA (Forward 
Edge of the Battle Area) divisions. 47 
What Bagnall required of the operational reserve force was that it be 
made up of a mobile all-arms formation of corps size with 'a lot of punch, which 
was solely tasked to undertake counter offensive.48 It also needed to have 
flexibility, high counter-mobility and substantial firepower.49 Mobility not only 
assured high speed action and a high degree of responsiveness but also enhanced 
45 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993, Farndale on 21 June 1993 and Von 
Sandrart. Also see McInnes, 1988, p.388, for the political difficulty involved in 
deploying the operational reserves. 
46 See Bagnall, 1984, p.60. 
47 See more in 4.4.1. for a specific battle plan after this change. 
48 Interview, Bagnall on 5 May 1993. Also interview, Dewar. See Mackenzie, 
op. cit., in Holden Reid and Dewar, op. cit., pp.177-178, for more on the 
description of the counter offensive force. 
49 See E.F.G. Burton, "What Measures Should be Taken to Strengthen NATO's 
Deterrence Strategy?" in Mackenzie and Holden Reid, 1989, pp.222-3. 
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survivability. Furthermore, superior firepower would have further improved its 
flexibility and chance of survival as it would have been able to cope with many 
different enemy formations. 
Previously, COMNORTHAG had 7 Panzer Division as his sole reserve in 
the theatre. Initially, Bagnall was able to reach a preliminary agreement with the 
Germans on the provision of 3 Panzer Division as an additional reserve while 
reassigning 3 (BR) Armoured Division to the same role. His successor, F arndale, 
who replaced him in 1985, was eventually able to officially designate them as the 
army group reserve, although some uneasiness concerning the term 'official' 
remained within the Bundeswehr.50 Indeed, they were a formidable corps-size 
force with strength, agility, and 'a lot of punch.' Moreover, they were solely 
tasked to carry out counter offensive under COMNORTHAG's control, and 
were not to be dual-tasked (e.g. having an additional role as the covering 
force).51 As mentioned, this was possible only after Bagnall insisted that the 
principle of forward defence be reinterpreted to allow the adoption of the new 
concept. 
The logic of releasing the Netherlands and Belgian corps from the task of 
providing more forces for the army group reserve role was based on the fact that 
they needed their in-theatre force to cover the deployment of the bulk of their 
corps forces and reinforcements. Furthermore, they generally lagged behind the 
Germans and British in terms of their standard of training and competence. 52 
Nonetheless, the army group reserve, which was made up of forces from 
two different national corps with different weapon systems and tactical concepts 
50 Interviews, Farndale on 21 June 1993 and Von Sandrart. 
51 Interview, Bagnall on 5 May 1993. 
52 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993, Farndale on 21 June 1993 and Inge. 
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(as opposed to an operational one in the army group which was being gradually 
formulated under Bagnall's guidance), could have caused some problems. For 
example, the kind of operation envisaged was the highly complicated and mobile 
counter offensive. Thus, the reserve principally required interoperability and 
should preferably be made up of homogeneous formations so as to maximise its 
capability. This problem nevertheless persisted until the US decided to officially 
designate 3 (US) Corps as the NORTHAG reserve--and establish its HQs in the 
area--a formation which eventually became the major NORTHAG counter 
offensive reserve. This was, in a way, a reflection of the desperate situation in 
which COMNORTHAG had previously been left; with only one division as his 
reserve, he had to get hold of anything he could lay his hands on. 
While Bagnall was COMNORTHAG, however, he did not rely on the 
availability of 3 (US) Corps. Planning a defence with this corps in mind would 
have been an action which contradicted his own conviction--preparing for the 
worst. In fact, if NORTHAG was completely surprised, despite the fact that 
Bagnall would be allowed to use 3 Panzer Division, he felt that he could use only 
7 Panzer and 3 (BR) Armoured Divisions for a counter offensive since 3 Panzer 
Division might have to cover for the deployment of the Netherlands corps as 
well as reinforce the covering force and main defensive battles.53 In short, 
depending on the situation, the number of operational reserves available to 
COMNORTHAG for the army group counter offensive phase of the battle was 
between two armoured divisions (7 Panzer and 3 (BR) divisions) and two corps-
equivalents (3 and 7 Panzer and 3 (BR) divisions and 3 (US) Corps) by the mid-
1980s. 
53 Interviews, Farndale on 21 June 1883 and Kenny. See more in 4.4., chapters 
5 and 6. 
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4.3. THE FORMULATION OF THE LAND/AIR BATTLE CONCEPT 
4.3.1. THE AGREEMENT WITH THE RAF AND 2ATAF 
Airpower was the only asset in NATO with marginal superiority, technological if 
not numerical, over the WP. 2ATAF alone had 370 to 550 or more combat 
aircraft if immediately reinforced from the forces in the UK and US.54 
Furthermore, the cooperation among national contingents and between the two 
ATAFs in the AAFCE was good due to doctrinal and conceptual harmony as the 
necessity to plan and organise combat in a highly integrated fashion in both 
ATAFs barred 'incompatibility between national doctrines.'55 The major obstacle 
was how to identify the common objectives between NORTHAG and 2AT AF, 
the success of which was vital for the implementation of Land/Air Battle. 
The necessity of joint land/air operations for the British Army had been 
highlighted as early as the years right after the end of the Second World War.56 
However, the RAF's major concern was the fact that the Army would have a 
strong influence on the Air Force, thereby enabling it to overlook the RAF's 
requirements and priorities, if the RAF were too acquiescent. Therefore, a 
tendency which dismissed inter -service cooperation between the two as a 
'diversionary activity' persisted until the early 1980s.57 
54 Jonathan Price, Air Battle Central Europe, (New York: The Free Press, 
1986), pp.1-2. 
55 Stratmann, op. cit., in O'Neill, op. cit., pp. 196-7. 
56 See Dawson, op. cit., p.214. 
57 See C.E. Carrington, "Land/Air Warfare," RUSIJ, (June 1981), p.15. Also 
see Dawson, op. cit., p.214; and N. Crookenden, "Land/Air Warfare," BAR, 
(April 1966), p. 55, for more detail. 
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However, the relationship between the RAF and the Army was not as 
discouraging as it looked. In fact, Air Chief Marshal Jackson had something 
better to say about this matter in an interview: 'the relations were actually very 
cooperative, not like in the us .... Fights, if there were some, usually surrounded 
weapons systems and equipment. But it would be resolved in [the MoD] 
building.' He commented that one of the reasons for such a good relationship 
was that the RAF developed its own policy which actually supported the army's 
operations. For example, the RAF had Tornados for deep interdiction, Jaguars 
for shallow interdiction, and Harriers for CAS. Hence, relations between 
COMNORTHAG and COM2ATAF were closer than those between the corps 
commanders, despite the fact there was no visible opposition from corps 
commanders. This was also helped by the fact that the commanders of both were 
British. Above all, what prevented a major disagreement was that the RAF and 
2ATAF's priority and policy coincided with Bagnall's requirements, and thus, 
when he requested the expansion of the cooperation through closer coordination 
and prioritisation of the AT AF's missions according to the army group 
commander's need, his pursuit was not hampered. 
Bagnall identified three priorities for the application of air power: firstly, 
winning the air battle to keep the enemy air force off the army group's back (i.e. 
by Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAI»; secondly, concentrated use of air power to 
create a vacuum between the WP first and second echelons; and, thirdly, it 
would be used for close support only in an emergency. 58 In fact, he even said 
that land forces might not see a single aircraft at all during the early days of a 
war. 59 2AT AF's priority remained thus: first, air superiority and OCA; second, 
58 Interview, Bagnall on 6 November 1993. Also see, Bagnall, 1984, p.60. 
59 Price, op. cit., p.28. Also interview, Bagnall on 5 May 1993. 
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FOF A and BAI; and finally, CAS.60 Furthermore, in direct support of the land 
operations ofNORTHAG, two of the most important missions of2ATAF were: 
1) counter breakthrough operations, and 2) air superiority and support 
operations for the counter offensive and counter stroke.61 
Above all, what Bagnall sought to achieve was to free COM2AT AF to do 
what he was supposed to do--win the air battle. In other words, the aim was not 
to separate the operations of the two, which would inevitably cause a waste of 
effort as each would identify and assign different priorities for different missions. 
What was critical for COMNORTHAG might not have been so important for 
COM2ATAF. The prioritisation of the ATAF's operation in the order of: 1) 
winning the air battle; 2) FOFA (which replaced the British term 'BAI'); 3) 
counter breakthrough; and, 4) close support (e.g. counter stroke support), 
assured COM2ATAF that COMNORTHAG would not hinder his effort by 
requesting air support for non-critical land operations. 62 
However, when the request was received, COM2AT AF would make the 
necessary support available to assist COMNORTHAG's operation. By 
amalgamating the NORTHAG concept of operation and air force doctrine, both 
commanders would avoid the time-consuming joint planning of air support every 
time it was requested; by using the same language, further time would be saved 
without creating confusion. Above all, it was hoped that it would foster a more 
60 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993 and Jackson. Also see John Warden, The 
Air Campaign, (New York: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1989), pp.133-5, for the 
benefits of the prioritisation of missions. 
61 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993 and Jackson. 
62 See more on BAI in 4.3.4. 
170 
active role of the ATAF in the overall defence of NATO as 2ATAF would 
maintain more freedom of action within the priorities. 63 
This was a very reassuring development which enhanced NORTHAG's 
ability to counter the WP. As Bagnall stressed in an interview, he was certain he 
could stop the WP as long as the air war was won and air superiority could thus 
be maintained. Inge agreed by saying in an interview that, 'the WP would 
undoubtedly have had initial successes .... [But] if 2ATAF was reasonably 
successful, they would have had a very difficult time maintaining that 
momentum, and we had the edge in that. ,64 
4.3.2.COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THE JOINT LAND/AIR 
BATTLE 
The highlight of adopting the joint concept was the establishment of the joint 
NORTHAG-2ATAF HQ. Although the increased demands and pressures on the 
HQ in support of an array of complex joint land/air operations were 
considerable, and it would face severe congestion problems unless the 
requirements for C2 (Command and Control) were streamlined, as Famdale and 
Kenny said during interviews, the capability of the HQ was substantially 
enhanced with the deployment of the new high technology C3I systems (e.g. 
Ptarmigan, Wavell, etc.). 65 Also, the joint HQ accepted the principles of 
directive control (mission-orders or Auftragstaktik) in C2 between NORTHAG 
63 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993 and Jackson. 
64 Also see Richey, op. cit., p.72, for the importance of air power in NATO's 
defence. 
65 Interviews, Famdale on 21 June 1993 and Kenny. 
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and 2AT AF, which achieved some reductions in the number of staff and the size 
of the HQ.66 Famdale added that, despite some difficulties in the early days, the 
C2 problem of air support for the counter offensive was finally resolved by the 
time it was put to the test during REFORGER 87.67 
4.3.3. AIR SUPERIORITY 
The highest priority of the joint land/air battle was the maintenance of air 
superiority. As was noted quite early by commentators like Liddell Hart, 'there is 
fatal folly in dreaming that armoured divisions can operate in mass and deliver 
concentrated punches under an enemy-dominated sky. ,68 Indeed, everything 
depended on the accomplishment of air superiority at the earliest possible hour. 
Most of all, it would enable the concentrated use of air power, which would 
substantially improve the chance of successful counter breakthrough operations; 
this was NORTHAG and SHAPE's highest priority.69 Also, it would render 
friendly air interdiction (AI) and BAI both effective and affordable. 70 
F or example, the Israeli mobile defence in Golan in 1973 was possible 
because the Israeli air force succeeded in minimising air interference which 
enabled its support for the land forces during the defence. In the case of 
66 Interview, Famdale on 21 June 1993. Also Bagnall, op. cit., in Boyd-
Carpenter, op. cit., p. 155. 
67 See more in 7.2. for more discussion on the subjects of C3I and 
Auftragstaktik. 
68 Liddell Hart, op. cit., p.182. 
69 Interview with Jackson. 
70 Warden, op. cit., p.84. 
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NORTHAG's initial defence, reaction time would be substantially reduced 
against sudden enemy breakthroughs, which could cause a sudden collapse of 
NORTHAG's defence in the front. Under the circumstances, air power would be 
the only responsive means with a short enough reaction time to counter the 
contingency.? 1 Furthermore, air superiority was absolutely essential in 
preventing the enemy from conducting interdiction or giving CAS to its forces. 
Hence, it would force the enemy to divert its air assets to defensive air 
operations rather than allocating them against the defenders. 
This was very relevant to NORTHAG's counter stroke.?2 Firstly, rur 
superiority would, above all, allow air interdiction against the enemy forces 
countering the counter stroke. Secondly, it would enable the air force to protect 
the attack corridors and flanks of the counter stroke force. Finally, it would 
prevent the counter stroke force from being interdicted. Above all, it would 
create a favourable environment within which NORTHAG's counter offensive 
could be launched. 
In the case of a counter penetration operation by NORTHAG, which 
would be launched in order to seal off the enemy breakthrough in a particular 
sector, both interdiction of the enemy and maintenance of air superiority would 
be vital in covering the deployment of reserves while preventing the enemy 
ground forces from reacting against the NORTHAG reserve committal. 
In the case of an operational counter offensive by NORTHAG, continuous 
air interdiction would be vital in degrading the progress of the enemy thrust, as 
well as maintaining air superiority to prevent enemy air interference in the 
71 Interview, Jackson. 
72 See 4.4. 1. for the definition and application of counter stroke, as well as 
counter penetration, counter attack, and counter offensive. 
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counter offensive operation. During the counter offensive, the role of the air 
commander would be decisive because he would be responsible for the 
synchronisation of the committal of the ground operational reserves based on his 
progress. Without the sustenance of a favourable air situation and interdiction of 
the enemy vanguard, the committal of operational reserves would be very 
difficult. Most of all, the air commander would be in a very good position to 
select, or create, the target for operational reserves. 73 
Since ATAF would take a lot of punishment, de facto air superiority 
might be difficult to accomplish, but COMNORTHAG would have requested 
temporary, and--at least--local, air superiority during the counter offensive. In 
response, COM2ATAF would have provided it by throwing in everything he had 
at the time regardless of the cost. 74 Meanwhile, the land forces would have 
contributed to the ATAF's effort by coordinating air defence operations. 
COMNORTHAG would attempt to create and protect the air corridor for ATAF 
fighters with the SAM belts (Surface-to-Air Missile--in this case Nike Hercules 
and Patriot). 75 
As a part of air superiority, 2ATAF paid a lot of attention to OCA 
operations. The aim of OCA in support of NORTHAG was to prevent enemy 
aircraft from interdicting NORTHAG forces concentrating for the counter 
offensive. OCA was, indeed, high on the agenda as it fitted Bagnall's request 
('get them off my back!,).76 Furthermore, it represented seizing the initiative by 
taking the fight to the enemy as early as possible. The acquisition of Tornado 
73 Also see Williams, op. cit., in Mackenzie and Holden Reid, 1990, pp.28-29. 
74 Interviews, F arndale on 21 June 1993 and Jackson. 
75 Interview, Farndale on 21 June 1993. 
76 See Price, op. cit., p.l0. 
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aircraft with JP 233 runway denial weapons offered major improvements in the 
ATAF's capability.77 
There were a few problems in accomplishing OCA to a degree which 
would cause severe disruption of the enemy airpower, however. Firstly, OCA 
would achieve the destruction of runways, but might not be able to destroy the 
enemy aircraft which were sheltered in hardened hangers with their crew. 
Therefore, OCA would have to pay attention to the capability to attack those 
targets, as well as runways.78 Otherwise, OCA would only delay the enemy 
operation by merely inconveniencing them. Secondly, the cost of keeping the 
enemy air force out of action by OCA might be prohibitive as the AT AF would 
be forced to repeat OCA operations in order to do so. Most of all, the aircraft 
would be extremely exposed not only to the enemy SAMs, but also to AAA 
(Anti-Aircraft Artillery) fire as well. The Gulf War experience showed that 
2ATAF aircraft assigned to an OCA role would suffer heavily since the RAF 
Tornados suffered punishing casualties flying low-level missions during the war, 
despite the lack of the effective Iraqi air defence. Time and time again in 
previous conflicts, AAA fire proved to be one of the most lethal weapons and 
caused the majority of aircraft casualties. 79 
One of the solutions would be not to endanger the aircraft themselves by 
forcing them to fly right over the runway in order to dispense JP 233 type 
weapons. The alternative weapons, the long-range stand-off munitions and 
77 Mcinnes, 1991, p.39. 
78 Garden, op. cit., p.124. 
79 See Jefferey Ethell and Jonathan Price, Air War South Atlantic, (New York: 
Macmillan, 1984), pp.212-215, for the vulnerability of Harrier GR3s flown by 
the RAF pilots during the Falklands War. One was lost to AAA and the other to 
small arms fire. Also see chapter 8.3. for the Gulf War experience. 
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missiles (e.g. SLAM--Stand-off Land Attack Missile), however, were not 
available at the time, and it was only during the Gulf War that a limited number 
of those weapons was used. As MacIsaac emphasised, aircraft must be spared 
from such heavy pounding by making use of 'weapon performance (e.g., use of 
stand-off missiles)' instead of stressing 'platform performance. ,80 In short, the 
survival of aircraft would critically depend on providing them with those 
weapons to prevent them from exposing themselves to such a danger. 
Hence, ifOCA forced so much attrition of the ATAF's airpower without 
achieving a significant result, it would not only be futile, but would also 
endanger its further efforts. Regardless of the outcome of OCA operations, the 
counter offensive, among other operations, would at least require temporary air 
superiority in vital local sectors. Thus, the AT AF would have to maintain the 
balance between NORTHAG's and its own requirement for OCA in order not to 
jeopardise the counter offensive. For this reason the acquisition of SLAM-type 
weapons should have received more attention. The use of such weapons could 
save aircraft, and, in tum, they could be assigned to an air superiority role which 
would enhance the success of the counter offensive. 
4.3.4. BATTLEFIELD INTERDICTION AND FOFA 
• BAI and CAS: The Different Views 
The dilemma over the priority between BAI and CAS operations by fixed-wing 
aircraft gave rise to numerous arguments. CAS operations were critical in certain 
circumstances, such as in countering breakthroughs or in support of a counter 
80 David MacIsaac, "Voices from the Central Blue: The Airpower Theorists," in 
Peter Paret, ed., Makers of Modem Strategy, (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press: 1986), p.647. 
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offensive.81 However, it was agreed that, since fixed-wing aircraft were valuable 
assets, they should not be committed to risky and low-profit missions like CAS. 
Bagnall's ideas on CAS were quite clear about this. He said in an interview that: 
When the breakthrough occurs in the Hanover Plain, you will be tempted 
to regain the ground by whatever means available. The most stupid thing is 
to divert airpower to do exactly that when your air is doing well. I would 
have never authorised CAS except in a critical emergency because it could 
seldom arrive in time to strike the right target in a fluid, fast-moving 
battle. 82 
The air force's philosophy also reflected his idea that the RAF, for example, 
wanted Harriers, which were primarily CAS assets, to be assigned in a BAI role 
as far as possible.83 Air Marshal Hine emphasised this point earlier: 
Although CAS can still be very effective, it is usually more profitable to 
use airpower in the BAI role against the concentrated target groups, 
leaving the land forces with their organic weapons to deal with the enemy 
in contact.... The main thing would be to identify massed and lucrative 
targets and not fritter away our assets in penny packets. 84 
Also, the aircraft's survivability would be much better in the BAI role since the 
exposure time against the enemy AAA fire would be shorter than in CAS. 85 
In addition, Hine stressed that BAI should only be used in a concentrated 
manner.86 For instance, it would be most effective when the enemy's 'own plans 
81 Hine, op. cit., p.66. See 7.4. for the helicopter's role in BAI and CAS. 
82 Interview, Bagnall on 5 May 1993. 
83 J.D.L. Feesey, "Fixed-Wing Close Air Support--Is There a Future?" in 
Mackenzie and Holden Reid, 1990, p.17l. 
84· . 66 Hine, op. CIt., p. . 
85 See Feesey, op. cit., in Mackenzie and Holden Reid, 1990, p.171. 
86 Price, op. cit., pp.23-4. 
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demand mobility.,87 It meant that, given the nature ofWP doctrine, it would be 
inevitable for the WP to concentrate its forces at some point in a particular 
sector to achieve the breakthrough even if it succeeded in dispersing its forces 
until then. Concentrated BAI against such a target would yield considerable 
success for NATO's defence. Therefore, if it were carried out by a small number 
of aircraft in a sporadic manner, the effect would be negligible. In fact, during 
the D-day landing, the Allies' persistent and concentrated air interdiction 
prevented the Germans from concentrating on the counter attack. 88 2AT AF's 
priority, thus, would and should be BAI--as was NORTHAG's--not CAS, unless 
the situation deteriorated seriously. 
Nonetheless, CAS would be very important for NORTHAG's counter 
offensive as well. There were limits to how much the land forces' assets could do 
in support of a fast-moving counter stroke force. MLRS, which was the main 
corps and army group deep attack asset, did not possess the necessary flexibility 
of airpower to satisfy all the needs of the mobile forces. Above all, MLRS could 
not replace CAS's flexibility. Under the circumstances, CAS would enhance the 
success of the initial committal of the operational reserves by preventing the 
enemy forces from taking counter action, or the enemy main body from gaining 
time to take defensive positions. 
Also, airpower could act as an operational reserve itself in the place of 
the ground forces to counter unforeseen contingencies, against which the ground 
forces would be unable to react quickly.89 For example, when the counter attack 
87 Warden, op. cit., p.72. 
88 Warden, op. cit., p.91; and David Craig, "The RAF's Contribution Today," in 
Philip Sabin, ed., The Future of UK Airpower, (London: Brassey's, 1988), p.12. 
89 Warden, op. cit., p.90 and 142; and Craig, op. cit., in Sabin, op. cit., p.4. 
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forces' flanks were threatened, CAS could act as the reserves for flank 
protection instead of the valuable armoured assets. In addition, CAS would be 
quite effective in the preparation of a target for the counter stroke by disrupting 
the enemy main body and isolating the part that was about to be attacked. 90 
• NORTHAG and 2ATAF's FOFA 
FOFA was an integral part of the conduct of the NORTHAG concept of 
operation. As mentioned, it replaced the term BAI in the British Army, the 
agreement on which was reached between Bagnall and Hine before the official 
adoption of FOFA in 1984. Therefore, the NORTHAG FOFA concept was 
developed independently of, and prior to, SACEUR's, to cater for its own 
specific needs. Hence, even after the formal adoption of FOF A, some differences 
remained between the army group and SACEUR concept. In fact, SACEUR's 
had a strategic and a higher operational level design while COMNORTHAG's 
maintained an operational-higher tactical level aim. The difference lay in the fact 
that the technology used in FOF A did not exist when the concept was initially 
adopted by NORTHAG and 2ATAF. Thus, the focus of the army group FOFA 
was the combination of 2ATAF's assets and the land force's long-range artillery 
for the operation in tactical depth, while SACEUR would conduct his FOF A 
primarily with the AAFCE assets in the operational depth. 
Also, NORTHAG's emphasis on shallow-FOFA was both logical and 
comparatively cheap. In a standing start scenario, there might not be immediate 
follow-on echelons--so it would be more important to interdict the enemy 
tactical follow-on echelons, particularly for the purpose of the committal of the 
operational reserve. In this case, the corps and army group's integral long-range 
90 Mackenzie, op. cit., in Holden Reid and Dewar, op. cit., p.168. 
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artillery assets (e.g. MLRS) could keep the enemy leading divisions isolated, and 
would limit the number of the enemy arriving to a manageable level. It would 
enable NORTHAG to maintain a favourable force ratio for the contact battle , 
and delay the enemy's coordinated introduction of the follow-on echelons which 
could interfere with its reserve committal. 91 
Thus, its tactical FOFA (up to division) would be targeted against the 
interdiction of the enemy artillery, C2 facilities and immediate reserves within 30 
km of the FLOT (Forward Line of Own Troops) with the corps assets (artillery, 
MLRS, attack helicopters, etc.) while coordinating the ATAF's operation to fix 
and delay the enemy advance.92 At the operational level, it would be centred on 
the disruption of the enemy operational echelon and higher command system. 
The corps would have the primary responsibility as they would have to deal with 
threats posed to each corps sector. The army group coordination would focus on 
the use of the long-range corps weapon systems (mainly MLRS) and ATAF 
assets across the corps boundaries and beyond their areas of responsibility to 
support a particular corps under threat, or in support of the committal and battle 
of the army group reserve. 93 
Although this was agreed upon, the question of whether 
COMNORTHAG would have exclusive control of the FOF A operation, which 
was what Bagnall wanted, remain unresolved.94 The main reason was for this 
that the corps were in a better position to conduct FOF A because they had most 
91 See Stratmann, op. cit., in O'Neill, op. cit., pp.198-9; Bellamy, 1987, p.134. 
Also the GDP, p.14, for supporting views. 
92 See Hans Henning Von Sandrart, "Operational Considerations on the Battle-
in-Depth," AQ&DJ, (October 1987), p.280. 
93 See Von Sandrart, 1987, p.281. 
94 Interviews, Kenny and Bagnall on 5 May 1993. 
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of the necessary assets. Eventually it was settled, according to interviews with 
Bagnall and Von Sandrart, that while corps would take primary responsibility for 
FOFA, COMNORTHAG would coordinate FOFA when he committed reserves 
and when he decided to intervene in support of a particular corps battle which 
required higher formation support.95 
In this framework, COMNORTHAG would support a counter offensive 
operation, as Bagnall stressed, with 'the deep attack battle at the 40 to 150 
kilometre range.... [which] should be the responsibility of the army group and 
ATAF, and should have nothing to do with the corps whatsoever.'96 In this 
case, the corps, army group, and ATAF assets would be merged to create a 
maximum effect. Von Sandrart explained such thinking in the following manner: 
While the counter-attacks are taking place against the front of the enemy, I 
will instruct my AG [army group]/ATAF Commanders to conduct FOFA 
operations against the enemy forces in depth which could critically 
interfere with my decisive counterattacks. I would like to emphasize here 
that FOF A should not be considered as an independent operational 
concept. On the contrary, FEBA defence and FOFA are governed by the 
same operational campaign concept.... Therefore, the key role in 
determining the operational FOF A objectives in context with the land 
forces scheme of manoeuvre rests with the land force commander, mainly 
at Army Group level, in close coordination with the ATAF commander. 
However, our FOF A capabilities, especially our air attack assets are scarce 
and therefore the operational FOF A requirements have to be balanced 
against other operational tasks in the mission framework of OAS 
[Offensive Air Support], AI and most importantly OCA. The rapid 
technological developments being made at the moment will enable the land 
forces, mainly at the corps level, to take a much greater part in the FOF A 
battle. 97 
95 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993 and Von Sandrart. 
96 Bagnall, op. cit., in Boyd-Carpenter, op. cit., p.155. 
97 Von Sandrart, speech as CINCENT in 1989. 
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4.3.5. THE ESSENCE OF AIR POWER IN LAND/AIR BATTLE 
The symbiosis between the Army and RAF (NORTHAG and 2AT AF) was based 
on the fact that the use of air power at the operational level of war rested on 
principles similar to those which governed the operational level thinking of the 
land forces; the air force was expected to do more with less, within the limitation 
of fewer resources. In turn, this meant the prioritisation of missions in order to 
give a proper level of support to only urgent missions as opposed to spreading 
assets thinly to cover everything. Moreover, only at the operational level could 
the air force and army identify high priority missions by selecting targets which 
could bring most benefits at the theatre level. 
The operational concept prior to the reforms, (e.g., the British AKA or 
the US Active Defense) was by nature a dangerous drain on air power, calling 
for CAS every time a counter attack was mounted. Given the WP's initial air 
superiority, the AT AF would be bound to suffer heavy losses in support of mere 
tactical defensive and counter attack operations. 
Conversely, the new concept relieved the ATAF from the pressure of 
providing continuous support to the ground forces and left it free to do its own 
job. Once committed to the NORTHAG counter offensive, however, the ATAF 
would concentrate air power to provide simultaneous BAI (shallow-FOFA), 
CAS and OAS in support of ground forces while continuing to maintain friendly 
air superiority as well. This would be facilitated by devoting most of the 
available assets to the particular mission, and by the first signs of success against 
the enemy from previous concentrated actions. Ultimately, this concept was to 
allow the successful launch of a NORTHAG counter offensive. Hence, the 
highlight of airpower in the Landi Air Battle doctrine was to be its concentration 
without dilution by attending to NORTHAG's pettier problems on the ground. 
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4.3.6. THE DIFFERENCES FROM THE US AIRLAND BATTLE 
DOCTRINE AND FOFA 
As mentioned, Bagnall's idea was developed independently based upon his own 
personal research of history, without any influence from the US or other sources. 
However, since the new concept was officially adopted by NORTHAG in 1984 
and endorsed by the government and the Alliance in 1986 (which was much later 
than the adoption of the AirLand Battle in 1982 and FOF A in 1984), some 
considered the British doctrine to be a copy, or a revised British version, of the 
AirLand Battle Doctrine, as interviews with many NORTHAG personnel 
revealed.98 Nevertheless, the ideas for the new operational concept originally 
came much earlier than the others. 99 
Although the British doctrine has a lot of similarities with the American, 
the two are fundamentally different from each other, despite both subscribing to 
the same theoretical principles--the operational level of war and manoeuvre 
warfare. 100 Furthermore, the British concept had already taken into 
consideration the importance of interdiction, which was the highlight of FOF A, 
before it was promulgated. Therefore, despite an observation by Holden Reid 
that the new concept was 'heavily influenced by the American pattern of thought 
and solutions,' 1 0 1 it was an entirely unique British innovation, especially when it 
98 Interviews, Chalupa, Fischer, Colonel B.C. Gilchrist on 28 April 1992, 
Kunzendorf, Stoetermeer. 
99 For dates, see Bagnall, 1984, pp.59-62; and SD 1986, p.33. 
100 See "The British Army," Military Technology (MT), (June 1986), p.48, for 
Bagnall's explanation on the differences between the two doctrines. Also see 8.3. 
and 8.4. for growing compatibility between the British and US doctrines. 
101 Holden Reid, op. cit., in Mackenzie and Holden Reid, 1989, p.8. 
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was initially conceived by Bagnall, and it was much later after Bagnall's 
retirement that more attention was paid to the American line of thinking and 
practice. 102 
Bagnall's concept differed from AirLand Battle, or FOF ~ in four major 
aspects. Firstly, unlike the other two, his concept, when formulated, did not rely 
heavily on technology, even though his idea was eventually to benefit from it. 
His original idea emphasised an operational counter offensive against the enemy 
first operational echelon with existing weapon systems rather than simultaneous 
close-in and deep battle, which put heavy pressure on resources. In fact, striking 
deep was technologically too demanding, and could also inhibit the defender's 
capability to conduct initial defence and close-in battle. 1 03 
Secondly, the British doctrine was to provide an army group-wide 
concept of operation with which to promote doctrinal interoperability in order to 
enable a single army group operational battle, which the AirLand Battle Doctrine 
did not focus on. In the case of FOF ~ it was, as criticised by Bagnall, an effort 
to provide modem terminology for what the military had already been doing 
since the birth of aircraft--air interdiction and cooperation between the air force 
and army. 1 04 It was inevitable that Bagnall's new idea, especially when it was to 
be supplemented by new equipment and capability, should require new terms to 
explain the overall concept and how the different weapon systems and 
capabilities should be applied in an actual operation. 
102 Interviews, Bagnall on 4 May 1993, F arndale on 19 May 1994 and Inge. 
103 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May and 6 November 1993 and Farndale on 14 
April and 21 June 1993. Also see McInnes, 1990, p.130, for the difficulties 
involved in the simultaneous conduct of both contact and deep battles. 
104 Interview, Bagnall on 5 May 1993. 
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Thirdly, his idea on the joint Landi Air Battle was that it could, in effect, 
lessen the burden on the air force to provide constant close support to the land 
force. As mentioned, cooperation with the air force was to facilitate the 
identification of the operational priorities so as to allow the AT AF to provide 
necessary support only when it became imperative rather than expanding the 
AT AF's support for the army group operation. The strong accent on both close-
in and deep battle in the AirLand Battle would have exhausted the air force's 
assets, which could endanger its ability to undertake its primary task--the air 
superiority mission. 
Finally, although both the US and NORTHAG operational concepts 
stressed the importance of the offensive, unlike AirLand Battle's emphasis on 
deep battle by both air and land forces, the British idea was fundamentally a 
defensive concept, which did not include an offensive operation outside of the 
existing NATO territory when it was initially conceived. 
The main reason for such differences was, as Bagnall stressed, that 
NORTHAG was not capable of carrying out the kind of operation envisaged by 
the US doctrine. 105 For example, the US had a larger attack helicopter fleet and 
stronger troop-lift capability than the British, which permitted more offensive 
manoeuvre operations in greater-depth. Furthermore, the geographical 
differences between NORTHAG and CENTAG obliged the British concept to be 
different to the American one. 1 06 Thus, the major conceptual difference was 
that, instead of dispatching troops forward and over the FLOT as in AirLand 
Battle, the British concept advocated the maintenance of strong armoured 
105 "Interview," MT, (June 1986), p.48. 
106 Interviews, Bagnall on 6 November 1993, Farndale on 21 June 1993, Dewar 
and Von Sandrart. 
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reserves to deal with enemy penetrations in a more traditional form of tank-
heavy mobile defence operation. 
Ironically, due to its lack of resources compared to CENT AG, 
NORTHAG had to take further steps in utilising the manoeuvre principles in a 
joint army group defence which emphasised fighting-power of the force rather 
than material superiority, which the US corps enjoyed to a certain degree. In that 
sense, it was inevitable that the NORTHAG concept ultimately become as active 
and offensive as the US one, if not more so. This is not to say that the emphasis 
on manoeuvre and offensive replaced the importance of the positional element in 
its defence, for this was not the case. What was crucial was its ability to go on 
the offensive as often as it could in order to disrupt the enemy and secure the 
initiative. The manoeuvre principle was to be applied 1) at the tactical level, to 
avoid attrition, and 2) at the operational level, to enable the rapid committal of 
the reserves both in defensive and counter offensive (see more in the next 
section). As NORTHAG attained some technological and material capacity, 
though still falling short of the US forces, it was eventually able to obtain the 
ability to execute the kind of operation envisaged by the AirLand Battle Doctrine 
in addition to what it was already able to do. 107 
In essence, the ultimate departure of the British from the American 
concept was that the former was a doctrinal and command rationalisation with 
which to secure maximum potential and fighting-power in the days of 
diminishing resources. Specifically, faced with no numerical growth of the force, 
the only alternative was to increase fighting capability. In this sense, manoeuvre 
and the operational level concept promoted the better understanding of a 
smaller, but professional force, giving them a chance to offer a strong resistance, 
107 See chapters 5 and 6 for more discussions on this subject. 
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and it was hoped a victory, against the numerically superior foe. This was the 
case with the Germans during W orId War Two, and the Israelis during the 1973 
war. In fact, such rationalisation was the only choice available to them. 1 08 
It was the same with the British Army interest in technological 
innovation, especially in C3I technology and generation of more firepower 
within a given number of weapon platforms. Since British manpower costs were 
so high, this was again the only alternative which would help it increase its 
fighting power. In fact, the place of technology in the British concept was a 
complementary one with which to support more active defensive operations with 
the limited number of forces it had. 1 09 In short, technology became a 
considerable force multiplier for the British, enabling NORTHAG to achieve 
economy of force at the operational level and create the operational reserve. 
Also, it would reinforce the ability to commit a mobile defence, because the new 
capacities would permit the movement of a large reserve and the subsequent 
engagement of the enemy breakthrough more accurately at a greater distance. In 
addition, it would allow for the concentration of the reserve, through which a 
favourable force ratio could be achieved when the operational reserve was 
committed to an all-important operational level counter offensive operation. 
Many of these were, in fact, what Betts called, 'subjective or intangible 
factors,' which 'almost always do more to determine the outcome of battle than 
108 See chapter 8 for some examples of the German and Israeli operations. It 
should be noted that their defence, and application of the manoeuvre principles, 
was not dominated by fighting a fluid battle, but began with a careful positional 
defence, especially during the initial defence, before the committal of reserves in 
a counter offensive. 
109 See 7.2. and 7.3. for more details on C3I and fire support. 
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numbers of troops and distribution of weapons.' 11 0 In short, the innovative 
thinking and application (and especially the proper utilisation of technology) of 
what it has or what it could have in the short term, were vital for the smaller 
force ofNORTHAG if it was expected to fulfil its assigned duty. Although more 
interest in the US AirLand Battle Doctrine was aroused later, this was what 
Bagnall had wanted to achieve and what his thinking was based on. 
110 Betts, 1983, p. 142. Also see ibid., pp.155-9, for the weakness of the US 
concept. 
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4.4. THE FUNDAMENTALS OF COUNTER STROKE 
4.4.1. THE BRITISH ARMY'S CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS IN 
CENTRAL EUROPE 
• Covering Force Battles 
Under Bagnall, NORTHAG's operational defence came to incorporate a four-
phase defensive operation: 1) the covering force battle; 2) the battle in the Main 
Defensive Area (MDA); 3) counter operations; and, 4) the subsequent battle. 1 1 1 
The first phase would be a covering force battle, the aim of which would be to 
stop the first operational echelon near the 1GB so as to break the momentum of 
the enemy's initial attack. 1l2 This was to be done by those troops in corps 
assigned to this specific role (usually one division in the early days--l Panzer or 
11 panzergrenadier Division in the case of the German corps, and 1 or 4 
Armoured Division in the case of the British) without draining resources being 
held at the army group level, the action of which could impede its counter 
offensive. 113 
The main focus was the maintenance of elasticity of defence throughout 
the theatre by using the terrain and fighting an aggressive and offensive covering 
111 See McInnes, 1990, pp.136-8, for an analogy. 
112 Von Sandrart's speech as CINCENT in 1989. 
113 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993, F arndale on 21 June 1993 and Von 
Sandrart. NORTHAG's reallocation of two divisions (one each from the British 
and German corps) under its direct control as reserves did not create a problem, 
since it was envisaged that at least one division would be assigned to the 
covering force battle and another one for main defensive battle in each division. 
This was possible to achieve within existing forces as the German corps had four 
and the British had three in-place regular divisions. 
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force battle. 114 The primary task of the covenng force was to conduct a 
delaying battle to allow the full deployment of forces in the MDA. Other 
missions included: 1) identifying aggression, 2) determining the main enemy 
thrust lines, and 3) destroying enemy reconnaissance. 115 The force would 
consist of: 1) a screening force to cover for the main delaying engagement; 2) a 
delaying force to inflict as much damage on an enemy as possible so as to gain 
time; and 3) reserve forces to counter unexpected developments or to cover for 
the withdrawal of forces. It was expected to have good protection and mobility 
with which to undertake a mobile operation to allow quick engagement in, and 
disengagement from, combat, while retaining the capability to react quickly to 
sudden enemy action or to reinforce other defensive areas. 116 
Other defensive measures, such as using terrain enhancement and the 
intelligent use of artificial barriers, would be employed while receiving intensive 
OAS and while FOF A would be committed at the army group level. 117 In the 
meantime, the covering force would try to fight from good defensive positions, 
not in fluid battle, under the above support and cover, so that mobility would be 
used for rapid movement within the battlefield and not as a means of fighting in 
the open. Thus, the primary tactical considerations would be to force the enemy 
to take the defensive position by using mobility to lure him in and firepower 
from prepared or favourable positions, and also to use mobility to quickly move 
114 See John Stanier, "The Covering Forces Battle in the Central Region," 
NSN, (Special 1, 1985), pp.96-7; and Von Sandrart's speech as CINCENT in 
1989. Also see, TDRC 5507A, sec.17.1. 
115 TDRC 5507A, sec. 17.1. 
116 See Stanier, op. cit., pp.96-7; Kitson, 1987, pp.26-7. For other tasks, see 
Gander, op. cit., p.24. TDRC 5507A, sec. 17.2.b., 3., and 4. 
117 Von Sandrart's speech as CINCENT in1989. 
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to the next defensive position for further resistance. A successful operation of 
this kind would force the enemy to waste a significant amount of time as he 
would have to deploy into a defensive position before being allowed to move on, 
at which time he would have to redeploy into an attack formation. 118 
Equally, the flexibility of forces would have been the most important 
factor. It would allow a rapid shifting of the forces from one role and area to 
another according to the developing situation. For example, a division in the 
forward area tied to, and tailored for, the defence of a specific area, would not 
have been able to disengage itself quickly enough to take another role (e.g. 
reinforcing the :rvIDA battle) when it was so required by the operational 
commander. In operational battle, the capability and flexibility of forces to take 
exactly this kind of action were paramount. 119 In short, accepting economy of 
force at the operational level required more than a physical reassignment of 
forces. It required an ability to recognise the opportunity in a certain situation 
and rapidly exploit the chance by shifting, or concentrating, the available forces 
against the enemy at an ideal moment. 
Therefore, the first thing to be considered was the acceptance and 
achievement of the principle of 'economy of effort' at the operational level, and 
this began with determining the role and size of the covering force. Previously, 
NORTHAG envisaged a strong covering force battle so that the majority of 
forces could be more or less evenly distributed along the 1GB. The depth of the 
118 Interview, Farndale on 21 June 1993. 
119 This is how manoeuvre warfare in operational battle differs from attritional 
warfare. See chapter 7 for the training and education for manoeuvre and 
operational warfare. Also see Mackenzie, op. ~i~.? in Holden Reid and Dew:ar, 
op. cit., p.178, for the requirements (e.g. fleXIbIlIty) for the counter offenSIve 
force. 
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covering force area would have depended on the terrain. 120 Behind the delaying 
zone, each corps would have formed a MDA in varying depth and irregular 
shape according to the terrain and the available strength.121 Behind the MDA, 
corps reserves in varying sizes would have been located, again according to the 
availability of force. Therefore, the major consideration in achieving economy of 
effort in the early days of the reforms was, as discussed, to reassign those forces 
previously earmarked for the covering force battle to the tactical (corps) reserve 
role so as not to deplete the strength of the operational reserve. The army group 
commander would adjust the number and size of the covering forces according 
to the developing situation, but the principle that the majority of corps reserves 
was to be created out of the covering force, and they would only be used for 
offensive and counter operations as far as possible, remained. 122 The rest of the 
covering forces would have to try to compensate for the loss of strength through 
gaining more flexibility of defence by exploitation of mobility and offence in the 
covering force areas. 
This was based on the thinking that risks would be taken where and 
when acceptable in order to meet the demand of creating the reserves. 123 For 
example, COMNORTHAG might take the risk of reducing the number of forces 
(down to a brigade) in an area such as the Harz where the terrain favoured 
defence, or leave an area open when he needed to concentrate forces for the 
counter offensive. Although the requirement for the reserves did not surpass the 
120 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993 and F arndale on 21 June 1993. Also see 
Bagnall, op. cit., in Holden Reid and Dewar, op. cit., p. 242. 
121 Bagnall, 1984, pp.61-2. 
122 See Bagnall, 1984, pp.61-2. Also interview with Bagnall on 5 May 1993. 
123 Interview with Bagnall on 5 May 1993. 
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necessity for a strong covering force in some sectors, COMNORTHAG might 
have had to take a decision at some point to take the risk under the operational 
principle when it became imperative for his operation. 
Yet there was no specific plan for the subsequent role of the covering 
force, except for the assumption that it would either merge with forces in MDA 
to bolster its defence, or would be re-deployed as army group reserves. 124 
Although they would be too battered, and their strength too depleted, to 
undertake more missions, it was hoped that the army group could still make 
some use of them for the above purposes . 
• Main Defensive Battles 
During the second phase of the battle, a main defensive operation would be 
conducted. Although the size of forces in MDA would strongly depend on the 
army group's condition after the covering force battle, this was essentially where 
COMNORTHAG wished to shape the penetration and hoped to impose a halt. 
Thus the primary task of the main defensive forces would be to stall the enemy 
advance while inflicting as much attritional damage as possible to reduce the 
enemy's momentum to foster a favourable environment within which the counter 
operation would be launched. 
The defence ofMDA was to be carried out with elasticity in mind. Thus, 
the pre-selected area (i.e. AKA), as well as other important ones, were to be 
strongly held to shape the enemy penetration by creating a 'net' to trap the enemy 
and create a good environment before launching a counter offensive. 125 In fact, 
the MDA defence was crucial if a counter operation was to be conducted. This 
124 TDRC 5507A sec.17.8., and 9. Also interview, Famdale on 21 June 1993. 
125 See Von Sandrart's speech as CINCENT in 1989; and Bagnall, 1984, p.62. 
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meant positional defence would be undertaken where favourable. 126 Thus, the 
MDA force would depend on using positional defence only in vital areas, and 
they would be defended and recaptured if lost, while local counter stroke would 
create a sort of mobile AKA to inflict maximum attrition. 127 Mobile defence 
would be committed only when a sector could not be 'held in sufficient strength 
to achieve mutually supporting positions in depth.' 128 All in all, at least one 
division from each corps would be assigned for the MDA battle, while the 
German, and possibly the British, forces in MDA could be reinforced by the 
forces of the German Territorial Command-North. 129 
In theory, out of a total of seven in-place divisions in the British and 
German corps (since the Dutch and Belgian corps were not asked to provide 
reserves), three divisions (3 and 7 Panzer and 3 (BR) divisions) were designated 
as the army group reserves and two divisions each for the covering forces and 
main defensive battles. Therefore, the British and German corps had a difficult 
task to provide tactical reserves for the each phase of operation. Moreover, since 
the corps were not supposed to rely on the army group to provide reserves for 
their operations, they had to create corps reserves from the divisions remaining 
under their control, mostly by thinning out the covering force. 
In short, it was difficult to distinguish between the covering and MDA 
forces battle, as was the case with the MDA force and tactical counter 
operations. Since there would be no significant capacity available for the 
126 TDRC 5507A sec.18.3. 
127 See McInnes, 1991, pp.31-2. Interview, Major Dennis Mills on 23 March 
1993. 
128 TDRC 5507A sec. 18.4. 
129 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993 and Von Sandrart. 
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covering force to conduct an extensive and extended battle, it would have 
quickly merged with the MDA forces, or withdrawn through them upon 
accomplishing its mission. Also, the defence of the MDA was to be a combined 
effort of forces and counter operations by tactical (corps) reserves, which would 
probably be the reserve brigades of those divisions in the covering and main 
defensive roles, or the elements of those forces which previously had the role of 
the covering forces. 13 0 This was why the offensive operations by the corps were 
emphasised and local counter stroke could not be separately identified away 
from those two battles, and thus, these three phases--the covering and MDA 
forces and tactical counter operations--should be seen as one battle which 
completes the first phase of the first operational (conventional) battle rather than 
considered in isolation . 
• Counter Operations 
One of the most important components of the British Army and NORTHAG 
operational concept under Landi Air Battle was the army group's ability to 
commit reserves, both tactical and operational, in a major defensive counter 
offensive. These two were distinctively different concepts, each of which was 
designed to counter different contingencies in two different levels of war. 
Therefore, this operational level (army group) counter offensive/counter stroke 
concept must be distinguished from a tactical level ( corps) counter stroke 
operation. In fact, when counter stroke was introduced to the British Army, the 
initial aim was a purely defensive operation by the 1 (BR) Corps to counter and 
destroy the enemy penetrations or spearheads in the corps area by the corps 
mobile reserve (sizes would vary from one brigade to a whole division depending 
130 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993, Dewar and Von Sandrart. 
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on the situation) either in conjunction with, or separately from the maIn 
defensive battle. 13 1 This operation was outlined by Famdale in 1985 as one of 
three tactical mobile options available in the committal of the tactical reserve at 
the tactical and lower operational level (corps-only) operation. 
According to F amdale, counter penetration was 'the move of reserves 
into a blocking position to stop an enemy breakthrough.' 132 He stressed that 
counter penetration alone could not win the battle as it was a purely defensive 
application of the reserves which could consume valuable assets in a passive 
operation, despite the fact that sometimes it would be vital to counter 
unexpected enemy breakthroughs and support a counter stroke operation. In this 
case, they could help create a favourable environment for the counter stroke 
force by imposing a barrier to halt the enemy advance before launching a counter 
stroke against the enemy's exposed flanks. 
Local counter penetration was to be carried out by the corps reserves 
which mainly consisted of mechanised infantry and armoured forces, and 
possibly with the army group airmobile reserve, only if there was a chance for 
this to be developed into a sudden operational breakthrough. It was hoped that 
these areas would be prepared to offer strong resistance before the enemy 
arrived. I33 Although the airmobile force's main purpose was to be counter 
penetration, it would not be committed unless the enemy penetration developed 
131 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993, Dewar and Famdale on 21 June 1993. 
132 Farndale, 1985, p.6. 
133 TDRC 5507A I9.4.a. 
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into an operational one, because it was earmarked as the asset with which to 
support the operational counter offensive. 134 
Counter attack was 'an operation designed to recapture ground and then 
hold it.' 13 5 Its primary aim would be the recovery of lost territory--either a 
specific or a larger area that had been lost--by using mobility, firepower, and 
other means. It was a mainly area-oriented operation which would be launched 
either immediately or deliberately, according to the situation. The former offered 
the opportunity to dislodge the enemy before he had time to consolidate the 
captured ground, while the latter would only be committed to the recovery of 
the area which was critical for successful defence. 136 
However, once the goal was achieved, the extension of the initiative by 
leading to a further offensive would be limited, because the impetus of the 
operation would generally wind down after the initial victory. 137 Furthermore, it 
usually referred to an attack against the enemy's positions, most of which would 
probably be prepared with dug-in forces. Thus, counter attack usually required 
superiority in both firepower and manpower. The 3: 1 ratio rule would apply in 
this case. This scenario was to be avoided as far as possible because it would 
cause severe casualties in the counter attack force as it had to attack the enemy's 
prepared positions unless launched immediately before the enemy consolidated 
his defensive position. 138 
134 Interview, Bagnall on 5 May 1993 and on 21 June 1993. See more in 7.3. 
for the roles of the airmobile force. 
135 Farndale, 1985, p.6. 
136 See Bellamy, 1987, p.146. 
137 See Farndale, 1985, p.7. 
138 Interview, Bagnall on 5 May 1993. See more in TDRC 5077A sec. 19.b. 
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Counter stroke, described by F arndale as the 'battle winning' formula, 
was a fully offensive mobile operation 'designed to seize the initiative and to 
win.' It was 'an operation designed to destroy an enemy who is either on the 
move, or temporarily halted, but who has not coordinated his defence.' 13 9 Thus, 
the counter stroke force would seek to strike 'an enemy in the flank when he is 
on the move,' and to hit him 'unprepared, in his weakest moment, and often on 
ground which the defender knows, but where the attacker was unfamiliar.' 140 It 
would be an attack against the enemy's mind as well as his forces. It would be 
less deliberate and swifter in preparation than a counter-attack against an enemy 
in a defensive position. The key to success depended on the correct choice of 
location and timing. 141 Once the aim of destroying the enemy was achieved, it 
could lead to a general counter attack to consolidate its successes. Above all, the 
greatest appeal of counter stroke was that it 'can have greatest impact when a 
numerically inferior defending force, with a finite number of reserves, is faced 
with a numerically superior enemy,' and that when 'successfully conducted .... not 
only can heavy losses be inflicted upon the enemy, but his plans can be severely 
dislocated and the initiative seized from him.' 142 Finally, the recapture of ground 
would be achieved as an indirect consequence of the successful operation. 143 
Indeed, counter stroke was the British corps' favoured choice. Its aim 
was the destruction of the enemy forces--winning the battle--and thus it was 
mainly a force-oriented operation. Therefore, it was an operation that usually 
139 Farndale, 1985, p.6. 
140 Halberdier, op. cit., p.32. 
141 Halberdier, op. cit., p.32. 
142 Farndale, 1985, p.7. 
143 Farndale, 1985. p.7 
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applied a 1: 1 force ratio rule, since both sides would fight exposed on the 
battlefield, but these odds would shift greatly in the attackers' favour when the 
counter stroke force had the initiative and surprise. The counter stroke force, 
consisting mainly of armoured forces, was expected to be constantly on the 
move so as not to lose tempo; this constituted the intrinsic criterion in 
maintaining the initiative. 144 Past experiences support such an assumption; the 
counter stroke at Arras in 1940 and Von Manstein's counter stroke operations 
were able to achieve disproportionate victories against enemies who usually 
outnumbered the attacker by 10 to 1. Nevertheless, as Bagnall and Von Sandrart 
stressed during interviews, counter stroke was only one of the options available 
to the commander.145 For example, where and when a careful positional 
defence was required, counter stroke would not be launched; thus came the 
stress--it was one option, not a universal panacea. 
The highlights of corps counter stroke were to be a combined arms 
offensive operation (with elements from not only mechanised infantry and 
armour but also from artillery, combat engineers, air defence (AD) assets, attack 
helicopters (AHs), and air support) in an offensive mobile operation to hit the 
enemy's open flank, force the collapse of his defence and thus achieve 
destruction. 146 The all-arms nature of the counter stroke force was so important 
144 The composition of the counter stroke force varied, but was usually made 
up of an all-arms formation with an emphasis on armours. See TDRC 6266, 
TDRC 6265 and TDRC 5507A. 
145 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993 and Von Sandrart. 
146 See TDRC 6266 and 6265, passim; and TDRC 5077A sec. 19.c. Also see 
Smith, 1992, p.7. 
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that without secunng such a capability, it would not be able to conduct a 
successful operation. 147 
The principles of application were therefore surprise, speed, simplicity, 
and flexibility. 148 The formation of forces differed depending upon the terrain 
and situation; and could be: 1) tanks leading, 2) mechanised infantry leading, or 
3) dismounted infantry alone. Above all, the most important operational 
considerations were that: firstly, mobility (e.g., by dedicated combat engineering 
support) and counter mobility must be attained; secondly, air superiority must be 
achieved, or at least strong AD assets must accompany the force; and finally, 
flank protection by anti-tank units would be vital for the survival of the 
force. 149 
If such a series of tactical defensive and counter operations failed to 
contain the enemy's operational breakthrough, which would result in the loss of 
territory, or if NORTHAG decided to impose a counter threat to deter further 
onslaught by the WP, they would then make a decision to launch an operational 
counter offensive/counter stroke. 
The operational counter stroke concept was originally based on ideas 
offered by the tactical level counter stroke concept. Unlike the tactical level 
counter stroke concept, however, the operational level counter offensive/counter 
stroke was not a fighting doctrine with which to fulfil the specific aim of 
destroying the enemy forces in the target area. It was more of a grand over-
arching idea which accepted and exploited the spirit of offensive and manoeuvre 
147 See R.H. Gould, "The Validity of Armoured Vehicles up to the Year 2000," 
BAR, (April 1982), p.35, for possible ramifications. 
148 TDRC 6265 sec.3. 
149 TDRC 6266 sec. 9 and 6265 sec.9 and 15. Also see, TDRC 5077A sec. 19.c. 
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in the tactical doctrine at the operational level for the conduct of an operational 
counter offensive. 
F or example, the tactical counter stroke would involve a brigade-size 
reserve formation, or sometimes a division size in the case of a corps operation 
in a mobile battle, to counter the enemy penetration at a specific area of a corps 
sector, and the fighting would have lasted from a couple of hours to a maximum 
of half a day until the enemy forces were destroyed. 150 Yet, the operational 
level counter offensive/counter stroke would involve at least a corps-size 
operational reserve in a theatre-wide operation (although the aim, timing, and 
size of the army group operation were left to COMNORTHAG's discretion). 
The aim of this operation would be to bring an initial stabilisation of defences 
along the 1GB, and restore the original status quo, by destroying the first 
operational echelon to create a favourable environment for reinforcements from 
the US to launch a further offensive against the second operational echelon. The 
operation would have lasted several days at least. 151 
Although the TDRC documents indicated that the army group counter 
offensive would be put off until all corps counter operations had been 
committed, Bagnall and F arndale thought it should be committed as soon as the 
enemy main effort was identified in order to maximise the effect of surprise and 
prevent the WP from gathering momentum. 152 Thus, the reserve would be 
manoeuvred across corps, and hence across the national boundaries of 
responsibility. Also, the army group's ability to generate sufficient firepower was 
150 See TDRC 6266 and TDRC 6265, for the tactical counter stroke. 
151 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993 and Farndale on 21 June 1993. Also see 
Mackenzie, op. cit., in Reid and Dewar, op. cit., pp.161-180, for the description 
of an army group counter offensive. 
152 TDRC 5507 A sec.20.1.a and b. 
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a crucial element in supporting such manoeuvre operations. Moreover, the 
possibility of a nuclear strike in conjunction with the operation was also 
contemplated. I53 Although this was an unlikely scenario--unless the WP made 
nuclear use first--because it was contrary to what Bagnall wanted in the first 
place and would make the operation itself very risky as the force would become 
the major target for WP nuclear retaliation, the possibility nevertheless remained. 
At the very least the detailed planning for nuclear use would be drawn up and 
completed by then because the failure of an army group counter offensive would 
have required escalation to the nuclear phase. 
In this sense, the aim of the tactical counter stroke was to achieve victory 
in a particular battle by destroying the enemy force, whereas the operational 
counter offensive was to bring about the pause of the enemy's attack itself 
throughout the theatre, either by destroying the enemy first operational echelon 
or holding his multi-echelon attack by both destruction and delay. As will be 
discussed in chapter 6, the aim of the operation became more ambitious than the 
earlier goal, but the fundamentals of the operation remained the same. 
Most of the common misconceptions with regard to the nature and 
operation of counter stroke revolved, therefore, around aspects of the aim of its 
operation. Above all, because no clear indication was provided of the fact that 
there were two different counter stroke operations in pursuit of two different 
objectives, tactical and operational, some saw counter stroke as primarily a corps 
operation using one of the divisions in the British corps for the purpose. 
153 TDRC 5507A sec.20.2. 
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The mix-up also seemed to occur because of writers' misunderstanding of 
the extent of the operational level. 154 They viewed it as roughly covering the 
British corps operation, and later implementation at the NOR TRAG level was 
considered to be a natural evolutionary process, whereas Bagnall actually 
intended it to be an army group-wide operation from the outset. 155 In short, 
while the options for reserve operations at the tactical level by the corps 
consisted of counter penetration, counter attack and counter stroke, the 
operational level option consisted of counter penetration (e.g., by the airmobile 
force) and counter offensive by the army group. The success of the initial 
defence and tactical operations would determine the necessity for, and the size 
of, the operational reserve operations. In short, the major point of the counter 
operations was that the army group would take some risks because it lacked the 
capability to fight a long attritional war. 156 
• The Subsequent Battle 
The objective of the fourth phase would be determined by the outcome of the 
corps and army group counter operations.1 57 Essentially, COMNORTHAG 
would face two choices: either to introduce nuclear weapons if the counter 
operation failed (thus entering the second phase of the operational battle), or to 
154 See Bellamy, 1987, pp.146-7; and McInnes, 1990, pp.137-8, for the 
description of an army group battle. 
155 McInnes acknowledged the transformation of counter stroke from a corps 
concept to an army group one, but described it as an evolutionary process rather 
than an existing idea which was a major part of Bagnall's plan from the outset. 
See McInnes, 1990, p.140. 
156 Von Sandrart's speech as CINCENT in 1989. 
157 Von Sandrart's speech as CINCENT in 1989. 
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conduct further conventional defence to stabilise the original FEBA if it 
succeeded. In the case of the latter, which everyone hoped would be the case, 
the fourth phase would involve the recovery of lost territory. 
There was no clear consensus on primary responsibility after the 
operational counter stroke, except that it would be carried out by the corps 
defenders in principle, with counter attack, 158 since the counter stroke force 
would be hard-pushed to do so. Although it was mentioned during interviews 
that the counter stroke force might have to do just that if the situation 
demanded, it was hoped that it would not be subjected to such pressure if3 (US) 
Corps, or other assets provided by CINCENT, could assume responsibility. 159 
Despite McInnes's criticism of the ambiguity of this phase--since the 
necessity could not be determined until the above three operations had been 
committed--the aims of the subsequent battle were clear.160 There was hope 
that winning the first and second battles would be sufficient to convince the WP 
to stop before the inevitable nuclear exchange. Thus, it could either involve the 
nuclear operation while continuing fighting in and around the 1GB if the army 
group succeeded in its counter operations (which would also consist of a series 
of mopping-up operations to clear up the WP penetration), or it would mean 
maintaining the current position if negotiations succeeded in convincing the WP 
that there would be no point in escalating to nuclear exchange when it had 
already failed in its conventional venture. This would be the ideal situation which 
everyone in NATO could hope for once war broke out. 
158 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993, Farndale on 21 June 1993 and Dewar. 
159 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993, Famdale on 21 June 1993, Dewar and 
Draper. 
160 McInnes, 1988, p.386. 
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4.4.2. REQUIREMENTS FOR COUNTER STROKE 
How did the British Army interpret the manoeuvre principles to be used in 
NORTHAG's defensive operations and in counter stroke? The BMD identified 
the fact that the general aim of manoeuvre warfare is 'to defeat enemy intentions 
by the disposition of forces with only the minimum of essential tactical fighting' 
through 1) deliberate operations in usually offensive action to engage or defeat 
an enemy with the minimum of fighting by forcing him into a disadvantageous 
position; and 2) exploitation to consolidate success gained in deliberate 
action. 161 Simpkin provided a useful analogy for this; he wrote that manoeuvre 
warfare, 'draws its power mainly from opportunism--the calculated risk, and the 
exploitation both of chance circumstances and (to borrow a tennis term) of 
"forced and unforced errors" by the opposition; still more on winning the battle 
of wills by surprise or, failing this, by speed and aptness of response. ,162 
Luttwak stressed that the goal is to incapacitate the enemy by a 'systematic 
disruption' of his will to fight by 'the application of some selective superiority 
against presumed enemy weakness, physical or psychological, technical or 
organisational,' while avoiding the physical substance in which the enemy's 
concentration of strength is found. 163 
Contrary to attrition warfare, it is not a simple aggregate of successful 
tactical battles that brings victory. 164 Manoeuvre requires an operational level 
161 The Bl\ID, pp.75-6. 
162 Simpkin, 1985, p.22. 
163 Luttwak, 1987, p.94. Also see Simpkin, 1985, pp.22-3. 
164 See Simpkin, 1985, p.20; Mearsheimer, 1983, p.33; and Luttwak, 
1980/1981, p. 63, for attritional warfare. 
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design through which the attacker can plan the avoidance of the enemy's strength 
while seeking a deliberate action against his weakness. In short, this method 
seeks the dislocation of enemy strength at the operational level, while pursuing 
to engage the weaker enemy forces at the tactical level, during which the 
destruction of those forces and the tactical penetration of its defensive line 
would be achieved. The initial success would be turned into an operational one, 
and the attacker would seek to dislocate the enemy further by penetrating deeper 
into the enemy's rear while preventing him from concentrating his strength 
against the attacker. The attacker would also continuously seek to engage the 
defender's weakness, during which he could create even more disruption, 
dislocation, and destruction of the enemy.165 The complete paralysis of the 
enemy defence would be achieved and the enemy's will to resist would be 
destroyed when the attack succeeded in the breakthrough of the defences at the 
operational and strategic depth. 
However, as a political guideline prohibited NATO preemptive action 
against the WP, the only viable choice available under the manoeuvre approach 
was to undertake a mobile defence after absorbing the initial WP onslaught, with 
a combination of relatively static defence in strong points and an aggressive 
covering force battle, the primary aim of which was to identify the enemy main 
etforts.166 After this, NORTHAG could be committed to a series of tactical 
mobile defence (counter stroke) operations to slow down the enemy. 
Nonetheless, it should be emphasised that tactical mobile defence at this 
time would be strictly designed to delay the enemy in order to make early 
165 Simpkin, 1987, p.140; and Leonhart, op. cit., pp.66-76, for more on 
dislocation and disruption. 
166 See Mearsheimer, 1983, pp.48-9, for forward-attritional defence. 
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identification of the main efforts, if there was more than one penetration, to 
foster the environment for operational mobile defence to be launched. 167 Thus, 
tactical level defence in operational mobile defence should focus on facilitating 
the recovery of vital ground, or, specifically, on concentrating on a series of 
delaying battles if the counter force's strength was not sufficient. If it had enough 
fighting power, then the force would launch a series of tactical counter strokes 
for maximum delay and attrition in order to allow more time and create an ideal 
situation in which an operational mobile counter offensive could be mounted. 168 
Such a situation would arise when the tempo of the enemy forces would 
be significantly disrupted and their momentum stalled by the defenders tactical 
actions by 'repeated and relentless manoeuvre and strikes' to fix and disrupt the 
enemy advance. 169 Under the circumstances, the leading echelons would be 
engaged from the defenders' strong points while the follow-on echelons would 
not have enough space or time to prepare adequately for defence. Therefore, the 
tactical level defence was to concentrate on creating this effect throughout the 
operational theatre to act as a pivot for an operational mobile counter to swing 
on. This would be a model defensive operation using manoeuvre principles. In 
other words, the main aim was the disruption of the enemy's tempo so as to 
unhinge it and make 'his mass' become a liability rather than an asset; during this 
time the enemy could make a series of mistakes and create confusion, which 
could cause a mental domino effect--once the defending forces achieved the 
initial disruption of the enemy tempo, it could have been exploited 'by further 
167 See Mackenzie, op. cit., in Holden Reid and Dewar, p.177, for a specific 
explanation. 
168 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993 and Farndale on 21 June 1993. 
169 Mackenzie, op. cit., in Holden Reid and Dewar, op. cit., p.177. 
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attacks, which in tum create more disruption and still further opportunities for 
deeper and more powerful manoeuvre, leading eventually to the unhinging effect 
that manoeuvre warfare was designed to create.,170 Therefore, in essence, the 
operational counter stroke was a mobile defence concept utilising manoeuvre 
principles at the operational level of war so as to identify and destroy the 
enemy's centre of gravity to render it inoperationa1. 171 
The main target of the operational counter offensive thus became the 
destruction of the enemy centre of gravity (commonly, the rear echelon where 
most of the C3I, artillery, logistics, and reserves were concentrated). 172 In the 
British concept, the centre of gravity was also recognised as the degraded 
strength of the enemy--his major fighting force which had reached a culminating 
point, or 'decisive point,' the identified point of weakness. 173 
If the enemy lost tempo due to NORTHAG's successful tactical mobile 
defence, his momentum of attack would be disrupted and he would not have 
enough time to establish a coherent defence. 174 By then, the enemy's true centre 
of gravity would be revealed--his dislocated and diffused mass which would be 
still on the move and exposed on the ground. This would be when the enemy 
was at his weakest, and for Bagnall, offensive actions against the enemy's 
170 Mackenzie, op. cit., in Holden Reid and Dewar, op. cit., pp.175-6. 
171 See Mearsheimer, 1983, pp.50-1, for a definition of mobile defence. 
However, he does not distinguish between the tactical and operational level 
operations. In fact, his description is more akin to the British tactical level 
operation. 
172 Interview, Bagnall 5 May 1993. 
173 See the BMD, pp.83-4, for the description of the culminating point and the 
centre of gravity. See Leonhard, op. cit., pp.20-24, for an in-depth discussion. 
174 See Simpkin, 1987, pp.l06-112, for elements which degrade tempo. 
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vulnerable strongest point would be the maIn army group counter aim. 175 
Within the scope of the operational counter offensive, a series of offensive 
actions and counter strokes would be committed against a number of enemy 
formations on the move to isolate his head by severing his LOC (Line of 
Communication), causing him to be defeated piecemeal by a series of 
envelopment and counter attacks by combined defensive and counter operations. 
To achieve this, synchronisation and orchestration of both tactical and 
operational battles at the operational level were required, involving a rapid 
exploitation of tactical successes by larger counter offensive forces. 176 In short, 
a counter offensive at the operational level would have made use of the 
synergistic effect of attrition of the enemy forces by tactical and decisive 
operational manoeuvres in order to defeat the enemy. So, the application of the 
manoeuvre principle, which exploited the command ability and art of command, 
became paramount. 
To achieve this end, Bagnall stressed that the initiative must be taken at 
the earliest hour. In fact, this did not require a new set of concepts; instead the 
Army's ten principles of war could be used as long as the fundamentals of 
manoeuvre warfare were understood. 1) Selection of aim meant the 
identification of the enemy centre of gravity. 2) Morale must be kept high at all 
times, especially during the early hours, so as to absorb the enemy attack and 
take on the counter action. 3) Offensive Action must be taken to deliver 'a rapid 
and relentless series of synchronised counter-punches.,177 4) Concentration of 
Force was essential to the success of the operation. This implied the 
175 Interview, Bagnall on 5 May 1993. 
176 Mackenzie, op. cit., in Holden Reid and Dewar, op. cit., p.177. 
177 Mackenzie, op. cit., in Holden Reid and Dewar, op. cit., p.179. 
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concentration of all assets, reserve, air, artillery, etc., for the success of the all-
important counter offensive. 5) Economy of Effort had to be achieved before 
concentration was possible. It would be done by not allocating reinforcements 
for positional defences. 1 78 Furthermore, synchronisation would be achieved to 
enable both concentration and economy of force at an appropriate time. 6) 
Security was a critical asset for the protection of the counter stroke force in both 
physical and psychological terms. Particularly, the flank protection of the 
counter stroke force's battle area would be paramount. 179 7) Flexibility was to 
be achieved in every possible sector. Command flexibility was especially critical, 
and this was why Auftragstaktik was adopted. 8) Cooperation was another vital 
ingredient because the operation had to be a true all-arms combined operation, 
involving not only all the elements of land forces, but also air and other supports. 
9) Administration in this case would mean logistics. Moving a large force would 
be a daunting task, and thus without a good logistics capability, such an 
offensive could not take place. 180 
Finally, 10) Surprise was, as Bagnall and Farndale stressed, the most 
important component if the counter stroke was to be successful. 181 Even the 
complete destruction of the WP attacking formation would be possible with a 
numerically inferior counter stroke force if it could maintain stealth to the last 
moment. Thus, the counter stroke force would have to launch an attack with 
whatever it had in hand rather than wait to gather more strength, which would 
178 Interview, Farndale on 21 June 1993. 
179 Interview, Farndale on 21 June 1993. 
180 Interview, Farndale on 21 June 1993. 
181 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993 and Farndale on 21 June 1993. 
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compromise the effect of surprise. 182 Both men added that the sheer speed and 
offensive nature of the action would limit the chance of failure. Simultaneously, 
the counter stroke force needed to avoid detection before it was committed. 
Thus, all the supporting elements (i.e. AHs, air support, combat engineers, etc., 
and especially, fire support) and other critical efforts outlined in the principles of 
war had to be ideally distributed and utilised. Famdale described one way to 
achieve last-minute surprise before committal of the attack. He said that the 
rapid generation of firepower, particularly by artillery, would be important in the 
situation as the counter stroke force moved together and emerged from the 
friendly fire barrage right before the attack. Although it would take some 
casualties from friendly fire, the enemy would be caught in complete surprise as 
he would be on his knees hiding from the artillery barrage. 183 
Essentially, NORTHAG's counter offensive concept was an operation 
designed to allow the army group to counter the first operational echelon with 
both positional and mobile defence by corps forces and reserves, while 
committing a series of offensives and counter strokes as a part of a larger-scale 
operational counter offensive against the enemy second echelon during the WP 
multi-echelon attack, or to achieve a thorough destruction of the enemy in a 
single-echeloned attack. Above all, these actions would allow the creation of a 
window of opportunity giving the defender a chance to create surprise and chaos 
in areas and times of his choosing by using manoeuvre. The enemy would be 
channelled into a particular sector to be counter-attacked with tactical reserves 
by luring him into good country where the defender could also make use of 
mobility. The major aim was to decelerate WP momentum so as to create a 
182 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993 and Famdale on 21 June 1993. 
183 Interview, Famdale on 21 June 1993. 
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culminating point at the operational level, through which the enemy's centre of 
gravity would be forced to be revealed. By this time, an operational counter 
stroke would have been launched against the enemy centre of gravity, and if 
won, it would have more or less stabilised the status quo. 
Due to the need to involve and orchestrate all the above elements in 
pursuit of achieving the defensive objective, Bagnall tried to explain his concept 
within the framework of the operational level of war, in which manoeuvre was a 
part of his ideas. Under operational level planning, both the physical movement 
of force to fulfil a given task and the mental ability of the commanders to 
maximise their flexibility and creativity would be possible. In this sense, the 
British understanding of manoeuvre could be summed up as the movement of 
forces and generation of sufficient (or overwhelming if attainable) firepower in 
order to secure surprise and the initiative to reinforce its offensive capability to 
achieve goals at the operational level, and is thus 'more about the movement of 
mass than masses of movement.' 184 Therefore, the main aims of the defensive 
operation were to achieve a rapid counter concentration of forces to reinforce 
existing defences, or to exploit the enemy's vulnerability, which could provide 
NORTHAG with various options against the WP surprise or other attacks. 
184 A.I.G. Kennedy, "An Approach to Warfare," Doctrine Digest (DD), 
(Edition 2, 1992), p. 9. 
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4.5. CONCLUSION 
NORTHAG was suffering from a lack of operational thinking, which left its 
corps to plan their own defence without regard to the army group's 
requirements. I have argued that the majority of the reasons preventing the 
formulation of an army group operational concept were political, but without a 
jointly agreed operational concept and planning, there would have been a 
wastage of already scarce resources and confusion over the priorities. Thus, 
NORTHAG's numerically weak forces would not be able to counter the WP 
attack. 
Therefore, Bagnall's reforms, which introduced the operational level and 
the subsequent formulation of the NORTHAG concept of defence, were to 
strike a balance between the need for achieving economy and concentration of 
forces within the existing resources. The operational level created a necessary 
conceptual framework within which NORTHAG could formulate a jointly 
agreed operational level doctrine. Above all, the new concept needed to take 
into account that NATO had to undertake comprehensive defence at both the 
tactical and operational levels. Therefore, NORTHAG required a concept which 
could allow the accomplishment of the above goal, and this required flexibility 
throughout the levels of command and services. This was fulfilled by adoption of 
Landi Air Battle and by embracing more mobile-oriented and combined land and 
air operations to bolster the existing defence. 
It has to be pointed out that the British Army did not have the necessary 
traditional background and understanding of joint operations at the higher 
operational level to enable formulation of the new concept from the British 
experience in war. Therefore, it was a very daunting and difficult process 
formulating the reforms to be applied throughout the army group. Nonetheless, 
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the reforms in the British Army, while being concurrent with the other 
developments, were indigenous and designed to achieve very specific strategic 
and operational goals. Moreover, unlike the US AirLand Battle Doctrine, 
NORTHAG's new concept of operation was, from the outset, designed to be 
used by all four national-contingents in the army group. 
CHAPTER 5 
DEBATES AND DISSEMINATION OF THE REFORMS 
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5.1. INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a comprehensive review of the debates and 
the process of the dissemination of the reforms in Britain and in the Alliance 
during Bagnall's tenure as COMNORTHAG. I argue that Bagnall's personality--
his assertive attitude, cautious and calculated approach to the reforms (e.g., 
through the use of the TDC) and plausible operational logic--was a vital factor 
both in convincing people in the British Army and RAF quickly and preventing 
the formation of any tangible opposition. In fact, he and his subordinates' 
relentless campaign prevented any significant debate from taking place in Britain. 
My next main argument is that as personality was a major component in 
the introduction and implementation of the reforms in Britain, it was much the 
same with the debates in the Alliance. Also, it was as much a debate concerning 
the strengthening of NATO's deterrence and NORTHAG's conventional 
capabilities as it was a clash between personalities. The cause of this problem 
was, as discussed earlier, the German hesitation to conform to the views of 
others in formulating a strategy for the defence of the FRG; the Germans felt 
that the British were not in the best position to carry out the proposed reforms 
because the British Army did not have the necessary capability and tradition to 
make such profound changes in the Alliance. The fiercest debate took place 
between two people, Bagnall and General Leopold Chalupa who was 
CINCENT, and the feud was often arbitrated by Von Sandrart who was the 
COS of the Bundeswehr at the time. 
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5.2. NIGEL BAGNALL'S PERSONALITY 
The majority of the British officers whom I interviewed unequivocally agreed 
that the reforms were the product of Bagnall and would not have happened 
without him. 1 For example, the current CDS, Field Marshal Inge, strongly 
emphasised in an interview that: 'Sir Nigel was the key figure .... There is no 
doubt about it .... Without a man of his stature and personality, I personally 
believe [the change] would not have [taken place]. And if it hadn't, we would 
have stayed the same .... It was not only Bagnall's intellect but also his drive that 
achieved it.' Many officers in the NORTHAG armies agreed.2 As these 
interviews show, it is crucial to understand Bagnall's personality in order to 
appreciate the origin and course of the implementation of the reforms in the 
British Army and NORTHAG. This should prove instrumental in answering one 
major question--Were the reforms really a product of one personality and could 
they have happened without Bagnall? 
Based on the testimonies of many people who worked with or served 
under him, as well as those junior officers who observed the developments, 
Bagnall seems to have been many things, sometimes projecting contradictory 
images depending on the individual. Nevertheless, Bagnall is best described as a 
very flexible and shrewd person who had the patience and determination to see 
the reforms through from beginning to end. Sometimes, especially in the early 
days, he had to go out of his way to convince people of the necessity and 
feasibility of the reforms almost single-handedly, due to the overall lack of 
1 Interviews, Famdale on 21 June 1993, Inge, Von Sandrart, Steel, Dewar and 
Draper. 
2 Interviews, Von Sandrart, Briot, Kunzendorf and Fischer. 
217 
interest and enthusiasm.3 In the end, with the success of the reforms, I was told 
by some that he earned the reputation of a sort of cult leader among many 
officers of both the British and other NATO armies.4 Inge, in particular, had 
something special to say about Bagnall's personal impact on the officer corps as 
a whole, i.e., that he 'guided' many young officers with his leadership, and gave 
them that 'special feeling' of being in the forefront of a new era. 
Meanwhile, Bagnall was known to be a very strict and temperamental 
person who sometimes did not have enough patience in his dealings with some 
people. Also, some commented that he could sometimes be very intolerant. Most 
of all, he often did not hesitate to show his discontent to those he thought to be 
ill-informed and impractical. 5 Farndale described this side of him in an interview 
as follows: 
Bagnall to me was absolutely straight down the middle, and he always 
did what he thought was right. If people didn't like it, he didn't care. He 
would have been a very good wartime commander. He would have made 
a ruthless wartime commander .... I would have been very brave, I think, 
to have said no to something he said. 6 
Moreover, his sometimes over-enthusiastic approach to the reforms gave rise to 
some uneasiness within the British Army because he often ignored the chain of 
command in implementing his ideas.7 This was particularly the case with the 
TDC. This side of him had major repercussions on some Germans in the early 
days of the reforms. For instance, he had a long and famous dispute with General 
3 Interview, Bagnall on 5 May 1993. 
4 Interviews, Inge and Dewar. 
5 Interviews, Farndale on 21 June 1993, Inge, Kenny and Dewar. 
6 Interview, Farndale on 21 June 1993. 
7 Interviews, Farndale on 21 June 1993, Inge and Kenny. 
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Chalupa at the time. Famdale commented on the matter that, 'I think this is 
unfortunate. I think if he handled Chalupa better, the whole thing would have 
been better for us all. I know I had to man quite a few fences trying. ,8 The 
dispute between the two was never satisfactorily resolved, and the full 
cooperation from the Germans with official support only came after Bagnall left 
the COMNORTHAG post to become CGS and as Chalupa retired in 1987 as 
CINCENT (see more later in this chapter). Nevertheless, Bagnall went ahead 
with his reforms regardless of Chalupa's opposition, while letting his 
subordinates, Inge and F amdale, take care of many of the practical problems. 9 
Despite some of his less admirable qualities, he was still respected as a 
strong leader and original strategic thinker by his peers and subordinates. The 
success of his reforms crucially depended on a favourable perception of his 
qualities. 1 0 For example, while having had trouble with Chalupa, he had a very 
important ally, Von Sandrart, who later replaced Chalupa as CINCENT, who 
considered Bagnall as one of the modem strategic thinkers of his time. In fact, 
Von Sandrart's contributions to Bagnall's plans were instrumental as he 
convinced Germans of their necessity, and most of all, dissuaded Chalupa from 
objecting to the reforms. Bagnall admitted in an interview that he was very lucky 
to have had Von Sandrart as a supporter who shared most of his views, and Von 
Sandrart was instrumental in introducing Bagnall's reforms in the Bundeswehr, 
as well as arbitrating disputes with Chalupa while he was COS of the 
8 Interview, Famdale on 21 June 1993. 
9 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993, F amdale on 21 June 1993, Inge, Von 
Sandrart and Chalupa. 
10 See J.P. Kiszely, "The Contribution of Originality to Military Success," in 
Holden Reid, 1993, p.33; and Dannatt pp.I-2, for the views of British officers on 
Bagnall's conceptual contribution. 
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Bundeswehr.ll The reforms would have been a failure without Von Sandrart's 
and the Bundeswehr's cooperation and understanding. 12 
Bagnall's ability to secure strong loyalty from his subordinates was 
extraordinary. He was very confident about his subordinates' ability and trusted 
them to carry out his wishes with the best of goodwill and faith. 13 In fact, he did 
not hesitate to delegate his authority to his subordinates in matters which he 
considered them better able to manage (for instance, in dealing with Chalupa). 
They later came to hold senior positions in the British Army. Famdale for 
instance commanded 1 (BR) Corps when Bagnall was the army group 
commander and then became his direct successor; Kenny, Bagnall's COS when 
he was Commander 4 (BR) Division, became COMNORTHAG after F amdale, 
and Inge, who was Bagnall's COS when he was Commander 1 (BR) Corps 
became COMNORTHAG after Kenny and eventually became CGS and CDS, 
the highest military post in the country. 
Finally, although Bagnall was sometimes intolerant and quick-tempered, 
he was nonetheless a pragmatic person, an opportunist capable of adapting to 
situations. This was illustrated by the way he seized the chance to show his ideas 
as a division commander after a long wait and thoroughly prepared the reforms 
to effectively neutralise opposition before it gathered momentum. If he had not 
been such a careful person, as well as good with people, above all, he could not 
have become CGS.14 
11 Interview, Bagnall on 5 May 1993. 
12 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993, Von Sandrart and Inge. 
13 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993, Famdale on 21 June 1993, Inge and 
Kenny. 
14 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993 and Inge. 
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But how original were his ideas? Some would say the changes in the 
Army would have happened anyway, particularly with the advent of high-
technology weapons and the growing desire for the de-nuclearisation of NATO's 
defence. 15 However, without a solid framework to exploit the potential of new 
weapons and equipment, the changes could only have been cosmetic, and would 
have been limited to the deployment of new weapons and minor tactical 
adaptations to reinforce existing defences. Bagnall never claimed, during 
interviews, that his idea was original and radically different from the earlier 
German, or Israeli, ideas, and he suggested that the reason why his reforms were 
successful was the fact that he was in the right place at the right time to make a 
sensible adjustment. 16 
As discussed, his ideas came, originally, from the German experience. 
Von Sandrart acknowledged in an interview that Bagnall 'thought very much on 
the same line as old [Reichswehr] generals.' However, while his idea may have 
borrowed heavily from history, his originality rested in the fact that he was able 
to modify those lessons to the time, area and available capability so as to allow 
them to be effectively applied in his own time. Furthermore, he had the ability to 
correctly assess the political and strategic situation at the time and formulate the 
necessary concept which could reinforce the Alliance's strategic goal to a 
credible degree. Had he not been a competent original strategic thinker, as will 
be discussed later, it is very difficult to imagine how his accomplishments could 
have been accepted or influenced the military and political hierarchy of the 
Alliance. 
15 See McInnes, 1991, p.45. 
16 Interview, Bagnall on 5 May 1993. 
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The effect he had on US operational thinking presents a good example of 
this. In fact, his ideas were enthusiastically received in the US and General Glen 
Otis, who was then Commander CENTAG, tried to adopt Bagnall's concept, 
especially in relation to the reserve operations in its army group defence, 
although there was no urgent need due to the deployment of strong US and 
German corps. 17 This shows that Bagnall was able not only to fend off the 
American line of thought in formulating his concept, but also to influence the US 
Army into considering his ideas for application in CENT AG instead of its own 
AirLand Battle Doctrine. Given the US's strong influence on the Alliance's 
strategic and military affairs, his was a unique and rare achievement, which 
revitalised the British Army's prominence in the Alliance. 
Among many factors which enabled the reforms, his originality, and 
specifically, the way he commanded loyalty and trust from his subordinates, were 
quite important. This is well-reflected in Farndale's remark that, 'We got together 
on [the reforms]. And I said to him, "I assure you, I will simply develop the 
concept. Because I believed in it. III 18 Thus, although the time was right for 
changes in the British Army and NORTHAG, I am forced to conclude that 
without him and his strong personality, they would not have occurred. The 
course and speed of the implementation of the reforms, and the methods which 
were utilised in the process, well reflect this point. In this sense, Bagnall must 
certainly be viewed as one of the few original British strategic thinkers of 
modem times. 
17 Interview, Bagnall on 6 November 1993. 
18 Interview, Farndale on 21 June 1993. 
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5.3. DEBATES IN BRITAIN 
5.3.1. THE ROLE OF THE TACTICAL DOCTRINE COMMITTEE 
Bagnall established the Tactical Doctrine Committee (TDC) when he became 
commander of 1 (BR) Corps in Germany as an informal discussion group, which 
was founded to educate, as well as discuss and debate the issues concerning the 
reforms throughout the departments and services. It was instrumental in 
introducing and implementing his reforms. As he himself said in an interview, 
without the TDC he could not have achieved half of what he wanted. 19 
Furthermore, it was not only a discussion group, but also a powerful tool in 
aiding the countering and neutralising of opposition within the military. For this 
reason, the TDC had more impact than Bagnall himself wanted to admit~ he had 
intended it to be an educational establishment, rather than a gathering with real 
power to make changes. 20 
The TDC was initially made up of twelve members of different arms and 
services of the military, who understood what Bagnall wanted to do and had 
some understanding of his concept. Particularly, it included those from training, 
logistics, and engineering who would discuss all the possible aspects of military 
operations, especially under the combined arms environment. The number of 
members grew as the TDC was expanded to NORTHAG level--and eventually 
to the MoD when Bagnall became the CGS. Today, a typical meeting would 
consist of 20 to 30 people from various ranks, branches and services of the 
19 Interview, Bagnall on 5 May 1993. 
20 Interview, Bagnall on 4 May 1994. 
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British military establishment. There is no regular interval for the meetings, but 
they take place as a major conference at least twice a year. 
He described in an interview the atmosphere of a typical TDC meeting; it 
usually involved heated debates and representations of differing views from 
different arms. Each subject was discussed in detail; not only the conceptual 
aspect of a possible operation, but other elements (such as the feasibility of 
implementation and training) received equal attention.21 While Bagnall himself 
would be chairing each meeting, the selection of topics was usually carried out 
by Inge, as he was in charge of formulating the preliminary proceedings as well 
as organising the agenda. Attention was always paid primarily to current issues, 
including discussions about SOP, as well as others which were recognised by the 
organisers as worthy of discussion. Notably, careful consideration was given to 
allowing the questioning and contribution of thoughts by junior officers, and the 
agenda was organised to provide an opportunity to update everyone's thinking. 
After each meeting, a progress report was made to be circulated and read by 
people in the Army and thus disseminate the ideas discussed in the previous 
gathering. 22 
Eventually, people with different or opposing views were invited to the 
meetings and allowed to ask questions in depth, after which they left with a 
better understanding. This process continued even after he became Commander 
NORTHAG and CGS. In fact, some became converted to Bagnall's ideas 
following the meetings and became very supportive afterwards.23 Also, people 
from other national armies were invited to join in when Bagnall became 
21 Interview, Bagnall on 6 November 1993. 
22 Interviews, Bagnall on 6 November 1993 and 4 May 1994 and Inge. 
23 Interviews, Bagnall on 6 November 1993, Inge and Kenny. 
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COMNORTHAG, despite the TDC being designed strictly for the purpose of 
educating the British military. This remained so until the IDC was moved to 
Britain, and Bagnall's NORTHAG international staff became either permanent 
members, or at least frequently attended meetings. In fact, the Operational and 
Planning Groups were established to discuss Bagnall's concept later. Those 
people were to become a major asset for Bagnall when he set out to explain his 
ideas and persuade other corps commanders; it was his international staff, who 
joined the above two groups, that enthusiastically and effectively convinced their 
national contingents about the validity and necessity of what Bagnall was 
doing. 24 
As stated earlier, former members of the TDC, such as Kenny and Inge, 
came to hold high positions in the military. Some people who joined the TDC as 
middle-ranking officers became senior officers. These included Lt. General Sir 
Peter Duffell, who joined it as a Colonel and became the Inspector General 
Doctrine and Training, and General Sir John Walters, who later became Deputy 
SACEUR. The former had direct and successful dealings with the Germans, 
while the latter introduced first-hand combat experience as he joined the TDC 
right after returning from the Falklands. Also, General Sir Charles Guthrie, who 
was a Colonel at 2 Armoured Division at the time (1983), was a regular 
member. He is now the CGS.25 
Above all, the direct result of the TDC was the writing of the first ever 
British operational doctrine, Design for Military Operations, in 1989 and the 
foundation of the HCSC in 1987. In fact, the idea for establishing the HCSC 
24 Interview, Bagnall on 6 November 1993. 
25 Interviews, Bagnall on 6 November 1993 and 4 May 1994. For example, 
Guthrie was responsible for drafting a counter stroke battle note for 2 Division. 
See TDRC 6265. 
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came when Bagnall was corps commander, and the first thing he did when he 
became CGS was to implement his vision.26 Another TDC member, then 
Colonel M. McAffee, started the preliminary work on the HCSC while he was 
the first Colonel HCSC; Bagnall wanted him to find a 'different way of training' 
in this capacity.27 Other key members of the TDC, Inge and Duffell, also made a 
significant contribution in establishing the course.28 Incidentally, Lt. General Sir 
Jeremy Mackenzie, who is now Commander Allied Rapid Reaction Corps 
(ARRC) , was Deputy Commandant Staff College, and he was the person who 
prepared and made out the detailed programme of the course before the start of 
the HCSC.29 And Major General Sir Rupert Smith, who commanded 1 (BR) 
Armoured Division during the Gulf War, also received the new training in the 
early days.30 Meanwhile, the BMD was ordered to be written in the Staff 
College soon after the first class ofHCSC. 
The TDC was not without its critics, especially those who saw its 
unorthodox approach as threatening to the chain of command. This was a 
legitimate concern since the TDC had many junior-ranking officers down to 
Major while many senior officers were not asked to join in.31 Most of all, the 
image of elitism it unwittingly projected constituted sufficient reason for making 
many middle-ranking officers discontented as they felt they were being excluded. 
26 Interviews, Bagnall on 6 November 1993, Inge and Kenny. See 7.5 on 
HCSC. 
27 Interview, Bagnall on 6 November 1993. 
28 Interviews, Bagnall on 6 November 1993 and 4 May 1994. 
29 Interviews, Bagnall on 6 November 1993 and 4 May 1994. 
30 Interview, Smith. 
31 Interviews, Bagnall on 6 November 1993 and Kenny. 
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It could also have been seen by senior officers as creating a faction within the 
army.32 In fact, some scepticism was expressed by people like Field Marshal 
Carver and General Sir John Akehurst, who was then Deputy SACEUR.33 
However, Bagnall explained the origin of their views in an interview as probably 
stemming from not having held a senior field position in NORTHAG. In fact, 
Carver's last major appointment in Germany was as commander of a Brigade. 
Most importantly, however, Bagnall, through the intervention of then Colonel 
Duffell who was a friend of Inge's in the MoD, was able to convince Field 
Marshal Sir Edwin Bramall, the CGS, of its necessity.34 
5.3.2. DEBATES IN THE BRITISH ARMY AND RAF 
• Outline of the Opposition within the Army 
Just as with those who disapproved of the TDC, the main reason for the 
opposition to Bagnall's reforms within the British Army was ignorance. From the 
beginning, there was some opposition, mainly from those who again did not hold 
major field appointments in Germany. 3 5 The argument revolved around three 
major factors. Firstly, some considered the new concept as unsuited to the 
British Army. Secondly, the new concept required major changes to be 
introduced to the system, and in effect turned it upside down. Finally, the British 
mind was very settled in the existing GDP, which was in fact a set of rules on 
32 Interviews, Bagnall on 6 November 1993 and Kenny. 
33 Interviews, Famdale on 21 June 1993, Carver and Kenny. 
34 Interview, Bagnall on 6 November 1993. 
35 Interviews, Bagnall on 6 November 1993, Inge and Kenny. 
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how Germany was to be defended. Some felt that the reforms were breaking the 
rules.36 
Nonetheless, there was no organised opposition, and whatever adverse 
opinion existed, it was quickly pacified and suppressed. This was particularly the 
case when Bagnall became CGS; with his personality, and the continuous 
campaign by his subordinates, he did not face any trouble concerning the 
implementation of his ideas, especially since F arndale and Inge were the real 
door-to-door salesmen. 3 7 Here, the TDC proved to be a useful tool as well. 
Above all, once a change in the mind set of the British Army had been achieved, 
there was no opposition whatsoever, and those previously averse to the ideas 
eventually conformed to them . 
• Outline of the Opposition from the RAF 
As discussed, the Army and RAF maintained a rather amicable relationship 
throughout the reforms. If there were any problems with the RAF, they involved 
two areas: firstly, some RAF officers did not like the idea of being subordinated 
to the Army command in adopting the joint C2 and HQ to implement LandiAir 
Battle. But opposition ceased once this was understood not to be the case.3 8 
Secondly, a major problem existed over the control of helicopters. The 
question was whether the Army should have its own assets to implement 
Landi Air Battle as it saw fit, or whether the RAF should retain them. There was 
particular trouble over the ownership of utility and transport helicopters, as well 
36 Interviews, Bagnall on 6 November 1993, Farndale on 21 June 1993, Inge 
and Kenny. 
37 Interviews, Farndale on 21 June 1993, Inge and Kenny. 
38 Interviews, Flaherty and Jackson. 
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as the acquisition of AH. Eventually, a compromise was reached as both agreed 
that they should retain some elements separately--AHs and light utility 
helicopters were to be held by the Army, whereas large transport and support 
helicopters (CH-47, etc.) were to remain under RAF contro1.39 This was 
followed by a Chief of Staff meeting in 1987; an agreement was ultimately 
reached, in which it was stated that even the transport assets would come under 
COMNORTHAG's command in the case ofa war.40 
5.3.3. THE VIEWS OF THE CIVIL SERVICE AND GOVERNMENT 
• Views of the Ministry of Defence 
According to Paul Flaherty, who was involved in the implementation of the 
reforms as a civil servant in the MoD, they were cautiously accepted as a good 
and timely idea.41 Among MoD concerns were the following: 1) they could 
upset Allied solidarity if they went wrong; 2) they might upset CINCENT, 
Chalupa, which could have diplomatic ramifications; 3) they might have 
insufficient resources; and 4) Bagnall's 'uncontrollable force' (in other words, his 
relentless and imperious pursuit of the changes) could be detrimental. 42 
However, those worries were soon dismissed as the general consensus 
indicated that the actions offered a better alternative to static defence under 
which the efficient use of resources was difficult. In fact, the reforms were 
39 Interviews, Flaherty, Jackson and Bagnall on 5 May 1993. More in chapter 
7.4. 
40 Interview, Bagnall on 5 May 1993. 
41 Interview, Flaherty. 
42 Interviews, Day, Dewar and Flaherty. 
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eventually viewed as offering a better chance of defence and better use of 
resources. It was also felt that if the Army and MoD could put forth a rational 
argument supporting such benefits, it was assumed there should be no political 
difficulties, as the government did not have to commit more resources--which 
could prove to be an additional financial burden they did not need.43 Most of all, 
once Chalupa left his post, the major source of concern disappeared. 
Furthermore, the MoD's preoccupation with the implementation of 
FOFA eased the process of the dissemination of the reforms. Not only did it 
present financial problems, but it also involved political difficulties because of its 
apparent emphasis on the attack beyond the 1GB. Thus FOFA was seen by some 
as an aggressive doctrine.44 Although Bagnall's idea did involve an attack over 
the 1GB, which could have been more damaging since it involved an actual 
counter offensive by a land force, this element was skilfully omitted when the 
idea was presented. In fact, it was sold as a purely defensive concept to be 
employed inside the 1GB, which could be utilised to enhance the army group's 
flexibility in defence. If it had been presented as what it was actually designed to 
do, it would have had great difficulty being accepted by the MoD. As Bagnall 
and Von Sandrart admitted in interviews, there was no need to upset people by 
explicitly stating what might not happen after all.45 
Once the reforms were accepted by the MoD, they were quickly 
disseminated both in Britain and the Alliance. The process of dissemination in 
the military involved: 1) finalising the initial concept and plan in concert with 
NORTHAG's international staff; 2) formalising an agreement with other corps' 
43 Interviews, Bagnall on 6 November 1993, Day, Dewar and Flaherty. 
44 Interview, Flaherty. 
45 Interviews, Bagnall on 6 November 1993 and Von Sandrart. 
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commanders and their national and international staffs; and 3) discussions with 
air and other components' commanders.46 At NATO level, it involved: 1) 
NORTHAG selling the idea to SHAPE's international staff and getting 
SACEUR's approval; and 2) presenting it to be discussed in DPC (Defence 
Planning Committee) and its international staff in NATO.47 At the MoD, it 
resulted in arbitrating the final details between the services and departments 
before it was reported to the Secretary of Defence. All these processes went 
remarkably smoothly, and by the time the Berlin Wall came down it had become 
a workable concept in the Alliance. 48 
The attraction for the MoD was three-fold: firstly, the reforms were 
viewed as allowing efficient use of resources and manpower, both of which were 
government aims at the time of a budget squeeze due to the introduction of a lot 
of new equipment and a manpower shortage. Secondly, many aspects of the 
reforms were considered to be about better C2 since battles were becoming 
extremely complex and confusing; they thus recognised the need to find an 
imaginative way of using the new equipment which was beginning to be available 
at the time. Finally, it was seen as a measure which would revitalise the US 
presence, a positive result which the reforms did bring about. Also, they were 
seen as reinforcing Britain's leading role in NATO as a member capable of 
formulating and implementing an original idea throughout the Alliance, a fact 
which also achieved a 'rare harmony' in NORTHAG.49 
46 Interviews, Bagnall on 6 November 1993 and Inge. 
47 Interviews, Bagnall on 6 November 1993 and Flaherty. See 6.3. for more 
details. 
48 Interviews, Bagnall on 6 November 1993, Inge and Flaherty. 
49 Beach, op. cit., in Kaiser and Roper, op. cit., p.135. Also see Rees, op. cit., in 
Byrd, 1991, p.99. 
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• Views of the Government 
As discussed, the major role the government played was in the creation of a 
permissive environment within which the reforms could occur, and it essentially 
let the military do whatever it chose with something it considered to be a 
primarily military concern. Nevertheless, this reaction had a lot to do with the 
way Bagnall approached the political leadership and secured support. Bagnall 
and Farndale acknowledged during interviews that they always enjoyed good 
relations with the Thatcher government. 50 Bagnall briefed Michael Heseltine, 
Secretary of Defence at the time, on his ideas before carrying out the reforms in 
the Army.51 In the end, as mentioned, civilian officials came to support the 
reforms as genuinely better than the previous stance, and as something which 
needed to be done, thus concluding that there would be no particular political 
difficulties in the Alliance. When this was discussed, there was strong support 
from Prime Minister Thatcher and Heseitine, who were prepared to support 
Bagnall's reforms in the Alliance. 52 Also, once approval was given, Bagnall was 
able to use civil servants to extend his cause in the Alliance (for example, he 
secured strong support from the then British Ambassador to Bonn) which 
proved to be very beneficial. 53 
In return, the reforms were beneficial for the government as they fitted its 
tmage of strong defence and willingness to take a leadership role in the 
Alliance. 54 The positive support of the government gave it a chance to play a 
50 Interviews, Bagnall on 6 November 1993 and Farndale on 21 June 1993. 
51 Interview, Bagnall on 6 November 1993. 
52 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993 and Day. 
53 Interviews, Bagnall on 6 November 1993, Inge, Kenny and Day. 
54 See McInnes, 1991, p.45. 
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wider role in the affairs of the Alliance than previously, and this stopped the 
decline of Britain as the leader in European NATO, especially at a time when 
Germany was growing more assertive. Above all, the reforms reinforced the 
British government's image of having a coherent plan to reinforce the 
progressive strengthening of NATO's defence, and as actually being capable of 
delivering its promise. Furthermore, as mentioned previously, as long as the 
government was relieved of the task of having to come up with more financial 
support, it had nothing to lose from the reforms. As a result, the reforms served 
the government's, and particularly Thatcher's, aspiration well in the sense that 
they offered strong evidence of her effort in the Alliance, thus helping the 
government in 'keeping up appearances.'SS 
5.3.4. SUMMARY 
In short, there were no worthwhile debates concerning the reforms in Britain, 
and any small remnants of the initial opposition evaporated rapidly once the key 
figures in the British military establishment were convinced of the need for their 
introduction. In the military, the ground on which some opponents stood was a 
subjective and parochial one; hence, once converted to the ethos and benefits of 
the reforms, there was no more debate on, and opposition to, this necessity. 
55 David Greenwood, "Expenditure and Management," in Byrd, 1991, p.64. 
Also see House of Commons, Third Report from the Defence Committee 
Session 1984-85: Defence Commitments and Resources and Defence Estimates 
1985-86, Vol., I., (1985, London, HMSO), para. 68, for the acknowledgement 
by the Parliament for the favourable reception by the Alliance of the 
government's efforts to increase its military contribution. 
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5.4. THE DISPUTES AND DEBATES WITH THE GERMANS 
5.4.1. AN OVERVIEW OF THE DISPUTES 
For Bagnall, forward defence itself was not the problem; an over-literal 
interpretation of it was. In fact, as discussed in the previous chapter, he was 
more willing than others in the British Army to uphold the principle of forward 
defence, not for political reasons but for operational ones. This consideration 
was well-reflected in the following statement: 'forward defence is absolutely 
essential; if we are going to fight mobile offensive operations, we want to do it in 
and around the 1GB and not deep into Western German territory, and that is a 
purely military argument and not a political one. ,56 What he wanted was changes 
in the NORTHAG posture and operational concept to be able to counter and 
accommodate the political and strategic developments at the time. What he told 
the Allies, especially the Germans, was that a moderate increase in conventional 
capability and a rearrangement of NATO's defence posture would eventually be 
more acceptable than the total destruction of Germany and the possible nuclear 
devastation of the others. 
However, his vision and concept of operation, which would inevitably 
involve a reinterpretation of forward defence, became a cause of major disputes 
and debates among the Germans. In fact, although the two were able to make a 
compromise, the disagreement with the Germans was never really fully resolved, 
and it was only after Von Sandrart replaced Chalupa as CINCENT in 1987 that 
the reforms were comprehensively implemented by the army group. 
56 Bagnall, op. cit., in Boyd-Carpenter, op. cit., p.154. 
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5.4.2. HIGHLIGHTS OF THE GERMAN OPPOSITION 
The German position concerning the status of forward defence had been made 
very clear. In a speech at RUSI in 1984, Chalupa relentlessly insisted that, 'the 
principle of Forward Defence must.... not be allowed to become a matter of 
interpretation.' This was preceded by yet another strong and bitter reaffirmation 
by the then COS of the Bundeswehr, General Wolfgang Altenburg, that forward 
defence remained a 'pre-requisite for German membership of NATO' and that 
'every kilometre yielded up means additional dangers for the population of 
Western Europe.'57 All the above actions constituted an attempt to halt the 
discord that was slowly surfacing at the time among different NATO 
commanders and politicians on the essence of the objective of the strategy, and 
were very much targeted against Bagnall's views. 
The origin of the problem was the different depth of understanding 
among senior officers in NATO. The Germans were obviously irritated because 
they understood the British emphasis on the reinterpretation of forward defence 
as giving up the principles of the strategy altogether. This was viewed as 
insensitive and in blatant disregard of the needs of the German population and 
their survival as a country. Some Germans felt that no other countries were 
seriously concerned with their needs because the others (especially the British) 
were not going to fight a major war on their own soil. 58 
In order to implement Bagnall's idea, the strength of forward deployed 
forces--and particularly the size of covering forces--needed to be cut to create 
reserves. This was contested by Chalupa since he felt it would cause severe 
57 See quotes in Farindon, op. cit., p.329. 
58 Interviews, Farndale on 21 June 1993, Von Sandrart and Chalupa. 
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problems concerning the evacuation of refugees, and he said in an interview he 
would have had difficulty explaining to his fellow citizens why NATO, and 
mostly German, forces were withdrawing without giving them sufficient time to 
seek safety. Also, given Germany's experience of territorial loss after World War 
Two, there was some suspicion of the possibility that NATO might compromise 
German territorial integrity to avoid, or stop, a war with the wp.59 In short, the 
initial German opposition to the reforms stemmed from their misconception in 
regarding the new concept as a strategy requiring trading space for time. 
Other grounds for German opposition were principally the difference of 
opinion concerning the prospect of a WP surprise attack. Chalupa said that since 
the Germans did not believe in a surprise attack because of modem surveillance 
systems, it was felt that a war in Europe would be bound to involve substantial 
mobilisation before the outbreak of hostilities; thus no need existed to plan for 
the worst. 60 Therefore, under the circumstances, it was felt that the 
implementation of Bagnall's concept was a redundant, and even dangerous, idea. 
Particularly, the lowering of the number of the covering and MDA forces, which 
Bagnall called for, would not only significantly hamper the initial defence, but 
also actually favour a WP surprise option as it could aid the generation of a 
higher tempo attack since the changes would leave some areas in the forward 
sector open. They firmly believed a strong covering force would be needed to 
provide the necessary preparation time for the army group, not the contrary.61 
59 Interviews, Famdale on 21 June 1993 and Von Sandrart. 
60 Interview, Chalupa. 
61 Interviews, Chalupa, Von Sandrart and Kunzendorf Also supported by 
Carver in an interview. Also see McInnes, 1988, p.384 and p.389, for possible 
operational repercussions which could be created by having a weak covering 
force. 
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Therefore, there was no middle ground for the debate since, in order to satisfy 
both parties' desires, the army group would be stretched too thinly to provide for 
a strong covering force and also to retain an army group reserve--which would 
prevent the concentration of sufficient forces for a decisive counter attack or 
counter penetration--without seriously depleting the force in MDA.62 As a 
result, this could compel some forces to end up being double-tasked with initial 
defensive and reserve roles.63 In short, the Germans were not satisfied with the 
trade-off between the covering and MDA forces and reserves. 
This perception was further fuelled by the German misconception that 
Bagnall's idea was to involve allowing enemy penetration down to Hanover, or 
even to the Rhine. They were appalled by the fact that this was not only against 
their beliefs, but also a move which would make the recovery of territory almost 
impossible once willingly given up. 64 In fact, the Germans perceived the new 
operational concept to be a plan for a counter offensive inside the 1GB because 
they felt that NORTHAG did not have the capability for more. They worried 
that the failure of this could have dire consequences for Germany. 65 
The next area of opposition concerned the feasibility. Firstly, the 
Germans felt that the British themselves lacked the necessary capabilities, 
especially the equipment in use, to implement such a concept. 66 The weapons in 
the British Army's inventory at the time was comprised of such systems as the 
Chieftain MBT (main battle tank), the towed-Rapier SAM and FV432 APCs 
62 See McInnes, 1990, p.147; and 1988, p. 389. 
63 Interview, Von Sandrart. 
64 Interviews, Farndale on 21 June 1993 and Inge. 
65 Interview, Chalupa. 
66 Interviews, Chalupa, Fischer and Kunzendorf 
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(armoured personnel carrier). While it was considered that the Chieftain :MBT 
had excellent protection, firepower and tactical mobility, the tank generally 
lacked the degree of battlefield mobility which was required for the counter 
stroke force. So did its other systems, which, in addition, lacked the necessary 
protection to undertake such an operation. 67 All these factors would have limited 
the flexibility and capability that NORTHAG was looking for. Secondly, the air 
situation might not be favourable and the operation could be disastrous without 
air superiority.68 This problem would be particularly severe, especially in the 
early days of war, in that the movement of the reserves would be detected and 
interdicted without air superiority having been achieved first. Thus, securing 
surprise under the situation would be almost impossible. Thirdly, since the 
operation involved the movement of large forces, this would put extreme 
pressure on logistics. Also, this problem would be aggravated by the 
sustainability and interoperability problems from which NORTHAG was 
suffering. 69 
In sum, the highlight of the German opposition was that there would be 
no need to take such a dangerous option since the threat of surprise attack was 
not as imminent as the British thought. Therefore, due to many operational and 
implementation problems, the new concept was an elusive one, and thus, the 
defence of Germany would be better served using the traditional method of 
defence. Also, such a view stemmed from the German misconception that the 
67 Interviews, Famdale on 21 June 1993, Chalupa and Dewar. See Gander, op. 
cit., p.154 and p.157, for problems with Chieftain's reliability. 
68 Interviews, Fischer and Chalupa. 
69 Interviews, Chalupa, Fischer and Kunzendorf A point raised by Carver in an 
interview. 
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reforms were a callous interpretation of the political imperative, which they 
subsequently considered a willingness to compromise German territory. 
5.4.3. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE GERMAN VIEWS 
The limitations of the German views were as follows: firstly, the majority of the 
above rationale were political considerations disregarding many operationally 
critical factors (such as the need for an offensive operation to restore the original 
status quo) which would actually be more vital for the defence of Germany; 
secondly, they were strongly based on the war-avoiding strategy afforded by 
nuclear deterrence, which did not properly consider an eventuality such as a 
surprise attack, and would not be effective once a war got under way; thirdly, 
there was no guarantee that the necessary mobilisation could be achieved in 
time, and, as noted in 3.4., the WP's force superiority would reach its pinnacle 
on a short-term mobilisation scenario under which NATO would be at a distinct 
disadvantage. 
Most of all, because of the terrain in the Hanover Plain and the limits of 
NORTHAG's fighting power, the enemy attack would develop in depth anyway. 
Since NORTHAG was made up of a collection of four different national corps 
with varying degrees of capability, there had to be a coherent plan to turn their 
limitations into strengths and thus be able to counter any contingency that might 
develop. It was not an attempt to draw up a contingency plan, but a way of 
having several options within the political guideline including mobile defence and 
army group counter offensive under a single operational plan which would, 
above all, allow for a simultaneous achievement of economy and concentration 
offorces to enhance forward defence according to the army group's capability. 
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Regarding criticisms put forth by the Germans, Bagnall offered specific 
alternatives and remedies to address those problems before, and during, his 
proposals. Firstly, he had a clear idea of what the size and the role of the 
covering and MDA forces should be. Again, it should be remembered that his 
operational design was to counter the enemy's single echelon attack under the 
standing start scenario. Therefore, as mentioned, the WP would not be able to 
concentrate against more than one or two sectors. This was why the strong 
covering force would not be needed, its role being limited to the identification of 
the enemy's main efforts, because it would be operationally dislocated as it 
would have to be deployed thinly along the front. Also, the preparation time 
would be so short that, rather than wasting troops in covering force duty, they 
could be better used as reserves. Meanwhile, there was no overriding 
requirement for the strong in-place MDA force because the tactical level reserve 
operation was in fact a part of the MDA operation. Particularly, Bagnall's aim 
was to strengthen the MDA defence through an imaginative use of both defence 
of strong points (i.e. AKA) and committal of the corps counter stroke. 
Above all, this was necessary because of the lack of resources. In fact, 
when Bagnall and others allocated more resources through the reforms, they 
hurriedly reinforced the covering force and MDA rather than the counter force 
by reallocating those forces which were earmarked as reserves.70 This move 
was a confirmation that Bagnall's endeavour was not a way to compromise 
forward defence but a way of reinforcing it with the limited resources available. 
Therefore, this trade-off was a justified one within the specific operational 
contingency (surprise attack) against which he was preparing his defence, and 
70 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993, Farndale on 21 June 1993, Inge and 
Kenny. See more in chapter 6. 
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although the size of forces was small, the covering and MDA forces were 
balanced in the sense that they were sufficient to create an environment within 
which his counter offensive concept could be implemented. 
The problem of the British ability to implement the new concept was 
somewhat remedied when Challenger l\1BT and Warrior MICV (Mechanised 
Infantry Combat Vehicle) were introduced in 1982 and 1985 respectively, while 
Bagnall and other COMNORTHAGs after him paid particular attention to 
improving the interoperability, sustainability, logistics capability and training of 
the army group.71 Also, as mentioned, the adoption of the Land/Air Battle 
concept with the AT AF was to specifically address the problems of achieving air 
superiority and providing tailored support for other important army group 
operations. In particular, both Bagnall and Farndale's recognition that there 
would be an interoperability problem in an army group made up of different 
national contingents led to their preference of 3 and 7 Panzer divisions as a 
major counter offensive force while maintaining 3 (BR) Division in a supporting 
role, until 3 (US) Corps and other resources were allocated to NORTHAG.72 
Meanwhile, Bagnall thought the corps counter stroke should be launched 
fairly early in the conflict to disrupt the enemy's advance at the operational level 
(also as a way of complementing the weak covering and:MDA forces), while the 
army group counter offensive should be put off until the result of the corps 
71 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993, Dewar, Farndale on 21 June 1993 and 
Inge. See more in chapter 7. 
72 However, as noted previously, Bagnall's initial perception was that, in the 
worst case scenario, he might not be able to use 3 (pz) because it would have to 
cover for the deployment of 1 (NL) Corps when surprised. In this case, 7 (pz) 
and 3 (BR) divisions would have to be used together in a double envelopment 
counter stroke launched from each corps area to avoid the interoperability 
problems which could surface in the case of mounting a joint single stroke 
counter offensive. 
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operation was known. Above all, a successful corps counter stroke, and an army 
group counter offensive following immediately after the corps defensive 
operation, would prevent the enemy from making a major penetration of the 
NORTHAG area. The 1983 CPX proved that this could be done by meeting the 
WP attack as early and as far forward as possible. 
In fact, this was an occasion which proved that achieving surprise was 
possible once the basic requirements (at least temporary air superiority, quick 
identification of the enemy main efforts, and disruption of the enemy plan) were 
met before the launching of the operation. Also, since the whole idea was 
developed based on the assumption that the WP would launch a surprise attack, 
without an immediate follow-on echelon, the success of this operation would 
leave a gap between the leading and reinforcing echelons, which would definitely 
hold up the progress of a war. 
In short, the tension between the Germans and British in the early days 
stemmed from the fact that they had different political priorities (nuclear 
deterrence and forward defence) and strategic perceptions (surprise attack), as 
well as different ideas on how the limited resources should be utilised in the 
defence of Germany, which could be interpreted differently from person to 
person and from country to country. 
5.4.4. THE IMPACT OF PERSONALITY ON THE DEBATES 
The most important aspect in understanding the full extent of the debate between 
the British and Germans is the impact and role of the personalities of the major 
actors since the strong personal element involved in the debate was in fact as 
important as the obvious difference in views over the strategic and operational 
considerations. On the political and strategic side, the debate was ignited by the 
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difference in perception of the two leading figures in NATO. In essence, the top 
German commander, Chalupa, who was also the theatre commander 
(CINCENT), treated the defence of Germany in terms of deterrence and thought 
a war would come only after a substantial mobilisation, whereas Bagnall, who 
was the top British field commander in the theatre viewed this in terms of 
defence after the collapse of deterrence, and the major challenge came from WP 
surprise attack. It was thus a debate between a German who wanted to reinforce 
deterrence through traditional logic, which stressed not fighting a war at all (and 
relying on nuclear first- and early-use), versus a Briton who thought this an 
outdated concept which must be reinforced by the actual capability for 
successful defence as the WP capability improved. 
Yet this debate was equally, if not more, affected by differing personal 
feelings between Bagnall and Chalupa. As the two, and others who had observed 
the dispute, admitted, the debate was intense and emotional. It sometimes 
resulted in bitter personal disputes involving not only discrediting each other's 
ideas, but also sometimes a 'name-calling' match. 73 Although this did not cause a 
political problem in the Alliance in the end, as the feud was confined to the 
personal level and no official objection to the reforms was filed, it was a 
reflection of a certain amount of turf fights among NATO's senior officers, as 
well as a clash between diverse kinds of national pride, and this was a major 
factor which could have changed the course of the reforms. In fact, this element 
sometimes exceeded the realms of debate and made some people forget the 
original aims of formulating the reforms as they developed personal antagonism 
towards each other (perhaps more so in the case of Bagnall than Chalupa). 
73 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May and 6 November 1993, Dewar, Farndale on 14 
April and 21 June 1993, Von Sandrart, Kenny, Inge, and Chalupa. 
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Although this was not necessarily about placing one's feelings before national 
interests, since the debate originated from the fact that they were both genuinely 
concerned about maintaining deterrence, it became just that as the disputes 
continued. 
F or instance, Chalupa told me in an interview that, although he was glad 
that Bagnall was able to devise an ambitious reform plan, and did recognise that 
Bagnall's ideas would be beneficial in improving the operational efficacy of 
NORTHAG, he felt Bagnall's counter offensive concept to be dangerous and 
boasting a capability which the British did not have. 74 It was true that since the 
reforms were initiated and advocated by the British, Bagnall and other British 
officers undoubtedly became more assertive and sometimes unintentionally 
offended some Germans. In fact, Chalupa was annoyed at being preached to 
about principles which the Germans themselves had pioneered--operational and 
manoeuvre war --by the British, whom they tacitly viewed as novices. Thus 
Chalupa was surprised that a small army, such as the British one, could even 
contemplate something which a larger army with an excellent tradition in 
operational and manoeuvre war, such as the German one, defending its own 
country considered to be too ambitious. Most of all, he was offended because he 
thought the Germans, not the British, had the prerogative to decide how the 
defence of Germany should be planned and implemented, and thus he resented 
actions he considered challenging to his perception of how the defence of his 
country should be conducted. It was a reflection of Chalupa's philosophy that, 
'we Germans understand our situation better than anyone, unlike you British who 
74 Interview, Chalupa. Also, interviews, Fischer, Kunzendorfand Von Sandrart. 
244 
do not have to fight a war on your soil. t7 5 Indeed for him, the British reforms 
were merely cosmetic and aimed simply at gaining more control within the 
Alliance.76 This was also, in a way, a reflection of growing German 
assertiveness and confidence in the defence of their country. 77 
Equally, Bagnall regarded Chalupa as incompetent, skewed, and not fully 
understanding the new concept--and his career as too politically-oriented--to 
have developed broader and rational views concerning the defence of his own 
country. Also, he thought that Chalupa's thinking epitomised a traditional 
German dilemma between deterrence and defence--the politically desirable 
options and the operational reality which sometimes did not go hand-in-hand 
with the political imperatives.78 For example, how could Chalupa even think of 
gaining the territory in the east without a counter offensive capability? How 
could he conceive of sparing its population from a nuclear holocaust if he were 
forced to use nuclear weapons before offering a strong conventional resistance, 
and most of all, without even thinking that the conventional defence of Germany 
was possible? 
As mentioned, the debate had never really been satisfactorily resolved 
while Chalupa remained as CINCENT, and Bagnall and Chalupa never had an 
opportunity to reconcile their personal differences since Bagnall left Germany in 
1986 as he was appointed CGS. Nonetheless, despite the fact that Chalupa did 
not officially endorse the new concept, he allowed an 'understanding' to be 
75 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May and 6 November 1993, Dewar, Farndale on 14 
April and 21 June 1993, Von Sandrart, Kenny, Inge and Chalupa. 
76 Interviews, Chalupa, Fischer, Kunzendorf and Von Sandrart. 
77 Interview, Day. 
78 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May and 6 November 1993. 
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reached with the British that Germany might provide an additional division to 
COMNOR THAG. Nonetheless, Chalupa was prepared to overrule Bagnall by 
exercising his seniority if the dispute became compromising to the German (his) 
understanding of forward defence. 79 
There were many reasons for Chalupa's action, despite his personal 
resentment towards Bagnall and his reforms. F or instance, Chalupa was 
concerned about a possible political backdraft by filing an official protest to 
SACEUR and seeking permission to overrule COMNORTHAG. Many believed 
that this was politically difficult in practice. Also they commented that, because 
Chalupa was a political person, and, in his own way, had a genuine concern for 
the solidarity of the Alliance, he chose to 'overlook' and exercise discretion by 
intervening only in matters which he considered to be too audacious (such as 
agreeing on thinning out forward defence to hold back 3 Panzer division in the 
rear) rather than objecting to the changes outright since he had the power to 
overrule this informal arrangement depending on the progress of war. 80 Thus, it 
was not too difficult for him to unofficially concede to this preliminary 
agreement. 
Above all, the main reason that a major conflict was avoided was Von 
Sandrart's conciliatory measures. In fact, he acted as a buffer between Bagnall 
and Chalupa, and without his intervention and careful arbitration, the 
introduction of the reforms could have faced serious barriers. In this sense, Von 
Sandrart was an atypical person, ready to set aside both national pride and 
political concerns in order to secure what was important and required to bolster 
79 Interview, Chalupa. 
80 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993 and Farndale 21 June 1993, Inge and Von 
Sandrart. 
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strategic and operational imperatives; this was not only critical for the defence of 
the country but also for the possibility of some territorial gains, or ultimately, 
reunification, in the event of Germany's being forced to pay a heavy price 
through WP provocation. He believed in 'taking a token' to punish the WP. Also 
he understood Bagnall's concept fully and appreciated that the new idea was not 
necessarily compromising to forward defence since it did not involve trading 
space for time and would be launched early to stop the enemy progress before it 
built up significant momentum.81 
This retaliatory aspect of the new concept was something Chalupa also 
recognised to have many political and strategic advantages, although he 
remained sceptical of Bagnall's concept. His logic coincided with Von Sandrart's 
that if they were forced into a war with the WP, they would 'take a token', or at 
least seek some territorial gains.82 If there was one element which completely 
agreed with Chalupa, it was that Bagnall's concept offered him a plausible means 
and operational framework through which to achieve the secret German 
aspiration to regain territory in the case of war, provided the progress of a war 
became favourable to NATO.83 If it did not, he always had the power not to 
divert the reserve to reinforce forward defence by overruling Bagnall. 
In short, Chalupa was being as opportunistic, shrewd, and flexible as 
Bagnall had been in pursuing his own ideas; rather than objecting to the reforms, 
which could have many political ramifications, he opted to maintain control over 
the situation as he had the ultimate power of decision at the end of the day. 
81 Interview, Von Sandrart. 
82 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993, Chalupa and Farndale 21 June 1993 and 
Von Sandrart. 
83 Interviews, Chalupa and Von Sandrart. 
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Equally, he remained indecisive and political because his main motivation for not 
rejecting the whole idea was his lack of conviction that Bagnall was wrong. Had 
he possessed the courage of his convictions, he would have rejected the changes 
from the outset since he had the prerogative as CINCENT. 
In the end, nothing happened. As soon as Chalupa retired, the debate 
ceased. This was mainly due to the fact that Von Sandrart became his successor 
and was in favour of the new concept. Although Bagnall could not fully 
implement the reforms under a hostile CINCENT, he had laid the foundation 
upon which his successor, Famdale, was able to finalise what was already agreed 




In this chapter, I have argued that success has to be attributed most of all to 
Bagnall's personality and ability to convince a variety of people throughout the 
hierarchy of the military and government. The effective use of the TDC and his 
subordinates was exemplary, since it did yield major successes. This was a 
reflection of Bagnall's personality, his tendency to work out all details before 
submitting them to be scrutinised by the others, which, in the end, left no loose 
ends to be criticised. Meanwhile, the main reason why the British government, 
civil service, and military came to embrace Bagnall's reforms was that their 
successful implementation would largely be favourable to strengthening Britain's 
leadership among the Allies in Europe. 
The early German opposition stemmed from the idea that the reforms 
would weaken NATO's deterrence. This notion was wrong for four reasons. 
Firstly, the WP's de facto conventional superiority significantly strengthened its 
chance of launching a surprise attack, which discredited the belief that a war 
could only come after a period of mobilisation. Secondly, although the Germans 
saw the British concept to be exclusively about mobile operations which they 
were not capable of implementing, it was in reality about taking a calculated risk 
(because of the lack of resources) which utilised both positional and mobile 
elements in the army group defence. Thirdly, although it was true that Bagnall's 
original concept could only be achieved by weakening the covering and MDA 
forces to create an operational reserve, the reinterpretation of forward defence 
did not mean the abandonment of the strategy, but was actually a way of 
strengthening it with the fostering of a counter offensive capability with which to 
restore the original status quo. Finally, it was a move which actually reinforced 
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deterrence by providing strong means of both denial (with conventional forces) 
and punishment (with nuclear and, to an extent, conventional forces as well). 
In addition to these strategic and operational debates, I have identified 
that the element of personality was quite significant. It was true that the British 
previously lacked the necessary aptitude and ideas to undertake the kind of 
mission imagined, but an equally important factor at the root of the German 
opposition was its desire to resist others' intervention and leadership in matters 
which concerned its national security. Indeed, this was an unfortunate episode in 
the saga of the debates over the reforms. This was a good lesson on how 
decisively personality might have affected so crucial a matter, since any failure to 
reach a consensus could have caused major repercussions and a political split in 
the Alliance. 
Nonetheless, it was fortunate that Von Sandrart, who had more 
favourable views on Bagnall's reforms, was able to arbitrate the differences 
between Bagnall and Chalupa prevent the outbreak of a public dispute, and 
dissuade Chalupa from objecting to the reforms officially. In this sense, Bagnall's 
ideas could not be fully implemented under a hostile CINCENT, but his effort 
laid the foundation on which his successor, Farndale, could pursue the changes 
under the new CINCENT, Von Sandrart. 
CHAPTER 6 
THE EXPANSION OF THE REFORMS 
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6.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter's aim is to discuss the expansion of the reforms by Farndale, and the 
process of adopting them by the Alliance. I argue that the expansion of the 
reforms was a logical and natural evolutionary process aimed at utilising the 
newly available resources to further strengthen the reforms started by Bagnall. 
This was a deliberate policy with added incidental effects. It was deliberate in the 
sense that, because of the new resources and burgeoning optimism and 
confidence, F arndale wanted to explore other options in order to make the 
reforms more effective. Meanwhile, it had incidental consequences in that his 
expansion reached a state in which its counter offensive concept began to radiate 
an aspect of conventional deterrence and retaliation. 
In this sense, it was a watershed for NORTHAG as the operational 
concept and the ideas of deterrence moved away from a nuclear to a 
conventional basis, from denial (although Bagnall's concept had a strong element 
of punishment in terms of aiming to destroy the enemy force) to the stage when 
both denial and punishment (by the way of a counter offensive over the 1GB) 
were planned. This was a subtle and previously unpremeditated progress, but an 
aspect of conventional retaliation came, although unwittingly, to win the heart of 
some Germans as well because it supported their secret aspiration to regain 
territories in the east, which they had always considered to be their own, if they 
were forced to fight a war. 
Finally, I argue that the remarkably smooth process of disseminating the 
reforms in the Alliance, after the initial debates were settled, was indebted to the 
overall changes of mood in the Alliance, which was becoming more confident of 
its capabilities, and the change in views which rendered a more offensive-
oriented concept acceptable. 
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6.2. MARTIN FARNDALE'S EXPANSION OF THE REFORMS 
6.2.1. HIGHLIGHTS OF FARNDALE'S THINKING 
Famdale's expansion was encouraged by five developments preceding, as well as 
during, his tenure as COMNORTHAG. Firstly, since most of the difficult and 
sensitive military and political obstacles within the Army and NATO were more 
or less overcome and settled by Bagnall earlier on, F amdale was less burdened 
by political in-fighting, and was able to get on with the actual implementation of 
the reforms. Secondly, when Von Sandrart became the new CINCENT, he also 
became Famdale's most important ally since he supported the implementation of 
the original concept as well as Famdale's expansion of it. I Thirdly, NATO 
became more confident both politically and militarily as the earlier effort to 
modernise its defence was slowly reaching fruition. Fourthly, Famdale thought 
that, with the growing capabilities ofNORTHAG, the WP would not be able to 
launch a standing start attack, especially after Gorbachev came to power. Finally 
and most importantly, the POMCUS (Pre-positioning of Material Configured in 
Unit Sets) site for 3 (US) Corps was completed and officially designated as 
NORTHAG's exclusive operational reserve. By the time Famdale left his post, 
he was sure that at least two out of three POMCUS divisions would be deployed 
and ready for battle within four days of the initiation of the hostilities. 2 
Unlike Bagnall's intention, which was to stop or destroy the WP first 
operational echelon (or a single echelon attack) mainly with the in-theatre army 
1 Interviews Famdale on 21 June 1993 and Von Sandrart. , 
2 Interviews, Famdale on 21 June 1993 and 19 May 1994. Also interviews, Von 
Sandrart and Kenny. 
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group reserves and some of the external operational reserves to buy some time 
before a nuclear decision by the Alliance, or to seek a negotiated settlement, 
Farndale's idea went well beyond this original concept, both in scale and 
intensity) First of all, he was willing to fight an extended conventional-only 
battle with the substantially increased number of operational reserves against at 
least three or possibly four WP operational echelons, each consisting of between 
six to eight divisions as a part of the first operational battle (which was a 
conventional phase). Secondly, as he thought that the danger of a surprise attack 
was diminishing, he felt he should be able to prepare to fight under various 
scenarios, including both a standing start and a stop-go, or post-mobilisation 
war.4 Thirdly, he was firmly committed to expanding the scope of warfare not 
only within the NATO sectors, but also to WP territory. 
The underlying essence of Farndale's expansion was, therefore, to 
execute Bagnall's counter offensive concept on a larger scale with the allocation 
of more reserves and resources. This was a logical and deliberate progression 
from the original idea because F arndale believed that the availability of more 
resources, as he projected them to be more than previously calculated in time of 
crisis, would enable the army group to undertake more ambitious missions than 
earlier. Furthermore, it would give him the capability to prolong the 
conventional (first)-phase of war, not only by creating a pause, but also by 
actually winning the first phase of the war thoroughly with conventional means 
only under various scenarios of attack. 
The defence for the first phase of war would have to consist of three 
stages: the first battle, the second battle and the subsequent operation, as agreed 
3 Interviews, Farndale on 21 June 1993, Von Sandrart and Kenny. 
4 Interviews, Farndale on 21 June 1993 and 19 May 1994. 
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with the CINCENT. 5 Prior to the initiation of the conflict, the requisite pre-war 
preparation would be carried out; NORTHAG would concentrate on building up 
its reserves while the corps would be left alone to do their own job of preparing 
the defences and allocating corps reserves. The first battle would mainly be 
comprised of corps-defensive battles against the WP first operational echelon 
designed to absorb the impetus of the WP initial onslaught and break its tempo 
by conventional means. Meanwhile, the army group would try to identify where 
the enemy main effort was by picking up the OMG forming. The initial aim 
would be to hold the WP advance for as long as possible and to make its life 
very difficult. The principle of defending ground which was favourable for 
defence was accepted and all agreed that the size of the covering force would be 
small. In the defence of the MDA, the Germans and British would be holding the 
far end of each shoulder to shape the WP penetration. It was envisaged that one 
major penetration would occur between the German and British sectors. The 
shaping of the penetration would be possible because they were ready to accept 
it under the new concept, while the Dutch and Belgians would be able to hold 
their defences as WP concentration was not expected there. 6 
The first operational counter stroke using the in-theatre army group 
reserves would be launched against the enemy penetration which, by then, would 
have penetrated about 30 kms (the major aim here was actually closer to the 
counter attack concept during which the army group could repel the enemy and 
make conditions for the follow-on reserve operation easier by holding a secure 
starting-line). According to the size of the enemy force, at least one armoured 
5 The following description is based on interviews with Bagnall on 5 May 1993, 
Farndale on 21 June 1993, Von Sandrart and Kenny. Also see Von Sandrart's 
speech as CINCENT in 1989. 
6 Interview, Farndale on 21 June 1993. 
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division (e.g. 7 Panzer) would be used to launch a stroke across the corps 
boundaries to attack the enemy flank. When it succeeded, the fighting power of 
the enemy first operational echelon was expected to more or less evaporate. 7 
The fighting along the 1GB would continue and a few blisters of the enemy 
would remain, but the initial penetration would be closed up. 
The second battle was a counter battle using either the unused in-theatre 
reserves or the external reserves (3 (US) Corps) against the enemy second 
operational echelon. By then, the OMG would either be forming part of the 
second echelon, and would thus be dealt with as a part of the second battle, or 
would already have been dealt with by the first army group counter attack. It 
was hoped that the use of 3 (US) Corps would be delayed until the third echelon 
approached by using the in-theatre reserves (e.g. consisting 3 Panzer and 3 (BR) 
Armoured Division).8 In the case of its use, it would be attacking across the 
1GB towards Magdeburg, and the corps would be deployed as a whole.9 
In the subsequent phase, which was the third phase, Farndale would 
expect the arrival of the WP third echelon. By this time, the army group would 
have exhausted many of its resources, unless it received support from the 1 
French Army. By putting together additional reserves from the remainder of the 
forces used in earlier counter strokes, if possible, it could buy a little more time 
by having 'one more go.'10 Otherwise, it would be time to commit to going 
nuclear--hence the start of the next phase of the operational battle. 
7 Interview, Farndale on 21 June 1993. 
8 Interviews, Farndale on 21 June 1993. Also see, Von Sandrart's speech as 
CINCENT in 1989. 
9 Interviews, Farndale on 21 June 1993 and Von Sandrart. 
10 Interview, Farndale on 21 June 1993. 
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In essence, Farndale's concept was to destroy the first echelon with the 
in-theatre corps defence and the army group reserve, hold and destroy the 
second echelon with 3 (US) Corps, and together hold the advance of the third 
echelon, or counter it if 1 French Army or some element from the French FAR 
(F orce d'Action Rapide) became available, before becoming committed to using 
nuclear weapons. 11 The most crucial element of his ideas was the availability of 
3 (US) Corps, as it was a very strong formation which could deliver the kind of 
counter stroke which Farndale envisaged, and if it could arrive in theatre in time, 
the army group would be under less pressure to build up reserves at the expense 
of the front-line force. 3 (US) Corps was a vital component of the army group 
planning as its timely arrival would prevent NORTHAG from going nuclear at an 
early stage of the conflict. 12 
6.2.2. REFORGER 87 AND THE TEST OF THE EXPANDED 
NORTHAG CONCEPT OF OPERATION 
The preparation for the 1987 REFORGER, which was the nineteenth of a series 
of exercises to be held in October 1987, began in 1984 when the C-in-C US 
Army in Europe (CINCUSAREUR) invited COMNORTHAG to plan, prepare, 
and conduct the FTX phase (code-named 'Certain Strike') of REFORGER 87. It 
was the first time a corps-level exercise was commanded by a British officer. 
The first phase of the exercise comprised the return of the US forces to 
Germany (thus the name REFORGER) by air and sea to be linked up with pre-
11 See, Von Sandrart's speech as CINCENT in 1989 for the possibility of 
allocating 1 French Army and the element of FAR to NORTHAG. 
12 Interviews, Farndale on 21 June 1993, Von Sandrart and Kenny. 
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stocked equipment in POMCUS sites located in the Netherlands, Belgium, and 
the FRG. They were then moved by road and rail to their concentration area 
while the commanders were engaged in CPX against the WP leading echelons. 13 
Meanwhile, forces of NORTHAG four national contingents, 3 (US) corps (3 
divisions), a company from I French Army, all of 2ATAF, and the German 
Territorial Command were preparing for involvement in 'Certain Strike.'14 
The underlying concepts of the FTX phase were as follows: first, holding 
parts of the front where it was 'essential to achieve cohesion and provide the 
framework from which counter moves can be launched'; second, achieving as 
much depth as possible within the strategy of forward defence 'in order to buy 
time and space in which to move onto the offensive'; and third, 'hold[ing] 
effective reserves at all levels'. 15 The orange force was assembled from Belgian, 
Dutch, and British brigades, and was led by the Dutch commander, to simulate 
penetration north of Hanover. Meanwhile, the objective of 3 (US) Corps acting 
as the NORTHAG reserve was to make a 100-km transit through a passage of 
lines of 1 German Corps to attack the flank of the orange penetration. 16 In fact, 
this was a simulated operational counter stroke by NORTHAG, which involved 
the corps fighting through, at the end, a distance of 150 kms (average 35 km 
advance per day) across the 1GB towards Magdeburg, which was the 
hypothetical target. I 7 
13 See Farndale, 1988--B, pp.7-8 and p.Il. 
14 Farndale, 1988--B, p.8 
15 Farndale, 1988--B, p.9 
16 See Farndale, 1988--B, pp.12-13 and pp.16-7. 
17 Interview, Famdale on 21 June 1993. See the details of troops movement 
during the FTX phase of the REFORGER 87, in C.L. Donnelly, "Warsaw Pact 
Perceptions of the Correlation of Forces," in Keith Dunn and Stephen Flanagan, 
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The most spectacular battle took place as 3 (US) Corps broke out after 
an assault river crossing which involved the extensive use of AHs and airmobile 
operations to seize a bridgehead. Soon after, a series of tank battles ensued 
involving over 400 tanks, SOO guns and 200 helicopters and lasting almost 24 
hours. 3 (US) Corps attacks over a two-day period were made over a depth of 
SO-60 kms; the Corps engaged in a series of encounter battles, feints, attacks, 
counter attacks, and counter counter attacks. Counter attack and counter stroke 
operations were practised throughout the exercise, which lasted for two 
weeks. 18 
The successful conduct of the REFORGER 87 exercise was crucial and 
reassuring for everyone in NORTHAG in a number of ways. Firstly, it was the 
first real test of the viability of the new NORTHAG concept, which was 
officially adopted by all NORTHAG nations in June 1986, in actual FTX format 
involving all in-place corps and the whole of 3 (US) Corps. Especially during the 
FTX phase, it tested the interoperability between national forces and the 
importance of the army group level battle procedures and SOPs. 19 Secondly, it 
involved the full-scale deployment of 3 (US) Corps in Europe, the success of 
which was vital for the credibility of the new concept. Thirdly, along with the 
valuable experience gained through the exercise, it delivered a clear message to 
the WP that NORTHAG's defence was indeed formidable, and that it would not 
win a war against NATO easily. Therefore, the exercise itself, as well as the 
demonstration ofNORTHAG's commitment and ability to resist a possible WP 
ed., NATO in the Sth Decade, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University 
Press, 1990), p.S8. 
18 See Farndale, 1988--B, pp.16-7. 
19 See Farndale, 1988--B, p.8 and p.12. 
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attack, was considered an important factor in reinforcing deterrence in the eyes 
of both the WP and NATO.20 In fact, the ultimate exercise was dubbed 'THE 
LAST BATTLE OF THE COLD WAR.' Finally, this was the occasion which 
provided the necessary credibility and desirability for Farndale's expansion, 
because it demonstrated NORTHAG's ability to undertake highly intensive 
mobile defence operations without the use of nuclear weapons, as well as to 
launch a major conventional counter offensive to restore the original status quo 
and pose a counter threat against further WP attack by sitting astride the area 
between the 1GB and Magdeburg. Most of all, it demonstrated its ability to 
coordinate its multinational forces with 3 (US) force. 21 And this exercise 
showed that, while the original Bagnall concept envisaged a decisive blow 
against the first echelon, if Farndale's operation succeeded, it could ensure the 
destruction of at least two enemy operational echelons while delaying the 
introduction of a third one to the battle. 
6.2.3. THE POLITICAL RESTRICTIONS, OPERATIONAL REALITIES 
AND THE CROSS BORDER COUNTER OFFENSIVE 
One of the most critical elements of REFORGER 87 was the simulated counter 
offensive across the 1GB. Such a leap in the Allies' operational thinking, and 
particularly the fact that such planning actually became a viable option for 
NORTHAG's defence plan, was a momentous development which signalled the 
fundamental changes in the Alliance's views on the defence of Central Europe. In 
fact soon after the conclusion of REFORGER 87, and with Farndale's new , 
20 Interview, Farndale on 21 June 1993. 
21 See Karber, op. cit., in Pfaltzgraff and Shultz, op. cit., pp.178-80. 
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concept, this changing view became more acceptable to others in the Alliance, 
despite the fact that his ideas were not tested in their entirety. 
Yet, the political guidelines concerning the possible cross-1GB offensive 
remained clear--there must be no peacetime planning of such an operation, nor 
must it be acknowledged that such a plan existed. This prohibition stemmed 
from a quite obvious reason: NATO was a defensive Alliance which did not plan 
any offensive or preemptive operations. Besides, article 26 of the basic law of 
the FRG Constitution specifically banned preparation for a war of aggression. 
Also, the clear indication of such an intent would be damaging both to the 
maintenance of good relations with the WP and to the preservation of the 
cohesion of NATO. Above all, it would be politically disastrous, especially in 
Germany.22 Thus, as Von Sandrart complained, it was easier for the politicians 
not to 'differentiate between offensive operations within the context of a 
strategic defence and a strategy of aggression. ,23 
Indeed, the possibility of such an operation remained taboo for NATO 
until it received shock treatment by Bagnall during the 1983 CPX 'Winter Sale,' 
when he launched a cross-border counter offensive as he detected and attacked a 
gap in the WP advance over the 1GB. After that, such a possibility began to be 
cautiously, but actively, discussed.24 At the same time, it was also gaining some 
support (from a small section of the public) due to a few strategic and 
operational advantages it could bring in the case of war. That is to say, it was 
absurd for NATO to allow the fighting to be confined to FRG territory; so, 
22 See Stanley Sloan, NATO's Future, (Washington, D.C.: National Defence 
University Press, 1985), p.146. 
23 Von Sandrart, speech as CINCENT in 1989. 
24 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993, Famdale on 21 June 1993, Inge, Kenny 
and Von Sandrart. 
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although NATO did not have to adopt an offensive strategy, if it were able to 
gain some territory over the 1GB, it would be politically useful in negotiations 
for terminating the war.25 Secondly, due to the lack of depth and time to allow 
the full mobilisation of NATO, it was crucial to stop the enemy momentum as 
close to the 1GB as possible.26 Above all, as Niklas-Carter wrote, '[It] would 
certainly act as a powerful kind of conventional deterrence, which would 
significantly bolster, though not replace, the existing nuclear deterrent. ,27 Its 
main appeal was, as Betts has described, that it would 'throw a wrench into 
carefully plotted Soviet plans, ' which could be an effective counter surprise 
against any Soviet strategic and tactical surprises. 28 
Similarly, the fundamental rationale behind such thinking was that once 
the enemy violated the national border, his territory could no longer be a 
sanctuary. In fact, the cross-1GB operation gave a few clear strategic and 
operational advantages which paralleled the above argument. For example, an 
early cross-border counter offensive toward Magdeburg (as during CPX -83) was 
a solid plan because the counter force's left shoulder would be protected by the 
Elbe, while it was attacking the flank of the main WP thrust against the front of 
NORTHAG. Furthermore, opening an extra front, in a similar vein to 
Huntington's ideas, could actually relieve pressure on the army group, especially 
25 See Rennagel, op. cit., in Gabriel, op. cit., p.123; and Sloan, op.cit., pp.146-
7, in addition to Dinter and Griffith, op. cit.; and Huntington op. cit., passim. 
26 See Norman Dodd, "Armoured Operations in the Future," AQ&DJ, (January 
1980), p.l 0; and Rennagel, op. cit., in Gabriel, op. cit., p.123. 
27 Niklas-Carter, op. cit., in Harris and Toase, op. cit., p.211. Also see Simpkin, 
1985, pp.276-8; and Mearsheimer, 1983, p.51, for the supporting ideas. 
28 Betts, 1982, p.213. 
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since the WP would not have sufficient forces to counter this.29 Most of all, 
there was a limit to fighting a battle of withdrawal due to the lack of depth in 
Germany. Besides, it was much easier to destroy the enemy's momentum before 
he had developed a major penetration rather than after, provided his centre of 
gravity could be identified early.30 Therefore, in the case of a war, the choice 
would have been clear. It meant either that the defence would be carried out in 
NATO's own areas, or that the attack would be launched over the 1GB so as to 
gain depth and time. Both the Germans and British unequivocally agreed that 
depth would be gained forward, not backward. Furthermore, everyone believed 
that it would be done relatively quickly. 31 
As Bagnall and Farndale stressed, exerCIses such as CPX-83 and 
REFORGER 87 achieved a transition of thought among people in NATO. As a 
result, the changes in perception permitted them to actually consider that sort of 
contingency, and thus what had previously been objectionable became an 
acceptable option. 3 2 In addition to this, more and more people were bound to 
acknowledge what was actually militarily sensible, and they knew in their hearts 
that, if the battle developed, action across the 1GB would be inevitable. Once 
war broke out, rather than giving up German soil, the reverse would be better 
for NATO, as well as for the quick termination of war. What it had not known 
clearly until 'Certain Strike' was that it actually had the ability to exploit such an 
option in reality, and it was a military imperative which could not really be 
29 See Huntington, op. cit., pp.40-6; and Simpkin, 1985, p.307. 
30 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993, Farndale on 21 June 1993 and Von 
Sandrart. 
31 Interviews, Von Sandrart, Bagnall and Farndale. 
32 Interview, Farndale on 21 June 1993. 
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controlled by a solely political need.33 Indeed, by the time REFORGER 87 was 
executed, there was no clear discontent over the objective of the exercise and its 
selection of the hypothetical target. 34 This was due to the changes in perception 
in both the civilian and military sectors towards the view that there was nothing 
wrong with such thinking as long as it was not an exercise in preparing NATO 
to undertake an offensive or preemptive attack. Therefore, one of the main 
contributions of Bagnall's new operational concept was that it made it easier for 
the military to think about taking the militarily desirable option, rather than 
abiding by the political restrictions, and Famdale's expanded idea actually 
provided an option to achieve that objective. 
For their part, the Germans wanted East Germany to be their territory 
and if a war broke out, they would try everything in their power to regain the 
long-lost ground. 3 5 By quickly reclaiming the territories in the East, they could 
also secure some territorial gains if the war could be resolved through a 
negotiated settlement with the WP. Also, there was a notion that their taking the 
war to the east meant they could limit damage to the west. Such desires were 
clearly expressed during interviews with German officers and in observations by 
British officers. 36 
Knowing such a secret, the only factor of which the military was wary 
was a possible leak of what it was thinking. In fact, the political guideline was so 
33 Interview, Famdale on 21 June 1993. 
34 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993, Famdale on 21 June 1993, Von Sandrart 
and Kenny. 
35 Interviews, Chalupa, Von Sandrart and Fischer. Also see Hackett, op. cit., 
pp.282-3, for the German dilemmas and desires concerning this issue. 
36 Interviews, Bagnall on 6 November 1993, Famdale on 21 June 1993, Von 
Sandrart, Chalupa and Fischer. 
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strict that even a map exercise or Cpx, which contemplated a cross-border 
operation, was prohibited. 3 7 Nevertheless, the military continuously practised 
such an operation behind closed doors. Besides, it was absolutely essential to 
train officers to be able to undertake a larger-scale operation according to the 
operational imperative, not the political one. Furthermore, without some kind of 
training or forward thinking, NATO forces would not be able to undertake such 
an operation once the restriction was lifted. Therefore, the military had to be 
very careful that such exercises would not come to be known to those outside, 
particularly in the political and public domains. It was their belief that the 
exercises were necessary, but that peacetime exercises might be mistaken by the 
political leadership as a plan for preemptive attac~ and this would have created 
a major controversy. Also, the military placed its hopes in the fact that the 
political and popular barriers would come down in the case of war. 3 8 
Eventually, this kind of audacious forward thinking offered the Germans 
logical grounds with which to transcend the confines of forward defence as it 
offered them a rational alternative to, and neutralised their traditional excuse for, 
abiding by the strategy. Once the physical and mental barriers--which confined 
the military's capability to a level sufficient for planning defence inside the 1GB 
only--were overcome, there was no reason why other militarily viable plans 
should not be considered. In this sense, although the new concept challenged and 
made largely invalid the German understanding of forward defence, in effect it 
made the strategy more relevant within the confines of operational planning 
because forward deployment (of strong area defence elements utilising both 
37 Interviews, Bagnall on 6 November 1993 and Von Sandrart. 
38 Interviews, Bagnall on 6 November 1993, Famdale on 21 June 1993 and Von 
Sandrart. 
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positional and mobile tactics) became more crucial than before to give 
NORTHAG a secure start-line to launch counter offensives as envisaged. 
Therefore, it became difficult for the Germans to argue against Bagnall's 
logic, and eventually Farndale's ideas, and indeed this was one of the main 
reasons for Von Sandrart's enthusiastic support of the reforms. In fact, he 
believed that Bagnall was right for three reasons. Firstly, Bagnall's idea was not 
about having a contingency plan or altering the German and Alliance 
understanding of their strategic priority, but about increasing the options for 
defence by accepting the operational level concept which could make better use 
of limited resources. Secondly, he knew that due to the lack of forces, the 
mobility factor became extremely important to compensate for the weakness.39 
Thirdly, it was a prudent plan which gave NATO a chance to win the first battle 
by stopping the enemy's impetus with operational craft.40 
In sum, along with the fact that Farndale's expansion offered more 
options than those already planned, since it provided more leverage and choices 
for reacting to unforeseen contingencies, and his ideas were welcomed in terms 
of timing and good intentions. As Farndale stressed, his idea was based on the 
logic that having an extra option in addition to the existing plan could further 
enhance the promotion and exploration of new ideas which could transcend the 
confines of Central Europe.41 
39 See Hans Henning Von Sandrart, "Forward Defence--Mobility and the Use of 
Barriers," NSN, (Special 1, 1985), p.40. 
40 See Hans Henning Von Sandrart, "Land Battle and the Army's Needs," in 
Boyd-Carpenter, op. cit., pp.145-7, for details. 
41 Interview, Farndale on 21 June 1993. 
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6.2.4. THE LIMITS OF THE EXPANDED CONCEPT 
Despite the number of benefits, F amdale' s concept was in some ways too 
ambitious. First of all, it was based on resources which might not be available in 
time. In fact, his calculation of the possible allocation of reserves seemed too 
positive, and it thus endangered his plan, which could be seriously damaged if 
those resources on which he counted did not become available. He was very 
strongly dependent on the timely arrival of 3 (US) Corps, and he himself said in 
an interview that if it did not arrive, he would have gone nuclear quickly.42 
Furthermore, he mentioned various formations other than the previously agreed-
on reserves, some of which were in fact CENTAG or NATO's strategic reserves, 
and which might not become available at all. 
F or example, other than 3 and 7 Panzer and 3 (BR) Armoured Division, 
Famdale also included 11 Panzergrenadier, while retaining the option of adding 
1 (NL) Division, which was to be mobilised and brought from home as his rear 
reserve if the necessity arose. He also mentioned 1 French Army (which was the 
size of a corps), as well as some elements of FAR. As described earlier, all these 
formations were to be used in multi-axes, a multiple counter operation during 
the various phases of battles, but this would not have been possible in reality. 
Firstly, 3 (BR) Division was eventually reallocated back to the British corps as 
its own reserve after it was recognised that it would have difficulty in 
undertaking an effective joint operation with Panzer divisions because of the lack 
of interoperability. Also, 11 panzergrenadier could not be earmarked as a 
reserve because of its duty to cover the deployment of 1 (NL) Corps in addition 
to tasks in its own corps area. As a result, the in-theatre army group reserve in 
42 Interview Famdale on 21 June 1993. , 
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fact consisted of two divisions, 3 and 7 Panzer.43 Secondly, retaining the option 
to use the 1 (NL) Division (which was a reinforcement for 1 (NL) Corps) as a 
reserve would have been very difficult, because it would probably have to be 
used to bolster its own corps defence due to the lack of the corps' readiness. 
Thirdly, although there were indeed many positive indicators which directed one 
towards the view that 3 (US) Corps would be available in time and quickly 
deployed to the battle position, the decision for dispatching the corps was an 
entirely political one which might not have materialised. In fact, there was no 
guarantee of its availability. Also, regardless of how well-trained they were, 
arriving from the US and marching up to the assembly area, and then waiting to 
be committed to a major counter offensive, was not feasible, since they would 
have been a prime target for WP air and other attacks. In short, the total number 
of reserve divisions F arndale would be able to have, even under a favourable 
estimate, were four divisions (two Panzer divisions plus about two US armoured 
divisions from 3 (US) Corps), not eight (3 division of 3 (US) Corps, three 
German, one British and one Dutch divisions). Furthermore, NORTHAG could 
not be sure about the definite availability of the French reinforcements. 
The next concern was logistics and the other penalties NOR THAG had 
to pay if Famdale's idea was to be implemented. It is very difficult to imagine 
that NORTHAG could manage the traffic problems involved in moving those 
formations, especially if they became intermingled with refugees. Also, since 
NATO was still experiencing sustainability problems, which a best estimate still 
put as sufficient for less than 10 to 15 days of intensive fighting (despite some 
43 Interviews, Bagnall on 6 November 1993, Famdale on 21 June 1993, Kenny 
and Von Sandrart. 
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improvement), supporting such a grand-scale counter offensive would have been 
close to impossible. 44 
Also, the operation itself was too complicated to be executed as planned, 
despite both the time invested in improving NORTHAG's C3I and the repeated 
training. Particularly, expecting to maintain a steady flow of information and 
hoping to keep up the control of several different operational battles across great 
distances by various national elements would have been daunting and would 
have quickly outrun the command staffs physical and psychological ability to 
cope with the demand. It was true that interoperability was somewhat improved 
in terms of C2, etc., but the possible chaos created from such complex 
operations would, in essence, have limited the army group's ability to cope.45 
Meanwhile, Farndale did not consider the fact that Bagnall's plan was 
most viable under a standing start scenario, since the movement of a large 
counter offensive force would have been only plausible in a battlefield with low 
force density. If mobilisation was carried out both sides, even if it were not a full 
mobilisation, the force density in the front would have been significantly higher 
than in standing start, and this would have prevented the manoeuvre of a large 
mobile force. Indeed, F amdale was less concerned with the prospect of a 
surprise attack than Bagnall, thus planning to fight a different kind of war. In 
short, utilising the manoeuvre and operational spirit remained as crucial as ever, 
but applying Bagnall's original operational plan, even with modifications, would 
have been unwise. 
44 Interviews, Bagnall on 6 November 1993 and Brown. See more on 
sustainability in chapter 7.6. 
45 See more on interoperability in chapter 7.6. 
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Most of all, the additional resources which F amdale had hoped to receive 
could be used instead to bolster the covering and main defensive battles, which 
could prevent the enemy's penetration in the first place, instead of risking them in 
a counter offensive. This was especially true if there was enough warning, thus 
enabling NATO to have sufficient time to mobilise. Both Bagnall and Famdale 
agreed that a major counter offensive was a dangerous option, and it was to be 
used only as a last resort.46 In fact, as Bagnall pointed out, if the war came after 
some mobilisation and gradual political breakdown, there would be no need for 
this kind of planning. As Bagnall said in an interview: 'What's the point, if there 
were enough warning? [The Russians] would have tried it only if they thought 
they could catch us unprepared. ,47 Given the sheer strength of the WP, it was 
prudent to bolster forward defence rather than undertake a risky option. Thus, 
his cross-border counter offensive was a measure to counter the enemy surprise 
attack to buy time for NATO's mobilisation, as well as to cater for other 
aforementioned reasons, since his in-theatre reserve would not be sufficient to 
win the war but might be enough to keep it going without hasty nuclear use. In 
other words, his aim was to force a pause. Therefore, ifNORTHAG's ability to 
bolster forward defence had been substantially reinforced with the new resources 
to enforce a pause, there was no need to launch such a dangerous operation, the 
failure of which could cause severe ramifications to NATO's morale as it would 
expedite the defeat of its defence. The retention of such an ability, in addition to 
full mobilisation, could allow NATO to concentrate on stopping a war from 
starting by dissuasion, as the chance for a full-scale war with the WP would have 
significantly subsided. This was the original objective of the reforms. 
46 Interviews, Bagnall on 6 November 1993 and Famdale on 21 June 1993. 
47 Interview, Bagnall on 6 November 1993. 
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In Famdale's case, his argument was based on the fact that, with the 
allocation of more resources, it became possible to think about actually winning 
the war.48 Thus, he felt there was nothing wrong with exploring such an option 
if it could bring victory while securing some territorial gains. Moreover, neither 
idea posed a threat to the political objectives of the Alliance, because they 
provided the political leadership with a stronger hand to play against the WP. 
Meanwhile, they were militarily desirable options to consider as a part of an 
overall defence plan because the military had to have a means of maximising its 
capability to counter the WP operation. 49 
Although the counter offensive option, including a cross-border one, 
offered many benefits, a question has to be raised on why a last-resort operation 
should be planned ahead if one already had the ability to launch it without pre-
planning, the capability for which the new operational doctrine was designed to 
foster. In fact, Famdale pre-planned the cross-border operation to be an action 
which would have to be taken, rather than considering it as a possible option 
which could be launched if the operational situation dictated and favoured such 
an offensive action. Although he insisted, in an interview, that his idea was one 
of the options, there seems to have been a definite counter offensive plan 
according to interviews with other senior NORTHAG officers. 50 As mentioned, 
it was the capability to launch such an attack that was most important, not the 
plan. There was no doubt that Famdale's expansion significantly enhanced the 
army group's capability and confidence; nonetheless, he should have paid more 
48 Interviews Famdale on 21 June 1993 and Von Sandrart. , 
49 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993, Famdale on 21 June 1993 and Von 
Sandrart. 
50 Interview, Famdale on 19 May 1994. Also interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 
1993, Inge, Kenny and Von Sandrart. 
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attention to bolstering the existing defences. It was, in a way, becoming a 
deviation from this earlier aim. Winning the war was an irresistible motivation, 
but was this really as beneficial as it sounded?51 
In short, Farndale's concept was over-enthusiastic compared to Bagnall's 
in three major ways. One, its success depended on resources which were not 
dependable, and this was in a sense in direct opposition to Bagnall's idea which 
was to make the best use of what was already available in-theatre. Two, 
Farndale was preparing under the best possible circumstances, whereas Bagnall 
was planning for the worst, the evidence of which indicated Famdale's lack of 
comprehensive understanding of the origin and essence of Bagnall's concept. 
Three, Farndale underestimated the political repercussions of planning an overtly 
offensive operation, despite the fact that it was within the defensive framework, 
and so did not consider a possible political breakdown in the Alliance. 
Overall, it seems logical to conclude that Bagnall's idea was more 
realistic--he did not expect 3 (US) Corps to arrive in time, although he hoped to 
be able to use them (whenever they succeeded in arriving) in a decisive defensive 
battle if the army group counter offensive failed. In fact, he put his faith in the in-
theatre reserve operation. According to Bagnall, if such an operation failed, he 
would rather use 3 (US) Corps to consolidate his defences than expose it to an 
uncertain and dangerous mission, especially since he doubted whether 
circumstances, rather than plans, would enable it to be used as a complete 
corps. 52 In that sense, Bagnall was truer to his own concept in that forward 
defence was an operational necessity, not just rhetoric. In short, he believed that 
conventional improvement was needed to reinforce nuclear deterrence, not to 
51 See the next section for more. 
52 Interview, Bagnall on 6 November 1993. 
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embrace conventional deterrence. In fact, Landi Air Battle, and associated 
improvements, signalled that NORTHAG's defence was beginning to take on the 
character of conventional deterrence (see next section). 
Both Bagnall and F arndale approached an extremely difficult situation 
with the utmost enthusiasm and tried to find an alternative with a pragmatic 
managerial response based on intellectual rationalisation. Although Bagnall was 
critical of Farndale's views, he nevertheless stressed that he was glad that 
Farndale thought he could do what he wanted to do, and if everything happened 
as Farndale hoped, he might have achieved it. 53 Nonetheless, the essence of the 
expanded concept remained the same as before. Also, it showed a certain 
confidence and euphoria which had not existed previously and which had grown 
sufficiently in NORTHAG as a result of the reforms. Most of all, both Bagnall's 
and Farndale's ideas succeeded in reinforcing the operational logic of forward 
defence in one way or another. As will be discussed at the end of this chapter, 
after another digestion period and a review of Farndale's expanded concept by 
his successor, Kenny, in late 1987, the army group concept was redrafted and 
returned somewhat closer to Bagnall's original idea. 
6.2.5. THE REFORMS AND CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE 
As much as Bagnall's personality was the factor initiating the reforms, the 
expansion of the concept reflected Farndale's personality. Based on interviews, 
one could sum-up Farndale as a pragmatic and amiable person who showed 
immense mental and physical capacity for detailed planning and implementation 
of the affairs of the army group, including the reforms. Also he was described as 
53 Interview, Bagnall on 6 November 1993. 
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a person with the qualities of a good businessman--a professional soldier rather 
than a charismatic leader. 54 In fact, although he lacked Bagnall's flair, he 
certainly had the resilience, patience, and brilliance to implement the original 
reforms and expand them according to the changing situation in Europe. It was 
true that his expansion was easier at his time, but without his versatility and 
intellectual capacity, the expansion of the reforms, which in fact became a 
watershed in transforming the British and NORTHAG armies' concept of 
deterrence into a conventional one, would not have been possible. 
However, Famdale's stress on the conventional aspects of defence and 
deterrence was not entirely desirable, though it became a major catalyst in 
enhancing confidence in the Alliance. Also, since the new idea was presented and 
packaged as a plausible and attainable goal, as well as suiting the secret German 
ambition, there was no tangible opposition to his underlying ideas, despite Von 
Sandrart's warning to him that his calculations were untenable. 55 As a result, 
although Famdale was a faithful follower of Bagnall's reforms, his expanded 
concept unintentionally became a deviation from Bagnall's original ideas because 
it went too far. As mentioned, there was a certain lack of continuity in Famdale's 
ideas as he planned to fight under an ideal situation, not under the worst-case 
scenario upon which the original reforms were based. Indeed, some criticised his 
actions as having stemmed from his not fully comprehending Bagnall's ideas and 
thus letting them go too far. 56 Their criticism could be justified, especially 
concerning Famdale's shortcomings in comprehensive strategic thinking, if one 
54 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993, Dewar, Draper, Inge, Kenny and Von 
Sandrart. 
55 Interview, Von Sandrart. 
56 Interviews, Bagnall on 6 November 1993, Inge, Kenny and Von Sandrart. 
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could accept the argument that this originated from his background as a Gunner 
(artillery). Also, they noted that Farndale's absence at any of the TDC meetings 
was conspicuous. 57 
Nonetheless, this observation is too dismissive. Since an integral part of 
the new concept involved better utilisation of fire support, it is not too difficult 
to see that his contribution and experience as an artillery officer was invaluable 
and critical. Also, not only was his more approachable personality vital in 
convincing many people in Britain and the Alliance, but he also had legitimate 
reasons for exploring new options due to the changes in NORTHAG's capacity. 
The major difference between Bagnall's and Farndale's ideas, as 
mentioned, revolved around the different views concerning the definition of the 
term 'winning.' Bagnall (rightly so in his time) perceived the most dangerous 
threat to be a surprise attack, which required NORTHAG to force a pause in the 
advance of the WP, while F arndale considered retaining additional options to 
counter various contingencies. With the improvement of capabilities, he was 
actually planning to thoroughly defeat the WP during the first phase of war, and 
hoped that this victory could convince the WP not to enter the second phase--a 
nuclear confrontation. Therefore, Farndale's logic, which persuaded him to look 
for more convincing options, was suitable for this time. 
One major, and obvious, benefit of conventional deterrence is its capacity 
to further put aside the possible use of nuclear weapons to maintain deterrence. 
According to Mearsheimer, it was best enforced when the attacker wanted to 
avoid a long-drawn out war, while the defender was capable of inflicting severe 
casualties on the attacker. 58 This is conventional deterrence based on denial. As 
57 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993, Inge, Kenny and Von Sandrart. 
58 See Mearsheimer, 1983, p.203, pp.206-7 and p.210. 
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shown, no one in NOR THAG wanted this to happen, especially since it entailed 
a long conventional war; nor did they want to depend on nuclear early-use. So 
the new idea was more in line with Huntington's conventional retaliation idea, 
which was in fact conventional deterrence based on both denial and punishment. 
For NATO, punishment was traditionally to be carried out by nuclear forces, but 
if they were sure of achieving the same result with conventional forces alone in 
the early stage of a war, it is simple to postulate that they would have preferred 
this option. In fact, this seemed to have been the main rationale for exploring this 
new idea. In particular, it might have been a desirable option for the Germans as 
they could potentially reclaim at least some of their lost territories in the east. As 
a result, F arndale did want to acquire the capability of conventional deterrence 
implicitly with the improvement NORTHAG's conventional fighting power, and 
his thinking was somewhat similar to the mixture of Mearsheimer's and 
Huntington's ideas--secure capacity to deny the enemy while having the ability to 
destroy the enemy fighting power to retaliate and prevent it from being any 
further threat, during which punishment would be inflicted. 
However, even if the political barrier concerning NATO's offensive 
operation was somewhat lowered, Farndale's idea was too offensive to be 
acceptable to the Alliance, and it in fact put aside nuclear deterrence by stressing 
conventional defence too strongly, thus confirming the concerns of earlier 
critiques--having such a plan de facto was politically impossible to accept and 
capable of causing a possible split among Allies. Above all, it would have 
compromised the whole essence of NATO's nuclear deterrence. 59 It is doubtful 
whether the Germans would have supported the replacement of nuclear with 
59 Refer to the discussions in chapters 2, 3 and 5 for critiques. Also interviews, 
Bagnall on 6 November 1993, Carver, Chalupa, Inge, Kenny and Von Sandrart. 
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conventional deterrence. It was true that although the expansion of the ideas did 
not entail a full substitution, it nevertheless reflected the desirability of 
conventional deterrence in place of the nuclear one, making it the ultimate last 
resort. Yet this question could no longer be answered properly because of the 
end of the Cold War and the changing nature of the conflict in the post Cold 
War -era. In fact, no one I interviewed seemed to be able to answer the question 
of whether the Germans and the Alliance might have approved of conventional 
over nuclear deterrence; this is primarily due to the fact that the Berlin Wall 
came down before there could be any in-depth discussion of the idea. 
Nonetheless, the general opinion concerning this question was that while no one 
disapproved of highlighting the capability to enforce conventional deterrence, 
they believed nuclear deterrence must remain the underlying element of the 
Alliance because the conventional capability could never replace the ultimate 
deterrent power of nuclear weapons.60 Conventional forces alone could never 
have the same deterrent effect. 
Conventional deterrence based on conventional retaliation was not 
ultimately feasible. For the WP, the stakes were too high to let NATO both 
achieve a conventional victory and take the territories in the east. It would have 
been a major stimulus in pushing the WP to retaliate with nuclear weapons. The 
WP might have been able to accept defeat in battle, but not in war. For NATO, 
this would be a gamble which it could not afford to lose since the destruction of 
its counter retaliation force would mean an inevitable escalation to strategic 
nuclear exchange in the case of continued hostilities, as well as a loss of viable 
force to defend its territory under the circumstances. This prospect would 
60 Interviews, Bagnall on 6 November 1993, Farndale on 21 June 1993 and Von 
Sandrart. 
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outweigh any German desire for reunification, and the Alliance's hope to contain 
the next war with the WP conventionally would have precluded taking such a 
gamble in the first place. Therefore, the new concept was more viable in the 
sense that it offered a means to defend the original status quo and pose a counter 
threat against any further WP attack, but if the situation required an operation 
over the 1GB, as Bagnall and Von Sandrart said, it would have been taken out of 
operational need, and could not have been used to liberate cities in the east. 61 
In conclusion, Bagnall's thought, which pursued the bolstering of the 
existing defences with a more active defensive posture, would be a better and 
safer option because it would be a display of NATO's willingness to defend its 
own territory, not to threaten the other's. Such a misunderstanding could prove 
fatal, especially during a time of tension. Most of all, Bagnall's counter offensive 
idea would be both operationally and psychologically advantageous. It would 
not only be beneficial if depth could be extended forward--over the 1GB, but 
also, unlike a premeditated conventional retaliation pursuing a seizure of WP 
territory, which could trigger an escalation, a limited (both in temporal and 
spatial scope) cross-border operation against the enemy force followed by a 
withdrawal would not provoke a WP nuclear retaliation against this force. As 
Bagnall repeatedly stressed, he believed a war would not come if both sides were 
able to reach full mobilisation out of fear that a war could result in the end of 
both. Therefore, it was more important to guard against a surprise attack which 
could upset this delicate balance of prudence. In other words, his aim was to 
reinforce the traditional form of deterrence, which depended on both nuclear 
deterrence (as a means of punishment) and strong conventional defence (as a 
means of denial and punishment by destruction of the enemy). 
61 Interviews, Bagnall on 6 November 1993 and Von Sandrart. 
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6.3. THE DISSEMINATION OF THE REFORMS IN THE ALLIANCE 
6.3.1. THE VIEWS OF THE NETHERLANDS AND BELGIDM 
• The Netherlands 
Since the Dutch corps was located in the northern edge of NORTHAG, it was 
the least affected by the changes. The Dutch still felt that, because of their close 
geographic proximity to 1 German Corps, it was more important for them to 
emphasise cooperation with the latter. Thus, they were lukewarm towards the 
reforms in the early days because this change did not affect the way in which 
they approached the defence of their area. Also, they were not comfortable with 
the strong British confidence and assertiveness on the matter of the reforms. 62 
In effect, they were largely indifferent to the reforms because the only major 
consequence of accepting the changes was a remote possibility of having to 
provide 1 (NL) Division as NORTHAG reserve, which in fact they did not 
believe would happen.63 Also, they were sceptical of the feasibility of the 
operational concept even if it was implemented.64 Meanwhile, support provided 
by the British, such as communications assets, proved to be more beneficial. 
As Bagnall emphasised, they were more than content with the plan since 
they were expected to hold their own area and, as confirmed through various 
interviews, they were largely spectators of the reforms. Their participation in the 
debates was negligible, and their efforts to represent their opinion in the 
62 Interview, Stoetermeer. 
63 Interview, Stoetermeer. 
64 Interviews, Bagnall 5 on May 1993, Farndale on 21 June 1993, Kenny and 
Stoetermeer. 
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formulation of the reforms was minimal. 65 This was also the case when the 
reforms were expanded by Farndale. 
Yet, by the late 1980s, they came to strongly embrace the reforms as 
they became convinced of their necessity and the benefits of the new concept. 66 
In the end, when the army group SOP was redrafted, they did not display any 
hesitation in endorsing it in their corps. Since then, they have shown an active 
interest in participating in the joint planning of the army group affairs, and have 
been sending their officers to be trained with the British in the HCSC . 
• Belgium 
After accepting the new concept, the Belgians envisaged a more fluid battlefield. 
For that purpose, they reassigned the more capable Reconnaissance Brigade 
Group as the corps reserve for the counter attack instead of the less experienced 
forces which were supposed to be deployed after mobilisation. It was decided 
that they should be used as reinforcements for the MDA rather than as a counter 
attack force. 67 The latter would be ordered not to withdraw under any 
circumstances. The major counter offensive in the Belgian corps area, if there 
were to be one, was expected to be carried out by the army group. 68 
The Belgians did admit that they used to have readiness problems and 
would need more reserves.69 As a result, they wholeheartedly accepted the new 
65 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993, Farndale on 21 June 1993, Kenny and 
Stoetermeer. 
66 Interview, Bagnall on 5 May 1993. 
67 Interview, Briot. 
68 Interviews, Briot, Bagnall on 5 May 1993 and Farndale on 21 June 1993. 
69 Interview, Briot. 
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concept since they viewed it as actually making their job of defending the area 
easier and as a measure to correct some of the problems identified. After 
accepting the change, they became more confident at the prospect of the 
successful defence of their area. 70 
However, such a resistance-free embracing of the reforms had more to 
do with the Belgian corps' small size rather than its appreciation of the changes. 
Therefore, as indicated in interviews, it was neither in a position to influence the 
direction of the reforms, nor did it consider itself to have a sufficiently strong 
voice in the army group to force its own ideas. Most of all, due to lack of 
resources, the attempt to improve the corps' capacity remained only cosmetic. 
Hence, like the Dutch corps--but for a different reason--it remained a spectator 
and beneficiary of the changes and new resources created by the reforms. 71 
Yet, the Belgians showed their support by actively participating m 
various meetings and planning sessions in NORTHAG. I was told that support 
for the reforms and the new operational concept was particularly strong among 
middle-ranking officers who became strong followers of Bagnall's ideas. 72 
6.3.2. THE APPROVAL OF THE REFORMS BY THE ALLIANCE 
The reforms could not have continued without SHAPE approval even if they 
were endorsed by AFCENT. This remarkably smooth process within the alliance 
may be attributed to two factors. Firstly, General Rogers, who was SACEUR at 
70 Interviews, Briot, Bagnall on 5 May 1993, Farndale on 21 June 1993 and 
Kenny. 
71 Interviews, Briot, Bagnall on 5 May 1993, Farndale on 21 June 1993 and 
Kenny. 
72 Interviews, Briot, Bagnall on 5 May 1993 and Inge. 
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the time, was so consumed with the FOF A affair that he did not have time to 
give the reforms his lengthy personal consideration. Also, he was not terribly 
concerned with NORTHAG matters, and he in fact supported the army group in 
having a unified operational concept. Furthermore, NORTHAG's international 
staff successfully convinced SACEUR's staff to accept the changes. 73 
Secondly, the way in which Bagnall presented his reforms as a fait 
accompli left few loose ends to furnish the DPC, NATO's highest military 
decision-making body, with grounds for a dispute, and resulted in a quick review 
and approval by the DPC and its international staff. Also, it was accompanied by 
an intensive campaign by Bagnall's team. This involved numerous presentations 
and discussions of the ideas in various meetings, including the IDC with 
NORTHAG's international staff, as well as visits to every MoD and Staff 
College of the countries concerned. 74 
6.3.3 THE NEW GENERAL DEFENCE PLAN AND ATP-35 (Al: THE 
ALLIED LAND FORCE TACTICAL DOCTRINE 
The new GDP, which was adopted by the Bundeswehr and the Alliance in 1987, 
was written by Von Sandrart when he was the COS of the Bundeswehr. This 
was the document which fully supported Bagnall's ideas and also reflected Von 
Sandrart's effort to commit them to German and Alliance-wide application. 
Consequently, the 1987 GDP was based on a renewed emphasis on the 
manoeuvre approach at the operational level of war, and was essentially similar 
73 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993, Famdale on 21 June 1993 and Inge. 
74 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993, Famdale on 21 June 1993, Inge and 
Kenny. 
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to Bagnall's idea.75 He said in an interview that the process was smoother 
afterwards, as Germany and other allies (Belgian and Dutch) accepted the fact 
that some changes were indeed necessary. As a result, the 1987 version of the 
GDP was to act as an umbrella document for the introduction of the operational 
level to the Bundeswehr and the others.76 
The change in the Bundeswehr's view toward the operational level was 
well-illustrated in the Preface to the GDP, in which Von Sandrart wrote: 
An attack launched on a broad front and supported by a comprehensive 
operational idea cannot be countered in a predominately static manner 
and in national, comparatively narrow sectors.... The integrated 
command and control of land forces begins at the operational level of 
command; this is also where the interfaces between forces under national 
command and control are found. A successful integrated defense thus 
requires thinking and acting in accordance with uniform principles at the 
operational levels of command.... With this guideline operational 
princ*les have been laid down again in the German Army after a long 
time. 7 
The GDP recognised the combined nature of AFCENT and the army groups' 
defence under the joint land/air environment. It also recognised that winning the 
first operational battle was so important that risks would be taken in the areas 
which were not immediately threatened.78 It also wrote: 'If the WP launches an 
attack, its territory will not be a sanctuary. ,79 This was an implicit recognition of 
the fact that the NATO's response to the preemptive WP attack could include a 
counter offensive onto the territory of the WP by NATO ground forces. 
75 See Dannatt, op. cit., pp.13-4. Also interviews, Fischer and Von Sandrart. 
76 See the GDP, p.16., p.20 and p.3l, for the identification of the operational 
priorities of the Bundeswehr, AAFCE and army group under the new GDP. 
77 The GDP, pp.2-3. 
78 The GDP, p.ll and p.12. 
79 The GDP, p.9. 
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The issuing of the 1987 GDP signified that any previous debate and 
dispute between the Germans and British, which included issues over the 
creation of the operational reserve, was finally resolved; in it, the following was 
recognised: 'The creation of an operational reserve may restrict the freedom of 
action of subordinate levels of command. This is justified, if in this way an 
operational objective, such as the destruction of the first operational echelon in 
the area of the forward division, can be achieved. ,80 It also meant a joint SOP 
for the army group could be drawn up based on the GDP. 
The adoption of the GDP was preceded by the adoption of the new 
Allied Land Force Tactical Doctrine ATP-35 (A) in 1986. It originally appeared 
in 1976, and the revised version ATP-35(A) was published in 1984 (with another 
revised version in 1986). The 1984 version should be regarded as a completely 
new document. In particular, the 1986 version, which gradually placed more 
emphasis on the operational level so that the fundamentals of operational level 
war were outlined for the first time, was in response to the changes in 
NORTHAG and in the Alliance in general. Thus, the latter's aim was to ensure a 
'common understanding and approach' in combined arms operations at the 
brigade level and, above all, to promote the capability of the joint operation in a 
multi-national environment so as to achieve what it regarded as key tenets in all 
NATO operations--manoeuvre and the maintenance of initiative. Also, both the 
coordination of the fire plan in defence by all elements of NATO forces--
including the air force--in both defensive and offensive actions, and the use of 
mobility in such operations, were emphasised as a result. 81 
80 The GDP, p.17. 
81 See Bellamy, 1987, pp.125-8. 
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Its primary concern, therefore, was the higher tactical level with an 
extension to an operational level so that all NATO forces 'apply the same 
doctrine in tactical operations,' so as to minimise the confusion which could be 
created by using a different language and operational terminology.82 Also, 
emphasis was placed on the interoperability and standardisation of NATO forces 
for the joint-combined operation.83 As a result, it provided the necessary 
operational language and procedures on which the subsequent SOP, agreed by 
the NORTHAG corps and the GDP, were based. Also, the BMD was written 
using the terminology provided by ATP-35. 84 Meanwhile, the Hdv series of the 
Bundeswehr tactical pamphlets were revised as well using the same approach. In 
the case of the 1987 version of Hdv 100/100, it became more operationally-
oriented. However, it was still considered a tactical document which was 
optimised for the division and lower operationallevel--the corps. 85 
Above all, the new GDP was an attempt to combine all the changes in 
concept in one coherent document which could be understood throughout the 
Alliance. It nevertheless stressed that the defence of Germany was the highest 
priority and that defence should therefore begin as far east as possible.86 In 
reality, however, it officially acknowledged that the army group would use 
whatever approach was necessary to support its operations to secure the victory 
in the first battle, which in fact catered for the operation over the 1GB. 
82 See ATP-35 (A), Foreword, p.xxiii, for quotes in this paragraph. 
83 See Bellamy, 1987, p.127. 
84 Interview, Smith. 
85 Interviews, Von Sandrart and Fischer. 
86 McInnes, 1990, p.140. 
285 
6.3.4. THE FINAL SETTLEMENT 
The adoption of the new GDP and the army group SOP marked the end of the 
long drawn-out debates. Also, Farndale's concept was eventually scaled down to 
something close to Bagnall's original idea (an option for one, or at most, two 
counter offensives) because of the aforementioned operational difficulties, as 
well as changes in the situation, particularly the greater chance of the rapid 
introduction of the external reserves to the battle. As a result, his successors 
opted to reconsolidate the army group's defensive posture by re-tasking a large 
portion of forces, which were designated as the in-theatre reserve, to bolster 
their corps defences. In fact, by the time Kenny became COMNORTHAG, in-
theatre army group reserves were to be made up only of 3 and 7 Panzer, and 
other possible candidates had reverted to respective corps to bolster their 
defences. Even those two divisions were not to be risked prematurely in a major 
counter offensive unless it was absolutely essential. 87 
This development was not an effort either to return to Bagnall's original 
concept or to discredit Farndale's vision. Once the situation had improved, there 
was no real need to choose a risky option. This was particularly the case after 
changes in Soviet operational thinking, which shifted more towards the defensive 
after the advent of Gorbachev. Although influenced by changes in the political 
scene, changes in the western military, which reoriented itself toward more 
offensive concepts, convinced the Soviets that they would not achieve a quick 
victory against NATO.88 Hence, there was no longer a pressing need to plan a 
87 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993, Kenny and Inge. 
88 See McInnes, 1990, p.108; and Flanagan, 1988, pp.121-4. Also see Niklas-
Carter, op. cit., in Harris and Toase, op. cit., pp.206-7, for the possible motives 
behind its planned unilateral force reduction; and see John Lewis Gaddis, 
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series of major counter offensives as strong forward defence was more feasible· 
, 
thus, the remaining need to counter a surprise attack also diminished 
somewhat. 89 This was based on the assumption that the availability of new 
assets and the ability to fight more effectively meant that the chances of 
maintaining the original status quo were significantly enlarged. 
Ultimately, counter offensive was to be the primary responsibility of 3 
(US) Corps and other forces which could be allocated by CINCENT or 
SACEUR; this remained unchanged when Inge replaced Kenny in 1989 and until 
the fall of the Berlin Wall. 90 In this sense, the reforms ultimately succeeded in 
bolstering forward defence, as it had been insisted upon by the Germans. 
Under the final version, all the operational imperatives, Landi Air Battle, 
FOF A, and counter offensive, came under one operational plan to be managed 
by COl\1NORTHAG. His highest priorities were then: 1) to attack the enemy 
force and his main supporting bases; 2) to make the attacker feel the burden of 
aggression on his own territory with a counter offensive (although the mission 
for the restoration of the territory was to be ended at the 1GB); and 3) as soon as 
possible, to return to the negotiating table to establish the 'status quo ante. ,91 
Most of all, the possibility of an operation over the 1GB was formally 
acknowledged as a distinct one once the political barrier came down after the 
WP initial attack. 92 
"International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War," IS, (Winter 
1992-3), passim, for a discussion of the causes of the fall of the WP and Soviet 
Union. 
89 Interviews, Bagnall on 6 November 1993, Inge and Kenny. 
90 Interviews, Inge and Kenny. 
91 Von Sandrart's speech as CINCENT in 1989. 
92 Von Sandrart's speech as CINCENT in 1989. 
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6.4. CONCLUSION 
This chapter's most significant finding involves the development of the reforms 
and concept of operation into distinctively offensive ones, which in fact helped 
achieve a capability for conventional deterrence by making the threat of nuclear 
retaliation the ultimate last resort. Delaying nuclear use was welcomed; 
however, substituting for it could have created major strategic repercussions 
which could even prompt the WP's own nuclear use either to compensate for its 
lack of conventional success or out of fear that it could lose a war. Above all, 
regardless of NATO's conventional might, it could never really replace the 
deterrent effect of nuclear weapons. Having done so would also entail raising a 
question over the origins of NATO's foundation as a defensive alliance. 
Retaining sufficient capability, even an offensive one, was a desirable option if 
NATO were to display its ability to maintain the status quo, but having an 
outright offensive capability which could enable it to achieve a territorial gain 
could have been a destablising factor. There was nothing wrong with military 
planning on defensive measures to maximise its operational efficacy without 
abiding by political restrictions, but it was not wise to dictate or influence the 
changes in the political aims. There had to be a careful balance among the 
general desirability, political and strategic reality, and operational feasibility. 
Yet Farndale's expansion, and the ensuing search to obtain a 
conventional capability with which to make nuclear retaliation the ultimate last 
option, reflected the fact that NORTAHG came close to achieving the kind of 
capability which the reforms were seeking to introduce. Also, Farndale could not 
be blamed for his boldness since exploration of new options to reinforce NATO's 
deterrence in a different environment was only natural; this was the founding 
spirit of Bagnall's earlier efforts since the state of NORTHAG's defence in the 
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beginning of the reforms required extreme measures to change it. And Famdale's 
action should be seen in the same vein, in that the consideration of such an 
extreme action option made 'a sleeping bear listen' and succeeded in fostering 
more active debates on how to strengthen deterrence. In fact, both CPX-83 and 
REFORGER 87 should be considered as occasions which changed the Alliance's 
perception of the benefits of executing the militarily desirable option without 
conforming to the political restrictions once war got underway. Otherwise, the 
exercises, and particularly REFORGER 87, could not have taken place. In fact, 
it was an acknowledgement that as long as territorial gain was not contemplated, 
more offence-oriented defensive planning could be acceptable for the Alliance. 
Above all, it must be noted that the ultimate objective of the reforms was 
not to foster the capability to launch offensive operations, and nor was counter 
offensive a panacea--the aim was to reinforce the defensive capability of the 
army group. Evidence showed that, whenever an opportunity arose, 
COMNORTHAG endeavoured to fortify forward defence rather than strengthen 
his counter offensive capability because it would reinforce the ability of NATO 
to maintain deterrence. Bagnall certainly tried to do so; this was especially the 
case with Kenny and Inge. 
In short, regardless of the rhetoric and the attainment of the necessary 
capability, it was eventually agreed, by the time Farndale left his post, that it 
would not have been wise to delay the use, or the threat of use, of nuclear 
weapons too long if NATO wanted to maintain deterrence and secure a quick 
cessation of the conflict in the case of war. This was the basis for NORTHAG 
returning to embrace a more traditional form of defence, but with more flair and 
confidence. 
CHAPTER 7 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REFORMS 
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7.1. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the process of implementing the 
reforms, which includes a comprehensive discussion on the overall aspects, from 
C31, weapon systems, training, and education to resource management. 
Firstly, I argue that the British Army's and RAF's efforts to implement 
the reforms were largely successful, and achieved an overall improvement of 
their ability to conduct the kind of operation envisaged. In fact, the application 
of the operational thinking in the implementation of the reforms was manifested 
in the securing of an array of combat multipliers for the theatre-wide operation. 
My second main argument is that, while there were numerous successes, 
the shortfalls in financial support from the government, especially after 
abandoning the LTDP commitment in 1985, prevented the military from fully 
implementing the reforms as they had hoped to. Despite the number of changes 
made in acquiring new weapon systems and creating new formations, the British 
Army and RAF continuously suffered from shortages in sustainability, and in 
fact, the stockpile of spares, etc., was critically threatened by the government 
squeeze in financial support. 
Finally, I argue that because of the shortcomings of resources and the 
reduction of financial support from the government since 1986, if the army 
group was forced into a war with the WP at the time, it would have exhausted 
its conventional combat power rather earlier than expected, not because of any 
concept or posture faults, but due to the lack of sustainability. 
Although this chapter attempts to discuss the changes of NOR THAG as 
a whole, it is more concerned with the changes in the British corps, as the 
conditions of other corps in NORTHAG were briefly discussed in chapter 2 and 
6 and it was in the British corps that the reforms created the most changes. 
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7.2. COMMAND AND CONTROL 
7.2.1. C3I (COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATION AND 
INTELLIGENCE) 
The success of the kind of operation envisaged would have critically depended 
on the reliability and responsiveness of the C3I network in NORTHAG. It was 
recognised that the system should be fully automated and distributed and 
electronic warfare (EW) resistant. Furthermore, it had to ensure flexible 
command and movement and, above all, provide secure communication links, 
which was the most important factor in the achievement of the above 
requirements. 
Previously, there were three areas of weakness in C3I which part of the 
reforms was aimed at improving. Firstly, while the C3I interface and network 
were good at the corps level, C3I in the army group and interface with corps 
was not effective enough to conduct the army group battle. Also, a problem 
remained in the interface with the AT AF. The major factor underlying this was 
that each corps maintained separate C3I assets without integration at the army 
group level. Thus, the focus was on the provision of a joint C3I system which 
integrated target acquisition, surveillance, and C2 systems at the army group 
level in particular as a shared facility rather than each corps maintaining different 
systems for their own use. Also, the army group C3I facilities would be manned 
by the international staff to facilitate regular liaisons between the army group and 
corps. 1 Above all, this was designed to avoid duplication of systems and effort 
1 See Bagnall, op. cit., in Boyd-Carpenter, op. cit., p.156. Interviews, Bagnall 
on 5 May 1993 and Farndale on 21 June 1993. 
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and enable the effective distribution of information at the army group level for 
the conduct of an operational battle. 
The problem with the AT AF was due to the fact that the air force HQ 
was bound to be tied up with the airfields while the army HQ was maintained 
forward in mobile facilities. 2 Bagnall and F amdale stressed in interviews that this 
problem was solved by maintaining an improved communication system, and 
maintenance and exchange of staff (which always accompanied each commander 
for liaison and immediate battle planning) between the two.3 Also, as mentioned, 
the interoperability problem was solved after the British supplied other corps 
with an interface package. 
Secondly, the survivability of the corps and army group C3I remained 
precarious. Both Bagnall and Farndale recognised that the C2 of the army group 
battle had to be conducted near the battle area in mobile HQs in order for it to 
be effective and to maintain the necessary responsiveness to conduct mobile 
battle.4 Famdale stressed that he was able to move around quickly without 
detection in either a land-based mobile HQ which consisted of four to five 
vehicles (Land Rovers or APC), or a specialised Lynx-based command 
helicopter flying NOE (Nap-of-Earth) under ten feet from the ground. 5 This 
allowed the commander to continuously monitor the battle from both land and 
air, and thus, he was never out of touch with the progress of the battle. 6 
2 Bagnall, 1984, p.60. 
3 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993 and Famdale on 21 June 1993. 
4 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993 and Famdale on 21 June 1993. Also see 
McInnes, 1988, pp.388-9. 
5 Interview Famdale on 21 June 1993. Also see Famdale, 1988--B, p.18. , 
6 Interview, Dewar. 
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Thirdly, the vulnerability of C31 systems to both WP electronic counter-
measures (ECM) and break -down (both from problems in the systems and 
human errors) was a major concern, despite the fact that most of the modern 
technological enhancements were focused on improving them.7 The main 
problem was the over-burdening of C3 I staff and the choking of the system with 
an overflow of information.8 It was hoped the new C3 I system would reduce 
manpower by providing a technological solution--unfortunately, high technology 
systems required skilled manpower for their effective operation and this could, in 
turn, increase the size of HQ. 9 
The main focus of the C31 system improvement was on the deployment 
of an integrated and automated C3 I system throughout the corps with the 
interface, and especially target-acquisition and intelligence-gathering systems, 
optimised at the army group level. The centre of the communication network 
was the Ptarmigan trunk communication system, which was a second generation 
voice and data battlefield communication system designed 'to meet the needs of 
mobile warfare.' This provided both voice traffic and associated data links to the 
Wavell ADP (Automatic Data Processing) system, teleprinter, facsimile, and 
even pulse video signals. 10 The system was similar to a civilian cellular phone 
system and provided communication links to all the communication assets 
7 See Bellamy, 1987, pp.239-40. 
8 See Bagnall, op. cit., in Boyd-Carpenter, op. cit., p.155. 
9 See Rice and Sammes, op. cit., p.241. 
10 Jane's Military Communications, (Surrey: Jane's Publishing Co., 1988), p.737. 
Also see Gander, op. cit., p.57. 
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deployed in the corps and army group down to the unit level. 11 It was 
commented that Ptarmigan was very effective in real-time as it allowed greater 
flexibility and faster movement of troops throughout the chain of command 
down to unit level. 12 
Also, enhancing the responsIveness of C3 I, which was to be 
complemented by the deployment of the ADP system to ease the commander's 
decision-making process, was high on the agenda. 13 The highlight of the system 
was Wavell. The system fielded in NORTHAG was the Stage II system, which 
was deployed in 1985, using the Ptarmigan network to provide the ADP system 
to assist commanders and their staffs with the conduct of general operations and 
intelligence work throughout the army group, corps, and down to brigade 
level. 14 It was designed to optimise situation assessment and resource allocation 
based on a better visual picture of the overall situation. 15 It could also act as a 
data sorting and storage bank that could be consulted at will, 'providing the 
information that commanders need, when they need it, and in a manner that all 
levels can assimilate and understand.' 16 
Intelligence and target acquisition were the responsibility of both the 
army group and AFCENT. At the AFCENT level, J-STARS was the main target 
11 See David Miller and Christopher F. Foss, Modem Land Combat, (New 
York: Portland House, 1987), p.65. 
12 Interviews, Dewar and Mills. 
13 Interview, Famdale on 21 June 1993. 
14 Jane's Military Communications, 1989-90, (Surrey: Jane's Publishing Co., 
1989), pp.741-2. 
15 See Rice and Sammes, op. cit., p.242. 
16 . 61 Gander, op. CIt., p. . 
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acquisition system which could provide target and engagement information to 
the army group and corps through data down-link. Also, because the US had 
substantial intelligence assets, NORTHAG would be able to depend on its 
provision of intelligence as well. 1 7 NOR THAG maintained its own intelligence 
and target acquisition assets in the form of CASTOR (Corps Airborne Stand-Off 
Radar) either independently, or in a working relationship with J-STARS. It was 
based on Islander aircraft with MTI (Moving Target Indicator) radar housed in 
the nose.1 8 It was planned that CASTOR, which was operated by 2ATAF, 
would be used in short hop-on-and-off mode in order to increase survivability by 
reducing the exposure time in the air, and that it could distribute target 
information quickly without being dependent on the AFCENT. Also, 2AT AF 
would provide photo surveillance with its RF-4C, Jaguar and Tornado aircraft 
with photo reconnaissance equipment and other electronic and signal intelligence 
with EF -111 (although its primary role was escorting bombers by jamming the 
enemy AD). 19 
On the ground, intelligence gathering still depended on traditional 
methods such as Long-Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) and Human 
Intelligence (HUMINT) , but they were to be supplemented by Phoenix RPV 
(Remotely Piloted Vehicle) for round-the-clock surveillance and target 
acquisition.20 It was equipped with a navigation package and thermal imager 
which was designed for the enhancement of artillery target acquisition, and thus 
17 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993 and Farndale on 21 June 1993. 
18 See JDW, (27 April 1991), p.701. 
19 See Price, op. cit., chapters 10 and 12 for more. 
20 Interviews, Fischer and Mills. 
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would be vital for the accuracy of the army group's MLRS attack. 21 Phoenix 
also had a data link with other C2 and ADP systems for information to be 
instantaneously available for timely use. 
F or example, the information gathered by Phoenix would be delivered to 
the army group and corps ADP (Wavell) system through Ptarmigan so that it 
could become available to the commanders and help them make a decision for 
attack. Attack information would be delivered directly to the BATES system for 
immediate artillery fire. BATES was in turn linked with all levels, from forward 
observers and individual fire units up to divisional and corps artillery HQs, 
providing information including tactical and technical fire control (both 
conventional and nuclear), ammunition and fire-unit status, fire planning, artillery 
target intelligence, calculation, and distribution of meteorological data, target 
records, reports and returns. 22 
7.2.2. DIRECTIVE CONTROL (AUFTRAGSTAKTIK) 
With these technological gadgets and advances enhancing the C2 of its 
operation, the most important changes in the NORTHAG C3I involved the 
human factor. As mentioned, the rigidity of command and its set-piece 
methodical mentality were the most well-known and often-criticised element in 
the British Army's tradition.23 This required a change in culture for it to execute 
the kind of mobile operation it envisaged. Thus, the Army had to re-educate its 
21 See Mark Hewish, "British Army Equipment Programs," ID&, (June 1984), 
p.75 1. 
22 See Hewish, 1984, (June 1984), p.745. 
23 Interviews, Chalupa, Von Sandrart, Fischer, Kunzendorf, Gilchrist and 
Carver. 
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officers in Auftragstaktik (directive control), and introduce it at the army group 
level. Above all, this was essential if NORTHAG was to conduct a mobile 
operation, because it could provide the necessary flexibility of command and 
responsiveness in a fast moving battlefield. 24 
Specifically, this was crucial in the modem battlefield where the C2 
would be severely jammed and chaotic.25 It was essential to tum such a 
treacherous battle to advantage by allowing instantaneous response to the 
developing situation within the local commander's authority and within the 
operational level objectives.26 This required adopting an SOP which could be 
understood at alllevels.27 
What NORTHAG sought were information processes of superior speed 
which would 'permit breaking into the opponent's command and control process, 
interfering with his decision cycle, seizing the initiative and forcing the enemy to 
react.'28 The fundamentals of NORTHAG's Auftragstaktik were explained by 
Colonel Van Vels of the Dutch Army as follows 
The concept is Mission- and Commander-oriented ... This also provides a 
'linking-pin' structure: any Commander knows the mission of his superior 
commander, his own mission, and the missions he has given himself to his 
subordinate commanders; when any Commander acts completely .... 
subordinated to the mission given to him and understands its contribution 
24 See more in Simpkin, 1985, pp.230-2; Martin Van Creveld, Command in 
War, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), passim; and Frank Kitson, 
Directing Operations, (London: Faber and Faber, 1989), pp.38-40. 
25 J.M.F.C. Hall, "The Role and Position of the Commander in Today's 
Battlefield," in Mackenzie and Holden Reid, 1989, pp. 48-9. 
26 See Van Creveld, op. cit., p. 198. 
27 See Simpkin, 1985, p.206. Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993 and Von 
Sandrart. 
28 Von Sandrart, op. cit., in Boyd-Carpenter, op. cit., p.148. 
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to the superior's mission, he will be able to make decisions on his own 
whenever he thinks the need arises in the developing situation. This 
concept could provide responsiveness and flexibility; but only, when the 
whole generation of commanders understands it. 29 
Also, it would demand less information processing, central planning and 
intervention, which would quicken each phase of the operation.30 NORTHAG's 
Auftragstaktik was to resemble what the Germans practised during W orId War 
Two as it was the type of operation that was aimed at what the Germans had 
achieved before.31 
However, re-educating British officers and soldiers throughout the ranks 
in Auftragstaktik was a slow process due to the influence of tradition. The 
adoption of the B:MD and establishment of HCSC were in fact aimed at 
promoting, as well as re-educating the British and other national armies' officers 
in, such a command style.32 Nevertheless, British officers in particular are still 
criticised for being rigid--especially at the lower level. 
29 R. Van Vels, The Modern Operational Level Commander and His HQ, 
(HCSC 6, TDRC 10481, 1993), p.12. 
30 See Van Creveld, op. cit., pp.249-51. 
31 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993 and Von Sandrart. Also see Simpkin, 
1985, p.229. 
32 See chapter 7.5. 
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7.3. FIRE SUPPORT 
The NOR TRAG fire support concept under the army group operation was based 
on the same operational principles of economy and concentration of forces, 
under which its artillery assets could become a manoeuvre multiplier under the 
combined arms operation. This was a paramount aim due to NOR THAG's 
limited firepower and artillery assets. Although having a doctrine (including a 
firepower doctrine) was viewed as suspicious in the British Army, it nevertheless 
veered towards adopting one)3 Its purpose was to achieve flexibility in fire 
support, and it was to be used with imagination and responsiveness so as to 
break the enemy's momentum of attack while disrupting his coordinated 
introduction to the battle both in the defensive and counter offensive. 
Furthermore, it was to be used aggressively, very close to the attacking force, 
despite the inevitability of friendly casualties. 34 
The principles of fire support in the British Army were as follows: 1) 
flexibility and concentration of force; 2) surprise; 3) offensive action; 4 ) 
cooperation; 5) economy of effort; and, 6) logistics.35 The application of the 
operational concept and manoeuvre principle in fire support would depend on 
concentrating 'fires and forces at decisive points to destroy enemy elements 
when the opportunity presents itself and when it fits our larger purposes. ,36 
33 See Shelford Bidwell, "Indirect Fire Artillery as a Battle-Winner/Loser," in 
Barnett, Bidwell, Bond, Harding and Terraine, op. cit., p.138. 
34 Interview, Famdale on 21 June 1993. 
35 M.J. Tomlinson, "Handling Artillery within the Corps," BAR, (December 
1983), p.7. 
36 J.M. Lance, "Artillery and Maneuver Warfare Can Mix," Proceedings, 
(November 1990), p.78. 
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Artillery would have to be ready at all times to provide simultaneous and 
successive fire support, and the increased range of modem artillery and 
automated C2 would make it possible to switch extremely heavy concentrations 
of fire from target to target in-depth. Thus, it would be essential to begin the 
artillery battle at long range, attacking the first echelon forces with 'maximum 
impact as they close on our main defensive areas, yet at the same time attacking 
his follow-on forces and his concentration of artillery' to create a window of 
opportunity for a counter offensive. 3 7 Such a simultaneous application of 
firepower would facilitate early attrition, and doing so by rapidly shifting the 
concentration of firepower to address various targets in depth would further 
increase the rate of attrition and secure more surprise.38 Under this situation, 
fire support required: 1) speed of response; 2) accuracy; 3) increased weight of 
fire; and 4) target acquisition in every phase of the artillery battle. 39 
NORTHAG's fire support missions therefore consisted of: 1) close-range 
battle; 2) long range battle against enemy artillery, follow-on echelons and other 
targets; 3) air defence; and 4) the nuclear phase.40 For the first two, the focus 
was put on two areas: firstly, on the deployment of new C2 systems which 
consisted of BATES and Phoenix RPV with associated C3I equipment, and 
secondly, on the replacement of older weapons with new ones, as well as on the 
full-scale deployment ofMLRS. 
37 See Martin Famdale, "Field Artillery for the British Army in the Next Two 
Decades," AQ&DJ, (July 1989), p.272.(1989--A). Also see Peter Williams, 
"Artillery against Massed Attack," NSN, (November-December 1984), p.74. 
38 Interview, Smith. Also see, Smith, TDRC 10269. pp.6-7. 
39 Williams, op. cit., pp.71-2. 
40 mI· . 7 To Inson, op. CIt., p .. 
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It was crucial for the British Army to be able to deliver more weight of 
firepower to a longer range with more speed without an increase in manpower, if 
it wanted to support simultaneous close-in and deep battle (counter offensive 
and FOF A), especially as the number of artillery systems available in the British 
corps was small compared to that of the German and US corps. It was planned 
that all the older artillery systems (Abbot 105 mm SP (Self-Propelled), and 105 
mm towed artillery pieces) would be replaced with modem SP weapons (AS 90) 
by the early 1990s to complement older 155 mm M109s. It was projected that 
this alone would increase 'the throw weight' by 60 per cent. Also, it was planned 
that the British Army alone would acquire 72 MLRS launchers with AT ACMS 
by the same time.41 
However, even these measures lacked firepower compared to those of 
the US Army and Bundeswehr. This was why it became imperative for the 
British Army to exploit operational principles because only they could 
compensate for such a weakness with greater organisational and managerial 
tlexibility.42 One of the biggest problems, as Bagnall and Famdale admitted, was 
the small number of artillery assets despite the provisions mentioned in the above 
paragraph.43 However, the deployment of new C3I and ADP systems 
significantly improved the army group fire support capability. 
Nonetheless, the lack of assets made it difficult to maintain control under 
the army group. For example, because of such a lack of overall assets, Bagnall 
insisted that both FOF A and fire support for the counter offensive should be 
41 Famdale, 1989--A, pp.271-2. 
42 See Bailey, op. cit., p.311. 
43 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993 and Famdale on 21 June 1993. 
302 
performed at the army group level. 44 Meanwhile, it was equally strongly 
suggested that ground-based FOF A should be carried out by corps, while 
COMNORTHAG would conduct his FOFA with ATAF.45 As discussed, the 
latter was ultimately agreed upon, while the support for the counter offensive 
was to be done by a combination of integral assets within the force, corps 
MLRS, and long-range and ATAF support under the army group direction. 
Because of the requirements necessary to support the counter offensive, 
there remained a number of problems. Firstly, most of the aforementioned new 
systems were not available at the time, and counter offensive would thus suffer 
from low mobility of artillery support. Secondly, there were limits to the 
application of the operational principles to enhance fire support, which was 
lacking in numbers. Thirdly, because of this lack in numbers, as well as the burst 
weight of fire the artillery could deliver, it would be difficult to provide the 
necessary support during the whole phase of the counter offensive, which 
consisted of 1) area clearance; 2) area protection; 3) flank protection; 4) 
suppressive fire operations; and 5) long-range fire protection to prevent the 
follow-on forces from joining in. Furthermore, air defence, which was vital for 
protecting the counter force, remained insufficient. Although the decision to 
purchase Tracked Rapier in 1983 helped to relieve some of the pressure, the 
British Army did not have AAA systems to complement the missile systems. 46 
44 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993, Kenny and Von Sandrart. 
45 Interviews, Famdale on 21 June 1993, Kenny and Von Sandrart. 
46 See Hewish, 1984, p.746. 
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7.4. AIRMOBILITY AND ATTACK HELICOPTERS 
The formation of the airmobile force and airmobility operation (with the AlI 
operation as one of its components) was one of the most eagerly anticipated 
parts of the reforms. It was even said that: 'The helicopter is probably the most 
versatile addition to the battlefield since the advent of the internal combustion 
engine. ,47 Above all, it was believed that airmobility would be the most 
important asset within the army group which could substantially enhance the 
successful application of its concept of operation, both in defence and offence. 
The earlier British airmobility concept was similar to certain elements of 
the US AirLand Battle and the Bundeswehr's AlI operation concepts, a fact 
which was demonstrated during the 1983 'Wehrhadfte Lowen' exercise. 48 
Clearly, the British idea was heavily influenced by the US concept as the Army 
was repeatedly impressed by the US Army's ability to integrate airmobile and AlI 
operations with the land operation.49 However, due to the lack of resources, the 
British Army has not been able to develop its own airmobile force to the level 
the US Army has achieved--the acquisition of dedicated AHs, which has been 
the core of the British programme, has still not been completed as of 1994. 
The appeal of airmobility was multi-faceted. The greatest advantage was 
flexibility. For example, its mobility and responsiveness would allow a rapid 
transit of troops and equipment over a long-distance regardless of the ground 
47 M.A. Willcocks, "Airmobility and the Armoured Experience," in Mackenzie 
and Holden Reid, 1989, p.123. 
48 See Bellamy, 1985, pp.249-256. 
49 Interview, Farndale on 21 June 1993. 
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and terrain conditions. 50 This meant airmobility could fulfil a number of roles 
ranging from general transportation (ferrying) of troops to rapid reinforcement 
of the threatened areas, as well as other defensive and offensive applications. 51 
The attractions of AHs included the facts that they: 1) were cheaper than 
fixed-wing aircraft, and they could thus enable the Army to maintain its own 
assets; 2) meant greater survivability, since they could utilise NOE or other 
stealthy measures, which would allow for closer support for the land operation 
near the battle area; and 3) were readily available if placed under the command 
of ground forces, and would thus become quicker than fixed-wing CAS--which 
was under the command of the Air Force--in responding to a situation. 52 
Specifically, three defensive uses of airmobility were envisaged. Firstly, it 
was viewed as the most valuable asset for counter penetration. 53 Particularly, 
NORTHAG's airmobile brigade (24 Brigade) was considered as a manoeuvre 
arm which was capable even of countering the OMG or other sudden enemy 
penetrations. 54 It was to be deployed under stealth only in terrain suitable for an 
effective defensive operation, such as built-up areas and ground dominated by 
wooded features. 55 The force was to be equipped with extensive anti-armour 
50 Bagnall, 1988, p.76. 
51 See Oerding, op. cit., pp.3 2-3. 
52 Feesey, op. cit., in Mackenzie and Holden Reid, 1990, pp.167-9. 
53 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993, Farndale on 21 June 1993 and Jackson. 
Also see W.B. Stevens, "Can We Make Better Use of Attack Helicopters?" 
Mackenzie and Holden Reid, 1990, p.205; Mackenzie, op. cit., in Holden Reid 
and Dewar, op. cit., p.168. 
54 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993 and Dewar. 
55 Interview Farndale on 21 June 1993. Also see, Mackenzie, op. cit., 1n , 
Holden Reid and Dewar, op. cit., p.168. 
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weapons and dedicated firepower support from NORTHAG.56 It would also be 
used for the rapid reinforcement of areas under pressure, since its ultimate 
purpose was to harass the enemy's progress so as to break the momentum of his 
advance to cover for the deployment of the counter offensive force. 57 In other 
words, the airmobile force provided ideal assistance in the disruption and 
delaying of the enemy forces. 58 
Secondly, it--especially the AHs--was considered to be an excellent 
addition to shallow FOFA.59 It was envisaged that it could free the ATAF to 
conduct long-range FOF A. If the operation was conducted in conjunction with 
the corps MLRS, it gave the Army a major role in implementing NATO's FOFA 
operations by independently conducting an operation to isolate the enemy 
leading echelon. 60 
Finally, it was thought to be an invaluable counter-desanty asset.61 Other 
land-bound assets such as an armoured force would not have either the 
necessary mobility or responsiveness to counter the enemy airborne or airmobile 
operation deep inside NATO's territory. Also, such an operation would mean 
diverting important land assets which could limit the army group's ability to 
concentrate. 
56 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993 and Farndale on 21 June 1993. 
57 R.D. Grist, "Airmobile Forces in Central Europe," RUSIJ, (Spring 1988), 
p.44. 
58 Interview, Famdale on 21 June 1993. Price, op. cit., pp.115-7, for details on 
operations. 
59lnge, op. cit., p.13. 
60 Stevens, op. cit., in Mackenzie and Holden Reid, 1990, p.216. 
61 See Bagnall, 1988, p.76; Blackbird, "The Value of Their Mobility," BAR, 
(April 1980), p.ll. 
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It was also recognised that airmobility could have significant offensive 
applications. Firstly, protecting the counter offensive force's operation was 
essential. In particular, it could provide the flank protection of the force, which 
would require round-the-clock anti-tank protection. Thus, it could free the 
armour assets for more concentration.62 Secondly, it could be used as the army 
group's own desanty or deep-penetration which could be pre-deployed in order 
to be linked up with the counter offensive force, or create another front and 
force the enemy to divert his assets to counter it. 63 Thirdly, it could expedite the 
offensive operation by providing forward scout and breakthrough capability, or 
create a bridgehead for the army group by concentrating its firepower to enable 
the counter offensive force's quick insertion in the punctured enemy line. 64 
Nonetheless, there were a few visible limitations. Firstly, once landed, the 
force would no longer have the capability to conduct a mobile operation; it was 
therefore inevitable that it could only assume a positional role. Secondly, it 
required round-the-clock, or at least temporary, air superiority during 
deployment for surviva1. Especially, the AH operation would not be possible 
without air superiority.65 Thirdly, it required concentrated use as there would be 
the temptation to scatter the force for multiple missions, various contingencies of 
62 See Bagnall, 1988, p.76; and Mackenzie, op. cit., in Holden Reid and Dewar, 
op. cit., p.168. 
63 J.F. Rickett, "Employment of Non-Mechanised Infantry in 1 (BR) Corps," 
RUSIJ, Vo1.131, No.2, (June 1986), p.30. 
64 Interview, Farndale on 21 June 1993. Also see Bagnall, 1988, p.77; B.W. 
Barry and a Camberley Team, "Future Airmobile Forces," RUSIJ. (Au~mn 
1988), pp.34-38, for various offensive applications, including combmed 
offensive armour/airmobile operations. 
65 See Grist, op. cit., note 5 on p.48, for support of survivability of concentrated 
airmobile operations. 
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which were bound to arise during the battle.66 Finally, the casualty rate in the 
force could prove intolerable, especially after landing, as it would become 
primarily a light-infantry force engaging the enemy major armoured formation. 
Due to such problems, the debate surrounded the question of whether 
the airmobile, and especially the AH, force should be a corps or an army group 
asset. There was no disagreement on the operational significance of the force. As 
Bagnall stressed, their effective use would only be possible at the operational 
level because all the necessary support (e.g. pooling the transport assets, 
firepower, etc.) would only be effective at that level. Also, the enemy 
breakthrough, which could occur anywhere in the army group territory, required 
control at the operational level, while the high casualty rate could be justified in 
securing operational objectives.67 Meanwhile, the support for the corps handling 
of AHs stemmed from the fact that the joint AH-:MLRS operation for shallow 
FOFA was primarily the corps' responsibility, as it had control of :MLRS.68 It 
seemed to be more aligned with the US concept which gave more power to the 
corps operation, but like the previous debate (between those who thought FOF A 
as primarily a corps operation and Bagnall, who saw it to be an army group 
one), the difference here lay in the fact that the weakness of NORTHAG corps 
entailed an operation under the army group, whereas some saw that the corps 
should instead be able to maintain some control of each group of national assets. 
66 See Gander, op. cit., p.50. 
67 See Bagnall, 1988, pp.77-8; and Grist, op. cit., p.45. 
68 See Stevens, op. cit., in Mackenzie and Holden Reid, 1990, p.216. See more 
on the history of the development in Blackbird, op. cit., passim; Martin ~arndale, 
"The Use of Helicopters on the European Battlefield," AO&DJ, (Apnl 1989), 
paSSIm. 
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Also, as mentioned, there was an initial problem of rivalry with the RAF 
about the control and role of airmobility. Besides which, there was a certain 
sense of uneasiness in the Army, especially among those who considered that 
armour should continuously receive the bulk of the Army's funds rather than 
splitting them, as such a practice could squeeze the number of available systems 
for the land operation.69 Nonetheless, the co-location and C2 problems with the 
RAF were initially resolved as mentioned, while some feeling of discontent still 
remained among high-ranking officers over the control of transport 
helicopters.70 It seems that this problem at least continues to be a source of 
dispute between the Army and RAF even today, especially in terms of resource 
allocation between the two services; however, it is also true that neither party 
would take any action which would threaten the other's status quo in this matter, 
but would instead attempt to solve it through a pragmatic approach. 
Nevertheless, airmobility was to become one of the major elements of the 
reforms, and was eventually recognised as one of their most important results. In 
particular, the extensive use of airmobile forces supported by AHs in the counter 
penetration was receiving more attention. Above all, it was one of the most 
important operational assets directly under COMNORTHAG, which had true 
mobility and a quick reaction time to counter an operational penetration and 
other emergencies. A substantial amount of studies and attention were focused 
on the subject during the late 1980s, and even today, as well as receiving 
69 See Willcocks, op. cit., in Mackenzie and Holden Reid, 1989, p.121; 
Blackbird, op. cit., pp.5-6, on the difference in views between the Army and 
RAF. 
70 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993, Famdale on 21 June 1993 and Dewar. 
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widespread support in both the government and Parliament. 71 With the 
successful test of its Airmobile Division, which consisted of elements from all 
four national corps, in 1991, it ultimately became the major operational asset 
which assumed NORTHAG's reserve role. 72 
The shortcomings of its operational concept, as well as other problems, 
were generally resolved with the amalgamation of the Airmobile Division. It was 
recognised that the force should not be used either extensively or in a dispersed 
manner. 73 To ensure survivability during deployment, it would disperse before 
concentrating for landing or attack. 74 Also, NOE and other stealthy measures 
would be taken to ensure survival. 75 Concerning the high casualty rate expected 
during the battle, it was decided that whatever kind of consequences there were, 
they would be absorbed and massive casualties among soldiers would be 
anticipated. To justify this, the force would be used more offensively than in a 
purely counter penetration role. Furthermore, the use of AHs would be justified 
and rather beneficial in bringing significant results in their concentrated use; as 
an exercise in the late 1980s showed, a regiment of AH (48 TOW armed Lynx) 
was able to stop an enemy armoured division. As long as such a result could be 
gained, it was felt that the amount of the expected casualties was warranted. 76 
71 See bibliography for the list. Also see Hansard, Debate on Army, 1984, 
comment of Mr. Wiggins; and Willcocks, op. cit., in Mackenzie and Holden 
Reid, 1989, p.118. 
72 See "Airmobile Success," JDW, (May 25, 1991), p.862, for details. Also see, 
Grist, op. cit., passim; Barry, op. cit., passim, for details of the structure. 
73 See the GDP, p.19. 
74 Mackenzie, op. cit., in Holden Reid and Dewar, op. cit., p.169. 
75 Feesey, op. cit., in Mackenzie and Holden Reid, 1990, p.167. 
76 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993, Farndale on 21 June 1993 and Dewar. 
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7.5. EDUCATION AND TRAINING 
7.5.1. HIGHER COMMAND AND STAFF COURSE (HCSC) 
The main purpose of HCSC is to provide higher staff education and training for 
high-ranking officers (Colonels and Brigadiers) in the British Army and Allied 
Armies and Air Forces (including US officers), to promote interoperability 
among NATO forces by training them on an operational level using a common 
doctrinal basis, as well as training them in Auftragstaktik to provide a 
comprehensive education and training for the conduct of operational and theatre 
level war. It was intended from the outset of the course that education of 
officers from other Allied nations was crucial in order to enhance understanding 
of each others' thinking, share and introduce ideas of other armies and services, 
and secure better cooperation among the Allies in the future. 77 
Each course consists of about twenty participants from various arms and 
services of the military so as to enable the dissemination of operational level 
philosophy throughout the armed forces and enhance mutual understanding 
among officers in the course on activities of other branches and services.78 The 
aim is to provide a comprehensive implementation of the operational ideas in the 
military as a whole and streamline the requirements of preparing a war at the 
operational level by sharing expertise among them.79 It mirrors Bagnall's effort 
77 See Williams, op. cit., in Mackenzie and Holden Reid, 1990, pp.24-5. Also 
interviews, Smith and Bagnall on 6 November 1993. 
78 See HCSC--Programme for Course No.5 and TDRC 10361. 
79 Interviews, Bagnall on 6 November 1993, Inge, Kenny and Dewar. 
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to include representatives of different arms and services of the military and MoD 
in the TDC sessions. 
This essence is reflected in the composition of the course. A typical 
course is divided into nine segments which cover most areas related to the 
planning and conduct of the operational level of war: 1 ) Foundation Studies to 
provide operational level lessons by way of historical examination; 2) 
Operational Art to provide the theoretical background to studies of the 
operational level planning and conduct of war, which also includes broader 
studies of the security policies of the Alliance to promote understanding of the 
strategic and political framework within which operations may be conducted; 3) 
Air Power to enable understanding of the characteristics, capabilities and C3 of 
air power at the operational level; 4) Planning and Conduct of Campaign and 
Operations to give insights into those areas, especially C2 and leadership; 5) 
Technology and War to enhance knowledge into the role of technology in the 
various aspects of the conduct of operations; 6) Corps Operations to understand 
and apply the operational ideas, which include C3 of air power, etc., at the 
operational level; 7) Army Group Operations to provide the same understanding 
as Corps Operations at a higher operational level; 8) Staff Ride to promote 
better understanding of the operational level through studies of military history 
accompanied by visits to the places where major battles had been fought; and 9) 
Theatre War Game to give students a chance to make operational level decisions 
as the ultimate test of the lessons they have acquired throughout the course. 80 
During the course, students are exposed to studies of specific subjects 
and other areas which have relevance to such an education. These include 
lessons on using ADP and C3I systems; coordinating joint HQs; maritime 
80 See HCSC--Programme for Course No.5, Passim. 
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operations; Low Intensity Conflict (LIC); peacekeeping; and media--even TV 
interview techniques. The course is frequently supplemented by visits to force 
installations, talks with academics, specialists and higher commanders, and 
speeches by the former and present high level national and Alliance commanders. 
At the end of the course, each participant is to produce an extended essay 
concerning his special interest fields. 81 
HCSC is, in a way, a course of elite education which is intended to train 
those with the potential to become very senior officers and those who could 
readily be appointed as major field commanders. Thus, it does tend to 
concentrate on people who were previously favoured with major staff duties 
(particularly former G3 staff officers who were in charge of Operations) and the 
command of major arms. Thus, despite the fact that the course provides 
excellent training for people with the right background and career selection, it 
does not provide others with the proper chance of education which could lead 
them to major flagship appointments in the military. In fact, these selection 
criteria have been rigidly applied since the beginning of the first course, which 
usually relies on hand-picking candidates. As Bagnall stressed, it has not always 
been possible to find the best qualified people to send to the course due to the 
fact that many of them hold field and other commissions. 82 
In terms of efficiency, however, which stresses the thinking that only 
those with the right mindset and aptitude will be given a chance, the course does 
satisfy its objective very well. In fact, this somewhat resembles the traditional 
Wehrmacht selection of higher level commanders and, to a certain degree, it fits 
the somewhat radical ideas of Simpkin, whose suggestions specifically focused 
81 See HCSC--Programme for Course No.5, Passim. 
82 Interview, Bagnall on 4 May 1994. 
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on getting the best out of a small pool of people with the right mentality and 
qualifications. 83 
Nonetheless, HCSC epitomises Bagnall's wish to 'make a leap in thinking' 
and reflects that rare approach to the education of officers which he used 
frequently during TDC sessions. As mentioned, Bagnall created a sort of cult 
following among many different national participants of the IDC and the 
tradition is said to have continued in HCSC, both of which have been used for 
'Bagnallising' young officers. 84 Also, the works which have been completed by 
the officers who participated in the courses are being made into major sources of 
study of British modern military thinking as they, as indicated in the 
introduction, are being published through non-military publishers. 85 
Furthermore, the lessons and ethos of the HCSC has been adopted by other 
educational establishments and, for example, Army Staff College is now placing 
greater emphasis on teaching officers in operational level thinking. 86 
Meanwhile, Bagnall, Inge, and Von Sandrart have repeatedly stressed 
that it is up to the educational establishments, such as the HCSC, to provide 
people with the correct ideas of what operational thinking is all about--this must 
not allow people to interpret the operational level as giving carte blanche to act 
as freely as possible in battle, as if utilising operational art is about being 'gung-
ho. ,87 Most of all, the educational establishment should beware of carrying this 
spirit too far, as it entails recklessness rather than the prudence and freedom of 
83 See Simpkin, 1985, Part 4, passim. 
84 Interviews, Dewar and Inge. 
85 See bibliography for details. 
86 Interview, Bagnall on 4 May 1994. 
87 Interviews, Bagnall on 6 November 1993, Inge and Von Sandrart. 
314 
thought which the operational level thinking set out to sanction. Therefore, the 
HCSC was designed to be at the forefront of disseminating the right ideas of the 
spirit of the reforms and the operational level. 
7.5.2. TRAINING IN THE MODERN BATTLEFIELD 
The training for the new operational concept was based on three factors: 1) 
optimisation of the combined arms operation; 2) realism; and 3) maintenance of 
high morale through continuous drills and contests of skill.88 This spirit was 
applied quite early on in NORTHAG, when it began the 48-hour warning 
practice in 1983. As a result, the British Army and NORTHAG's ability and 
readiness to react quickly to a WP surprise attack have been substantially 
enhanced since then. Famdale said in an interview that he frequently prepared for 
the 48-hour warning scenario through exercises such as 'Quick Training' and 
'Active Edge,' which were held at least three to four times every year. During the 
exercises, the in-place force was expected to get ready at eight hours warning, 
the first four hours of which would be spent getting everyone ready in their 
barracks. Other preparations, from the deployment to the actual battle area and 
the outloading of ammunition which was stored in peacetime, to the laying of 
mines in the battle area and the demolition of bridges etc., were frequently 
practised. 89 
Previously, all-arms training was rarely done, mainly because of the lack 
of sufficient space--both in Britain and Germany--for the large-scale live-
ammunition firing which is associated with such training. A lot of practice, which 
88 Interview, Famdale on 21 June 1993. 
89 Interview Famdale on 21 June 1993. , 
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compensated for the lack of individual national training to a certain degree, was 
carried out during the numerous annual exercises planned in the Alliance; 
however, the problem of the lack of realistic training remained. British small 
arms and unit training was conducted on Salisbury Plain and Soltau, but those 
places were too small for a major exercise involving all-arms formations. 90 
Thus, the only place where the British Army was able to conduct such 
training was in BATUS (British Army Training Unit Suffield), which was located 
in Alberta, Canada.91 A whole battlegroup (2 armoured and 2 mechanised 
infantry squadrons; 2 batteries of artillery; logistics; engineering and AHs units, 
and all other associated elements) is sent there for a six-week-Iong live 
ammunition firing exercise. In fact, many of the weapons used during training 
were damaged and some troops shaken by its realistic nature. Nonetheless, as 
Farndale stressed, after undergoing tactical all-arms training in Canada, the 
annual autumn exercise in Germany and a six-month tour in Northern Ireland, 
the troops were largely confident and well-trained. 92 
90 R.A. Oliver, "Training for the Friction of War," in Mackenzie and Holden 
Reid, 1989, p.187. 
91 Oliver, op. cit., in Mackenzie and Holden Reid, 1989, p.187. 
92 Interview, Famdale on 21 June 1993. 
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7.6. RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
7.6.1. FINANCES 
Financing the reforms was one of the main difficulties expressed from the early 
days, and it remained so throughout their implementation. As mentioned, the 
1981 review was a positive catalyst for the reforms because it secured the steady 
introduction of the new weapon systems. Indeed, the review allowed for 
extensive re-equipment of the Army, and by the mid-1980s the government's 
growing financial support had resulted in substantial improvements in the Army's 
and RAF's capabilities. 93 
Nonetheless, the situation was not without problems, particularly after 
the British abandonment of the LTDP commitment in 1985. Although this did 
not immediately affect the Army's need for re-equipping and financing the 
necessary requirements for the reforms themselves, it was a major setback for its 
aspirations.94 Moreover, this move was accompanied by a gradual dwindling of 
the government's financial support from the 1986/87 budget year. By the 
1987/88 budget, the fall in defence spending, or a 'funding gap' between the 
requirements and available resources, was becoming more conspicuous.95 This 
was despite the modest increase of the budget as each year passed--after 
including the rate of inflation, this trend represented an actual decline in funding 
93 See House of Commons, Third Report from the Defence Committee Session 
1984-85, Vol., I., para. 68. 
94 Interviews, Bagnall on 6 November 1993 and F arndale on 19 May 1994. 
95 Greenwood, op. cit., in Byrd, 1991, p.40. See ibid., p.53, fig. 2.1. for the 
trends in the funding gap. Also see McInnes, 1988, pp.389-90, for the 
repercussIons. 
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which lasted until the end of the decade. In fact, during the period 1986 to 1989, 
the military suffered an overall 6 per cent budget reduction in real terms.96 By 
the time the Berlin Wall came down in 1989, an event which gave further 
impetus to the government's effort to realign the defence budget to the changing 
environment, the budget decline began to affect the military more widely. 97 
The amount of money required to deploy many of the systems was 
indeed enormous. For instance, Dan Smith argued that even the 3 per cent goal 
outlined by the government in the late 1970s was not sufficient to fund this~ he 
suggested that at least a 6 per cent increase would have to be implemented for 
the improvement of the conventional capabilities the government was 
planning.98 Nonetheless, Bagnall's and Farndale's relentless pursuit of the 
rational use of resources and efforts to get more capabilities for money enabled 
the implementation of the reforms with the 3 per cent real increase. As 
mentioned, the ethos of the reforms was to do more with less, and in fact this 
motto was reflected in the Army's endeavour to cut overheads by increasing the 
'teeth to tail ratio' by abandoning an in-place division in Germany and cutting HQ 
staffs by rationalising and automating C2 and C3I. 
However, the cuts in budget inevitably brought about a hard choice for 
the Army because it had no resources to finance both the purchase of new 
weapons and the increase of sustainability, readiness, and training. In fact, those 
were the areas which the Army was eventually forced to reduce rather than the 
weapon systems. Particularly, live firing and mobility exercises were beginning to 
96 See Greenwood, op. cit., in Murry and Vlotti, op. cit., p.284. 
97 See chapter 8.4. for more on the options-for-change. 
98 Dan Smith, The Defence of the Realm in the 1980s, (London: Croom Helm, 
1980), p.249. 
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be reduced by late 1987 to early 1988, the effects of the cuts being indicative of 
a dent in the army's budget because they were two of the most expensive parts of 
its peacetime expenditure.99 In fact, by this time, the Army had begun to suffer 
from a shortage of spare parts, stocks of ammunition and fuel. As a result, it was 
forced to restrict exercises in Germany, fearing they would seriously deplete the 
supply of the spares. 1 00 
This situation was quite similar to the problems during the late 1970s as 
it could not support proper training due to lack of money.1 01 Indeed, what 
happened at the time was exactly the situation which the Parliament defence 
committee and other academics had foreseen and warned against, expressing 
their concern that this was something more profound than a passing problem and 
could last well into the 1990s. 102 Essentially, they argued that the cuts in 
funding would lead to cancellation of equipment orders and seriously affect the 
readiness of the forces. In tum, this would inevitably cause the reconsideration 
and elimination of some military commitments in the future. 1 03 
99 Interview, Farndale on 21 June 1993. Also see, Greenwood, op. cit., in Byrd, 
1991, p.40; and McInnes, 1988, p.390. 
1 00 Interview, F arndale on 19 May 1994. 
101 See Greenwood, op. cit., in Byrd, 1991, p.42; and McInnes, 1988, p. 390. 
102 See House of Commons, Third Report from the Defence Committee 
Session 1984-85, Vol., I., para. 36 and 76; and see Vols., II and ill., passim, 
particularly for the numerous comments by Major General L.A.W. New and the 
general pessimism of the main witnesses concerning the possible impact of the 
dwindling resources on the military's commitments. Also see McInnes, 1988, 
p.390; and 1990, p.141. 
103 See House of Commons, Third Report from the Defence Committee 
Session 1984-85, Vol., I., para. 76 and 106. 
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For the Army, the most worrisome factor was that the lack of funding 
was about to take a major toll on its readiness and ability to execute the kind of 
operations envisaged, because they required a high degree of training in a real 
situation. Unless constant training and a high degree of readiness were 
maintained, the British and other Armies in NORTHAG would not have been 
able to undertake a complex operation such as counter stroke. In short, it was 
possible for the reformers to introduce the changes because the 3 per cent real 
increase in the budget secured the minimum necessary resources for the reforms, 
while the later cuts prevented them from becoming as extravagant as was 
envisaged by F amdale. In fact, the financial resources were just sufficient for the 
initial implementation of the reforms and allowed their extension to the level 
which Bagnall initially envisaged, but no further. 
7.6.2. LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 
The success of the envisaged operation depended critically upon the army 
group's capability to support the logistics requirement for the battle. Particularly, 
the amount of ammunition and fuel consumed in such a mobile combined-arms 
operation was much greater than in positional defence. As Smith estimated, a 
single division would consume some 4.500 tons of supplies each day in a mobile 
operation, not to mention the distance the force had to travel which significantly 
added to the logistics penalty. 1 04 
The overall logistic network and capability had been improved over the 
years. The pressure for speedy fuel distribution was significantly eased after the 
104 Rupert Smith, Manoeuvre Warfare--Divisional Operations, A lecture given 
at the Staff College, Camberley on 10 September 1990. 
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completion of CEPS (Central European Pipeline System). Field service and 
repair capability were also enhanced with the streamlining of the repair and 
support service structures. 1 05 Also, an initiative was launched in early 1982, 
aimed at improving the Army's logistics and supply capabilities. The programme 
consisted of acquiring some 1.500 trucks, 15.000 flatracks and 40-plus rail 
transfer equipment (RTE) to support the transfer of DROPS (Demountable Rack 
Off-loading and Pick-up System) to meet the realistic demand for ammunition 
and other supplies. 1 06 Although these efforts had eased the overall pressure on 
logistics and provided more resources, the problem of war-time support still 
existed because of the structural deficiencies of the Army's logistics system. 
In the British Army, the basic logistics assets were concentrated In 
battlegroups under divisional control, under which each unit would hold about 
five days of supply. 107 Consequently, brigades did not have their own integral 
logistics support. Furthermore, the system depended on being 'pushed' forward 
rather than on units 'pulling' the resources. 1 08 Under the circumstances, the 
logistics requirement of each unit could not be properly met as the division 
would allocate resources as it saw fit. This could result in units being dependent 
on the division rather than being self-sufficient during the expected duration of 
combat they were expected to fight. As a result, the overall ability to fight a 
105 Interview, Brown. See Warren L. Kempf, "British Army Logistics," AL, 
(July-August 1986), pp.24-6; and "German Army Logistics," AL, (November-
December 1983), p.8. See 1983, AL, for more on the Bundeswehr's logistic 
systems. 
106 lC. Larminie, "Replenishment within British Army Battlegroups," ID~ 
(July 1986), p.946. 
107 See Kempf, p.23; and M.A. Gilbertson, "The Development of Logistics in 
the British Army," in Mackenzie and Holden Reid, 1989, p.86. 
108 Gilbertson, op. cit., p.85 and p.87. 
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mobile battle would subsequently be weakened. It was strongly suggested that 
brigades be provided with a logistics support capability to ease the pressure in 
the existing structure while increasing the flexibility of the system. Above all, the 
writing of a logistics doctrine alongside the BMD was suggested as an 
alternative in order to counter more problems in the future. 1 09 
7.6.3. INTEROPERABILITY 
After the reforms got underway, a great deal of attention was paid to the 
improvement of interoperability among NORTHAG corps. As mentioned, 
because the British supplied the necessary equipment to enhance interface among 
corps C3 I assets, the interoperability problem in this area was substantially 
eased. Nonetheless, many problems remained. Artillery ammunition (155 mm) 
was interchangeable, but tank ammunition was not. 11 0 Also, although the 
NORTHAG in-theatre corps C31 network was interoperable, the 3 (US) Corps' 
system (RITA) was not fully interoperable with NORTHAG's (Ptarmigan).111 
The only completely interoperable material was POL (Petrol, Oil and Lubricant). 
Thus, there was no hope that NATO could achieve a degree of interoperability 
similar to that which existed in the WP armies, but achieving at least some 
degree of interoperability was a strong desire. 112 The reforms attempted to 
address this problem, but they were limited to providing communication 
109 Gilbertson, op. cit., p.92. 
110 Interviews, Brown and Fischer. 
111 lS. Baxter, "Sustainability," in Holden Reid and Dewar, op. cit., pp.228-9. 
See Rice and Sammes, op. cit., chapter 9 for the degree of interoperability 
between existing C2 and C3 I systems. 
112 See Wright, op. cit., in Mackenzie and Holden Reid, 1989, pp.206-7. 
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interfaces to other corps in NORTHAG. The actual changes were to require 
more time and effort due to different national priorities and determinations. 
7.6.4. STOCKPILE, SUSTAINABILITY AND OTHER FACTORS 
The insufficient stockpile of the necessary war material to sustain the operation 
envisaged remained a major source of problems. 1 13 In fact, this was an area 
which consumed a lot of financial resources, but did not make any immediate 
visible difference. Consequently, it was the area which was most prone to cuts. 
In fact, the projected sustainability of NORTHAG even after the reforms was 
calculated to be no more than fifteen days of intensive fighting, contrary to the 
minimum thirty-day requirement of the Alliance. 114 As mentioned, only the 
German Army was barely able to meet this demand. The problem was 
aggravated by the fact that overseeing this matter was a national, not an army 
group, responsibility. Moreover, there were neither equipment reserves nor 
factories in the west which could quickly be converted to mass-produce the 
material needed. 115 Thus, despite the effort, there was a distinct possibility that, 
because of the lack of sustainability of the British Army and other corps in 
NOR THAG, the army group would be forced to resort to nuclear use earlier 
than it wished. If there was to be a failure ofNORTHAG's operation in war, the 
lack of sustainability would be the primary reason. 
There were other negative factors which were created due to the nature 
of the modem battlefield. Firstly, its complexity and continuous nature would 
113 See criticism in McInnes, 1990, pp.I47-8. 
114 Interviews, Brown and Fischer. 
115 Interview, Brown. 
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cause extreme fatigue to both commanders and soldiers alike. 116 Secondly, the 
horrific nature of the modem weapons' destructive power would cause excessive 
terror and paralysis to many soldiers on the battlefield. 117 Also, fighting a war 
usually involves boredom, sleep deprivation, and numerous other petty, yet 
crucial factors, which could only exacerbate the existing problems. The only way 
to avoid a general breakdown of the forces' morale, especially if they were meant 
to be exposed to an intensive and violent operation such as counter stroke, was 
for them to be highly-trained and motivated in peacetime, all the time. 118 Above 
all, this required a high degree of professionalism on behalf of both officers and 
soldiers, a perennial problem of armies during peacetime. 119 
Although F amdale stressed in an interview that he was able to go on 
commanding army group operations for more than a month--as he did during 
Certain Strike in 1987--with very little sleep, it is safe to suppose that the 
situation could be different in a real war condition because the pressure and 
stress of a real battle would significantly differ from that of an exercise. 120 Also, 
unlike the WP concept of formation relief, NATO forces relied on continuous 
operation by a single unit, which would have compounded the problems of 
116 M.G. Hunt-Davis, "Continuous Operations," RUSIJ, (September 1980), 
pp.13-4. 
117 See Kitson, 1989, p.34. 
118 See Edna 1. Hunter, Howard T. Price, "Stress and the Combat Leader," 
Extract from Conventional Warfare, (U.S. Air Force ACSC), p.273. 
119 See David Eshel, Chariots of the Desert, (London: Brassey's, 1989), p.117; 
and George Belenky, Shabtai Noy, and Zahava Solomon, "Battle Str.ess: The 
Israeli Experience, " Extract from Conventional Warfare, (U. S. ~ Force 
ACSC), pp.262-3, for a case with a marked difference among soldiers who 
participated in the 1973 defence of Golan and the 1982 invasion of Lebanon. 
120 Interview, Famdale on 21 June 1993. 
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fatigue and made troops more vulnerable to low morale in the longer term, as 
would the inevitable high rate of casualties. 121 Moreover, the survivability of 
the commander, who would become an obvious high priority target, was also in 
doubt. 
Another problem was that the amount of casualties would have been so 
great that the army group would have to continue the operation regardless of the 
casualties and lack of a capability to evacuate them, despite Bagnall's claim that 
there was an extensive plan for casualty evacuation. 122 Particularly, a heavy 
casualty rate (up to 80 per cent) was expected among the airmobile and counter 
stroke forces. 123 Overall, Bagnall and F amdale were too dismissive of the rate 
of casualties expected, as well as of how the army group would cope with such 
difficulties. It was pointed out that any casualty rate would be absorbed and that 
the timely evacuation of casualties would sometimes have to be delayed, but this 
indicates a lack of coherent planning and preparation to deal with the 
problem. 124 Taking casualties in training could be acceptable because they 
could receive immediate medical attention, but the lack of guarantees for such 
care during an actual battle could act as a factor in decreasing the maintenance 
of high morale among soldiers. 
121 See Richard Simpkin, "Tank Warfare," in Ken Perkins, Weapons and 
Warfare, (London: Brassey's, 1987), p.174. 
122 Interview, Bagnall on 5 May 1993. 
123 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993 and Famdale on 21 June 1993. 
124 Interviews, Bagnall on 5 May 1993 and Famdale on 21 June 1993. 
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7.7. CONCLUSION 
This chapter's main findings are three-fold. Firstly, the British Army's efforts to 
implement the reforms were largely successful, and achieved an overall 
improvement of its ability to conduct the kind of operation envisaged. In fact, 
the application of operational thinking in the implementation of the reforms was 
manifest in the securing of an array of combat multipliers for the theatre-wide 
operation. The emphasis on improving C3 I and fire support capabilities was 
intended to allow the selective application of the army group's resources by 
simultaneously achieving economy and concentration of forces at such a level, 
while the creation of the airmobile force was to secure the ability and mobility to 
quickly react to unforeseen and urgent contingencies in the army group's 
defence. Also, the new educational establishment, the HCSC, was instrumental 
in nurturing a novel breed of officers to undertake the operational level of war. 
Secondly, while there were numerous successes, the shortfalls in financial 
support from the government, especially after abandoning the L TDP 
commitment in 1985, prevented the military from implementing the reforms as 
fully as they had hoped to--at least not to the level Famdale had anticipated. This 
was despite the number of changes made in acquiring new weapon systems and 
creating new formations; the British Army continuously suffered from shortages 
in sustainability, and in fact, the stockpile of spares, etc., was critically 
threatened by the government squeeze on financial support. Nor were the 
conditions in other corps any better. 
Finally, because of the shortcomings of the resources, the reduction of 
financial support from the government since 1986, and the persisting 
interoperability and sustainability problems, if the army group was forced into a 
war with the WP at the time, it would have exhausted its conventional combat-
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power much faster than expected due to the obvious lack of sustainability. As a 
result, the introduction of, or at least the plan for, nuclear weapons would have 
to be made quite early into the conflict to compensate for such deficiencies. This 
assumption is reinforced by the example of 1 (BR) Armoured Division during 
the Gulf War, which spent 5 months increasing stockpiles and sustainability 
before being committed to battle. Also, due to the lack of sustainability, the two 
brigades in the division were made up from the total of eight brigades which 
were deployed in Germany, drawing up all available Challenger and ammunition 
stocks to support the operations by two brigades. 125 If one division had so 
much trouble building up to the necessary strength to fight an out-of-area war, it 
is not too difficult to imagine how much time and effort would have to be put 
into preparing the whole army group to reach an actual war footing. 
This consequently confirmed Bagnall's logic which suggested that a 
counter offensive would have to be launched earlier to neutralise the enemy 
forces, because the lack of sustainability would have prevented prolonged 
conventional fighting, and having done so would have put less strain on 
resources. This factor, more than anything else, discredited Farndale's ideas and 
any suggestion for a more extensive capacity for conventional deterrence. 
125 See Greenwood, op. cit., in Byrd, 1991, pp.40-1. 
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8.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the validity of the reforms through a historical review. 
Firstly, I shall discuss the feasibility of executing NORTHAG's concept of 
operation, especially the counter offensive, through reviews of the past successes 
and failures of such operations. Secondly, I look back at the British experience 
and performance during the Gulf War, which was the first and probably the last 
opportunity to test the viability of the reforms in a major war, to investigate 
whether the NORTHAG concept would have worked in Central Europe and also 
what benefits were introduced by the reforms. Also, these reviews will enable me 
to examine the shortcomings of the new concept. 
I shall end this chapter with a brief examination of the new changes 
introduced to the British Army since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the 
endorsement of the 'Options for Change' review in 1990. This is not an attempt 
to either criticise the developments since, which have been largely negative in 
terms of maintaining the operational efficacy of the British Army, or make 
suggestions. Nonetheless, I shall offer my views on how these changes will affect 
the reforms, and raise a few questions on where the Army goes from here. 
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8.2. HISTORY AND THE VALIDITY OF THE COUNTER OFFENSIVE 
CONCEPT 
There were a number of instances in the past when successful counter offensive 
operations had brought disproportionate victories to the defender. A review of 
such experiences provides valuable insights and helps in evaluating the validity of 
NORTHAG's counter offensive concept, as it allows the identification of the 
common themes and denominators behind the successes and, sometimes, failures 
of these counter offensives. 
In fact, among past experiences, the Israeli defence of Golan and Sinai 
during the Yom Kippur War is an ideal example of how an army could tum the 
tide of war by counter offensive, even after having been surprised. Along with 
the German counter stroke operations on the Eastern Front and the Arras 
counter stroke (which have been discussed in chapter 2), the Israeli counter 
offensive, particularly that following the successful initial defence in Golan, 
should provide significant insights because the situation the Israelis had faced 
there would have been precisely the condition NORTHAG would have been 
subjected to, and the result achieved by the Israelis would have been what 
NORTHAG would have endeavoured to secure. 1 
The Israeli successes, as well as others achieved by the Germans, display 
a number of common themes. Firstly, they showed the importance of containing 
the enemy penetration at an early stage, which was critical to buy time and 
secure ground through which a counter offensive could be launched. Indeed, this 
1 The Golan region shared many similar characteristics with the mixed terrain of 
the NORTHAG sector, and the Israelis, facing a surprise attack, lost some 
ground. See Cordesman and Wagner, 1990--A, pp.43-4, for the terrain in the 
Golan Heights. 
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was only possible by successfully slowing down the enemy through strong initial 
defence.2 Even though the Israelis had to commit, sometimes waste, every asset 
they had at the time, their desperate and bloody initial defence retained a secure 
start-line from which the ensuing counter offensive could be safely executed. 
This also had a psychological effect as the Syrian forces were demoralised and 
exhausted after the failure of their earlier attack. 3 As a result, the Israeli counter 
offensive was able to achieve a considerable momentum of attack. 4 Secondly, 
the Israelis, and Germans too, emphasised the importance of offensive action and 
taking the initiative, as well as the skill, flexibility, and imagination of the 
individual commanders and soldiers, which enabled the defender's swift counter 
offensive. Thirdly, the Israeli and German experiences exemplified how a well-
trained and determined defender could withstand continuous onslaught by a 
numerically superior attacker, if he were willing to absorb heavy casualties--the 
situation which NORTHAG's defenders would have to face. 5 Finally, the most 
crucial common denominator among these operations was how even a 
desperately outnumbered force could achieve spectacular success once surprise 
(or counter surprise in the case of the Israelis) was secured.6 This factor 
reinforced the fact that surprise was the most important element behind all of the 
2 See Eshel, op. cit., p.95 and p.97, for the Israeli defence concept of Golan. 
3 See Carver, 1978, p.97. 
4 See Charles Messenger, The Art of Blitzkrieg, (London: Ian Allan, 1976), 
p.245. 
5 See Bellamy, 1987, pp.17-19; Macksey, 1972, pp.259-60; Eshel, op. cit., 
chapter 8; and Carver, 1978, chapter 4., for the lessons of the 1973 War. 
6 See Eshel, op. cit., chapter 8 section III for a detailed account of the Israeli 
counter stroke. Also see Macksey, 1972, chapters 20 and 21, and 1991, chapters 
4 and 5 for details of the German operations. 
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successful counter offensive operations in the past, and NORTHAG recognised 
this as the key requirement if its operation was to secure victory. 
The irrelevance of material and manpower as substitutes for these factors 
in securing successful containment of an enemy onslaught is illustrated by the 
spectacular collapse of the Polish, French, and Russian defences in the Second 
World War. These instances vividly demonstrated that failure to meet the above 
requirements would bring dire consequences to the defenders regardless of their 
physical strength, especially when surprised by an attacker with superior skill, 
determination and the initiative of attack. 
In fact, the German success was largely attributed to the success of 
blitzkrieg, which increased the effects of surprise by achieving an awesome 
speed of attack, and thus enabled a quick penetration deep into the defenders' 
territory by operationally dislocating the bulk of defending forces deployed in 
static defence positions, and against which the Polish, French, and Russian 
defences were impotent. In addition to the fact that their speedy defeat was 
attributed to the inadequacy of their defence planning, epitomised by Poland's 
forward defence and France's Maginot Line, their failure to execute credible 
counter moves against the German surprise attack was the main deficiency. Their 
haphazardly organised counter attacks were quickly defeated by the sheer speed 
and offensive power of the German onslaught due to the overall lack of 
flexibility and speed of their counter forces, which, apart from the Arras counter 
stroke, failed to achieve surprise.7 Basically, they were too little and too late to 
make any significant difference to the German progress. Faced with surprise and 
7 See Simpkin, 1985, p.30; Macksey, 1991, chapter 4; and 1972, chapters 10 
and 11; and Messenger, op. cit., chapter 5. 
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speed, even the defender's material and manpower superiority (as with the case 
of France) became irrelevant to the outcome of war. 
On the other hand, the Battle of the Bulge in December 1944, during 
which the Germans launched a daring counter offensive through the Ardennes, 
was a classic case of failure of a major counter offensive operation, a gamble 
which failed to achieve its strategic purpose of halting the Allies' advance to 
Germany.8 There were many reasons for this. Firstly, many of the troops used 
during the battle were inexperienced and ill-supplied; in fact, they could have 
been better used in positional defence. Secondly, the Germans did not have air 
superiority; thus once the weather cleared, they became prey to the Allies' air 
power. Thirdly, the poor terrain condition in the Ardennes hampered their 
speedy operation. Finally, they did not have the necessary sustainability, in terms 
of both manpower and equipment, to achieve their strategic goal. In other 
words, their objective far surpassed their capability. 9 
Despite the fact that the most important operational requirement--
surprise--was achieved, at least in the early stage, and the initial high-speed 
attack paralysed the Americans, making their early defence ineffective, because 
of the above mentioned shortcomings, the counter offensive was an ultimate 
failure. 1 0 In fact, this blunder, which was caused by setting up unrealistic and 
unattainable strategic aims, expedited Germany's defeat as it had exhausted 
8 See Macksey, 1972, p.238; and Messenger, op. cit., p.214. 
9 See Messenger, op. cit., p.214; John Harding, "The German Op~ration in t.he 
Ardennes 1944," in Barnett, Bidwell, Bond, Harding and Terrrune, op. CIt., 
pp.105-113. 
10 See Macksey, 1972, pp.238-9; Messenger, op. cit., p.214; and Harding, op. 
cit., in Barnett, Bidwell, Bond, Harding and Terraine, op. cit., pp.105-113. 
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valuable reserves which could have been better utilised In defence of 
Germany. I I 
Nonetheless, despite its strategic miscalculation, the Bulge operation did 
achieve some temporary success as it pushed the Allies back to where they had 
been six weeks before.12 If NORTHAG could achieve this much, it would be 
considered as an exceptional operational victory, and this was in fact what 
NORTHAG wanted to secure in its counter offensive. There would be a number 
of fundamental differences between the German and NORTHAG operation. 
Above all, the NORTHAG operation would be on a much smaller scale, and the 
conditions under which the NORTHAG counter offensive would be committed 
would have been significantly different, as it would be launched early in a frantic 
and confused stage of the battle unlike the German operation which was 
committed when fighting had stagnated for winter and in a relatively stable front. 
Nonetheless, NORTHAG planned an operation somewhat similar to what the 
Germans attempted during the battle: securing surprise by using speed and 
concentrated striking power to stop the enemy advance. 13 Unlike the objective 
of the German operation, territorial gains would not be on NORTHAG's agenda 
since its main objective was to strike against the enemy main force, but 
NORTHAG's counter offensive was aimed at achieving a result close to that the 
Germans were able to attain--pausing the enemy advance. In a sense, the 
German experience fitted exactly what Bagnall wanted to achieve. 
11 See Harding, op. cit., in Barnett, Bidwell, Bond, Harding and Terraine, op. 
cit., pp.I 05-6. 
12 Messenger, op. cit., p.2I4. 
13 See Harding, op. cit., in Barnett, Bidwell, Bond, Harding and Terraine, op. 
cit., p.85. 
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In fact, it is not difficult to postulate that this much success would bring 
two major benefits to NORTHAG. Firstly, it could prevent the loss of ground, 
since the prospect of recovery would be virtually nonexistent once lost. 
Secondly, it could halt the progress of war since it would be in everyone's 
interest to stop a war as soon as possible to avoid an inevitable escalation to a 
nuclear exchange. Therefore, NATO's initial conventional victory (by pause), 
backed up by the de facto threat of its nuclear retaliation, could convince the WP 
to seek a negotiated settlement. The primary logic of Bagnall and Famdale, and 
of academics such as Dinter and Griffith, was based on this assumption. 
Ironically, taking such a gamble, which involved risking a bulk of NORTHAG's 
conventional assets in a single operational battle, was possible and justified 
because of the existence of nuclear weapons, the critical element which 
differentiated the situation ofNORTHAG and that of the Germans in 1944. 
The main difference between the Germans then and NORTHAG in the 
1980s was that at least NORTHAG's operation would not be hampered by the 
shortcomings which the Germans experienced during 1944, as the reforms were 
designed to improve those areas to which the downfall of the German operation 
was attributed. Indeed, the areas which the reforms attempted to address 
coincided with the prerequisites for the successful launch of such an operation. 
Firstly, adopting a coherent concept of operation enhanced NORTHAG's 
capabilities in many different areas. This allowed better training and education 
for officers and soldiers, the elements which were crucial in fostering the forces 
to gain necessary flexibility and creativity to undertake the envisaged operation. 
This in tum would allow swift offensive actions by the forces which was vital to 
maintain initiative of attack and exploit chances to secure surprise. Secondly, 
with better material provisions (e.g., better weapon systems and high-tech 
equipment), and increased sustainability and enhanced interoperability among 
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corps, the reforms attempted to provide the necessary resources to fight 
effectively in such a battle. Thirdly, the adoption of Landi Air Battle doctrine 
assured that the army group would receive necessary air cover and support. As 
discussed, all these aspects, which the reforms attempted to address and 
improve, coincided with the common themes which facilitated the successful 
launch of counter offensives in the past. 
In conclusion, these past experiences largely reaffirm the conceptual 
validity of NORTHAG's counter offensive concept. Specifically, the Israeli 
operations showed that the defender's ability to create a counter surprise by 
counter offensive disrupted the enemy's momentum of attack, leaving him 
confused, and its high-speed committal intercepted the enemy at its weakest 
moment. Most of all, it showed that even a small counter offensive by forces 
with superior mobility and skills could secure a disproportionately large victory 
because of the low force density and inevitable initial confusion, a lesson which 
is particularly relevant in NORTHAG's defence against a standing start attack. 
As discussed in chapter 3, if the enemy's capability was as constrained as 
NORTHAG's due to the lack of resources and the overall low force density of 
the operational theatre, it would expedite the movement of the NORTHAG 
reserve, hence increasing its chance of quickly intercepting the WP advance. The 
most favourable fact supporting the feasibility of NORTHAG succeeding in a 
counter offensive, even over the 1GB, was that the above requirements for battle 
were met. 
Overall, NORTHAG's operational level operation could be similar to a 
combination of Israel's Sinai and Golan counter offensives in the Hanover Plain, 
following a Golan-type tactical level defence and covering and main forces 
battle. This experience confirmed that NORTHAG had correctly identified the 
operational imperatives needed to commit a successful counter offensive, thus 
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reaffirming the validity of its operational concept and the focus of the reforms. 
Also, the German failure in 1944 showed the importance of setting an attainable 
goal. While the destruction of the enemy first echelon might have been achieved 
within the capabilities available to NORTHAG--provided other pre-conditions 
were met--seeking territorial gain was not possible due to the lack of capabilities 
and many political obstacles. 
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8.3. THE REFORMS AND THE GULF WAR EXPERIENCE 
8.3.1. THE OPERATIONS OF 1 (DR) ARMOURED DIVISION 
Operation Granby began in September 1990 following Britain's decision to send 
combat troops to the Gulf Region. 14 The heart of the British land force was 1 
(BR) Armoured Division, commanded by Major General Sir Rupert Smith, 
which was made up of two, 7 and 4, Armoured Brigades, an artillery group and 
a reconnaissance regiment. 1S The overall operational aim of 7 (US) Corps, to 
which 1 Division belonged, was to: 1) separate in-theatre Iraqi forces from their 
home base; and 2) make a direct thrust to Kuwait city.1 6 Meanwhile, the 
primary objective of 1 Division was to protect the right flank of the Corps by 
blocking Iraqi theatre reserves and destroying tactical reserves. 1 7 In this sense, 1 
Division was to be an anvil onto which 7 (US) Corps, a hammer, could be 
swung. 18 From the outset, 1 Division, as agreed between Lt. General Sir Peter 
de la Billiere, who was GOC, and Smith, planned a straight forward armour 
battle--a fast moving offensive battle in-depth, the attack of which was to be led 
14 See John Pimlott and Stephen Badsey, The Gulf War Assessed, (London: 
Arms and Armour), p.92. 
IS See Bruce W. Watson, Bruce George, Peter Tsouras and B.L. Cyr, Military 
Lessons of the Gulf War, (London: Greenhill, 1991), p.l04. See Pimlott and 
Badsey, op. cit., p.93; See House of Commons, Defence Committee session 
1990-91: Preliminary Lessons of Operation Granby, (1991. London, HMSO), 
para.6 andl8. 
16 See Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, "How Kuwait was Won--
Strategy in the Gulf War," IS, (Fall 1991), p.34. 
17 See AC 71S12, p.S--13; and Pimlott and Badsey, op. cit., p.160. 
18 See Pimlott and Badsey, op. cit., p.lSS. 
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by 7 Brigade committed to a direct break-in attack to ensure speedy 
exploitation. 19 
The British division achieved a spectacular success as soon as Operation 
Desert Sabre, the code name for the British land operation, got underway. On 
Day One (24/2/91), 1 Division quickly broke through the Iraqi defence after 1 
(US) Infantry Division succeeded in breaching the Iraqi trenches. Despite the 
initial assumption, 7 Brigade met with heavy resistance, but it achieved a 
dramatic 25 km advance in the first hour.20 The effectiveness and bravery of the 
British force was tested when 7 Brigade was attacking an Iraqi communication 
complex, during which it conducted a daring dismounted attack at night before 
quickly moving ahead towards the next objective at first light. Overall, the 
division's first day performance was highly praiseworthy, taking objectives far 
sooner than planned--a trend which was to be continued throughout the war.21 
By the end of the second day (25/2/91), the division managed to destroy one and 
damage two Iraqi divisions, while neutralising a number of Iraqi counter attacks 
without affecting the speed of progress. 22 On the third day (26/2/91), the attack 
was temporarily halted, partly due to the unexpected high speed of advance, and 
the break was used to reorganise logistics which were trailing behind the 
spearhead.23 On the final day (27/2/91), the division was ordered to revise its 
19 See Peter de la Billiere, Storm Command, (London: Harper Collins, 1992), 
pp.144-5; R.A. Smith. "The Gulf War: The Land Battle," RUSU, (February 
1992), p.1. 
20 See Watson, et. aI., op. cit., p.l04. 
21 See Watson, et. aI., op. cit., pp.104-5. 
22 See Pimlott and Badsey, op. cit., p.163; and AC 71512, p.5--18. 
23 See de la Billiere, op. cit., p.289; and Watson, et. al., op. cit., pp.113-4 and 
p.117. 
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objective. It was to swing north to trap a Republican Guard Division and then 
move east towards the Basra-Kuwait road, which ultimately became its final 
objective as the cease-fire was announced upon arrivaI.24 All in all, during 66 
hours of combat, the division had advanced 290 lan, destroyed almost three Iraqi 
divisions, taken 7.024 prisoners, and captured over 4.000 items of equipment. 25 
8.3.2. THE REFORMS AND THE GULF WAR COMMAND 
PERFORMANCE 
The triumph of the British Army's command performance, more than anything, 
epitomised its success in the Gulf War. This was one of the areas on which the 
reforms placed the utmost priority, and the war verified the fact that the efforts 
had paid off, making the most profound and far-reaching impact. Particularly, 
the influence of the HCSC had been significant. Through it the Gulf commanders 
learned to exploit fully the benefits of flexibility and creativity of command, and 
most importantly, the principles of the operational level of war. Above all, the 
reforms created a different breed of commanders with excellence in both 
commanding ability and innovative thinking. De la Billiere recalled in his 
memoirs that he immensely appreciated Smith's 'refreshingly unorthodox' ideas, 
which were both daring and versatile.26 Indeed, Smith had proved his 
adaptability and creativity during the build-up of British forces in the region. For 
instance, he had only about six weeks to prepare for the battle from 10 
24 See AC 71512, p.5--20; and Watson, et. aI., op. cit., p.117. 
25 AC 71512, p.5--20. 
26 See de la Billiere, op. cit., p.127. 
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December, when the full elements of the division arrived.27 Yet, during that 
short amount of time, he not only managed to rectify most of the problems he 
identified before the run-up to the battle, sometimes creating many new units ad 
hoc, but also successfully prepared all combat units for the battle. 
The command performance was greatly enhanced by close personal links 
among the commanders of the major arms. Having undergone the HCSC 
training, they were able to achieve excellent mutual cooperation and, most of all, 
trust each other. For example, not only was Smith a former participant and the 
director ofHCSC 3, but also the commander of 7 Armoured Brigade, Brigadier 
Patrick Cordingley, and the commander of the Artillery Group, Brigadier I.G.C. 
Durie, as well as the UK representative on Schwartzkopfs planning staff, were 
graduates of the course. Meanwhile, the commander of 4 Armoured Brigade, 
Brigadier Christopher Hammerbeck, was a friend of Smith's from the days of the 
Parachute Regiment. 28 This was explicit proof of how important it was for 
commanders to share a similar line of thought, and thus of the values of HCSC, 
which provided both an intellectual and empirical basis for such close relations. 
Overall, it was an opportunity which confirmed that such a close personal link is 
crucial for fostering effective cooperation among arms, and most of all, for 
directive control to be exercised. 
Most of all, the Gulf War provided an ideal opportunity to test the 
validity and British aptitude for utilising Auftragstaktik. Each level of command 
was given a mission order, 'directives,' rather than specific orders; hence, it was 
almost free from interference by higher command. This eventually lowered the 
decision making level, and proved to be instrumental in increasing the tempo of 
27 See de la Billiere, op. cit., pp.143-4. 
28 See de la Billiere, op. cit., p.263. 
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operation.29 Smith did say that he experienced some difficulty due to the 
inadequacy of surveillance and information-gathering capability, but the 
flexibility of command through the exploitation of the fundamentals of 
Auftragstaktik compensated for this problem in the theatre, thus facilitating the 
efficient conduct of high-tempo manoeuvre battle.30 
However, the experience was also a reminder that the drafting of a pre-
battle SOP was crucial to clear up any misunderstanding of plans before the 
actual battle got underway if Auftragstaktik was to be effectively utilised. For 
instance, Carver criticised the extensive length of the Gulf SOP (65 pages) as a 
hindrance to the command problem, since it would lead to inflexibility. 3 1 In fact, 
his assumption proved to be presumptuous as Smith was able to rely on orders 
which were no longer than two paragraphs and the SOP provided a useful basis 
for preventing confusion when issued with such orders. 3 2 
Also, the HCSC education, and its focus on training at the operational 
level, achieved doctrinal interoperability with the US Army, which further 
enhanced the effectiveness of 7 (US) Corps' operations by creating more 
effective command links. The US Army planned and undertook operations based 
on the AirLand Battle Doctrine, and since the British Landi Air Battle concept 
29 See Smith, 1991, p.4; and Watson, et. aI., op. cit., pp.l09-110. 
30 See Smith, 1991, p.4. Also see P.M. Reid, "Tanks in the Gulf," AQ&DJ, 
(Gulf War Issue, 1991), p.189, for the problems encountered due to the 
unexpectedly high speed of operation. 
31 Interview, Carver. 
32 The samples of orders Smith issued during the battle were shown to me 
during an interview. 
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shared a common operational language and conceptual background, 3 3 there was 
no confusion in planning operations between the two forces. Furthermore, the 
experience of cooperating in Europe proved to be invaluable in coordinating 
every aspect of the battle from war-fighting and C3I to logistics.34 For example, 
although the interoperability problem between Ptarmigan and RITA systems 
were not fully addressed, the British Army was able to use the American system 
when needed. Also, basic communication through radio, facsimile, etc., did not 
suffer interoperability problems.35 Moreover, such close cooperation was 
further ensured because a British senior officer was posted to Schwartzkopfs 
planning team, enabling a closer detailed co-planning while ensuring British 
input. 3 6 If he had not fully understood the operational doctrines of the two, his 
contribution could have been limited. Above all, the cooperation between the 
two armies, as well as the RAF and US Air Force was considered to be 
excellent; this was only possible because of doctrinal interoperability. 3 7 
The implications of this doctrinal interoperability in the conduct of war in 
Europe would be enormous. Particularly, the subscription to similar operational 
principles by the US and British Armies, and the same understanding of the 
benefits of operational thinking, would be vital if they could avoid 
33 See The U.S. Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian GulfConflict--
An Interim Report to Congress, (Washington, D.C.; US GPO, 1991), p.2--7; 
and AC71512, p.5--2. 
34 See The U.S. Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian GulfConflict--
Final Report to Congress, Appendices A-S. (Washington, D.C.; US GPO, 
1992), p.I--47. 
35 See Smith, 1991, p.4; and interview, Smith. 
36 See Defence Committee, Preliminary Lessons of Operation Granby, para.l 7. 
37 Interview, Smith; and Defence Committee, Preliminary Lessons of Operation 
Granby, para. 17. 
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misunderstandings or time-consuming preparation and dialogue between the two 
forces in C2 and cooperation. Also, the minimisation of effort and effective 
coordination would be one factor compensating for early resource limitation by 
achieving a selective concentration of forces and assets according to priorities. 
Considering such an achievement, it is possible to extrapolate that there 
was a strong chance, especially after the adoption of the joint SOP, that 3 (US) 
Corps could be quickly integrated and put into battle in the case of war in 
Europe. It was true that NORTHAG's ability to accomplish this task was rather 
limited, as discussed earlier, but once those shortcomings were redressed, it is 
safe to assume that NORTHAG would eventually be able to accumulate exactly 
the kind of counter offensive capability it once hoped to attain--although some 
time later than F arndale envisaged. Above all, this proved that reinforcing 
NORTHAG's covering and MDA forces area by reverting the divisions in the 
army group reserve role, while relying on 3 (US) Corps as the main operational 
reserve asset, was valid. Alternatively, NORTHAG could actually risk throwing 
in its every reserve in an early counter offensive, leaving the defensive duty to 
the freshly arrived, and still rather disorganised, 3 (US) Corps. 
8.3.3. THE REFORMS AND THE GULF WAR OPERATIONAL 
PERFORMANCE 
The success of the Army's operation highlighted the validity of the early 
offensive operation to secure the initiative, and thus, the validity of the 
operational concept based on manoeuvre principles. Above all, it was achieved 
by the clear selection of aim--to achieve concentration against the body of enemy 
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force, not the terrain.38 To attain this operational objective, the initial plan was 
to quickly by-pass the Iraqi prepared-defensive positions after the breaching 
operation to allow a rapid exploitation and manoeuvre battle.39 After this, all 
efforts were focused on allowing swift movement of forces, often fighting all-
hours. It was confirmed that the surprise, sheer speed, and aggressiveness of the 
assault prevented any meaningful Iraqi counter attack.40 Thus, the division's 
high-speed offensive mobile operation continued unhindered. 
This success largely rectified the earlier critical views of many who 
formerly thought that the British would be ineffective at mobile warfare due to a 
general lack of flexibility and firepower. 41 In fact, the successful operation by 7 
(US) Corps during the first two days owed much to the British triumph.42 Bruce 
George hailed the British performance as follows: 
If deeds can summon the shades of man back to earth, surely 1 st 
Armoured at that moment recalled to this world a retired captain of the 
Great War, one Basil Liddell Hart. In their dash and skilful maneuver of 
the next few days, they were to prove his spiritual heirs. Perhaps some of 
the Allies' high technology instruments might have enabled someone to 
see the faint ghostly shimmer of the thin, English scholar, waving 1 st 
Armoured on.43 
Also, the reforms' recognition of the importance of air power and the 
adoption of the Landi Air Battle concept proved to be a valid decision. There 
38 Interview, Smith. 
39 See Watson, et. aI., op. cit., p.102, for more on the planning. 
40 See Watson, et. aI., op. cit., p.109, for an assessment. 
41 See Defence Committee, Preliminary Lessons of Operation Granby, para.6; 
Frank Chadwick, Gulf War Fact Book, (Bloomington: GDW, 1991), p.61; and 
Pimlott and Badsey, op. cit., pp.74-5. 
42 See Watson, et. aI., op. cit., p.109. 
43 Watson, et. aI., op. cit., p.104. 
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were a number of factors proving Coalition air power to be one of the decisive 
factors in the quick cessation of war. For example, the desert terrain was well-
suited to offensive air operations, and the overall improvements in the Coalition 
(especially the US) air doctrine and technology were valuable assets, although 
the absence of the Iraqi air power and its poor AD were also key elements. 44 
Nonetheless, it reaffirmed Bagnall's pursuit to prioritise the use of air power. 
Indeed, the priority use of Coalition air power was in order of: 1) OCA (and air 
superiority); 2) strategic bombardment; 3) interdiction; and 4) CAS.45 This 
ultimately allowed the concentrated use of air power in support of the land 
battle, while reconfirming the importance of an early achievement of air 
superiority, iflarge armoured forces were to be used effectively. 
However, the successes both in air and on land would not have been 
possible without the effectiveness of other crucial areas. Notably, the efficiency 
of technology and weapon systems played a very important role. In the case of 
air power, technology increased the precision of weapon delivery systems, as 
well as securing better survivability of aircraft. Meanwhile, it enhanced the land 
force's ability to manoeuvre by enhancing mobility, allowing stand-off 
engagement and precision navigation, and providing the capability to conduct a 
continuous war by use of better night vision equipment. 46 Similarly, technology 
favoured an increase in the lethality of weapons, especially those of modern 
artillery.47 With the better C2 systems which allowed its concentration, this 
44 See James F. Dunnigan and Austin Bay, From Shield to Storm, (New York: 
William Morrow & Co., 1992), pp.156-9. 
45 Pimlott and Badsey, pp.113-122, for details. 
46 See Les Aspin and William Dickinson, Defense for a New Era, (New York: 
Brassey's, 1992), pp.17-21. 
47 Smith, 1991, p.4. 
346 
proved to be a decisive factor supporting the ground offensive. In fact, C3 I was 
the main beneficiary of improvements in technology as it provided effective links 
among J-STARS, AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System), and other 
C31 assets on land.48 For instance, J-STARS was hurriedly introduced to the 
battle, although it was still in the developmental stage. The system was 
conceived initially for use in Europe as a force multiplier, yet it proved to be 
useful, and capable, in directing AI and allied advance in the war. 
Although its critical contribution did not receive much attention, the 
training and education which the reforms stressed so greatly were probably the 
most important factors contributing to the British achievement. Despite the fact 
that there was a need for extensive live-firing and manoeuvre training before the 
commitment to battle, the high standard of training the British forces received in 
Europe, and particularly in the BATUS training range in Canada, was most 
beneficial. 49 Also, it was instrumental in the quick transition from the 
traditionally defensive-oriented planning to undertaking a purely offensive form 
of warfare. 50 Most of all, the well-trained troops, and their professionalism and 
superior skills, once more proved to be a 'priceless asset,' further enhancing 
flexibility. 51 
48 See Pimlott and Badsey, op. cit., p.117; and Dunnigan and Bay, op. cit., 
p.166. 
49 See Defence Committee, Preliminary Lessons of Operation Granby, para.26. 
50 See Defence Committee, Preliminary Lessons of Operation Granby, para.41. 
51 Defence Committee, Preliminary Lessons of Operation Granby, para. 7. Also 
see James Blackwell Michael J. Mazarr and Don M. Snider, The Gulf War-
Military Lessons Lea~ned, (Washington, D. C.: The Center for International and 
Strategic Studies, 1991), p.27; and William J. Taylor Jr. and James Blackwell, 
"The Ground War in the Gulf," Survival, Vol. XXIII, No.3, (May/June 1991), 
p.240. 
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In relation to the European theatre, this confirmed that the immediate 
counter offensive on the Hanover Plain, both in and outside of the 1GB, could be 
feasible as long as it could achieve the necessary amount of speed and tactical 
surprise in attack, both of which would compensate for the lack of size in the 
force. It would require much better training and readiness of forces, although a 
lot of effort had been put into this. Also, it showed to what extent a weakness in 
numbers could be compensated for by technology. Above all, the role of 
technology, in terms of enhancements in C31 and weapon systems performance, 
would be absolutely crucial because it would make the synchronisation of forces 
and assets possible, shifting the concentration of the counter offensive force to 
the target sector by allowing an exponential, though temporary, increase in 
superiority of force density and firepower to secure victory. This was the reason 
for replacing old weapon systems during the reforms, something on which the 
future effectiveness of British forces depends. 52 
8.3.4. THE SHORTCOMINGS 
The war also provided an invaluable chance to reassess the weaknesses which 
the reforms did not adequately address. The foremost problems were logistics 
and sustainability, the deficiencies of which suggested that NORTHAG's 
operation in Europe could have been seriously curtailed. Sustainability was 
singled out as the most serious problem. This was particularly acute with the US 
forces for which the five months build-up period provided just sufficient , 
52 See Defence Committee, Preliminary Lessons of Operation Granby, para. 47. 
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resources for the conduct of war. 53 The British experienced the same difficulty. 
Although it was in better shape than the US forces, it was nevertheless to suffer, 
especially from a shortage of ammunition. 54 This was a serious threat to the 
increased need for the use of artillery support which was identified as a vital 
element facilitating the operation of the armoured forces. 55 Moreover, the 
limited interoperability (in terms of material) between the US and British forces 
did not ease matters at all. 56 
Consequently, logistics was the most problematic area. While the US 
logistics capability was judged to be absolutely inadequate, the British were no 
better off as the army had to face the daunting prospect of building up logistics 
bases from scratch. 57 In particular, it had neither the logistics, nor the capability, 
to support a large-scale out -of-area operation. 5 8 For example, the British 
deployed a total of 2.611 combat vehicles, but it required 12.069 vehicles for 
logistic support alone. 59 Also, when faced with the reality of building-up forces 
in the region, it suffered from a shortage of cargo ships, forcing it to charter 
53 See Gene Rochlin and Chris Demchak, "The Gulf War: Technological and 
Organizational Implications," SurvivaL Vol. XXXIII, No.3, (May/June 1991), 
pp.265-6. 
54 Interview, Smith; and Defence Committee, Preliminary Lessons of Operation 
Granby, para.46. 
55 See Watson, et. aI., op. cit., p.1 05. 
56 See Dunnigan and Bay, op. cit., pp.58-9. 
57 See Aspin and Dickinson, op. cit., pp.34-6. 
58 See Defence Committee, Preliminary Lessons of Operation Granby, para. 6; 
and Pimlott and Badsey, op. cit., p.93. 
59 See Defence Committee, Preliminary Lessons of Operation Granby, para.44; 
and Hansard, Debate, Session 1991. Written Evidence, para.31 and 46. 
349 
commercial vessels for the purpose.60 Thus, it was faced with a number of 
major modifications needed to support the ensuing operation. 
Flexibility, creativity, and versatility proved to be major assets for this 
task. New support units were needed to address this deficiency in addition to 
making modifications in the logistics system already developed for use in 
Europe. Overall, while the division was supposed to be in charge of supporting 
its main formations with its own logistics organisation, an effort was made to 
render the subordinate units independent. 61 For example, artillery created its 
own service called the Artillery Group.62 Meanwhile, the Armoured Delivery 
Group (AD G) and the Divisional Reconstitution Group (DRG) were 
strengthened to support each brigade and its battle groups. They were 
formations which were conceived previously in Germany for the purpose of 
quickly replenishing, both in terms of material and equipment, and building up 
the lost combat power of the division to 90% of its original strength after each 
battle.63 Nevertheless, despite such extensive preparation, the division stretched 
logistics to the limit. 64 
Meanwhile, although the credibility of the use of air doctrine was largely 
reaffirmed, some loss of aircraft in the opening stages of the air war challenged 
the effectiveness of OCA and low-flying bombing missions in the early stage of 
contlict. Overall, seven Tornados were lost (one in an accident), out of which 
60 See Pimlott and Badsey, op. cit., p.93. 
61 Smith, 1992, pp.2-3. 
62 Smith, 1992, p. 3. 
63 See details in Smith, 1992, p. 3. 
64 See ID&, (September 1991), pp.999-1001. 
350 
four GR1 were shot down by AAA in low-level missions.65 This not only 
indicated that AAA was still one of the worst threats to aircraft, but also that 
expensive aircraft need not be readily exposed to such danger if stand-off 
capability were utilised.66 Although it was not possible to accurately assess the 
value of OCA based on JP 233 because of the marked difference between the 
Iraqi and WP air power, the quick shift of the Coalition aircraft from low to 
medium altitude operation was a self-admission of the dangers of such missions. 
One other area in which the British did not play a role, and to which 
more careful attention should have been be paid, was the impressive US 
airmobile capability. The Gulf experience also showed the weakness of the 
British airmobile capability as all RAF (G) support helicopter assets were 
committed for the support of the British Army.67 This was a damning 
indictment of how far behind the British were in this area, and if they want to 
attain a viable capability for airmobility, which they clearly do, a great deal of 
effort will be needed to prevent it from becoming a pipe-dream. 
The major lesson for the European contingency based on the British 
capability in the Gulf was that NORTHAG's potential to prepare for battle under 
the standing start scenario, given that the Coalition took five months of 
extensive build-up (despite the fact that it was an out-of-area operation) to 
properly train its force before battle, was not entirely credible. Under the 
scenario, although the WP would be equally handicapped in terms of the number 
of forces it could introduce, there is doubt as to whether NORTHAG could have 
65 See JDW, (4 May 1991), p.738. 
66 Hansard Debate Minutes of Evidence on 6 March 1991, (Defence 
Committee ~ession 1'990-91: Preliminary Lessons of Operation Granby). A 
question by Mr. Churchill. 
67 See Defence Committee, Preliminary Lessons of Operation Granby, para. 10. 
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amassed sufficient forces and fighting-power during the 48-hour preparation 
period. If there was one overriding factor which could prevent NORTHAG from 
launching an early counter offensive, this would be it. The effort would be 
further hampered by early information overload or the lack of information to 
fight the battle, despite its extensive high-tech C3I. It is wrong to assume that 
those forces might be better used to reinforce corps defence, because of the 
reasons mentioned before.68 Yet, time and time again, it was proved that even a 
small counter operation was able to achieve disruption of the enemy by virtue of 
being on the offensive and by securing surprise and initiative. Even the 
incompetent Iranian offensive operation in 1982 against the better-trained Iraqis 
was initially triumphant for the same reasons.69 Also, an ill-organised British 
force managed to do much better in the Arras counter stroke. Nevertheless, 
without an ability to prepare quickly for such a battle, and most of all, a timely 
decision to initiate the pre-battle preparation, the effect of a NORTHAG counter 
offensive would not only be significantly diminished, but even the prospect of its 
launch would be bleak. 
8.3.5. CONCLUSION 
The Gulf War was an ideal occasion to test the validity of the reforms. Most of 
all, its timing, which immediately followed the initial completion of the reforms, 
provided an excellent opportunity to reassess the effectiveness of the new 
operational concept and the credibility of the reforms. There are a number of 
differences which prevent a direct comparison between the situation in the Gulf 
68 See McInnes, 1990, pp .146-7, for his opinion. 
69 See Bellamy, 1987, p.26 and p.294. 
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and that in the Central Region. Among them, two key characteristics which 
distinguished the two theatres were the differences in terrain and enemy. Also, 
there was the fact that the Coalition attack was premeditated, which could not 
happen in Europe. Nonetheless, it was a barometer of the credibility of the 
implementation, and the experience testified to the value of key areas which the 
reforms were designed to reinforce. Overall, the British Army's performance 
during the conduct of war was exemplary, sometimes far exceeding the earlier 
expectations and operational aims of the Army. This surprised many, both in the 
British and Coalition Armies. 
Also, the war confirmed by and large a number of shortcomings which 
were discussed throughout the earlier chapters. Judging by the British Army's 
performance during the Gulf War, there is no doubt it would have been able to 
operate effectively in defensive operations with considerable success under the 
new concept. At least, the experience showed that both NORTHAG's 
operational concept and the steps the army group took to implement it were 
conceptually and practically feasible. 
Conversely, the areas of weakness which were identified during the War 
make it doubtful whether it could have sustained more than one major counter 
offensive over the 1GB due to logistics and sustainability problems. In this sense, 
the prospect of NORTHAG successfully launching a large-scale, multiple 
counter offensive as Farndale intended would not have been possible, and the 
operation itself would have been more or less a single attempt. The decision to 
commit a counter offensive, and the necessity for this to be on a sufficiently large 
scale to be effective, would have been a major dilemma for COMNORTHAG. 
Nevertheless, the counter offensive would at least offer a better chance 
of success, and result in a proportionally greater victory, if the vital requirements 
of speed and tactical surprise could be secured, as exemplified by the British 
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success in the Gulf. Most importantly and encouragingly, the British victory was 
a confirmation of the fact that the transition of the British culture and mentality 
had been completed. British officers proved themselves to be flexible and 
creative, as well as proud of their profession. There were a few problems 
identified as a result of the experience, but the victory of 1 (BR) Armoured 
Division demonstrated that the reforms in the British Army were largely 
successful, and, most of all, that the logic behind them was valid. 
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8.4. THE BRITISH ARMY AFTER THE GULF WAR 
8.4.1. 'OPTIONS FOR CHANGE' AND THE FOUNDATION OF THE 
ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE (ACE) RAPID REACTION CORPS 
The government's intention to conduct the 'Options for Change (OFC), review 
was first announced by the Secretary of Defence, Tom King, on 6 February 1990 
in the House of Commons, before its formal promulgation in July 1990. This, 
and a series of cuts in British defence spending that it outlined, were the result of 
the changes in the political scene in Europe since the fall of the Berlin Wall. This 
move followed major shifts not only in the government's, but also in NATO's, 
strategic priorities. The threat of the WP evaporating, and later the break-up of 
the former Soviet Union, meant there was no immediate major external threat to 
the Alliance and that NATO was suddenly faced with the need to adapt to the 
new political realities of the region. This resulted in a full scale revision of the 
government's strategic priorities, and the new goals were officially outlined in 
the 1992 Statement on the Defence Estimates. It identified three main defence 
roles: 1) protection of the UK and dependent territories; 2) the defence of the 
UK and its allies against a major external threat (e.g., defence of continental 
Europe); and 3) a contribution to promoting wider security interests (such as 
operations out-of-area and peacekeeping). 70 
The assumption behind OFC was that, since there was less chance of a 
major war breaking out in western Europe, the Alliance could become less 
70 See Colin McInnes, "The Future of the British Army," DA, Vol. 9, No.2. 
(1993), pp.125-6. 
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reliant on a high level of military readiness due to an increase in warning time. 71 
Thus, the size of the military, particularly the Army, could be reduced to a level 
at which it would be adequate to fight a limited war, or conduct crisis 
management to prevent a major crisis from developing, yet kept sufficiently lean 
to supply a peace-dividend.72 Hence, it was thought that a high-tech, smaller, 
but better-equipped and supported, military would suffice to meet these 
requirements without a major reduction in combat readiness. 73 In fact, it was 
considered as a future investment programme through which such a force, 
utilising enhanced mobility and flexibility to meet the range of defence needs of 
the next century, could be created. 74 
As a result, the main emphasis was placed on the reduction of the 
number of troops, which consequently affected the Army's strength in Germany 
most. 75 The plan was to halve BAOR's strength by mid-1995, reducing the 
number of in-place divisions from three to one. This would leave only 1 (BR) 
Armoured Division, which was to be reinforced by an extra division from Britain 
71 See House of Commons, Tenth Report from the Defence Committee Session 
1989-90: Defence Implications of Recent Events, (1992. London, HMSO), 
para.36. 
72 Interview Julian Miller on 25 March 1993. Also see House of Commons, 
. , 
Tenth Report from the Defence Committee Session 1989-90, para. 108. 
73 See Ian Kemp, "UK Unveils for the 1990s," JDW, (August 3, 1991), p. ~82. 
Also see House of Commons, Tenth Report from the Defence Comnuttee 
Session 1989-90, para, 37. 
74 See David Bolton, "Defence in Transition: Options for Change," RUSIJ, 
Vol. 136, No.3, (Autumn 1991), p.l. 
75 See House of Commons, Background Paper No.276. UK Defence Policy: 
Options for Change, 4 October 1991. (London, HMSO), p. 3. 
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in an emergency, while only the RAF's 2 Group would remain stationed in 
Germany. 76 
Although the need existed for a review of the military, OFC was 
criticised as being driven by the need to reduce expenditure, rather than by 
changes in external circumstances, despite King's insistence to the contrary.77 In 
fact, it was criticised for excluding a proper representation by the military in the 
process, since 'the MoD was overtly influenced by Treasury pressure. t78 Also, a 
House of Commons report argued that the announced cuts went too far, which 
could result in a significant run-down in the strength of the military, and would 
in turn bring about a 'chronic overstretch' of the Army. 79 
Meanwhile, the foundation of ARRC, and the designation of a British 
officer to the leadership of the corps, was announced after the Rome Summit in 
1990, during which NATO's strategic plans were significantly revised. The aim 
of the corps is to achieve a rapid deployment of multi-national forces for crisis 
prevention and control both in NATO and in out-of-area operations.80 It was 
76 House of Commons, UK Defence Policy: Options for Change, pp.3-4. 
77 House of Commons, UK Defence Policy: Options for Change, p.2. 
78 McInnes, 1993, p. 123. 
79 House of Commons, Second Report from the Defence Committee Session 
1989-90: Britain's Army for the 90s: Commitments and Resources, (1993, 
London, HMSO), p.vii and para. 56. 
80 See Ian Kemp, "Putting the Front Line First," JDW, (23 April 1994), p.21; 
and Ministry of Defence, Britain's Army for the 90s~ (July ~99~, London. 
HMSO), Cm. 1595, para. 9-15. Also see Army Doctnne Pubbcatlon (~P): 
Operations, Vol. I., (Pre-publication Edition), 1994, part 3, for the pOSSible 
future roles and operations that could be undertaken by the ARRC. Also see 
McInnes, 1993, p.133. 
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felt that more mobile and flexible forces can be adopted for a variety of 
unforeseen contingencies in the future. 
The foundation of ARRC offered a unique challenge to the Army. The 
main reason why the Army was given the command of ARRC was that it was the 
only force in Europe with enough experience to lead such a large formation; 
being a volunteer Army with a high state of readiness and good equipment, the 
British Army was recognised by many in NATO to be best-suited for the job. 81 
Also, the motive behind the government's pursuit of the leadership, overtaking a 
strong German desire, was the fact that it offered many political advantages 
towards securing British leadership in the European side of the Alliance.82 As a 
result, the British commitment in ARRC has become the Army's major effort. 83 
As a Commons report stated, 'our contribution to the ARRC must continue to be 
on a scale, and of a quality, to justify our continuing leadership of the Corps: a 
position which has not been readily accepted by all our Allies, but which 
guarantees the [UK] a powerful voice within the Alliance. ,84 
Consequently, the Army's contribution to ARRC is significant as Britain 
committed two divisions: 1 (BR) Armoured Division with its three armoured 
brigades (which possesses more than half the combat power of 1 (BR) Corps), 
and 3 (BR) Division, with its two mechanised infantry brigade and 5 Airborne 
81 Interviews, Bagnall on 4 May 1994 and Farndale on 19 May 1994. Bagnall 
also mentioned that the British leadership of the ARRC was strongly supported 
bySACEUR. 
82 See McInnes, 1993, p.133. 
83 See Kemp, op. cit., August 3, 1991, p.182. 
84 House of Commons, Third Report from the Defence Committee Session 
1991-92: Option for Change: Army, (London: HMSO, 1992), para.23. 
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Brigade.85 Also, 24 Airmobile Brigade (three infantry battalions with heavy AT, 
integral logistics and engineering assets plus it own AH regiment), will form a 
part of the four-nation multinational Airmobile Division. 86 
The virtue of ARRC is felt to be in the mobility of its small but high-tech 
forces, which can react quickly to various contingencies (including out-of-area 
and limited operations). This is especially so since its 'reaction force' element is 
designed to be ready 'at relatively short notice to provide an early military 
response to an emerging crisis. ,87 Meanwhile, the main defence and 
augmentation forces (strategic reserves), which are two other main elements of 
the corps, will undertake the more traditional role of defending Europe, although 
these two forces, particularly the latter, will have to find a way to increase their 
mobility as their elements will be stationed in home countries. 88 
8.4.2. THE FUTURE OF THE BRITISH MILITARY DOCTRINE 
The focus of future education and training, and the B~, which provides the 
necessary conceptual and doctrinal framework, must be redesigned to address 
the aforementioned requirements. The adoption of the 1989 B~ already 
focused on these areas in some detail, and the planned publication of the Army 
85 House of Commons, Option for Change: Army, para.23; and Kemp, 23 April 
1993, p.21. 
86 row, 17 August 1991, p.266. 
87 Cm. 1595, para.9. 
88 Cm. 1595, para.9. 
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Doctrinal Publication (ADP) : Operations later in this year will cater for changes 
in the emphases of the Army's future requirements. 89 
The new doctrine provides a link between the BMD, which is a 
document dealing with the conceptual aspects of the Army's operation and 
understanding of the nature of the conflict, and AFM (Army Field Manual), 
which is a tactical document concerning the implementation of doctrine. 
Nonetheless, it is not about procedure, but essentially constitutes a descriptive 
reference, not a prescriptive one. 90 Its main purpose is to achieve changes in 
employing forces to suit the current security environment; therefore, ADP--
Operations pays extra attention to joint and combined operations, as well as 
operations other than a war, an element which is a new addition to the Army's 
operational thinking.91 Also, it covers and provides reference to every level, 
from the military and strategic down to the lower operational level of operations. 
The novel feature of the new document is its emphasis on military 
operations in peacetime, which include peace support (including peace keeping 
and enforcement) and counter -insurgency operations.92 Consequently, the 
doctrine stresses the capability for force projection, joint and combined 
operations, control of the electro-magnetic spectrum, and endurance and 
professional expertise, which it recognises to be intrinsic requirements for such 
89 I was given a pre-publication copy of the ADP-Operations; therefore, I 
cannot make direct quotations from the text since it might change when the new 
doctrine is actually published. 
90 ADP-Operations, p.3. Also see lD. Shaw, "Ex~mining the ~echanisms of 
Change: How Can We Create Manoeuvre Warfare, BAR, (April 1991), p.22; 
and Spartacus, "Simplicity," BAR, (August 1991), p.50, for the concern that the 
next BMD should not become another tactical doctrine. 
91 See ADP-Operations, chapter 7. 
92 See ADP-Operations, 1-4, 7-2 and 7-5 to 6. 
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operations.93 Most interestingly, it actually attempts to define the successes of 
those missions, and rebuilding the peace is given the most prominence. Thus, 
avoiding an unnecessary or inappropriate use of force should be prevented since 
it is vital to gain a psychological advantage. 94 
Also, conspicuous in this document is the conscious use of the same 
operational language and terminology as the US AirLand Battle (e.g. the terms 
'deep', 'close' and 'rear' operations).95 As mentioned, the reforms had achieved 
some doctrinal interoperability with other Allied forces before, but many felt that 
this should be further enhanced and promoted, since it was thought that a future 
battle will demand multinational operations by a number of small contingents. 
This was the case with the Gulf War, and will be more so in the event of possible 
ARRC operations. 96 
Above all, ADP--Operations laid out the spirit of the conduct of a war at 
the operational level more clearly than the 1989 BNID. Also, it is more specific 
than the BMD in explaining campaign planning and operations. It eloquently sets 
out manoeuvre as a component of operational design, not as the primary 
requirement; the aims of the operational level of war are about the destruction of 
the enemy and the attack on the enemy's will, and manoeuvre is a part of 
achieving this operational goal, not a dominant element. 97 
It is clear that the ADP--Operations has finally succeeded in fully 
disclosing the overall aspects of Bagnall's operational thinking by providing a 
93 see ADP-Operations, 1-8 to 9. 
94 See ADP-Operations, 7-7. 
95 See ADP-Operations, 5-9 to 13. 
96 See Dannatt, op. cit., pp.I-2. 
97 See ADP-Operations, 2-2 to 4. Refer to my summary in chapter 4.3. 
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strong conceptual basis to promote more cultural changes in the Army and 
ameliorate command flexibility and creativity, while avoiding becoming just 
another tactical doctrine. Also it provides a useful basis for offering guidance for 
missions other than the defence of Europe. Since a more clear guideline has been 
set out by the new document, it is up to the Army educational establishments to 
transmit it and properly educate its officers to be able to undertake a variety of 
future obligations as identified by the ADP--Operations. 
In this sense, although training in operational level thinking was being 
introduced by the time the Bl\ID was amalgamated, for example, to the Staff 
College, the prominence of the HCSC becomes more important in the pursuit of 
this goal. 98 Thus, there is a need to revise the format and focus of the HCSC 
course to suit these requirements in order to ensure that the Army does not fall 
back to the previous level of cultural and conceptual parochialism, due to its 
diminishing capacity. As Bagnall stressed, the HCSC is the only place which 
could prevent that, and he is sure the course will guard against it happening. 99 
4.4.3. THE IMPACT OF THE CHANGES ON THE REFORMS 
The main focus of the 1980s reforms was on reinforcing the British Army's 
ability to fight a major conventional HIC (High-Intensity Conflict) in Europe 
against the clearly defined enemy--the WP. Although the Army's strong 
aspiration to secure such a capability paid off as it secured a considerable 
capacity to conduct such a war at the end of the 1980s, this posture became ill-
suited to counter contingencies of the present, which have been identified by the 
98 Interview, Bagnall on 4 May 1994. 
99 Interview, Bagnall on 5 May 1993. 
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government and the Alliance. Indeed, there are a number of urgent requirements, 
such as peacekeeping and crisis management duties--as is being vividly 
demonstrated by the civil war in former Yugoslavia, which have dominated the 
Alliance's agenda since the end of the Cold War. As a result, NATO is currently 
striving to secure 'power projection' capability by placing more emphasis on 
flexibility and mobility of forces, as epitomised by the aims and structure of the 
ARRC.100 
Currently, the British Army is under pressure to redefine its role and 
organisation to address the demands created by the changes in threat perception 
and the security environment in Europe. Also, this process has been expedited by 
the sweeping budget cuts which are forcing the Army to make many fundamental 
changes in its infrastructure and organisations without having sufficient time to 
review the impact of those changes on its overall efficiency. Indeed, the Army 
still has many roles in addition to those already identified, as it is still tasked with 
fulfilling a major commitment in NATO as the leader of ARRC, which requires 
maintenance of sufficient heavy conventional forces, as well as carrying out 
duties in Northern Ireland and other overseas possessions. 
Following OFC, the Army faces a severe overstretching of its resources 
in meeting these multiple tasks. 1 0 1 Because of these factors, the Army is 
required to conduct a long-term in-depth review of its immediate, intermediate, 
and long-term goals, through which its future shape and requirements for 
equipment could be determined. Might this lead to a radical restructuring and re-
definition of its traditional roles and modes of conducting warfare? Would the 
100 See Ian Kemp, "Digging in against the Cuts," JDW, (23 April 1994), p.20. 
101 See Ian Kemp, "UK 'Could Not Fight Alone', Says Study," JDW, (Au~st 
17, 1991), p.261; and Defence Committee, Preliminary Lessons of OperatIon 
Granby, para. 12. 
363 
Army be forced to abandon its capability to fight a major HIC in Europe, which 
it so relentlessly strove to acquire through the reforms? 
It is the argument of both current and former senior officers in the Army 
that it will be continuously required, and will need, to prepare for an HIC in 
Europe, if it wants to have the necessary flexibility to counter crises of a 
different kind, including such a contingency as the Gulf War. Hence, contrary to 
the belief that it should no longer invest heavily in the capability to conduct an 
HIC, they feel that the Army still needs to maintain a substantial capacity, 
though to a lesser degree than it did during the Cold War. Failure to do so 
would limit its ability to undertake an operation at the operational level, thus 
creating inflexibility, as well as a further dependency on friendly support to 
conduct an operation of meaningful size in the future. 102 Thus, they argue, the 
hasty rundown of its heavy equipment and formations is dangerous. 1 03 
Most of all, those I interviewed felt that concentrating on fighting LIC 
and peacekeeping would strip the Army of the lessons it has learned so far, and, 
when faced with changes in the nature offuture conflicts that could involve HIC, 
it would be unable to cope effectively. This would, therefore, result in the loss of 
the necessary flexibility, mobility, and creativity, which are all critical 
components for envisaged future conflicts regardless of their extent and 
intensity. 104 Thus, equipping and preparing for HIC is, in fact, to provide both a 
mental and physical basis to transcend the current style of warfare to be more 
effective in the future. In other words, the Army needs to have a solid 
102 See McInnes, 1993, p.129. 
103 Interviews, Bagnall on 6 November 1993, Farndale on 19 May 1994, Inge 
and Kenny. 
104 Interviews, Bagnall on 6 November 1993, Farndale on 19 May 1994 and 
Kenny. 
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framework upon which it can build a more flexible and robust force suited to the 
envisaged future contingencies; requirements for peacekeeping, as well as other 
missions, would be addressed within this setting. 1 05 
In fact, the Army's aspiration to conduct a major conventional war, such 
as the Gulf War if not a major war in Europe, and thus its desire to maintain the 
armoured forces and heavy arms, are vividly displayed by its decision to 
purchase a total of 386 Challenger 2 MBTs.106 Furthermore, it is still 
committed to the continuous introduction of other heavy weapon systems, such 
as AS 90 and MLRS, to its inventory. 107 This is a reflection that the Army still 
sees its primary task as fighting mc, and although the implementation of OFC 
would leave the Army heavy capability severely curtailed, it is reluctant to 
relinquish such a capability. 
Some academics have raised the question of whether the Army should 
continually pursue this heavy capability. McInnes and Sabin have argued that the 
Army's present posture is ill-suited and too costly, and that, in order to maintain 
its efficacy, it needs to pursue some specialisation of its capabilities and pay 
more attention to mobility and rapid reaction capability. 108 Sabin also argued 
that, due to the present and future budget constraints, without a long-term 
review and some specialisation, the Army might be forced to undertake a 'salami 
105 See A.I.G. Pollard, "The Army: Is Less Enough?" RUSIJ, Vol.136, No.3, 
(Autumn 1991), p.21. 
106 The Times, 15 July 1994. 
107 See Cm. 1595, para. 53. 
108 See Philip Sabin, "The Shifting Trade-offs in UK ~efence Planning," in 
Michael Clark and Philip Sabin, ed., British Defence ChOices for the Twenty-
First Century, (London: Brassey's, 1993), pp.171-2 ; and McInnes, 1993, p.I31. 
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slicing' of its capability which would lead to an overall decline of its capacity. 109 
It is argued by some academics that the Army no longer has sufficient funding to 
do everything it wishes, and the current programmes for the reduction of the 
military and the continuous falling of the defence budget indicate the inevitability 
of the Army having to make some hard choices. In order to maintain its potency, 
and avoid 'salami slicing,' Greenwood suggested that the Army should opt for 
some specialisation so as to aid its effort to continuously secure its leadership in 
the ARRC, and what he calls the 'coalition-in-waiting.' 11 0 
Contrary to their views, the Army has chosen new heavy equipment (new 
tanks will cost it 1. 1. billion pounds), and this has set the tone for its role for the 
foreseeable future. 111 It is clear that the Army has chosen the ability to fight a 
mc in some strength over other contingencies for now. This move displayed 
that the Army is resisting any hasty changes of its traditional organisation and, 
most of all, of its heavy forces. Furthermore, the Army is being led by people 
who were at the forefront of the reforms, such as CDS (Field Marshal Inge) and 
CGS of the Army ( General Guthrie), who might find it hard to let go of the 
things they so aspired to achieve. 112 Above all, this move could enhance the 
Army's ability to maintain significant representation in the ARRC, but may 
prejudice its capability to conduct a major conventional operation independently, 
or to cope effectively with peacekeeping and out-of-area operations. 
109 See Sabin, op. cit., in Clark and Sabin, ed., op. cit., p.172. 
110 David Greenwood, "Concentration of Effort and Complementarity," In 
Clark and Sabin, ed., op. cit., pp.193-4. 
III The Times, 15 July 1994. 
112 Interviews, Bagnall on 4 May 1994 and Farndale on 19 May 1994. 
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8.4.4. THE PLACE OF THE REFORMS IN TODA Y'S ARMY 
Although the reforms complicate force planning by bolstering the Army's 
enduring aspiration to keep armoured and other heavy arms, the experience of 
the reforms and the application of operational thinking would offer some 
solutions to the Army to maintain a certain degree of competence to fight a 
conventional mc. A direct comparison between the previous reforms and the 
current situation is impossible, but lessons of the rational use of existing 
resources and the use of force multipliers and technology to allow a significant 
increase in fighting power of the existing forces could offer some insights in the 
Army's current dilemma)13 In particular, this could prove a crucial asset 
preventing an outright 'salami slicing' of major arms and its overall capabilities. 
In fact, the effort to make the Army more flexible and mobile by further 
exploiting operational level thinking and manoeuvre principles is on the way.114 
Also, the benefits of high technology are being further utilised to support this 
objective by enhancing the mobility and firepower of weapons. The number of 
MB Ts in the future armoured regiments will be reduced from 74 (66 in time of 
peace) to 39, which is possible by replacing old Chieftains and Challengers with 
new and more capable Challenger 2 MBTs.115 Along with providing a real-time 
capability to conduct a 24-hour war, a capability which is enhanced by deploying 
new weapon systems, this emphasis on technology and innovative thinking will 
113 See Sabin, op. cit., in Clark and Sabin, ed., op. c~t., p.! 70, for a summary ~f 
the government's dilemma between the desire to obtaIn a ~gh-profile presence m 
the Alliance and the limitation posed by the budget constraInts. 
114 See R.A. Smith, The Nature of Future Warfare, TDRC 10368. 
115 See JDW, 6 August 1994, p.12; and Gander, op. cit., p.23, for details of the 
Armoured Regiment structure. 
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provide the means to substitute for the overall decline in the number of weapon 
systems, in addition to manpower, for some time to come. In this sense, the 
decline of the overall number of heavy units could be acceptable to a certain 
extent as long as it offers a means of creating more mobile firepower (for 
instance, by increased acquisition of MLRS-AT ACMS assets), which could 
generate a similar level of firepower as before. 116 Also, further exploitation of 
force multipliers--better C3I systems and tools to enhance synchronisation, as 
well as digiti sing forces, something which the US Army is already exploring--
would secure yet more flexibility and mobility to cover for the losses. 117 
This would not remedy the problems of providing capability to counter 
the contingencies in out-of areas because of the lack of mobility of those heavy 
formations. 1I8 However, the creation of the ARRC Airmobile Division, which is 
the high-profile element of the corps, and the Army's continuous programme for 
the acquisition of AH and the expansion of airmobility, will offer substantial 
capability to not only counter contingencies in Europe but also in out-of-area 
operations since the unit possesses the necessary mobility and capability. Also, 
this offers a plausible basis for future specialisation if such a need arises. 
In short, the experience of the reforms could be very beneficial In 
supporting the operations of the ARRC because it would provide the necessary 
mental capacity--flexibility and creativity--to ensure versatility of force suited for 
many different situations. Moreover, as long as the deployment of conventional 
forces of some strength in Europe is required, the lessons of the reforms will 
116 See Pollard, op. cit., p.23. 
117 See Barbara Starr, "'Desert Hammer VI' puts US Digitized Army to the 
Test," JDW, (9 April 1994), p.17. 
118 See McInnes, 1993, p.131. 
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continually provide the necessary framework on which the future requirements 
for the defence by the ARRC could be established. This is especially so since the 
commander of the corps is British. 
8.4.5. CONCLUSION 
Although the reforms were a major reason why the Army is left with the 
capability to fight HIC, the spirit of the reforms will remain valuable, as they will 
enable it to cope with cuts without overtly degrading its effectiveness for some 
time. Also, the lessons of the reforms, and the validity of the operational thinking 
and manoeuvre spirit, are the means which could provide a framework within 
which the Army could develop a future operational concept versatile enough to 
meet a variety of missions. It is already playing a major role as it has provided a 
conceptual basis for writing new operational doctrine, ADP--Operations. 
The rundown in the Army's capability has not hampered the currently 
pledged level of commitment to ARRC so far since the effect of the cuts has not 
been fully felt, but it will inevitably limit its ability to fulfil the duties of the 
ARRC and others, resulting in a serious overstretch. Any further decline in the 
defence budget will require a fundamental revision of its overall posture. It is 
hard to foresee whether this change would lead to a a general transformation of 
the whole Army, yet it seems that the Army will probably gradually detach itself 
from emphasising heavy arms in the future and seek some specialisation. This 
seems to be only logical choice if it wants to avoid an inevitable salami-slicing to 
accommodate various requirements. The Army is at a watershed and it has to 
make some difficult, yet crucial, choices. Will this lead to a radical restructuring 
of the Army? How will the Army look in the next century? These are two 




The main aim of this thesis has been, as stated in the Introduction, to conduct a 
comprehensive historical survey of the reforms. Throughout, I have attempted to 
shed new light on the subject by discussing the historical background, identifying 
the contents and context, and discussing a number of important issues and 
debates. Therefore, in this concluding chapter I shall sum up and offer my own 
views regarding the reforms by providing some answers to what I consider to be 
crucial questions in understanding them. 
1. Were the Reasons for Initiating the Reforms Justified and Logical? 
The answer to this question has to be an affirmative one. As discussed in 
chapters two and three, Field Marshal Bagnall's ultimate logic behind the reforms 
was that under forward defence (particularly as it was understood by the 
Germans), if the WP succeeded in a surprise (especially standing start) attack, 
NATO's defence would quickly falter as a large portion of its forces would be 
dislocated and beaten piecemeal by the numerically superior WP. As a result, 
NATO would be forced to opt for nuclear-early-use in the case of war due to the 
lack of its conventional capacity to stop the WP initial onslaught. Otherwise, 
NATO would face the possibility of losing its territory and thus, inevitably, the 
cohesion of the Alliance. Yet, not only could nuclear-early-use bring a number of 
political and strategic ramifications, but it could also effectively nullify any 
cohesive defensive efforts by the Alliance as it would quickly lead to the loss of 
control of the battlefield and, eventually, to an escalation to strategic nuclear 
exchange. Under the circumstances, Bagnall felt that NATO's nuclear deterrence 
was just not credible, and forward defence, especially an over-literal 
interpretation of the strategy, was the major factor undermining deterrence--not 
vice versa--despite a number of political and strategic justifications offered by 
many others. 
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Therefore, Bagnall's reforms, which were among the first tangible 
proposals offered to the Alliance, were aimed at compensating for the loss of 
NATO's strategic credibility and its ability to maintain deterrence by enhancing 
its conventional defence to the level at which its defence would no longer have 
to rely on nuclear early use. It required strengthening NORTHAG's conventional 
fighting-power to a level sufficient to counter and, if necessary, destroy the WP's 
surprise attack from a standing start. Bagnall also felt that, by virtue of preparing 
for this contingency, he would be able to secure an ability to fight whatever 
scenanos might unfold. This was a means of having more flexibility and 
vigilance. 
Above all, this was Bagnall's way of remedying the political and strategic 
problems through offering a purely military innovation to provide the political 
leadership with more choices in managing a crisis with the WP. In the case of 
war, he thought that NATO's strong conventional resistance with the capability 
to pause, and, if necessary, win a conventional war against the WP, would 
persuade the WP to consider an early negotiated settlement since NATO's threat 
of nuclear use would be more credible in that situation. Indeed, demonstrating 
NATO's ability to win the war against the WP would be a positive factor 
dissuading it from initiating a conflict, while the presence of a strong in-theatre 
force would lessen NATO's dependence on mobilisation, which could be an 
instrumental factor in preventing the WP's miscalculation and misunderstanding. 
These requirements and their reasoning demanded drastic changes m 
NORTHAG's conventional posture since there was only a finite amount of 
resources available to effect the changes, and the reforms offered the necessary 
framework and guidance for achieving these goals. 
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2. Did the Reformers have Sufficient Resources to Implement the Reforms? 
It was true that the resources, which were secured through the 1981 defence 
review, as discussed in chapter three, were beneficial for the successful 
implementation of the reforms in the measure to which they were manifested by 
1986, when the adoption of the new army group operational concept was 
officially acknowledged by the Alliance. It also has to be established that , 
without the renewed financial support of the government, the scope of the 
reforms would have been smaller in scale, and extending them to other corps 
would have been troublesome because such an effort would have been criticised 
as a futile attempt to impose British views on them without offering any tangible 
solution to the army group's problems. Meanwhile, the new financial resources 
allowed for the acquisition of new weapon systems and provided more support 
to increase sustainability and training on which the reforms became dependent. 
Particularly, the role of C3I to create an environment for combined and joint 
operations, which was a highlight of the envisaged concept, was critical because 
it was viewed as a major force multiplier facilitating such a series of complex 
operations. In this context, the reforms in NORTHAG were feasible partly due 
to the government's financial support, and the review's main benefit was that it 
allowed the purchase of the weapon systems outlined after the 1974 review and 
theLTDP. 
Conversely, the reforms were originally planned with the resources 
already available to the 1 (BR) Corps, and cooperation with other corps in the 
army group was supposed to be achieved by introducing operational level 
thinking, which could offer a different way of handling the existing resources 
without an increase in their numbers. Therefore, it has to be concluded that the 
impact of the 1981 review could be regarded as starting a synergistic effect 
which accelerated and expanded the speed and scope of the reforms, while it had 
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only a moderate direct influence on their promulgation. This was particularly so 
since the main contribution of the government was not to pursue heavy cuts in 
the Army and RAF strength under the 1981 review. 
Nonetheless, as discussed in chapters seven and eight, the Army 
persistently suffered from a lack of necessary resources to fully implement the 
reforms, and one of the most important reasons for restraining them from 
becoming an instrument of NATO's conventional retaliation and deterrence was 
the diminishing financial budget after the government's abandonment of the 
LTDP in 1985, and the subsequent real cuts in spending. By then, it had been 
decided that the British Army could not jeopardise the introduction of new 
weapon systems; therefore, it had to look for savings by cutting stocks and 
training, which was the only short term option. 
There was no doubt that NORTHAG was able to offer a more prolonged 
conventional resistance than was previously possible, but it would only have 
been sufficient for what Bagnall had initially envisaged during his tenure as 
COMNORTHAG (one major counter offensive against the enemy first echelon, 
and possibly another one with 3 (US) Corps if it were available in time) but no 
more, and certainly not to the level Farndale had hoped for. The lack of 
sustainability meant that NORTHAG might have to avoid an operation which 
could put greater strain on its resources. One of the reasons for its return to the 
original idea, after Famdale, could be traced to this factor, i.e. the realisation of 
the nonexistence of sufficient resources and sustainability. 
In conclusion, drawing on the findings, I have to supply a mixed answer 
to question 2. While there were some benefits in the 1981 review, it was the 
Army which had made the reforms possible through numerous efforts at 
rationalisation and redeployment of forces, since the amount of new financial 
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resources made available was not sufficient to support the reforms to their fullest 
extent. 
3. Did the Adoption of Operational Thinking and the LandI Air Battle 
Doctrine Provide the Necessary Conceptual and Pragmatic Framework 
around which the British Army Could Build the Reforms? 
Although the process had required a long digestion period, as the new army 
group SOP was only adopted in 1988 and the first BMD written in 1989, the 
reformers consciously endeavoured to instil operational level thinking in the 
British Army from the onset of the reforms. This was a particularly crucial task 
since a whole new concept had to be introduced to an Army which did not have 
traditional experience in utilising operational thinking. 
As discussed in chapters four and eight, although there was a persistent 
lack of full comprehension of operational thinking by people in both the British 
and other armies (since many mis- and over-interpreted it as either having a set 
of rules or involving unrestrained freedom of action), they have since been 
gradually conforming to the true ethos of operational level thinking. Above all, it 
was easier to provide a pragmatic framework by constructing a military doctrine 
such as the Bl\ID, but it seems that understanding the conceptual and more 
abstract aspects of the operational thinking would require longer time for full 
acceptance by the military. As Bagnall repeatedly insisted, it is not about having 
a set of rules but about a state of mind and fostering a different mentality, in 
order to nurture a more positive feeling and confidence in what one is doing and 
one's capability. The production of the ADP--Operations indicates that the Army 
has developed a broader and greater understanding of the operational level and 
has begun to address itself more to the abstract elements of the concept. 
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In fact, one of the most important reasons for initiating the reforms was 
the need to reinterpret forward defence so as to enable NORTHAG to exercise 
more flexibility and elasticity in its defence. Previously, there was a lack of 
economy of force at theatre level, which made NATO's defence very rigid. This 
problem was further aggravated by its relatively small size and weak fighting 
power compared to the CENTAG and WP forces. Consequently, operational 
level thinking was intended to allow the redeployment of the NOR TRAG forces 
to undertake a more elastic defence based on the principles of mobile defence 
and manoeuvre warfare. The ultimate aim was to achieve economy and 
concentration of forces simultaneously by gaining more operational flexibility, 
which would be vital if a small army were to fight a larger one. In short, the main 
focus of Bagnall's operational thinking involved avoiding waste of valuable 
resources and duplication of efforts to create the operational reserve, and this 
was to become possible by promoting more flexibility and creativity. These 
principles were ultimately extended to the 2AT AF because the main reason 
underlying the adoption of the Landi Air Battle doctrine shared exactly the same 
logical background as the land forces' concept. In this sense, it was a fitting 
manifestation of the ethos of Bagnall's operational thinking. 
Above all, the impact of operational thinking in the British Army and 
NORTHAG had been instrumental in fostering a new-found confidence and 
boldness which were reflected in the expansion of the reforms. Particularly, the 
greater capacity for the cross-border counter offensive, and the ability to 
successfully execute REFORGER 87, demonstrated that the army group had 
achieved a major transformation of its posture and mentality as a result of 
embracing operational thinking. In this sense, it was one of the most incisive 
highlights of the reforms, which did really matter in the defence ofNORTHAG. 
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4. Were Counter Stroke and Counter Offensive Possible? 
Regardless of Bagnall's and others' insistence, an objective answer to this 
question can only be found in history. As discussed in chapters four and eight, 
there were many instances during which defenders were able to launch 
successful counter offensives which brought them disproportionate victories. 
Also, there were occasions when such an operation failed to return favourable 
results to the defenders. This past experience suggests that such operations must 
meet a number of operational imperatives to be successful. These were: 
maintenance of strong reserves and air superiority, generation of sufficient fire 
support and mobility, superior (flexible and creative) command performance, 
good training and sustainability, securing surprise, and most of all, setting an 
attainable aim. 
The capability of the British Army to execute a complex and daring 
mobile operation was auspiciously demonstrated during the Gulf War, and based 
on this fact, there is a strong chance that NORTHAG would have been able to 
meet these requirements. If that were the case, and the people I have interviewed 
insisted on the point, NORTHAG's local counter stroke operations could be a 
feasible option, as at Arras in 1940 or the German counter operation on the 
Eastern front during World War Two. This was especially so since the execution 
of violent tactical mobile battles of a relatively short duration in local areas 
would put less pressure on the resources available than larger counter offensives. 
Particularly, the superior training, skill, and command flexibility of the 
NORTHAG forces, as compared to their WP counterparts, were major factors 
supporting this conclusion. 
Meanwhile, it would have been more dangerous and daunting for the 
army group counter offensive to achieve victory due to the sheer scale involved. 
There was also a number of crucial factors which made this a more dangerous 
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option than the tactical level operation. Most of all, the size of force involved 
and the length of operation both in time and space were much greater. Because 
of these two determinants, it would have been extremely difficult to satisfy the 
aforementioned prerequisites throughout the operation. Therefore, it would have 
involved a lot of uncertainty, something which could not be risked unless the 
attainment of its operational objective was absolutely essential for the defence of 
NATO. In fact, Bagnall's concept of the army group counter offensive would 
have been, although to a much lesser extent than Famdale's, a calculated gamble, 
something closer to the desperate German counter offensive in the Ardennes in 
1944, which could have been attempted only if Bagnall had had a chance to 
secure the necessary requirements. 
The success of the counter offensive would have depended critically on 
the timing and goal of the operation. It was evident that common wisdom 
preferred the operation at the early stage of the conflict because of many 
operational advantages, while there was no clear consensus for its scope and 
objective, especially in the case of Famdale's concept. As mentioned, the main 
target would have been the enemy's centre of gravity, but waiting for it to reveal 
itself would have postponed the operation significantly, while attacking without 
knowing it would have endangered the operation itself. Furthermore, unless 
there had been a clear notion of the purpose of the operation, the planners could 
have over-extended its aim (as the Germans did in 1944), which could have 
resulted in a major operational defeat. Despite the assurance that NORTHAG 
would manage to find the enemy centre of gravity in time for an early counter 
offensive (and Bagnall's counter offensive during CPX-83 supported such a 
claim), there was no guarantee that the army group would have been able to 
clearly identify its objective. 
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In short, while the tactical level operation had a strong chance of being 
successful, the operational level operation was a very dangerous gamble. 
Nonetheless, as the people I interviewed have repeatedly emphasised, the army 
group was committed to launching at least one major counter offensive at the 
time despite the dangers involved. This was because it was the only plausible 
way of buying a few more crucial days without compromising territory, 
especially under the surprise attack scenario, during which NATO could attempt 
to convince the WP of the futility of continuing the conflict under the threat of 
escalation to nuclear conflict. It is clear from the discussions in previous chapters 
that the leaders of the British and some of the NORTHAG Armies belonged to 
the school which thought a short-violent offensive was better than a prolonged 
conflict under the threat of nuclear devastation; it could offer the chance of a 
negotiated settlement since its success would undoubtedly bring a pause for 
some time. As the experience of the German counter offensive in 1944 showed, 
even a failed operation of this kind was able to retard the Allies offensive for six-
weeks. Such a gamble in Europe in the 1980s could have brought about more 
favourable results because of the existence of nuclear weapons. Such a pause, 
backed up by a blunt threat of nuclear retaliation, would have been a very strong 
tool in convincing the WP to seriously reconsider continuing with its renewed 
onslaught. In this sense, the gamble would have been worth taking. 
5. Was Personality Both the Most Important Factor behind the 
Formulation of the Reforms and the Main Focus of the Debates and 
Disputes? 
As discussed throughout the chapters, it can be concluded that personality was a 
major element in the formulation and implementation of the reforms, as well as a 
source of disputes, more so than any other political and strategic imperative. 
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Particularly, as concerns the nature of the development, which was shielded from 
both immediate public and political scrutiny, it is clear that the feasibility of 
accepting the changes depended heavily upon the personal perceptions of the 
military leaders, and became a testing ground for projecting their own 
contemporary beliefs. 
Although some changes were inevitable, it is true that the reforms would 
not have happened without Bagnall and his subordinates' enthusiastic support. 
Equally, Bagnall's unorthodox approach--for example, in establishing the TDC--
was an ingenious method which expedited the process of implementing them 
while avoiding the build-up of opposition. Nonetheless, Bagnall's overpowering 
personality, and the risky methods he used, could have been a destablising 
element in the relationship among the Allies. Also, it offended some people in 
the British military establishment as they considered his approach unacceptable 
to the military hierarchy. 
Only in retrospect can one recogmse that such an approach was 
successful due to the urgency involved in introducing the reforms, and that the 
risk was ultimately justified. This is particularly relevant concerning the disputes 
Bagnall had with Chalupa. It is clear now that the earlier German opposition was 
not concerted, but stemmed primarily from Chalupa since the disputes quickly 
disappeared once he left his post. However, if this change had not occurred, the 
result could have been vastly different from what we see today. 
It was fortunate that taking risks paid off in the end. However, it is quite 
clear from the investigation that the dispute could have become a major threat to 
the cohesion of the Alliance, potentially igniting even political disputes if it were 
perpetuated. In particular, Chalupa's intention to overrule Bagnall using his 
seniority could have sparked a major political split between the governments. It 
was only a stroke of luck that Von Sandrart shared a similar line of thought with 
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Bagnall, and he was willing to arbitrate the disputes between Bagnall and 
Chalupa during Chalupa's tenure as CINCENT. It showed how personal, and 
even national, differences can be transcended when the major protagonists hold 
similar views and mutual respect, and hence are able to forge strong 
cooperation. The reforms and the debates surrounding their implementation 
were, therefore, as much products of personality as of circumstance. 
6. Was the Attainment of the Conventional Deterrence Element Desirable? 
This question concerns the expansion of the reforms by F arndale, and eventually 
(to a certain extent) the inevitable surfacing of a desire to give more emphasis to 
conventional retaliation and deterrence as more capabilities were becoming 
available. Ideas revolved around the fact that adding the capacity to punish the 
enemy conventionally, in addition to the existing punishment capability provided 
by nuclear weapons, would further enhance the ability to maintain deterrence. 
Also, this reflected the fact that punishment could be inflicted using conventional 
forces only, which could result in taking tokens in the form of territory in eastern 
Europe. There was also an element, especially among the Germans, which 
indicated that this ability could offer a chance to liberate the lost territories in the 
east, and this was what the Germans were desirous of doing if forced into a war 
with the WP. 
Nevertheless, having such a capability was neither feasible nor desirable. 
First of all, the sheer scale of the operation would make it very difficult to 
support, not only in terms of the logistics penalty and sustainability problem, but 
also in terms of the impediments involved in the movement of such a large-scale 
force over such a distance, while providing the necessary fire and air support 
would also have been difficult. Also, the force density in the theatre would be 
considerably higher during Farndale's time compared to Bagnall's. This would 
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make the movement of a large counter offensive force, and thus its speedy 
committal, virtually impossible. These factors prohibited the launch of such an 
operation in reality. Secondly, the political ramifications of such a concept, 
especially if it became a declaratory concept of NATO, would have provoked 
the WP into devising countermeasures and could have resulted in a stepping-up 
of the arms race between the two blocs, causing a further deterioration in their 
relationship. Thirdly, it would have provided the WP with a propaganda coup, 
especially over the German desire for reunification, as evidence that NATO was 
an expansion-seeking Alliance, not a defensive one, thus causing a major split in 
the Allies' cohesion with members who found this unacceptable. 
What was required, as well as the core ethos of the reforms, was to have 
the ability to counter various and unforeseen contingencies in the case of war. In 
fact, the origins of considering the possible cross-1GB operation lay in a purely 
military logic, a requirement of fulfilling operational aims. The reason behind the 
sudden upsurge of a desire for conventional retaliation and deterrence was based 
on an incremental expansion of the reforms; once the ability for successful 
defence was attained, it was only natural to consider other options. The inherent 
problem of this idea, however, was the fact that it was a deviation from the 
original aims of the reforms, and was planned on nonexistent resources and 
capabilities. 
Those behind the exploration of this idea cannot be blamed for their 
boldness; in fact, they have to be praised for their confidence and diligence in 
expanding NATO's horizons. Nonetheless, theirs were not realistic options, and, 
as the ultimate settling of the reforms showed, the ideal capability and 
operational aims ofNORTHAG were to secure a sufficient ability to deter, and, 
if necessary, to meet and stop the WP onslaught as near to the 1GB as possible 
without losing its territory. This was best served if only conventional means were 
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applied in the process, and this was what was hoped and expected of the 
military. 
In retrospect, the major benefit of exploring such ideas, and of 
REFORGER 87, was achieving a psychological victory, without actually fighting 
a war, by displaying such capability. In fact, what could have become a major 
source of political dispute between NATO and the WP, unintentionally became a 
factor reinforcing NATO's stance against the WP, hence strengthening 
deterrence by impressing the WP without arousing suspicion of it being a 
practice for an offensive war. 
7. Are the Lessons of the Reforms Relevant Today? 
In a practical sense, the lessons of the reforms are not as relevant today as they 
might have been. The aims of the reforms were focused on fortifying the Army's 
conventional war-fighting capability in a major mc in Europe, but no real 
necessity for this exists in the foreseeable future, while there are more pressing 
needs for the Army, such as supporting out-of-area peacekeeping missions. 
Along with the recent cuts, which have targeted a reduction of overall aspects of 
its capacity, including manpower, equipment, and sustainabilty, any action which 
is intended to reinforce its conventional capability at the moment seems to be 
redundant and unwarranted. This will seriously undermine the Army's capability 
to fight a major conventional war, but it seems that it has no alternative but to 
make some painful choices to incorporate the current projected cuts. Although 
the Army is still sceptical about the reduction of its heavy arms (armour and 
artillery), there has to be a trade-off in order to finance other formations and 
structures, for instance more mobile and lighter elements with a rapid reaction 
capability, which are more suited to the currently outlined missions. Despite the 
fact that its leadership in the ARRC would require it to continuously maintain 
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some heavy elements in Germany, it seems inevitable that the Army has to 
conform to the changes in its environment. 
Therefore, the primary relevance of the lessons of the reforms in the 
post-Cold War era is the fact that, although they can no longer provide the basis 
for the operation by large heavy formations in a major contingency, their spirit, 
which promoted ways of doing more with less and fostered more flexibility and 
creativity in mind, would play a crucial role in maintaining the efficacy and 
prowess of the future Army. Equally, the operational thinking and use of 
manoeuvre principles would enable smaller British forces to be effective in their 
operations in various theatres regardless of the nature of their formations and 
character. 
8. How Successful were the Reforms and What were their Main Benefits? 
The answer to the first part of this question is that, despite some difficulties 
surfacing during the implementation of the reforms, they were largely successful, 
especially in fostering flexibility and creativity in the armed forces--the 
overriding ethos of the reforms. They not only encompassed the physical 
character of the forces, but were also extended to everything necessary in the 
conduct of the armed forces' businesses throughout the hierarchy. The adoption 
of the operational concept, and the very idea of embracing operational art, in the 
Army has been, more than anything, the attainment of this transition of thought, 
enabling individual officers to cultivate independent judgement and decision-
making skills. The Gulf War experience was a very important occasion which 
largely validated this approach as the capability to put the lessons into practice 
was successfully demonstrated throughout the command, as well as in the use of 
weapon systems and support. Most of all, flexibility allowed the maintenance of 
tempo and speed of operation by each formation even when ordered to change 
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its direction and objectives. This was why 1 (BR) Armoured Division was able 
to undertake missions other than those it was originally allocated. Indeed, the 
reforms had a major impact on the British Army's outlook, as it has been 
transformed from a passive and largely static institution to one that is active and 
confident. It is up to the Army to carry these successes into the next millennium. 
All in all, the main benefits of the reforms could be identified as two-fold. 
Firstly, the reforms achieved their goal of raising the nuclear threshold and 
reinforcing deterrence through providing the ability to maintain the status quo by 
destroying enemy forces with conventional means alone. This was a capability 
which did not exist earlier. The focal point was to secure maximum capability to 
offer the leadership more options at the critical time~ the reforms achieved 
exactly that. This was one of the reasons why the debates were limited, and 
when they did break out, they usually revolved around the approach to fighting a 
war. 
Secondly, they were instrumental in reinforcing the government's stance 
and leadership among the European Allies by proving the credibility of Britain's 
commitment to Europe in general. The reforms demonstrated that Britain had 
both the capability and resolution to carry out a series of complex changes even 
in a time of financial difficulties, and its aspiration to maintain a leading role in 
NATO was, in fact, a positive element which strengthened NATO's ability to 
maintain deterrence. It has to be said that the government was fortunate to have 
achieved such a result despite abandoning its much-needed financial support to 
the Army in the mid-1980s, but it nevertheless played a significant role in 
providing the initial impetus by giving the reforms a chance to become what they 
were in the end. 
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* * * 
This thesis has endeavoured to fill the gap in the existing literature and sources 
and shed light on hitherto unknown information by discussing the various 
elements involved in the formulation and implementation of the reforms. It has 
been a study of a turbulent era when the British Army had to make difficult 
choices, and take chances, to fulfil the task it was given, that is the maintenance 
of deterrence in Europe, in the face of diminishing resources. Against this 
daunting background, the reformers were forced to find an alternative, and their 
prudence and relentless pursuit of the changes did in the end enable the British 
Army and NORTHAG to fulfil their duty of defending, and preventing a war in, 
Europe. What this thesis has shown is that the reforms were, in fact, the most 
significant development in British Army thinking since the end of the Second 
World War, and as a result of the reforms, the Army was transformed into one 
of the most effective forces in the Alliance, while fundamentally altering its 
outlook and tradition in warfare. Above all, they significantly reinforced 
NORTHAG's ability to counter a WP surprise attack, and if it had been required, 
the army group had a very strong chance of checking the progress of a WP 
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